Quarantine Policy Research Articles

“In This Miserable Spot Called Quarantine”: The Healthy and Unhealthy in Nineteenth Century Australian and Pacific Quarantine Stations

By examining sources created by people who were detained or employed at the quarantine stations of Australia and the Western Pacific, this article illuminates aspects of the history of disease control that cannot be observed in other source material. Most research examining the history of maritime quarantine has tended to rely on the records of official and government agencies. As a result, discussion has largely been confined to government policy and larger issues of the political, economic, and social consequences of maritime disease control. This article contributes to the historiography by examining personal sources that show how quarantine policy and practice were experienced from the perspective of its participants. They reveal the experiences of otherwise obscured healthy detainees and illuminate agency among quarantined individuals that cannot be observed without these sources.

Lessons From the SARS Crisis – More Relevant Than Ever

Lessons From the SARS Crisis – More Relevant Than Ever

SARS in Singapore – Key Lessons from an Epidemic

The rapid containment of the Singapore severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003 involved the introduction of several stringent control measures. These measures had a profound impact on the healthcare system and community, and were associated with significant disruptions to normal life, business and social intercourse. An assessment of the relative effectiveness of the various control measures is critical in preparing for future outbreaks of a similar nature. The very "wide-net" surveillance, isolation and quarantine policy adopted was effective in ensuring progressively earlier isolation of probable SARS cases. However, it resulted in nearly 8000 contacts being put on home quarantine and 4300 on telephone surveillance, with 58 individuals eventually being diagnosed with probable SARS. A key challenge is to develop very rapid and highly sensitive tests for SARS infection, which would substantially reduce the numbers of individuals that need to be quarantined without decreasing the effectiveness of the measure. Daily temperature monitoring of all healthcare workers (HCWs) in hospitals was useful for early identification of HCWs with SARS. However, daily temperature screening of children in schools failed to pick up any SARS cases. Similarly, temperature screening at the airport and other points of entry did not yield any SARS cases. Nevertheless, the latter 2 measures probably helped to reassure the public that schools and the community were safe during the SARS outbreak. Strong political leadership and effective command, control and coordination of responses were critical factors for the containment of the outbreak.

Confidence in controlling a SARS outbreak: Experiences of public health nurses in managing home quarantine measures in Taiwan

BackgroundTaiwan experienced one of the most serious outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) during the 2003 epidemic. Public health nurses faced unprecedented challenges in implementing an extensive quarantine policy to prevent disease spread. Their professional confidence, however, was shattered during the SARS crisis. This paper assesses factors related to public health nurses' confidence in managing community SARS control programs.MethodsIn May 2003, we sent structured questionnaires to all 361 health centers in Taiwan and asked the public health nurses responsible for epidemic control to complete. A total of 312 completed surveys were returned for a response rate of 86.4%. Descriptive methods and logistic regression were used to analyze the data.ResultsMost public health nurses (71.9%) expressed a general lack of confidence in handling the SARS epidemic. Confidence was significantly associated with perceived epidemic severity (OR, 0.58; 95% CI: 0.35-0.99), daily epidemic updates (OR, 2.26; 95% CI: 1.28-3.98), and number of cases in the community (OR, 2.21; 95% CI: 1.13-4.31).ConclusionNurses' individual risk perception and prompt update of epidemic information significantly affect levels of professional confidence, a key factor influencing quarantine implementation success. Strategies to promote productive interagency collaboration and advocate participatory policy making involving health workers at all levels are needed to control effectively infectious disease outbreaks.

Experimental transmission and virulence of a megalocytivirus (Family Iridoviridae) of dwarf gourami ( Colisa lalia) from Asia in Murray cod ( Maccullochella peelii peelii) in Australia

In February 2003 there were 90% losses of Murray cod ( Maccullochella peelii peelii) fingerlings in a Victorian aquaculture facility. The disease was caused by a megalocytivirus (Family Iridoviridae) closely related to the recognized species Infectious Spleen and Kidney Necrosis Virus (ISKNV) and strain dwarf gourami iridovirus (DGIV), neither of which had previously been reported from farmed or wild fish in Australia. Experimental transmission trials were undertaken to test the hypothesis that the outbreak could have arisen through introduction of a virus with ornamental gouramis imported from South East Asia. Intraperitoneal injection of Murray cod fingerlings using filtered tissue homogenates from dwarf gourami ( Colisa lalia) positive for megalocytivirus DNA by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) resulted in > 90% mortality. Mortality was also induced by cohabitating Murray cod fingerlings and dwarf gourami; as the fish were physically separated, the virus spread between the two species via water. Histopathology revealed lesions identical to those reported in the Victorian outbreak, 125–130 nm icosahedral virions were observed in lesions and most exposed fish were PCR positive. DNA sequencing confirmed 99.9 to 100% homology of major capsid protein and ATPase nucleotide sequences between DGIV, ISKNV, the viral inoculum obtained from dwarf gourami and virus present in experimentally infected Murray cod. These findings confirm that Murray cod are highly susceptible to a megalocytivirus present in ornamental fish imported from South East Asia. The implications for aquaculture, conservation of native fish and quarantine policy are discussed.

