Rational Acceptance Research Articles

How to be indifferent

AbstractAccording to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists.

Positive Body Image and Psychological Wellbeing among Women and Men: The Mediating Role of Body Image Coping Strategies.

This study aimed to examine the mediating role of body image coping strategies in the relationship between positive body image and wellbeing. Three hundred and seventy-two women and three hundred and seventy-seven men completed a questionnaire assessing body appreciation, body appreciation functionality, body compassion, body image coping strategies (appearance fixing, avoidance, positive rational acceptance), self-acceptance and overall psychological wellbeing. Path analysis showed that avoidance significantly mediated the relationship between body appreciation and overall psychological wellbeing among both women and men; its mediating role was confirmed for men's but not for women's self-acceptance. Positive rational acceptance was a significant mediator of the relationship between body compassion and both psychological wellbeing and self-acceptance among men but not among women. These findings show that higher body appreciation is associated with a lower tendency to avoid appearance-related cognitions or thoughts that are interpreted as threatening, with an indirect effect on women's and men's psychological wellbeing. Analogously, but only for men, body compassion is associated with mental activities and self-care behaviors that foster rational self-talk and the acceptance of one's experiences, which, in turn, are linked to higher wellbeing. These findings can help to plan programs aimed at fostering individuals' wellbeing by focusing on their positive body image considering gender differences.

A liar-like paradox for rational reflection principles

Abstract This article shows that there is a liar-like paradox that arises for rational credence that relies only on very weak logical and credal principles. The paradox depends on a weak rational reflection principle, logical principles governing conjunction and principles governing the relationship between rational credence and proof. To respond to this paradox, we must either reject even very weak rational reflection principles or reject some highly plausible logical or credal principle.

Body image impact on quality of life and adolescents’ binge eating: the indirect role of body image coping strategies

PurposeThe role of body image in adolescent binge eating is widely confirmed, albeit the various facets of this relationship are still mostly unexplored. Within the multidimensional body image framework, this study hypothesized the indirect effects of three body image coping strategies (positive rational acceptance, appearance fixing, avoidance) in the expected relationship between the perceived impact of body image on individuals’ quality of life and binge eating symptoms.MethodsParticipants were 715 adolescents aged 15–21 years (49.1% girls) recruited in Italian schools. An anonymous self-report online survey was administered. A multiple mediation model was tested.ResultsA more positive perceived impact of body image on quality of life was a negative predictor of adolescents’ binge eating, controlling for individual levels of body satisfaction. Three indirect effects were found in this relationship: on one hand, the positive body image impact reduced binge eating via increasing positive rational acceptance (M1), and via reducing avoidance (M2); on the contrary, the positive body image impact also enhanced binge eating via increasing appearance fixing (M3).ConclusionsThe body image impact on quality of life can be alternatively protective—when adaptive coping is solicited, and maladaptive strategies are reduced—or a risk factor, which may increase binge eating by soliciting appearance fixing.Level IIIEvidence obtained from cohort or case–control analytic studies.

Can we combine practical and epistemic reason?

AbstractThis paper offers a theory of how epistemic and practical reasons for belief can be combined into all‐things‐considered reason. Unlike alternative theories, it does not involve any sharp cut‐offs or lexical priorities among types of reason. The theory allows that the relative strengths of the practical and epistemic reasons matter, as does the distance between the epistemically rational credence and the practically rational credence. Although there are important differences between the structure of epistemic and practical reason, they can still be combined in a satisfactory way. The central idea is that epistemic reason determines an epistemically rational doxastic state, and practical reason can push it around.

Learning from experience and conditionalization

Bayesianism can be characterized as the following twofold position: (i) rational credences obey the probability calculus; (ii) rational learning, i.e., the updating of credences, is regulated by some form of conditionalization. While the formal aspect of various forms of conditionalization has been explored in detail, the philosophical application to learning from experience is still deeply problematic. Some philosophers have proposed to revise the epistemology of perception; others have provided new formal accounts of conditionalization that are more in line with how we learn from perceptual experience. The current investigation argues that Bayesian epistemology is still incomplete; the epistemology of perception and the epistemology of rational reasoning have not been reconciled.

Knowledge and acceptance

In a recent paper, Jie Gao (Synthese 194:1901–17, 2017) has argued that there are acceptance-based counterexamples to the knowledge norm for practical reasoning (KPR). KPR tells us that we may only rely on known propositions in practical reasoning, yet there are cases of practical reasoning in which we seem to permissibly rely on merely accepted propositions, which fail to constitute knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that such cases pose no threat to a more broadly conceived knowledge-based view of practical reasoning. I will first motivate the view that rational acceptance depends on a knowledge-based condition being met. I will then show how KPR can be amended—yielding what I call KPR+—to include this condition. I will argue that KPR+ not only avoids Gao’s counterexample, but harbours additional explanatory power by providing an account of the normative role of acceptance in practical reasoning. Finally, I will defend KPR+ against objections by employing theoretical tools that are readily available to those sympathetic to knowledge-based views.

