Radical Skepticism Research Articles

Hinge epistemology, kink-free enactivism and a biological argument against radical scepticism

Hinge epistemology, kink-free enactivism and a biological argument against radical scepticism

Partners in crime? Radical scepticism and malevolent global conspiracy theories

Although academic work on conspiracy theory has taken off in the last two decades, both in other disciplines as well as in epistemology, the similarities between global sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories have not been the focus of attention. The main reason for this lacuna probably stems from the fact that most philosophers take radical scepticism very seriously, while, for the most part, regarding ‘conspiracy thinking’ as epistemically defective. Defenders of conspiracy theory, on the other hand, tend not to be that interested in undermining radical scepticism, since their primary goal is to save conspiracy theories from the charges of irrationality. In this paper, I argue that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories exhibit importantly similar features, which raises a serious dilemma for the ‘orthodox’ view that holds that while we must respond to radical scepticism, global conspiracy theories can just be dismissed. For, if, as I will show, both scenarios can be seen to be epistemically on a par, then either radical sceptical scenarios are as irrational as global conspiracy theories or neither type of scenario is intrinsically irrational. I argue for the first option by introducing a distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ sceptical scenarios and showing how this distinction maps onto contemporary debates concerning how best to understand the notion of a ‘conspiracy theory’. I demonstrate that, just as in the case of scepticism, ‘local’ conspiracies are, at least in principle, detectable and, hence, epistemically unproblematic, while global conspiracy theories, like radical scepticism, are essentially invulnerable to any potential counterevidence. This renders them theoretically vacuous and idle, as everything and nothing is compatible with what these ‘theories’ assert. I also show that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories face the self-undermining problem: As soon as global unreliability is posited, the ensuing radical doubt swallows its children – the coherence of the sceptic’s proposal or the conspiracy theorist’s preferred conspiracy. I conclude that radical sceptical scenarios and global conspiracy theories are indeed partners in crime and should, therefore, be regarded as equally dubious.

Sosa on scepticism and the background

AbstractSosa’s influential work on virtue epistemology includes an intriguing proposal about background commitments, which he in turn relates to the Wittgensteinian notion of a hinge commitment. A critique is offered of Sosa’s proposal, particularly with regard to how he aims to apply it to the problem of radical scepticism. In light of this critique, an alternative conception of hinge commitments is offered that enables them to play a very different role in our treatment of radical scepticism.

I Play, Therefore I Think: Procedural Philosophy in Remedy Entertainment's Alan Wake 2 (2023)

Regarding video games as loci of philosophical thinking, not simply illustrations of preexisting philosophical concepts and positions, is far too rare in gamic thought studies. Yet due to the conceptually complex nature of the critically acclaimed Alan Wake 2 (Remedy Entertainment, 2023) such a perspective becomes necessary in order to fully understand the philosophical, gamic, and aesthetic complexity of the game. Subsequently, this article argues that the game performs what is termed “procedural philosophy” as it involves adapting a position of radical skepticism and questioning the essential ontological categories of both the gamic and the nongamic reality. As the analysis shows, Alan Wake 2 develops a philosophical conceptualization of reality which results in the formation of “obscure ideas,” related to a gamic flattening of ontology.

Epistemological Implications of Radical Skepticism

Purpose: The general objective of this study was to explore the epistemological implications of radical skepticism. Methodology: The study adopted a desktop research methodology. Desk research refers to secondary data or that which can be collected without fieldwork. Desk research is basically involved in collecting data from existing resources hence it is often considered a low cost technique as compared to field research, as the main cost is involved in executive’s time, telephone charges and directories. Thus, the study relied on already published studies, reports and statistics. This secondary data was easily accessed through the online journals and library. Findings: The findings reveal that there exists a contextual and methodological gap relating to epistemological implications of radical skepticism. Preliminary empirical review revealed that the pervasive influence of skepticism on individuals' perceptions and decision-making processes, leading to feelings of anxiety and uncertainty but also empowerment and critical thinking skills. The findings emphasized the importance of promoting transparency, accountability, and public engagement in scientific discourse, as well as the need for supportive learning environments and cultural sensitivity in addressing epistemological uncertainty. Overall, the study highlighted the complex nature of skepticism and underscored the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration and ethical decision-making in navigating epistemological challenges. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The Constructivism theory, Social Constructionism theory and the Pragmatism theory may be used to anchor future studies on radical skepticism. The research contributed theoretical insights into knowledge formation and psychological responses to skepticism, offering practical recommendations for educators, policymakers, and practitioners. Policy recommendations emphasized the importance of promoting transparency and accountability in governance, while practical suggestions focused on fostering critical thinking skills and media literacy among the public. The study also identified avenues for future research, encouraging interdisciplinary collaborations and comparative studies across cultural contexts. Overall, the study offered a comprehensive examination of skepticism's impact and potential strategies for mitigating its effects. Keywords: Epistemological, Implications, Radical Skepticism, Education, Media Literacy, Governance, Psychological Responses, Interdisciplinary, Comparative Studies, Transparency, Accountability