Attitudes Toward The Use Of Quarantine In A Public Health Emergency In Four Countries

Countries worldwide face the threat of emerging infectious diseases. To understand the public's reaction to the use of widespread quarantine should such an outbreak occur, the Harvard School of Public Health, with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, undertook a survey of residents of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States. A sizable proportion of the public in each country opposed compulsory quarantine. Respondents were concerned about overcrowding, infection, and inability to communicate with family members while in quarantine. Officials will need specific plans to deal with the public's concerns about compulsory quarantine policies.

Dynamically Modeling SARS and Other Newly Emerging Respiratory Illnesses

The emergence and rapid global spread of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus in 2002-2003 prompted efforts by modelers to characterize SARS epidemiology and inform control policies. We overview and discuss models for emerging infectious diseases (EIDs), provide a critical survey of SARS modeling literature, and discuss promising future directions for research. We reconcile discrepancies between published estimates of the basic reproductive number R0 for SARS (a crucial epidemiologic parameter), discuss insights regarding SARS control measures that have emerged uniquely from a modeling approach, and argue that high priorities for future modeling of SARS and similar respiratory EIDs should include informing quarantine policy and better understanding the impact of population heterogeneity on transmission patterns.

Use of Dual TaqMan Probes to Increase the Sensitivity of 1-Step Quantitative Reverse Transcription-PCR: Application to the Detection of SARS Coronavirus

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), caused by a novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (1)(2)(3)(4)(5), has affected 8096 people and produced 774 deaths in 29 countries/regions (6). The vital step in preventing and controlling future epidemics is to block transmission of infection through an effective quarantine policy, which in turn hinges on early diagnosis and confirmation of the disease, particularly by laboratory tests (7). The need for rapid, ultrasensitive assays that can detect infection very early in the course of the disease is obvious. The antibody response to SARS-CoV infection is detectable only after ∼10 days of illness (8); hence early laboratory diagnosis rests on early detection of the virus itself. Detection relies on reverse transcription followed by PCR (RT-PCR) (7). We designed a 1-step real-time quantitative RT-PCR assay for SARS-CoV with the use of 2 TaqMan probes, instead of 1 probe, hybridizing to the same PCR product to further improve the sensitivity. This simple modification using dual TaqMan probes for quantification has wide applications in areas in which ultrasensitivity is critically required. Our 1-step assay was designed to amplify the ORF1b regions of the SARS-CoV by TaqMan EZ RT-PCR Kit in a 7500 Real Time PCR System (Applied Biosystems). We compared assays using 1 and 2 TaqMan probes (Fig. 1, A and B⇓ ). The 25-μL reaction mixture contained 1× TaqMan EZ Buffer, 3 mM manganese acetate, 0.3 mM each deoxynucleotide triphosphate (except 1.2 mM for dUTP), 0.25 U of AmpErase UNG, 2.5 U of r Tth DNA polymerase, 0.8 μM each primer, 0.4 μM each probe, and 10 μL of extracted RNA (4 μL for the 1-probe assay). The 1-probe assay was based on a previous report (9), but with slight modifications. Reactions were started by incubation at 50 °C for 2 …

Quantitative Risk Assessment of Rabies Entering Great Britain from North America via Cats and Dogs

Great Britain has been rabies-free since 1922, which is often considered to be in part due to the strict laws requiring that imported cats and dogs be vaccinated and quarantined for 6 months immediately on entry into the country. Except for two isolated incidents, this quarantine policy has contributed to ensuring that Great Britain has remained free of rabies. In 2000, amendments to the UK quarantine laws were made and the Pet Travel Scheme (PETS) was launched for companion animals traveling from European Union countries and rabies-free islands. Since its introduction, it has been proposed that other countries including North America should be included within the UK scheme. A quantitative risk assessment was developed to assist in the policy decision to amend the long-standing quarantine laws for dogs and cats from North America. It was determined that the risk of rabies entry is very low and is dependent on the level of compliance (i.e., legally conforming to all of the required regulations) with PETS and the number of pets imported. Assuming 100% compliance with PETS and the current level of importation of cats and dogs from North America, the annual probability of importing rabies is lower for animals traveling via PETS (7.22 x 10(-6), 95th percentile) than quarantine (1.01 x 10(-5), 95th percentile). These results, and other scientific evidence, directly informed the decision to expand the PETS scheme to North America as of December 2002.

