Radical Right Parties In Europe Research Articles

Not everyone suffers equally: The effect of electoral overlap on mainstream party responses to radical right parties

The rise of radical right parties in Europe has led to a number of strategic responses from mainstream parties (MSPs). However, not all MSPs are equally affected by the rise of challenger parties. This idea has been neglected in much of the quantitative work in the field. This paper extends this argument and investigates electoral overlap in a cross-country study of multiparty systems. Using Propensity to Vote (PTV) data to measure the electoral overlap between MSPs and radical right parties in eight Western European countries, I estimate the effect of right-wing threat on the positions of MSPs on immigration. A higher threat of losing voters to the radical right is associated with a move towards more restrictive immigration policies; on the other hand, a party’s chance to win voters back from the radical right has no significant impact on its positions.

Targeted Nativism: Ethnic Diversity and Radical Right Parties in Europe

AbstractRadical right parties are commonly associated with nativism and opposition to ethnic diversity, but there have been few systematic attempts to investigate this connection further. Noting that radical right parties in Europe do not express hostility towards all minorities or all immigrants, I investigate possible explanations for the difference in targeted hostility. I introduce the concept of targeted nativism, distinguishing between ethnic minorities that are excluded using the nativist cleavage, and those that are implicitly included in ‘the nation’. I propose three explanations for the targeted nativism, identifying minority outgroups based on: (1) ethnocultural differences, (2) minority political empowerment, or (3) ethnocultural minority accommodation. I examine these explanations using the examples of radical right parties in Sweden and Bulgaria, and further test these hypotheses with a new dataset that identifies targeted minorities. My findings indicate that more distinctive minorities are significantly more likely to be targeted by the radical right.

Economic Self-Interest or Cultural Threat? Migrant Unemployment and Class-based Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

Labor market competition theory has traditionally analyzed the threat perceived by lower and middle class’ natives on competition over jobs with immigrants. However, in this article we focus on the fiscal burden and competition for social benefits generated by unemployed immigrants and its impact on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs). Combining individual-level data and aggregate unemployment indicators for over 60 regions from 10 EU countries, we show that, on the one hand, upper class natives seem to support PRRPs when migrant unemployment rates are higher, irrespective of migrants’ origin, which is consistent with the fiscal burden model. On the other hand, lower and middle class natives are more likely to support PRRPs only in contexts of higher unemployment rates among non-EU migrants (but not among migrants from other EU member states), pointing towards an interaction between cultural and economic explanations. These findings underscore the need to account for migrant populations’ characteristics and to consider not only labor competition, but also the fiscal burden to better understand how unemployment may impact PRRP voting.

THE ZAFER PARTY’S DISCOURSE ON THE EUROPEAN UNION AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE EUROPEAN TYPE RADICAL RIGHT PARTY IN TÜRKİYE

This study examines the Türkiye-European Union relations of the Zafer Party, which was recently established in Türkiye and has been on the agenda with its discourses. The study consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, the definition of the Radical Right Party is made conceptually, and its general discourses are put forward. In the second chapter, the Radical Right Parties in Europe are examined and their discourses about the European Union are discussed. In the third chapter, the Zafer Party’s view of the European Union and Türkiye-EU relations is examined. In this study, the program of the Zafer Party, its manifesto and the Ümit Özdağ’s discourses were examined. In the Zafer Party, both the discourses of Chairman Ümit Özdağ and the discourses of other party members were examined and an evaluation was made with the claim that the Zafer Party was the first example of the Radical Right Parties in Europe in Türkiye. Both the discourses of Ümit Özdağ and the discourses of other party members were examined and an evaluation was made with the claim that the Zafer Party is the first example of the Radical Right Parties in Europe in Türkiye.

The makers get it all? The coalitional welfare politics of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. The case studies of Austria and Italy – CORRIGENDUM

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The makers get it all? The coalitional welfare politics of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. The case studies of Austria and Italy

AbstractThe article investigates whether and to what extent the welfare policies of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) vary in diverse government coalitions. Relying on a multidimensional framework differentiating coalitional politics along the welfare size and deservingness dimension, we conduct a comparative case study analysing welfare reforms of the ‘standard’ centre-right/PRRP government coalition ÖVP-FPÖ in Austria and the ‘new’ populist government coalition M5S-Lega in Italy. We find that both PRRPs do not promote pro-welfare policies in general, but rather opt for selective expansion of benefits for ‘makers’, while aiming at retrenching benefits for ‘takers’. This welfare strategy includes pensioners and male breadwinner families but excludes migrants or long-term unemployed. The analysis furthermore shows that the central line of conflict with the centre-right ÖVP is mostly about the size of welfare policies, especially for ‘deserving’ citizens, while with the socially more left-leaning M5S it is rather centred around the deservingness dimension, e.g., benefits for takers. These results offer a more fine-grained understanding of the PRRPs’ welfare agenda and their coalitional welfare politics in office.

The strategic ambiguity of the radical right: A study of the Danish People’s Party

Though radical right parties are easily identified by their strong nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment, significant confusion surrounds their positions on core economic issues, such as taxation and redistribution. This uncertainty may reflect an electoral strategy in which these parties intentionally blur their positions to avoid taking stances on economic issues that divide their target constituencies. Existing research on position blurring and the radical right focuses exclusively on expert surveys and party manifesto statements, providing little information about voter-level perceptions of these parties. This study directly investigates public perception of the positions of the Danish People’s Party, one of the most successful radical right parties in Europe. The study finds strong evidence that the DPP draws on a voter base with below average political awareness, allowing it to more easily recruit voters on opposing sides of economic issues by obscuring its own positions.

Radical women? Explaining the gender gap in radical right voting in the Nordic countries

Recent decades have seen an electoral resurgence of radical right parties in Europe. Despite their international reputations as gender-egalitarian welfare paradises, the Nordic nations are no exception to this trend. While Nordic radical right movements have appropriated gender-egalitarian language, the leadership and voting bases of these parties remains overwhelmingly male. The gender gap is generally understood as a reflection of gender differences in structural location and in values. This article examines the importance of attitudinal and structural influences on voting behaviour for men and women. I highlight the role of anti-immigrant sentiment, while also arguing that gender differences in voter demand for radical right politics are intimately linked to differences in party supply. In short, I endeavour to provide a nuanced view of the gender gap in radical right voting, while nonetheless highlighting the importance of anti-immigrant sentiment in radical right politics.

Explaining the electoral performance of radical right parties in Europe (2008-2019): a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Although radical right parties have been extensively examined since their significant breakthrough in the European political arena in the late 80s, not enough attention has been paid to the reasons behind their unequal electoral performance (or in other words, to the cross-national and within-national variations of their success). The aim of this research is to identify the different scenarios of electoral success for radical right parties in ten European countries between 2008 and 2019. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) -a case-oriented technique which allows in-depth comparative examination and which is based on the concepts of equifinality and causal heterogeneity- we test the role of several causal conditions related to demand-side and supply-side explanations. Our results reveal four sufficient causal paths that lead to the success of these parties, which confirm that they are able to achieve relevance in quite diverse contexts. The four paths combine both demand-side and supply-side conditions, but the role of the latter is qualitative and quantitative more important. In particular, we see how radical right parties can effectively take advantage of favorable political competitive dynamics, even in the absence of a priori favorable socio-economic context. Overall, our findings run contrary to some mechanistic explanations in the literature and support the idea of conceiving the radical right parties as a complex, multiform phenomenon which requires both theoretical and methodological innovations.

The Transnational Networks of the European Radical Populist Right and the Beacon of Hungarian Illiberal Democracy

Radical right parties in Europe have been in negotiations since 2018 in order to form a single, unified group in the European Parliament. Today, there are two competing caucuses: one, which is considered the “extreme right” by European standards; and another, which is a collection of far-right, Euroskeptic parties. A unified caucus would challenge the leadership of mainstream conservatives and Christian Democrats in the Parliament and be a show of strength by the radical right. For those who are at the origin of this attempt, namely Marine Le Pen from the French National Rally and Matteo Salvini, leader of the Italian Lega, the goal is also to mainstream their ideology by reaching an alliance with the Hungarian Fidesz party and the Polish Law and Justice Party. Both have become the beacons of illiberal democracy and role models for Western parties that used to be labeled “extreme right” and in need of a break from their past. However, tactical as well as ideological issues have, so far, prevented this unification of the radical right from becoming a reality.

