Radical Right-wing Parties Research Articles

Candidate shortages and the electoral consequences for radical right-wing parties: insights from Sweden

ABSTRACT While much research has explored factors that increase support for radical right-wing parties, the role of their local candidates has received less attention. This study contends that parties, particularly those distancing themselves from extremist elements, often struggle with a shortage of candidates, leading to both premature resignations and a lack of suitable replacements. This shortage negatively affects voter support in elections following candidate resignation. To illustrate this issue, the study utilizes a novel dataset examining the Sweden Democrats (SD), a party frequently grappling with “empty seats” in local assemblies, which are allocated seats after elections that remain unfilled or are prematurely vacated by local politicians. The analysis shows that these vacant seats reduce the party’s support by approximately 1.7 percentage points in local elections. This effect is compounded by voter turnout; when turnout is low and SD has previously failed to maintain their seats, their support decreases by as much as 10 percentage points. These findings emphasize the significant impact of a robust pool of local candidates on party performance, highlighting the critical role of local candidate representation for the electoral success of radical right-wing parties.

Exploring the Extremes: The Impact of Radical Right-Wing Populism on Conspiracy Beliefs in Austria

(1) Background: Populist radical right-wing parties and politicians have used conspiracy theories to perpetuate the antagonism between an evil elite conspiring against the good and unknowing people. Yet, less is known about whether and to what extent radical right-wing populism at the individual level is associated with different conspiracy beliefs. This analysis explores how the main components of radical right-wing populism—populist, nativist, and authoritarian attitudes—relate to both a general conspiracy mentality and specific conspiracy theories prevalent in political discourse. (2) Methods: Using data from an original 2023 online survey conducted in Austria, a stronghold of the populist radical right, this study includes new questions on immigration, COVID-19, and climate change, as well as a conspiracy mentality scale. (3) Results: The analyses reveal that all the main components are positively associated with different conspiracy beliefs, albeit to varying degrees. Across models, the strongest predictor is populism, followed by nativism and authoritarianism. Nativism varies the most across different conspiracy beliefs and is particularly associated with the belief in conspiracy theories related to immigration and climate change. (4) Conclusions: The results highlight the prevalence of radical right-wing populist attitudes across various conspiracy beliefs, reflecting how populist radical right-wing actors leverage conspiracy theories in their political discourse.

Spirited away: Access to alcohol and support for the populist radical right

Does the availability of alcohol influence support for radical right-wing parties, and if so, why? Drawing parallels to the UK, where pub closures led to increased support for UKIP, this study investigates similar trends observed in Sweden. Utilizing a novel dataset of over 50,000 alcohol-serving permits and electoral data from 2002 to 2018, the study finds that a reduction in permits is associated with a 3.7% increase in support for the Sweden Democrats (SD). To explain this, it is argued that bar closures politicize alcohol regulation and serve as a symbolic issue linked to the populist radical right. Survey data from over 20,000 respondents reveal that individuals in municipalities with a decreasing number of permits are more likely to support alcohol deregulation policies, and these voters become more likely to support SD. These findings underscore how perceptions of government overregulation drive support for radical right-wing parties.

Populist attitudes and vote for the radical right. A comparative analysis of five West European countries

ABSTRACT In recent decades, radical right-wing parties have gained significant prominence in Europe, attracting considerable academic attention. The electoral support for these parties has been linked to ideological principles such as nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. However, the connection between populist attitudes and voting for the radical right has been insufficiently addressed, either due to the lack of available empirical material or because populism has been taken for granted within this party family. To fill this gap this paper analyses the role of populist attitudes in the electoral support for the radical right in five West European countries (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Germany). The results reveal that, with the exception of Italy, populist attitudes play a significant role in the explanation of voting for the radical right. They also confirm the importance of nationalism in general and nativist attitudes in particular. By contrast, other orientations play a minor and often inconsistent across-countries role in the decision to vote for the radical right.

In-party love spreads more efficiently than out-party hate in online communities

In this article, we present the findings of a comprehensive longitudinal social network analysis conducted on Twitter across four consecutive election campaigns in Spain, spanning from 2015 to 2019. Our focus is on the discernible trend of increasing partisan and ideological homogeneity within interpersonal exchanges on this social media platform, alongside high levels of networking efficiency measured through average retweeting. This diachronic study allows us to observe how dynamics of party competition might contribute to perpetuating and strengthening network ideological and partisan homophily, creating ‘epistemic bubbles’ in Twitter, yet showing a greater resistance to transforming them into ‘partisan echo-chambers.’ Specifically, our analysis reveals that the rise of a new radical right-wing party (RRP), Vox, has heightened ideological homogeneity among users across the entire ideological spectrum. However, this process has not been uniform. While users aligned with mainstream political parties consistently share content that reinforces in-party affinity, resulting in highly efficient ‘epistemic bubbles,’ the emergence of the RRP has given rise to a distinct group of users associated with the most extreme partisan positions, characterized by a notable proportion of out-partisan hostility content, which has fostered the creation of low-efficient 'partisan echo-chambers.'

Ökonomische Ungleichheit und das Erstarken des rechten Randes – die empirische Suche nach einem Zusammenhang

Abstract The observation of the remarkably stable development of inequality indicators in Germany in the relevant period suggests that it is unlikely that they represent a major explanatory factor for the rise of the AfD. Furthermore, in an EU comparison, the success of radical right-wing parties appears to be quite independent of the classification of their level of inequality. In Germany, AfD supporters are also rather critical of a (flat-rate) expansion of redistribution policies. Their view of the welfare state is characterised by welfare chauvinism and status orientation, and therefore their view of socio-economic indicators is rather pessimistic. A more powerful reception of positive outcomes may help to develop a socio-politically stabilising effect.

The politics of resentment: what is it and how is it mobilized by populist radical right-wing parties in different contexts?

The role of emotions in politics is drawing increasing scholarly attention. Yet, despite this heightened interest, the ways in which politicians concretely appeal to emotions of their target audience are still blurry. Let aside how they do so in different contexts. This article focuses on an affect that is frequently mentioned as the key driver explaining the electoral appeal of populist radical right-wing parties (PRRPs): resentment. In that respect, several authors have used the term “the politics of resentment,” even though the exact definition of resentment often remains unclear. In this article, we theorize what resentment precisely is and how it is used politically, and hypothesize how it is mobilized in different ways by PRR parties in different contexts. Empirically, then, we employ content analysis to study a corpus of party documents of PRRPs in three West and two East European countries from 2004 onwards and identify three types of resentment mobilized by the radical right: (1) redistributive resentment; (2) recognitory resentment; and (3) retributive resentment. Despite being expressed in a more heterogeneous way than we theoretically expected, these forms of resentment share important commonalities that, we argue, can help to better understand the electoral appeal of radical right-wing parties.

Political realignment in Western Europe in the twenty-first century: eroding satisfaction and trust in democracy and its institutions?

ABSTRACT European democracies appear to be facing substantial difficulties. Challenges arise from the emergence of right-wing populist parties and the withdrawal of citizens from established political parties. These changes it is claimed have led to an erosion of trust in the democratic political system. Drawing on ten waves of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2020 in 11 Western European countries we test the evidence for a decline in democratic sentiment. Results do not support any deterioration in satisfaction with the way democracy works and trust in parliament, legal and police systems. Nor have hostile attitudes to immigrants increased in this period. Given the general rise in the electoral support for these parties our findings appear puzzling. However, while the evidence indicates no deterioration, attitudes to political parties and parliaments were far from positive in 2002 providing fertile ground for the emergence of populist radical right-wing parties.

Public support for the cordon sanitaire: Descriptive evidence from Spain

Reactions to the rise of far-right parties that advocate democratic backsliding, and the dilution of socially liberal democratic norms present a dilemma for existing political parties. How should existing political parties respond to this challenge? A commonly adopted strategy is to apply a cordon sanitaire which excludes radical right-wing challengers from the government-forming process. Do voters support this policy? Leveraging data from Spain – where the mainstream right has accommodated the radical right-wing party, VOX, via numerous governing coalitions – I rely on individual citizens’ views on how parties should respond to rise of the far-right party, to answer this question. Empirically, the results show very low-level support for the cordon sanitaire in Spain. Indeed, the modal position of the electorate, regardless of their ideological position, is to treat the party just like any other. These results are not conditioned by the propensity of individuals to identify VOX as indeed being a “radical right” party. These descriptive findings suggest that whilst radical right-wing parties may present an inimical threat to democratic norms, citizens do not necessarily view the means of squashing this threat to be one of strategic exclusion. This likely explains why the mainstream right has been able to institutionalise VOX as a political ally: where strategic exclusion is not expected, the mainstream right need not fear violating an expectation that does not exist.

Mainstream partisans’ affective response to (non) cooperation with populist radical right parties

What is the role of elite-level inter-party strategies in promoting or reducing negative affective evaluations of citizens? This article explores this puzzle by focusing on the decision of mainstream parties to exclude or cooperate with populist radical right-wing parties (PRRPs) in Western European countries. The analysis is based on CSES cross-national data and the LISS Dutch panel data merged with the record on whether PRRPs are subject to a cordon sanitaire or (in)formally cooperate with mainstream parties in a government coalition. The findings suggest that political exclusion fuels loathing for PRRPs among mainstream party supporters, while cooperation reduces dislike of PRRPs both among supporters of PRRP coalition partners and left-wing voters. Distinguishing between informal and formal coalitions, the cross-national data shows that only formal cooperation has a significant effect. However, the longitudinal Dutch data shows a temporary decrease of dislike also during informal cooperation.

Logistic hubs and support for radical-right populism: Evidence from Italy

Increasing discontent and the associated growing support for populist parties have been attributed to several drivers, including globalization, technological change, and migration waves. We analyse a phenomenon that encompasses a mix of economic and cultural grievances — the logistic revolution. The Italian logistics industry is characterized by a heavy reliance on low-paying and precarious contracts, it employs a large number of foreign workers, and is dominated by multinational corporations. The construction of large logistic hubs can increase the feeling of economic insecurity and trigger cultural backlash against foreign workers and large corporations. This, in turn, can create a favourable environment for populist radical right-wing parties that portray themselves as protectors of traditional values and national identity, and as defenders of the working class against the perceived threats posed by globalization, immigration, and large corporations. Through an IV and a DiD approach, we provide evidence that the support for Lega, a populist radical-right party, grew in Italian municipalities where new logistic hubs have been built.

Individual drivers of toxicity in radical right-wing populist legislative campaigns

Most studies of political rhetoric examine only political leadership or treat parties as unified actors. However, what happens where electoral systems incentivise candidates to diverge from stated party messaging during campaigns? This article uses novel data on political experience and candidate backgrounds from the 2022 French parliamentary elections to explore the individual drivers of campaigning behaviour. The choice of France, with its multiple and prominent radical right-wing parties, allows for the consideration of both within- and between-party differences in individual campaigning. Using the salient example of toxic rhetoric, findings demonstrate that even when party leaders publicly urge moderation, individual candidates do not necessarily follow along. This implies the need for additional focus on the individual-level drivers of political semantics, especially where candidates are apt to campaign independently, using social media platforms to communicate directly with citizens.

Political expectations and electoral responses to wind farm development in Sweden

Wind energy expansion has influenced electoral behavior by decreasing support for incumbents, primarily explained by not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) arguments. However, how does the establishment of wind farms shape electoral behavior when municipal politicians can veto such establishments? Analyzing Sweden, this study shows that voters respond not only by retrospectively evaluating past constructions but also by evaluating parties differently based on their expectations. Our results indicate that parties more likely to approve turbine constructions are punished more than those less expected to do so. Additionally, we find no evidence that the construction of wind turbines influences support for either Green or radical right-wing parties. In conclusion, this study show that the political repercussions of wind farm expansion are multifaceted, influenced by a combination of past actions, future expectations, and the ideological stances of political parties.

The war on flags: The opposition to state-sponsored LGBTQ+ symbols

Negativity against LGBTQ+ and gender equality symbols is escalating across Western European countries, including those at the forefront of sexual modernism. Drawing on data from Spain, this paper theorizes and finds that state-sponsored LGBTQ+ symbols receive significantly more negativity than other aspects of LGBTQ+ issues related to general and specific attitudes toward formal rights. The negativity is primarily explained by support for Vox, a radical right-wing party, and age. The study provides insights into the complexities of public opinion surrounding LGBTQ+ symbols, offering a nuanced understanding of the challenges faced by the LGBTQ+ community in terms of acceptance and visibility. Furthermore, it highlights the influence of political affiliations and generational factors in shaping these attitudes.

Populist radical right-wing parties and the assault on political correctness: The impact of Vox in Spain

The significant rise in the number of populist radical right (PRR) parties has not been accompanied by a parallel interest in the consequences that these parties may have on public opinion. The limited range of attitudes that the literature has considered so far can be broadened to include political correctness (PC), given the increasing attacks on this concept made by PRR parties. To address the effects of such attacks, we examine the Spanish case, where the presence of a new PRR party makes anti-PC messages a recent, quite exogenous stimulus. Using panel data to address potential non-recursive relationships and time-variant effects, we find that individuals are indeed more prone to lowering their levels of PC after finding Vox an attractive electoral option. Our results inform the debates on the effects that ‘cultural wars’, anti-woke and anti-PC rhetorics may have on public opinion, which could lead ultimately to harmful consequences for minority groups and social cohesion.

When the East Goes to the Poll: Explaining the Regional Differences in AfD-Voting in the 2021 Federal Election

In the 2021 German federal election, the share of East Germans who voted for the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a radical right-wing party, was more than twice as high as the share of AfD voters in West Germany. While most scholars focus on the general determinants of AfD-voting, this paper sheds light on specific variables that could explain these east-west differences. To achieve this, I develop a two-sided argument which considers both the distribution of common AfD-voting determinants and the socialization experiences of East Germans. Multivariate regression with the 2021 GLES data reveals a remaining East bonus in AfD-voting, indicating that the distribution of voting determinants alone cannot explain the regional differences in AfD vote share. Nevertheless, this paper presents a novel structured approach to the issue.

Radical right-wing support among urban voters in Germany: Disentangling the roles of immigration, immigration history, segregation, and poverty in the neighborhood

ABSTRACT We examine how Germany’s largest wave of immigration in recent history contributed to the election of a radical right-wing party (AfD) to the German parliament for the first time since the end of World War II. We focus on urban voters and use unique data from 34 of Germany’s largest cities, divided into 1,905 neighborhoods, covering 2014–2017. We find that local poverty strengthens the AfD, while greater local immigrant presence weakens AfD support. Immigrants are more concentrated in poorer neighborhoods, but crucially, local poverty does not undermine the effect of immigrant presence. Immigrant concentration in poorer neighborhoods indirectly increases AfD support in advantaged neighborhoods. The latter offer fewer opportunities for intergroup contact and are less likely to have prior meaningful history of immigration, rendering their residents more vulnerable to acculturative stress. Indeed, very low prior shares of immigrants predict higher AfD support when the local share of immigrants suddenly increases.

Assessing Regional Variation in Support for the Radical Right-Wing Party ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD)—A Novel Application of Institutional Anomie Theory across German Districts

The paper at hand aims to address a research gap by examining the spatial impact of economic and non-economic institutions on regional variation in the support for the German populist far-right party ‘Alternative for Germany (AfD)’. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach and drawing on institutional anomie theory, the study explores the relationship between economic dominance—economic inequality and economic strength—and regional AfD vote share, as well as the role of non-economic institutions in shaping support for the party. Using various regional indicators, the study assesses the strength of different institutions and their impact on the AfD’s electoral results in the year 2021 across 401 German districts (NUTS 3-level). The results point to significant differences between eastern and western Germany in the analysis of regional populist voting patterns. Economic dominance emerges as a stronger predictor of the AfD’s vote share in eastern regions. However, the findings on the protective effect of strong non-economic institutions against AfD voting are ambiguous and partly contrary to theoretical expectations. Overall, the study’s findings show that the newly introduced indicators deduced from institutional anomie theory contribute to the existing literature to help better understand regional variances in AfD support. Furthermore, the study contributes to the existing literature on the rise of contemporary radical right movements by employing Karl Polanyi’s framework of ‘disembedded’ markets. In doing so, it sheds light on the complex interplay between social change, anomic tendencies, and the growth of radical right movements in capitalist societies.

Citizens’ candidates? Labour market experiences and radical right-wing candidates in the 2014 Swedish municipal elections

This article uses Swedish register data to study the labour market experiences of radical right-wing candidates standing in local elections. We look at different measures of economic insecurity (labour market participation trajectories, experience of unemployment in social networks and relative growth in the number of jobs for foreign-born workers vis-a-vis natives) and examine whether they are predictors of candidates running for the Sweden Democrats, the main radical right-wing party in Sweden, as opposed to running for mainstream political parties. We find that the labour market trajectories of such candidates are markedly different from those of mainstream party candidates. Those with turbulent or out-of-labour market trajectories are much more likely to run for the Sweden Democrats, as opposed to other parties. The same is also true for candidates embedded in social networks with higher levels of unemployment, while working in a high-skilled industry markedly lowers the probability of running for the Sweden Democrats, especially for male candidates with low educational attainment. We find mixed results for the ethnic threat hypothesis.

THE REPUBLICAN TRUMP VOTER

With its emphasis on anti‐immigration rhetoric and actions, protectionism, as well as populism, Donald Trump has transformed the Republican Party into a party that closely resembles populist radical right‐wing parties in Europe. In this article, we first illustrate how the Republican Party has transformed into a radical right‐wing party. Second, we examine the degree to which the Trump voter has the same or similar characteristics as the prototypical radical right‐wing voter. To do so, we compare some key features of voters for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Trump voters. Through original survey research, we find that the two voter types are alike. Both AfD and Trump voters espouse anti‐immigrant sentiment, reject globalization, and position themselves on the right on a left‐right ideological scale. This implies that, both from a supply and demand side perspective, the Trump Republican Party has become a prototypical radical right‐wing party.