Hume's Constitutivist Response to Scepticism

In the concluding section of the Book One of the Treatise, Hume confronts radical scepticism about the standards of correct reasoning. According to the naturalistic interpretations, Hume resolves this scepticism by appealing to some psychological facts. A common criticism of this interpretation is that the alleged naturalistic epistemic norm seems to be merely Hume’s report of his psychology, and it remains unclear why this seemingly mere psychological description can provide a principled reason to overcome his scepticism. In this paper, I will argue that Hume’s discussions of the “indirect passions” and social identity provide a constitutivist ground for the naturalistic epistemic standards in the “Conclusion”: being the object of the indirect passions constitutes what kind of person one is, and being the kind of person (philosopher in Hume’s case) gives non-optional reason to pursue certain kinds of reasoning.

Nietzsche’s Portrayal of Pyrrho

Abstract Nietzsche’s portrayal of Pyrrho is predominately contained in two of his notebooks from 1888, and they present a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward him. In this article, I offer an explanation for Nietzsche’s variegated observations, and contend that his interest in Pyrrho is not really founded upon his radical scepticism as one might expect. Rather, it is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with decadence in general – and its ancient Greek philosophical incarnations in particular – that drives his scrutiny of Pyrrho. I describe Nietzsche’s evolving depiction of Pyrrho as one that ultimately develops into a critique, whereby Pyrrho is associated with a number of types of decadence, as well as exhibiting the characteristic traits of a decadent. I close by examining the cogency and soundness of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Pyrrho as a specific exemplar of decadence.

Organizing States: The continuing relevance of formal organization within political administration

In this paper, we argue for the continuing relevance of formal organization. We do so by examining contemporary challenges to ‘formality’ in one particular sphere of organizational existence: that of political administration. We deploy the latter term to refer to those formal organizational activities involving the constitution, maintenance, projection and regulation of governmental authority. Political administration, we argue, maintains its distinctive character because of the singularity of its purpose or ‘core task’ – namely, the activity of governing in an official capacity through and on behalf of a state. We begin by outlining how formality has regularly been opposed to substance in the social sciences, and how this has led to a series of unfortunate misunderstandings concerning the status of ‘formal organization’. We then turn to show what it means to serve a state in a formal capacity. Here the concept of office is of crucial import and we seek to indicate its key components and their relation to classical organizational theorizing concerning formal organization. Having established the centrality of office to the organizational conduct of the work of the state, we proceed to examine two different but linked developments in politics and public management that have compromised or undermined formal official conduct in political administration and highlight the organizational, political and ethical problems they raise. These problems are not inconsequential but rather go to the heart of debates concerning intense political partisanship and radical scepticism towards public institutions. In taking this route, the paper makes two overall contributions. First, against the ongoing problematization of formality within organizational theorizing, we seek to revive the relevance of classical conceptions of formal organization for organization theory as a practical science. Second, we argue that formal organization within state, government and political administration remains practically crucial to navigating the ‘extreme circumstances’ that confront us in the here and now in what has been termed the ‘New Era of Tragedy’.

“Reconstructing the Study of Religion”: Entering the Conversation from a Different Corner of the Academic World

Abstract This essay engages Josephson Storm’s project of the reconstruction of the study of religion after the latest linguistic and material turns and what he calls radical skepticism by provincializing his account of the study of religion and the human sciences. Referencing postfoundational reconstructive approaches, I argue that so called poststructural theories have already led to new reconstructive efforts, also in the study of religion, at least in the academic environment I was trained in. Furthermore, the lack of an account of power risks ignoring the role of status differentials that prefigure the ability of humans to engage in the practice of self-discovery which is central to his ethical project of revolutionary happiness.

Hinge commitments and trust

According to the innovative account of the structure of rational evaluation offered by Wittgenstein in his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, our rational practices necessarily presuppose arational hinge commitments. These are everyday, apparently mundane, commitments that we are optimally certain of, but which in virtue of the ‘hinge’ role that they play in our rational practices cannot themselves enjoy rational support. Granted that there are such hinge commitments, what is the nature of the propositional attitude in play? Many commentators have described this propositional attitude as a kind of trusting, on account of how our hinge commitments are effectively a groundless kind of presupposition. In contrast, I want to push back against this way of thinking about hinge commitments and argue instead that it is crucial to our understanding of Wittgenstein’s proposal especially in terms of its implications for radical scepticism to realize that hinge commitments are not presuppositions and that the hinge propositional attitude is not one of trusting.

How Can Skeptics Help Venture Capitalists?

Agassi’s radical skepticism leads to the following practical suggestion: When investors consider the likelihood that a suggested innovation will materialize, they should refer to the question: does this idea (that this innovation materializes) raise or reduce the strangeness of the world? And to answer this question, they should examine if the suggested technology is consistent with accepted scientific theories, and if it explains unexpected phenomena. This recommended method is not based on Bayesian epistemology but on a psychological theory of beliefs consistent with skepticism.

Interactivist Refutation of Radical Epistemic Skepticism Characteristic of Postmodern Literary Studies and Fiction

Postmodern fiction and literary theory have endorsed radical skepticism about knowledge, which was partly conditioned by philosophers’ inability to provide a viable epistemology that would resolve the radical skeptical problems. Most recent developments in both fiction and theory have largely ignored the apparently still unresolved issue and have instead embraced the position of active commitment that presupposes that knowledge is in fact possible. In this text, we address this apparent oversight and present an interactivist ontology of the mind and culture that explains how we can acquire knowledge about the world, and why the postmodern radical skepticism is ungrounded. We argue that once the interactivist theory of cognition as well as ontology of the mind and culture are assumed, the skeptical problems that troubled postmodern thought become non-problems and further pursuit of epistemically evaluable theory of culture (fiction included) gains solid theoretical grounds.

Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition

Abstract In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition, I highlight the main lines of argument in the book and provide an outline of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: Part I lays out an argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; Part ii presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on epistemic intuition); and Part iii defends epistemic intuition (and, thereby, my response to radical skepticism) from several important objections.

Replies to Chudnoff, Lemos, and McCain

Abstract These replies to critical comments by Elijah Chudnoff, Noah Lemos, and Kevin McCain on my book Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition begin (after the Introduction) with Section 2, where I address a cluster of complaints from Chudnoff and McCain in connection with skepticism-supporting underdetermination principles. (These principles play a significant role in my portrayal of radical skepticism and in my Reidian response to it.) In Section 3, I reply to some objections from Lemos concerning a claim (from Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition) that I call ‘the Paradigm-case Thesis’. In Section 4, I respond to some concerns that McCain and Lemos raise in connection with my discussion of the rationality of seemings. Lastly, Section 5 covers a few remaining objections from McCain and Lemos having to do with Chisholm’s “Problem of the Criterion,” the comparative strength of seemings, and the challenge of identifying which seemings count as epistemic intuitions.

Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains

<i>Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What it Explains</i>

THE ANCIENT SCEPTIC ATTITUDE AND DISAGREEMENT

ABSTRACT It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.

Skepticism, Mental Disorder and Rationality

Abstract I stipulate and motivate the overlooked problem of demarcating radical skeptics (perceptual and moral) from mentally disordered persons, given that both deny that they know ordinary Moorean propositions (e.g., that they have hands or that killing for fun is morally wrong). Call this ‘the demarcation problem’. In response to the demarcation problem, I develop a novel way to demarcate between mentally disordered persons and radical skeptics in an extensionally adequate way that saves the appearance that radical skeptics are not mentally disordered persons (at least not typically). Finally, I examine how a Moorean, non-skeptical epistemologist would compare radical skeptics with the mentally disordered in terms of what Plantinga calls internal and external rationality. Perhaps surprisingly, by Moorean lights, the mentally disordered fare better than the radical skeptic in terms of (internal) rationality. The upshot is that for Mooreans skeptical philosophy is more of an epistemic evil than mental disorder.

Epistemic Contextualism as Semantic Thesis and Knowledge-Attribution Standards in Qoheleth

The concept of knowledge plays an important role in Qoheleth. Both linguistic and philosophical perspectives remain popular trends in current related research. Developments in the two auxiliary disciplines that remain largely ignored include those associated with “Epistemic Contextualism.” The theory has been used as both a substantive-epistemological and a descriptive-semantic thesis, both of which concern the way variable epistemic standards are seen to supervene in different contexts of knowledge attributions. Initially offered as a solution to the challenges of radical scepticism, it has recently sought to show how an utterance affirming and denying a subject “knows” that something is the case could both be meaningful in virtue of changing propositional contents expressed in response to variable contextual stakes, interests, and needs. The original contribution of this study lies in constructing the relevant data set in Qoheleth and illustrating the possibilities and problems of applying the semantic format of the theory to discrepant propositional attitude reports in the world of the text.

Saving the Last Person from Radical Scepticism: How to Justify Attributions of Intrinsic Value to Nature without Intuition or Empirical Evidence

Toby Svoboda (2011, 2015) argues that humans cannot ever justifiably attribute intrinsic value to nature because we can never have evidence that any part of non-human nature has intrinsic value. We argue that, at best, Svoboda's position leaves us with uncertainty about whether there is intrinsic value in the non-human natural world. This uncertainty, however, together with reason to believe that at least some non-human natural entities would possess intrinsic value if anything does, leaves us in a position to acquire evidence that non-human nature has intrinsic value. We appeal to Michael Huemer's (2013) Probabilistic Reasons Principle to argue that we have direct reasons to not act in ways destructive to non-human nature, even if this reason is defeasible. Hence, if having intrinsic value just is being a source of direct reasons, it also implies that non-human nature has intrinsic value.

Making Law Possible

Making Law Possible