Rate Control Game Research Articles

Utility-based joint Power and Rate Control Game with Interference Threshold Elasticity for Cooperative Cognitive Networks

In cognitive networks, the cognitive radio users can share spectrum resource with the primary user while ensuring the normal communication of primary user. In addition, next generation wireless systems needs to provide flexible transmission rate to each terminal. In this paper, a utility-based game-theoretic model is proposed to study the joint power and rate control problem in spectrum underlay fashion in cognitive networks. We adopt a novel utility function based on cognitive network which focuses on social optimal resource allocation through pricing. Further, we show an interference threshold elasticity perspective, which is the key for primary network to maximize its utility by increasing its transmitted power to adjust the tolerable interference constraint. And also, the cognitive network can increase its total throughput capacity. In Stackelberg game, the primary user and the cognitive radio users interact with each other by adjusting their own actions. The cooperative cognitive networks model follows the “best-effort” principle as well as the win-win perspective of primary-cognitive user. Numerical simulations are conducted to demonstrate the performance of the model. The results show that the PU network can get more profit and also the CRU network can increase its total throughput capacity by the adjustment of the interference threshold.

A Game Theoretic Framework of Distributed Power and Rate Control in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

We present a game-theoretic study on the power and rate control problem in IEEE 802.11 WLANs where network participants choose appropriate transmission power and data rate to achieve maximum throughput with minimum energy consumption. In such game-theoretic study, the central issues are the existence, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE), the convergence to the NE and the system performance at the NE. We conduct our study for three specific games: the fixed-rate power control game G <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">NPC</sub> , the fixed-power rate control game G <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">NRC</sub> and the joint power rate control game G <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">NJPRC</sub> . As main contributions, we establish the existence, uniqueness and convergence of the NE for the three games. In G <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">NRC</sub> where the NE is inefficient, we provide pricing scheme to improve the efficiency. Based on our analysis on G <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">NJPRC</sub> , we propose the joint power and rate control procedure to approach the NE which is proven to be social optimal. The procedure is distributed and simple to incorporate into the existing IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol.