Radiological Accident Research Articles

Radioecological investigations in Brazilian tropical plants

The accumulation and long term behavior of radiocesium in chili pepper trees (Capsicum fructescens) were studied. The trees to be analyzed had been cultivated at one of the sites where the Goiânia radiological accident occurred and one of them transplanted to another site with uncontaminated soil. The aim of this paper is to examine the decline of 137Cs as function of time and verify how this radionuclide and 40K were distributed throughout this tropical plant in natural environmental conditions.

Radiological Dispersion Devices: are we prepared?

Already before the events of September 11th 2001 concern was raised about the spread of orphan sources and their potential use in Radiological Dispersion Devices by terrorist groups. Although most of the simulated scenarios foresee a rather limited direct health impact on the population, the affected region would suffer from the indirect consequences such as social disruption, cleanup requirements and economic costs. The nature of such a radiological attack would anyway be different compared to conventional radiological accidents, basically because it can happen anywhere at any time. Part of the response resides in a general preparedness scheme incorporating attacks with Radiological Dispersion Devices. Training of different potential intervention teams is essential. The response would consist of a prioritised list of actions adapted to the circumstances. As the psychosocial dimension of the crisis could be worse than the purely radiological one, an adapted communication strategy with the public aspect would be a key issue.

Application of the MAX/EGS4 exposure model to the dosimetry of the Yanango radiation accident

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), industrial radiography accounts for approximately half of all reported accidents for the nuclear related industry. Detailed information about these accidents have been published by the IAEA in its Safety Report Series, one of which describes the radiological accident which happened in 1999 in Yanango/Peru. Under unsettled circumstances an 192Ir source was lost from an industrial radiographic camera and later picked up by a welder, who normally had nothing to do with the radiographic work. The man put the source into the right back pocket of his jeans and continued working for at least another 6.5 h. This study uses the MAX/EGS4 exposure model in order to determine absorbed dose distributions in the right thigh of the MAX phantom, as well as average absorbed doses to radiosensitive organs and tissues. For this purpose, the Monte Carlo code for standard exposure situations has been modified in order to match the irradiation conditions of the accident as closely as possible. The results present the maximum voxel absorbed dose, voxel depth absorbed dose and voxel surface absorbed dose distributions, average organ and tissue doses and a maximum surface absorbed dose for zero depth.

Cytogenetic biodosimetry of an accidental exposure of a radiological worker using multiple assays

A technician involved in the maintenance of X-ray equipment visited the occupational medicine service with complaints of skin lesions, apparently caused by an accidental exposure three months earlier. To estimate the dose received by the technician in the accident, biodosimetry was performed 6 and 18 months post-exposure with the dicentric and micronucleus assays. Part of the latest blood sample was also used for retrospective dosimetry by fluorescence in situ hybridisation (FISH) analysis for translocations. The data obtained 6 and 18 months post-exposure indicate that both dicentrics and micronuclei disappear with a half-time of 1 y. After correction for delayed blood sampling, dose values of 0.75 Gy (95% confidence limits 0.56-1.05 Gy) from dicentrics and 0.96 Gy (95% confidence limits 0.79-1.18 Gy) from micronuclei were obtained. FISH analysis of translocations resulted in a dose estimate of 0.79 Gy (95% confidence limits 0.61-0.99 Gy). The satisfactory agreement between the three cytogenetic endpoints supports the use of the micronucleus assay for triage purposes in the case of large scale radiological accidents and provides further evidence for the valid use of FISH for translocations as a reliable retrospective biological dosimeter.

137Cs distribution in tropical fruit trees after soil contamination

Gamma-ray spectra from guava ( Psidium guajava), mango ( Mangifera indica) and avocado ( Persea americana) trees were measured. These tropical fruit trees were planted at one site that was contaminated by 137Cs due to a radiological accident occurred in the city of Goiânia, Brazil, in 1987. The 137Cs concentrations in fruit, leaves, twigs, stems, and roots were measured in order to determine its distribution in tropical fruit trees. Binary diagrams of the 137Cs radial distribution in the main trunk are presented. Comparisons with longitudinal and radial distributions of 40K for these trees are also shown. The 137Cs concentration is higher in fruit, leaves and bark than in the inner parts of the plant (main trunk and stems) and neither symmetrical nor homogeneous behavior of the 137Cs radial distribution is observed.