The Covid-19 Crisis: Opportunity or Threat for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe?

Starting as a public health problem, the Covid-19 pandemic has become a multi-dimensional crisis that involves various policy areas. Crises have the potential to change priorities and trigger various reflexes in any given society, including a realignment on the political spectrum. In Europe, Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) were on the rise due to the previous crises in Europe. In this context, have these parties appealed more or less to voters during the pandemic? This study aims to investigate the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the discourse and popular support of European PRRPs in its first year. The responses of the PRRPs of Austria, France, Germany and Italy to the pandemic and its governance are explored through leaders’ Twitter posts. Changes in popular support for the political mainstream and the PRRPs are examined through recent opinion polls. The trend of the rise of European PRRPs before the pandemic is revisited and discussed in light of the findings.

Give Me Your Least Educated: Immigration, Education and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

This article deepens the analysis of the effects of immigration on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, focusing on education levels of both natives and immigrants. By analysing the immigrant population in 101 regions from 11 European countries, we show that in contexts with a large immigrant presence, the low-educated voters tend to support Populist Radical Right Parties to a greater degree than those who are more educated. However, when the ratio of skilled immigrants is high, also the more educated population tends to support these parties. Hence, our analysis adds insight into the relationship between immigration, education and Populist Radical Right Parties voting, highlighting the need of focusing at lower levels of aggregation and combining the characteristics of both foreign-born and host populations.

The Role of Short-Term and Longer Term Immigration Trends on Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

The success of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Europe has, in part, been attributed to growing immigration, but previous findings have found an inconsistent relationship between immigration and voting for PRRPs. We address previous inconsistencies by suggesting a time-focused perspective on intergroup relations. We disentangle short-term from longer term immigration trends and argue that a recent increase in immigration should predict PRRP support. With time, however, citizens will adapt to these demographic changes and voting for PRRPs could decline. We drew on official immigration records and representative data from the European Social Survey, capturing the voting behavior of 75,874 individuals from 15 European countries between 2002 and 2014. We found that a recent increase in immigration predicted more PRRP voting, and this relationship was strengthened under conditions of higher economic strain and inequality. In contrast, sustained immigration in the longer term was not related with PRRP votes.

Ideological voting for radical right parties in Europe

The aim of this research is to examine to what extent the electoral support for radical right parties (RRPs) is driven by ‘policy voting’ and to compare this support with that of centre-right parties. Using the European Election Study 2019, we focus on six party systems: Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and the United Kingdom. Our analyses reveal that party preferences for RRPs are better explained by policy considerations than by other alternative explanations (e.g. by ‘globalization losers’ or ‘protest voting’). Additionally, the results show that although preferences for both party families are mainly rooted in ‘policy voting’, notable differences emerge when looking at the role of specific policy dimensions. Overall, these findings suggest that the support for RRPs cannot be understood fundamentally as a mere reaction against economic pauperization or political dissatisfaction but instead as an ideological decision based on rational choice models.

Mediators explaining radical right voting patterns of Christians in Europe: Attitudes toward immigrants, values, or social capital?

Previous studies show that radical right parties in Europe receive relatively low levels of supports from Christian voters, despite that Christian value is highlighted in the European radical right agenda. However, the mechanism remains largely untested. The study investigates the factors underlying Christians voting or not voting for populist radical right parties across Europe, using Round 8 European Social Survey data. It is shown that there is no general relationship between Christian religiosity and radical right voting across European countries. In most countries, Christians are neither more nor less likely to vote for the radical right parties compared to the non-religious. When Christians are underrepresented in radical right supporters, it can hardly be explained by tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social capital presumed to be fostered by Christian religion and church engagement. In some other cases, where Christians are more likely to vote for radical right parties, it is likely to be driven by anti-immigrant attitudes, authoritarian values and moral conservative values. In addition, Christians could have been more mobilizable for radical right parties due to their authoritarian and moral conservative values, which have not been fully capitalized. The study suggests that Christian religiosity does not serve as an “antidote” to the radical right. Tolerance towards immigrants, pro-social values or social capital are rarely the mechanisms driving European Christians away from supporting radical right parties.

Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe: What Impact Do they Have on Development Policy?

AbstractPrevious research suggests that the rise of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) is contributing to the politicization of European domestic and external policies. However, whether this is also the case for European development policy is unclear. Building on a new dataset that analyses government positions and coalition agreements across European countries since the 1990s, we investigate whether, and if so how, the strength of PRRPs affects European governments' framing of the relationship between migration and development policy. Research on PRRPs suggests that they influence other parties' positions directly when they are in government, or indirectly by framing topics such as migration differently from other parties, thereby pushing government and opposition parties to modify their own positions. We find (moderate) support for PRRPs' indirect influence on the framing and salience of the migration–development policy nexus, via their vote and seat share. The effect of PRRPs in government on the formulation of development aid policy goals is smaller.

Immigration, Race and the Radical Right: Politics and Policy from Colonialism to Brexit

AbstractI began studying the radical right and immigration policy in Europe in the mid‐1990s and when conducting my research, I have been acutely aware of the impact of my background and personal experiences on my perspectives on these issues. As an African American, first‐generation college graduate, I am unusual in my knowledge of French and German, let alone the fact that I study immigration and radical right parties in Europe. In fact, given that my name is gender neutral and non‐ethnic sounding, many who meet me are surprised that I am the Terri Givens who wrote the classic book, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe. However, I believe that it is important for a diversity of voices to reflect on and conduct research into these topics.

Populist Rhetoric and Nativist Alarmism

Using the 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey of party positions, this study compares the AfD with other European parties outside the political mainstream across several ideological/attitudinal dimensions. The paper explores the changing character of European party systems and multiple axes of party competition. It regards populism and nativism as distinct political phenomena, but as ones that are symbiotic and coupled together provide a particular powerful narrative. The paper finds that the AfD shares a close affinity with radical right parties in Europe but also emerges as one of Europe’s most populist and nativist parties. This explains the AfD’s affiliation with the Identity and Freedom Group in the European Parliament; it also supports the argument it is the blend of populist anti-elitism and nativist alarmism that has made the AfD the potent force in German politics that it is today.

Women and the Radical Right: Exploring Gendered Differences in Vote Choice for Radical Right Parties in Europe

This article explores the role that gender differences played in vote choice for radical right parties in European countries from 2002-2014. In particular, the research agenda explores whether men and women differ in regards to the attitudinal variables that drive vote choice for a radical right party. Further, the empirical analysis tests whether predictors of radical right vote choice have differing substantive effects for women and men. Using fixed effects statistical models; the major findings are that men and women do differ statistically on one attitude that correlates highly with radical right vote choice (i.e. far right ideology), but not other important attitudes (anti-immigrant sentiment). Substantively, however, given the same attitudes as men, women have a significantly lower probability of translating extreme attitudes into vote choice for radical right parties.

Voting for Radical Right Parties in Europe: The Role of Cultural Change and Party Polarization (Part 2)

The article is devoted to the problem of rapid growth in recent decades of electoral support for radical right-wing parties in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. It presents the results of empirical testing of the theory of silent counterrevolution and two-dimensional party polarization. Data from the European Social Survey (ESS 2006-14) and content analysis of electoral party manifestos (CMP/MARPOR), and statistics on migrants, electoral institutions and liberal culture for 56 parliamentary elections in 24 European countries were analyzed using two-level logistics modeling. The results show that anti-immigration attitudes and distrust of parliament are the most important distinguishing features of supporters of nationalists and populists. In accordance with the silent counter-revolution theory, the voting mobilization of nationalist supporters in parliamentary elections, according to the facts revealed, depends on the spread of liberal culture in society. The analysis also revealed that the conditions for their mobilization are favorable when party positions in the economic dimension converge and cultural polarization increase at the same time, although this conclusion needs further verification.