A feeling difficult to identify: Alexithymia is inversely associated with positive body image in adults from the United Kingdom

BackgroundResearch has increasingly examined the ways in which internal bodily experiences influence body image, including the relationship between alexithymia – the reduced ability to identify and describe one's own emotional feelings and bodily sensations – and negative body image. However, relationships between facets of alexithymia and positive body image remain unexplored. MethodsTo bridge this gap in the literature, we assessed relationships between facets of alexithymia and multiple, core indices of positive body image in an online sample of adults from the United Kingdom. A total of 395 participants (226 women, 169 men) aged 18 to 84 years completed measures of alexithymia, body appreciation, functionality appreciation, body image flexibility, body acceptance by others, and positive rational acceptance. ResultsOnce the effects of age had been accounted for, alexithymia was significantly and negatively associated with all five body image constructs in hierarchical multiple regressions. In the final models, the alexithymia facet of Difficulties Identifying Feeling emerged as a significant and negative predictor of all indices of positive body image. LimitationsThe use of cross-sectional data limits the causal conclusions that can be drawn. ConclusionsThese findings extend previous work by demonstrating the unique relationship between alexithymia and positive body image, providing important implications for body image research and practice.

On proper presupposition

AbstractThis paper investigates the norm of presupposition, as one pervasive type of indirect speech act. It argues against the view that sees presuppositions as an indirect counterpart of the direct speech act of assertion and proposes instead that they are much more similar to the direct speech act of assumption. More concretely, it suggests that the norm that governs presuppositions is not an epistemic or doxastic attitude such as knowledge, justified belief, or mere belief; it's a practical attitude, most plausibly the attitude of rational acceptance. This view has important ramifications well beyond debates in philosophy of language and linguistics. It affects not only our view of which speech act sequences are fine and which are off; it bears on whether presuppositions can function as testimony, whether they can be lies, and whether they are ontologically committal, thus addressing central topics in epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics.

Evidential Probabilities and Credences

Abstract Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism.

Rule Utilitarianism and Rational Acceptance

Rule Utilitarianism and Rational Acceptance

Existential Bias

AbstractTo ascertain the rational credences for the epistemic agents in the famous cases of self-locating belief, one should model the processes by which those agents acquire their evidence. This approach, taken by Darren Bradley (Phil. Review 121, 149–177) and Joseph Halpern (Ergo 2, 195–206), is immensely reasonable. Nevertheless, the work of those authors makes it seem as if this approach must lead to such conclusions as the Doomsday argument being correct, and that Sleeping Beauty should be a halfer. I argue that this is due to an implicit existential bias: it is assumed that the first step in those processes is the determination that the agent in question must necessarily exist. It is much more reasonable to model that determination as contingent and a result of other, earlier, steps in the process. This paper offers such alternative models. They imply an endorsement of what has mockingly been called “presumptuous” reasoning, and a massive shift of credences in favor of (1) the existence of a multiverse and (2) the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Paradigms and the Principle of Internalism: An Analysis of the Concept of Rational Acceptability

The article is devoted to the consideration of the relationship of T. Kuhn (and his followers) with representatives of the school of internal realism. Theses of the article: Kuhn’s teaching does not contain an unambiguous understanding of the basis on which ideas within the paradigm are acceptable to a scientist; post-Kuhn discussions in the field of epistemology of scientific knowledge acquire not historical, but “human” character; they are conducted around the concept of “rational acceptability”; theoretical positions as epistemological anarchism, similarly, internalism can equally be deduced from Kuhn’s teaching; the essentialist program of internal realists is excessively focused on criticizing the relativistic consequences of the doctrine of the paradigm; the revealed contradictions of Kuhn’s relativistic and internalist receptions prompt rejection of both these receptions. It is shown that Kuhn’s theory initially disposes to its transformation into a more consistent one in two ways: either due to radical antirealism, or due to an internalist approach, when its own epistemology is built within the framework of the paradigm with a mandatory definition of what is considered real and objective. Rational acceptability regulates the “value” aspect, i.e. preference for a certain theoretical model. Conclusions of the study: in internalism, the idea of the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge is not lost; rational acceptability in internalism plays a restraining role in relation to the individual wills of scientists, acting as a collective form of intentionality that precedes any private scientific research with epistemological prerequisites; the criterion of rational acceptability is conservative, since it allows us to restrain the tendency of any language to lock itself in its own context; rational acceptability in internalism successfully balances between dogmatism and skepticism; the realistic and rational nature of the concept of “acceptability” allows us to reject the relativistic thesis about the closeness of science within a particular paradigm and assume that there is always “not-paradigmatic” component, rooted in the philosophical understanding of science.

Aceitabilidade e consumo: um estudo sobre a percepção das raçoes operacionais do Exército Brasileiro no ambiente operacional de selva

Acceptability and consumption of operational rations are objects of study in several world armed forces due to the frequent history of underconsumption. In this scope, this article sought to identify, in an unprecedented way, the perception of military personnel about the menus in the operational environment of the jungle, a strategic region for national defense, by associating data obtained with an electronic questionnaire and a qualitative instrument of focus groups. The results showed the perception of high technology, but showed opportunities for improvement in terms of monotony, nutritional profile, and well-being in consumption. The focus groups emphasized demands for nutritional adaptations and increased menu variety. It was observed that a fraction of the menus presents consumption lower than 75% of the volume offered, indicating the need for reformulations, aiming to mitigate underconsumption and impacts on operability. Therefore, complementary studies are suggested, providing opportunities for the development of products that are more adapted to the strategic environment of the jungle.

Accuracy and infinity: a dilemma for subjective Bayesians

We argue that subjective Bayesians face a dilemma: they must offend against the spirit of their permissivism about rational credence or reject the principle that one should avoid accuracy dominance.

Assertion is weak

Recent work has argued that belief is weak: the level of rational credence required for belief is relatively low. That literature has  contrasted belief with assertion, arguing that the latter requires an epistemic state much stronger than (weak) belief---perhaps knowledge or even certainty.  We argue that this is wrong: assertion is just as weak as belief.  We first present a variety of new arguments for this, and then show that the standard arguments for stronger norms are not convincing.  Finally, we sketch an alternative picture on which the fundamental norm of assertion is to say what you believe, but both belief and assertion are weak. To help make sense of this, we propose that both belief and assertion involve navigating a tradeoff between accuracy and informativity, and so it can makes sense to believe/say something you only have weak evidence for, if it is informative enough.

Knowledge-Action Principles and Threshold-Impurism

Impurism says that practical factors encroach on knowledge. An important version of impurism is called ‘Threshold-Impurism,’ which says that practical factors encroach on the threshold that rational credence must pass in order for one to have knowledge. A prominent kind of argument for Threshold-Impurism is the so-called ‘principle-based argument,’ which relies on a principle of fallibilism and a knowledge-action principle. This paper offers a new challenge against Threshold-Impurism. I attempt to show that the two principles Threshold-Impurists are committed to—KJ and Fallibilism—are jointly in tension with a widely-held principle of credence that’s called ‘Truth-Directedness,’ in the sense that the former two principles cannot both apply to those who know the third. This tension constitutes a serious challenge to Threshold-Impurists, because it leaves them two options, both of which are undesirable: denying Truth-Directedness, or accepting Truth-Directedness and accepting that whether KJ and Fallibilism apply to a person depends on whether she knows Truth-Directedness.

Effects of social skills training on some adaptive-compensatory parameters in patients with paranoid schizophrenia

This paper examines the psychological aspects of adaptive-compensatory psychological mechanisms in patients with paranoid schizophrenia before and after social skills training. The features of self-regulation of behavior, the level of subjective control, life orientations and subjective perception of psychological characteristics of time are studied. The effects of social skills training were compared with a control group of patients who received only isolated drug therapy with psychotropic drugs. Positive dynamics was noted in both studied samples.The patients who took part in the study improved their ability to control impulses, increased behavioral flexibility, awareness of their contribution to the current situation and rational acceptance of responsibility for what is happening. Life goals also took shape better, the sense of manageability of life and satisfaction with it increased. The present has become perceived by patients with paranoid schizophrenia as more structured, saturated and predictable, and the past as realistic and tangible, which has a positive effect, including on the emotional background of patients. The effects of the training were clearly manifested when compared with a group of patients receiving only drug therapy. With combined treatment (social skills training and psychopharmacotherapy), patients begin to perceive the past more realistically, assess their actions and activity level more soberly, integration, awareness and structuring of past experience increases. This will allow patients with paranoid schizophrenia to facilitate the planning of their behavior in the future, as well as to increase the adequacy of the formation of cause-and-effect relationships and perception of what is happening, which has a beneficial effect on the ability to adapt to life in society and compensate for existing violations.

Ethical Challenges and Implications of Deactivating Mechanical Circulatory Support for Patients With Preserved Cognitive Function.

Ethical Challenges and Implications of Deactivating Mechanical Circulatory Support for Patients With Preserved Cognitive Function.

Nonclassical Probability, Convex Hulls, and Dutch Books

AbstractWe report a solution to an open problem regarding the axiomatization of the convex hull of a type of nonclassical evaluations. We then investigate the meaning of this result for the larger context of the relation between rational credence functions and nonclassical probability. We claim that the notions of bets and Dutch Books typically employed in formal epistemology are of doubtful use outside the realm of classical logic, eventually proposing two novel ways of understanding Dutch Books in nonclassical settings.