Protecting people against radiation exposure in the event of a radiological attack

Abstract This report responds to a widely perceived need for professional advice on radiological protection measures to be undertaken in the event of a radiological attack. The report, which is mainly concerned with possible attacks involving ‘radioactive dispersion devices’, re-affirms the applicability of existing ICRP recommendations to such situations, should they ever occur. Many aspects of the emergency scenarios expected to arise in the event of a radiological attack may be similar to those that experience has shown can arise from radiological accidents, but there may also be important differences. For instance, a radiological attack would probably be targeted at a public area, possibly in an urban environment, where the presence of radiation is not anticipated and the dispersion conditions commonly assumed for a nuclear or radiological emergency, such as at a nuclear installation, may not be applicable. First responders to a radiological attack and other rescuers need to be adequately trained and to have the proper equipment for identifying radiation and radioactive contamination, and specialists in radiological protection must be available to provide advice. It may be prudent to assume that radiological, chemical, and/or biological agents are involved in an attack until it is proven otherwise. This calls for an ‘all-hazard’ approach to the response. In the aftermath of an attack, the main aim of radiological protection must be to prevent the occurrence of acute health effects attributable to radiation exposure (termed ‘deterministic’ effects) and to restrict the likelihood of late health effects (termed ‘stochastic’ effects) such as cancers and some hereditable diseases. A supplementary aim is to minimise environmental contamination from radioactive residues and the subsequent general disruption of daily life. The report notes that action taken to avert exposures is a much more effective protective measure than protective measure the provision of medical treatment after exposure has occurred. Responders involved in recovery, remediation and eventual restoration should be subject to the usual international standards for occupational radiological protection, which are based on ICRP recommendations, including the relevant requirements for occupational dose limitation established in such standards. These restrictions may be relaxed for informed volunteers undertaking urgent rescue operations, and they are not applicable for voluntary life-saving actions. However, specific protection measures are recommended for female workers who may be pregnant or nursing an infant. The immediate countermeasures to protect the public in the rescue phase are primarily caring for people with traumatic injuries and controlling access. Subsequent actions include respiratory protection, personal decontamination, sheltering, iodine prophylaxis (if radioiodines are involved), and temporary evacuation. In the recovery phase, the relocation and resettlement of people may be needed in extreme cases. This phase may require remedial action, including cleanup, management of the resulting radioactive waste, management of any human remains containing significant amounts of radioactive substances, and dealing with remaining radioactive residues. The guidance given in relation to public protection is based solely on radiological protection considerations and should be seen as a decision-aidingtool to prepare for the aftermath of a radiological attack. It is expected to serve as input to a final decision-making process that may include other societal concerns, consideration of lessons learned in the past (especially these involving the public perception of the risks posed by radioactive contamination) and the participation of interested parties. A radiological attack could also be the cause of radioactive contamination of water, food, and other widely consumed commodities. This possible outcome is considered unlikely to lead to significant internal contamination of a large number of people owing to the large amounts of radioactive material that would be required to cause high levels of contamination of water, food, and other commodities. Nonetheless, the report recommends radiological criteria for restricting the use of commodities under such circumstances. The report concludes by reiterating that the response to radiological attacks should be planned beforehand following the customary processes for optimisation of radiological protection recommended by ICRP, and that optimised measures should be prepared in advance. Such plans should result in a systematic approach that can be modified if necessary to take into account the prevailing conditions and to invoke actions as warranted by the circumstances. Many potential scenarios clearly cannot induce immediate severe radiation injuries. Therefore, in order to prevent over-reaction, response measures prepared in advance should reflect the real expected gravity of the various possible scenarios.

Protecting people against radiation exposure in the event of a radiological attack

This report responds to a widely perceived need for professional advice on radiological protection measures to be undertaken in the event of a radiological attack. The report, which is mainly concerned with possible attacks involving ‘radioactive dispersion devices’, re-affirms the applicability of existing ICRP recommendations to such situations, should they ever occur. Many aspects of the emergency scenarios expected to arise in the event of a radiological attack may be similar to those that experience has shown can arise from radiological accidents, but there may also be important differences. For instance, a radiological attack would probably be targeted at a public area, possibly in an urban environment, where the presence of radiation is not anticipated and the dispersion conditions commonly assumed for a nuclear or radiological emergency, such as at a nuclear installation, may not be applicable. First responders to a radiological attack and other rescuers need to be adequately trained and to have the proper equipment for identifying radiation and radioactive contamination, and specialists in radiological protection must be available to provide advice. It may be prudent to assume that radiological, chemical, and/or biological agents are involved in an attack until it is proven otherwise. This calls for an ‘all-hazard’ approach to the response. In the aftermath of an attack, the main aim of radiological protection must be to prevent the occurrence of acute health effects attributable to radiation exposure (termed ‘deterministic’ effects) and to restrict the likelihood of late health effects (termed ‘stochastic’ effects) such as cancers and some hereditable diseases. A supplementary aim is to minimise environmental contamination from radioactive residues and the subsequent general disruption of daily life. The report notes that action taken to avert exposures is a much more effective protective measure than protective measure the provision of medical treatment after exposure has occurred. Responders involved in recovery, remediation and eventual restoration should be subject to the usual international standards for occupational radiological protection, which are based on ICRP recommendations, including the relevant requirements for occupational dose limitation established in such standards. These restrictions may be relaxed for informed volunteers undertaking urgent rescue operations, and they are not applicable for voluntary life-saving actions. However, specific protection measures are recommended for female workers who may be pregnant or nursing an infant. The immediate countermeasures to protect the public in the rescue phase are primarily caring for people with traumatic injuries and controlling access. Subsequent actions include respiratory protection, personal decontamination, sheltering, iodine prophylaxis (if radioiodines are involved), and temporary evacuation. In the recovery phase, the relocation and resettlement of people may be needed in extreme cases. This phase may require remedial action, including cleanup, management of the resulting radioactive waste, management of any human remains containing significant amounts of radioactive substances, and dealing with remaining radioactive residues. The guidance given in relation to public protection is based solely on radiological protection considerations and should be seen as a decision-aidingtool to prepare for the aftermath of a radiological attack. It is expected to serve as input to a final decision-making process that may include other societal concerns, consideration of lessons learned in the past (especially these involving the public perception of the risks posed by radioactive contamination) and the participation of interested parties. A radiological attack could also be the cause of radioactive contamination of water, food, and other widely consumed commodities. This possible outcome is considered unlikely to lead to significant internal contamination of a large number of people owing to the large amounts of radioactive material that would be required to cause high levels of contamination of water, food, and other commodities. Nonetheless, the report recommends radiological criteria for restricting the use of commodities under such circumstances. The report concludes by reiterating that the response to radiological attacks should be planned beforehand following the customary processes for optimisation of radiological protection recommended by ICRP, and that optimised measures should be prepared in advance. Such plans should result in a systematic approach that can be modified if necessary to take into account the prevailing conditions and to invoke actions as warranted by the circumstances. Many potential scenarios clearly cannot induce immediate severe radiation injuries. Therefore, in order to prevent over-reaction, response measures prepared in advance should reflect the real expected gravity of the various possible scenarios.

Lessons from bone marrow transplantation for a victim of a radiological accident with acute radiation syndrome

Unintentional acute exposure to whole body radiation has become a serious threat in recent years. Whole body irradiation leads to the acute radiation syndrome, with manifestations depending on the dose to which the patient was exposed. At high doses of radiation, a large number of cells die as a result of impairment of DNA replication owing to irreversible double-strand DNA damage. A whole body absorbed dose greater than 4–6 Gy causes severe gastrointestinal and bone marrow damage, and ultimately leads to death in most cases. Patients exposed to a total dose of ionising irradiation up to 12–14 Gy may be rescued with autologous or allogeneic stem cells, however the role of stem cell transplantation for patients exposed to higher doses of radiation is questionable and depends on the degree of damage to non-haematopoietic tissues. Here we report on a patient following an accidental exposure to whole body irradiation (estimated dose 10–20 Gy) from a γ-source in a commercial atomic reactor. The patient was treated with a haploidentically mismatched related stem cell allograft, featuring the problems associated in treating patients exposed to a supralethal but unknown dose of radiation.

PCC-FISH in skin fibroblasts for local dose assessment: biodosimetric analysis of a victim of the Georgian radiological accident.

We propose a new method of biodosimetry that could be applied in cases of localized irradiation. The approach is based on excess chromosome segments determination by the PCC-FISH technique in fibroblasts isolated from skin biopsy. Typically, 0 to 10 Gy ex vivo gamma-irradiated human skin biopsies were dissociated and fibroblasts were isolated and grown for several days. Cells next underwent PCC-FISH painting of whole chromosome 4, and the number of excess chromosome segments per metaphase was determined. An ex vivo reference curve correlating the number of excess chromosome segments per metaphase to the radiation dose was established and used to assess the dose delivered to the skin of one of the victims of the radiological accident that occurred at Lia in Georgia in December 2001. Specifically, the victim suffering from moist desquamation underwent skin excision in Hospital Percy (France). Measurement of excess chromosome segments per metaphase was done in fibroblasts isolated and grown from removed wounded skin and subsequent conversion to radiation doses was performed. The radiation dose map obtained was shown to be in accordance with clinical data and physical dosimetry as well as with conventional biodosimetry. These results demonstrated that PCC-FISH painting applied to skin fibroblasts may be a suitable technique for dose estimation. To assess its worth, this approach needs to be extended to future accidents involving localized radiation exposure.

137Cs distribution in guava trees

This paper presents results of 137 Cs concentration measured from a guava tree cultivated after the first decontamination work of one of the sites where the worst Brazilian radiological accident occurred. The present work aims to verify how the 137 Cs is transported and distributed along the tropical trees. Bi-dimensional analyses of the radial distribution of 137 Cs in the main trunk are also presented. Neither symmetrical nor homogeneous behaviors of the specific activity distribution in the tree rings were observed.

A computational tool based on voxel geometry for dose reconstruction of a radiological accident due to external exposure

In the case of overexposure to ionising radiation, estimation of the absorbed dose in the organism is an important indicator for evaluating the biological consequences of this exposure. The physical dosimetry approach is based either on real reconstruction of the accident, using physical phantoms, or on calculation techniques. Tools using Monte Carlo simulations associated with geometric models are very powerful since they offer the possibility to simulate faithfully the victim and the environment for dose calculations in various accidental situations. Their work presents a new computational tool, called SESAME, dedicated to dose reconstruction of radiological accidents based on anthropomorphic voxel phantoms built from real medical images of the victim in association with the MCNP Monte Carlo code. The utility was, as a first step, validated for neutrons by experimental means using a physical tissue-equivalent phantom.

Protective actions in the late phase--intervention criteria and decision-making.

Major countermeasures in the late phase of a nuclear or radiological accident where long-lived radionuclides have been dispersed in the environment are relocation/resettlement, foodstuff restrictions, agricultural countermeasures and clean-up of contaminated areas. There has essentially been a broad acceptance internationally of the principles for their introduction, but it has not been possible to reach an agreement for the purpose of defining a net benefit based upon the exact weighting to be attached to each of the attributes influencing the decision on intervention, e.g. socio-psychological attributes. Optimisation of protection, i.e. maximising the net benefit, is not a question of developing radiation protection philosophy to fully include socio-psychological factors but rather to include these factors--in parallel with the radiological protection factors--in cooperation between radiation protection experts and e.g. experts in social and psychological sciences under the responsibility of the decision-maker, who will take the final decision on the introduction of long-term countermeasures.

Management of spent sealed radiation sources.

Spent or disused sealed radiation sources--no longer needed sources--may represent a risk of radiological accident or may be a target for criminal acts in countries where final disposal options are unavailable and where an increasing number of sources are being kept in extended storage. In developing countries, thousands of radium needles, teletherapy sources, oil well logging neutron sources, and miscellaneous industrial radioactive gauges are annually collected as waste and stored in research institutes. The objectives of the study described in this paper are to inventory such sources in Brazil, including those presently in use and those already collected as waste, and to design a dedicated repository where spent sources could be disposed of properly. The inventory of sources in Brazil and the concept of the repository are presented and its feasibility is discussed.

In vivo monitoring of hydroxyl radical generation caused by x-ray irradiation of rats using the spin trapping/epr technique

Measurement of hydroxyl radical ( OH) in living animals irradiated with ionizing radiation should be required to clarify the mechanisms of radiation injury and the in vivo assessment of radiation protectors, because generation of OH is believed to be one of the major triggers of radiation injury. In this study, OH generation was monitored by spin trapping the secondary methyl radical formed by the reaction of OH with dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO). Rats were injected intraperitoneally with a DMSO solution of α-phenyl- N- tert-butylnitrone (PBN). X-irradiation of the rats remarkedly increased the six-line EPR signal in the bile. The strengthened signal was detectable above 40 Gy. Use of 13C-substituted DMSO revealed that the signal included the methyl radical adduct of PBN as a major component. The EPR signal of the PBN–methyl radical adduct was completely suppressed by preadministration of methyl gallate, a scavenger of OH but not of methyl radical. Methyl gallate did not reduce the spin adducts to EPR-silent forms. These observations indicate that what we were measuring was OH generated in vivo by x-irradiation. This is the first report of the in vivo monitoring of OH generation at a radiation dose close to what people might receive in the case of radiological accident or radiation therapy.

Emergency Preparedness and Response in Case of a Fire Accident with UF6Packages Traversing the Suez Canal

AbstractEgypt has a unique problem: the Suez Canal. Radioactive cargo passes regularly through the canal carrying new and spent reactor fuel. There are also about 1000 metric tonnes of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) passing through the canal every year. In spite of all the precautions taken in the transport, accidents with packages containing UF6 shipped through the Suez Canal may arise, even though the probability is minimal. Such accidents may be accompanied by injuries to or death of persons and damage to property including radiation and criticality hazards and high chemical toxicity, particularly if the accident occurred close to one of the three densely populated cities (Port Said, Ismailia and Suez), which are located along the west bank of the Suez Canal. The government of Egypt has established a national radiological emergency plan in order to deal with any radiological accidents which may arise inside the country. This paper considers the effect of a fire accident to industrial packages containing UF...

Justification, Optimization and Decision-Aiding in Existing Exposure Situations

The existing ICRP system of radiological protection from 1990 (ICRP Publication 60) can be seen as a binary or dual-line system dealing with protection in exposure situations categorized as either practices or interventions. The distinction between practices and interventions is summarized in the paper with focus on some of the problems experienced in making such a distinction. The protection principles within the existing system of protection are presented with emphasis on the application to de facto or existing exposure situations. Decisions on countermeasures to mitigate the consequences of existing exposure situations such as nuclear or radiological accidents and naturally occurring exposure situations include factors or attributes describing benefits from the countermeasure and those describing harm. Some of these attributes are discussed and the general process of justification of intervention and optimization of protection arriving at generic reference levels for implementing protective measures is presented. In addition, the role of radiological protection professionals and other stakeholders in the decision-making process is discussed. Special attention is given to the question whether radiological protection should form only one of many decision-aiding inputs to a broader societal decision-making process or whether societal aspects should be fully integrated into the radiological protection framework. The concepts of practices and interventions, however logical they are, have created some confusion when applied to protection of the public following a nuclear or radiological accident. These problems may be solved in a new set of general ICRP recommendations on radiological protection, which are anticipated to supersede Publication 60 in 2005. The evolution of the basic ICRP principles for radiological protection in existing exposure situations into a new set of ICRP recommendations is briefly discussed based upon the various material that has been presented by the ICRP during the preparation of these recommendations.

Technical Exchange: Responding to Radiological Accidents and Emergencies

Technical Exchange: Responding to Radiological Accidents and Emergencies

Two decades of radiological accidents direct causes, roots causes and consequences

Practically all Countries utilize radioisotopes in medicine, industry, agriculture and research. The extent to which ionizing radiation practices are employed varies considerably, depending largely upon social and economic conditions and the level of technical skills available in the country. An overview of the majority of practices and the associated hazards will be found in the <A HREF="#tabela4">Table IV</A> to <A HREF="#tabela7">VII</A> of this document. The practices in normal and abnormal operating conditions should follow the basic principles of radiation protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources, considering the IAEA Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources, Safety Series 120 and the IAEA Recommendation of the Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, Safety Series Nº 115. The Standards themselves underline the necessity to be able to predict the radiological consequences of emergency conditions and the investigations that should need to be done. This paper describes the major accidents that had happened in the last two decades, provides a methodology for analyses and gives a collection of lessons learned. This will help the Regulatory Authority to review the reasons of vulnerabilities, and to start a Radiation safety and Security Programme to introduce measurescapable to avoid the recurrence of similar events. Although a number of accidents with fatalities have caught the attention of the public in recent year, a safety record has accompanied the widespread use of radiation sources. However, the fact that accidents are uncommon should not give grounds for complacency. No radiological accident is acceptable. From a radiation safety and security of the sources standpoint, accident investigation is necessary to determine what happened, why, when, where and how it occurred and who was (were) involved and responsible. The investigation conclusion is an important process toward alertness and feedback to avoid careless attitudes by improving the comprehension of Safety Performance and Safety Culture. Accident investigation is the first step toward avoiding future injures and financial losses, by prevention of recur recurrence. On the other hand, accident investigation is also essential for the establishment of the responsibilities and liability for the consequences. This document discuss the main accidents that have happened in the last two decades, in terms of causes, consequences, similarities and lessons learned when sealed sources have been damaged, lost, stolen and abandoned. In considerable majority death and serious injuries were resulted from failures in the safety system for radiation sources and for the security of radioactive materials.

Goiânia: 12 years after the 137Cs radiological accident.

In 1987, in the city of Goiânia, Brazil, occurred one of the worst radiological accidents ever reported. The remains of 137Cs contamination in a terrain where part of a radiotherapy unit had been manipulated in 1987 were measured in 1999-2000, and some of the results are presented here. Using the technique of gamma ray spectrometry in situ and in the laboratory, the ambient dose equivalent rate at 1 m above the ground and 137Cs concentration in soil were determined. Values higher than the ones established by the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) as action levels in 1987, namely 0.8 microGy x h and 22.5 kBq x kg(-1), were obtained in that terrain. The 137Cs distribution profile in the soil shows high values of the specific activity in a layer located at a depth of 10-40 cm from the surface, where the soil is mixed with rubble, reaching values as high as 175 kBq x kg(-1).

Measurements performed in Goiânia after a new intervention action in 2001.

Brazil's worst radiological accident took place in 1987, in the city of Goiânia. In 1999 and 2000, detailed measurements of 137Cs contamination were performed in junkyard II, one of the places involved in the accident. High values of 137Cs activity per unit mass were found in soil layers at depths between 10 and 40 cm from the surface, reaching values as high as 175 kBq x kg(-1). High values of 137Cs concentration in fruits and plants were also observed. Moreover, values of ambient dose equivalent rate at 1 m above the ground were found to be higher than the limit of 1.0 microSv x h(-1) set by the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) in 1987. In February 2000, the CNEN was informed about the results of our measurements. As consequence, in August 2001, the CNEN performed a new intervention action in the area, covering all its extension with a concrete layer and removing some plants and trees. The new remedial action reduced the dose rate to approximately 13% of the value prior to covering the site in concrete, reaching values below the CNEN limit, as demonstrated by the measurements presented here.