A World Apart: Geography, Australian Quarantine, and the Mother Country

In many respects the Australian colonies were what one person called "the proud offspring of a grand old mother." Yet when it came to the prevention of imported infectious disease, Britain's Australian colonies were not a chip off the old block. British opposition to the lengthy and costly imposition of quarantine had intensified throughout the nineteenth century, eventuating in the abolition of human quarantine in 1896. The Australian colonies, on the other hand, which had based their first quarantine regulations on British law and remained constantly aware of changing medical trends in the mother country, gradually expanded the breadth and capabilities of their maritime quarantine as the century progressed. Although other European powers and British colonies progressively adopted systems of medical inspection more in line with British port prophylaxis and away from quarantine, the Australian colonies invested increasing amounts of time and money into more elaborate quarantine stations and regulations. In this article I examine some of the basic features of coastal disease prevention in the Australian colonies and how they differed from British controls. Australia's distance from Britain was emphasized in the quarantine debates geographically as well as in policy. I argue that the often controversial differences in quarantine policy were for the most part a product of Australia's geographical location. The natural prophylactic of Australia's remoteness was not a reason to minimize quarantine in the colonies but rather served to increase it; whereas, it was argued that "the geographical position of England deprived it of the advantages...derived from a comprehensive quarantine system." I discuss this seeming anomaly in light of other arguments that have claimed that the close proximity of a state to the acknowledged origin of a disease was likely to increase its eagerness to quarantine.

Comprehensive review of the records of the biota of the Indian Seas and introduction of non-indigenous species

1. Comparison of the pre-1960 faunal survey data for the Indian Seas with that for the post-1960 period showed that 205 non-indigenous taxa were introduced in the post-1960 period; shipping activity is considered a plausible major vector for many of these introductions. 2. Of the non-indigenous taxa, 21% were fish, followed by Polychaeta (<11%), Algae (10%), Crustacea (10%), Mollusca (10%), Ciliata (8%), Fungi (7%), Ascidians (6%) and minor invertebrates (17%). 3. An analysis of the data suggests a correspondence between the shipping routes between India and various regions. There were 75 species common to the Indian Seas and the coastal seas of China and Japan, 63 to the Indo-Malaysian region, 42 to the Mediterranean, 40 and 34 to western and eastern Atlantic respectively, and 41 to Australia and New Zealand. A further 33 species were common to the Caribbean region, 32 to the eastern Pacific, 14 and 24 to the west and east coasts of Africa respectively, 18 to the Baltic, 15 to the middle Arabian Gulf and Red Sea, and 10 to the Brazilian coast. 4. The Indo-Malaysian region can be identified as a centre of xenodiversity for biota from Southeast Asia, China, Japan, Philippines and Australian regions. 5. Of the introduced species, the bivalve Mytilopsis sallei and the serpulid Ficopomatus enigmaticus have become pests in the Indian Seas, consistent with the Williamson and Fitter ‘tens rule’. Included amongst the biota with economic impact are nine fouling and six wood-destroying organisms. 6. Novel occurrences of the human pathogenic vibrios, e.g. Vibrio parahaemolyticus, non-01 Vibrio cholerae, Vibrio vulnificus and Vibrio mimicus and the harmful algal bloom species Alexandrium spp. and Gymnodinium nagasakiense in the Indian coastal waters could be attributed to ballast water introductions. 7. Introductions of alien biota could pose a threat to the highly productive tropical coastal waters, estuaries and mariculture sites and could cause economic impacts and ecological surprises. 8. In addition to strict enforcement of a national quarantine policy on ballast water discharges, long-term multidisciplinary research on ballast water invaders is crucial to enhance our understanding of the biodiversity and functioning of the ecosystem. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Factors Influencing Compliance with Quarantine in Toronto During the 2003 SARS Outbreak

The purpose of this study was to cull lessons from Toronto's experiences with large-scale quarantine during the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in early 2003. We focused on issues that affected the population's willingness to comply with quarantine. Information was acquired from interviews, telephone polling, and focus groups. Issues of quarantine legitimacy, criteria for quarantine, and the need to allow some quarantined healthcare workers to leave their homes to go to work were identified. Also important was the need to answer questions from people entering quarantine about the continuation of their wages, salaries, and other forms of income while they were not working, and about the means by which they would be supplied with groceries and other services necessary for daily living. The threat of enforcement had less effect on compliance than did the credibility of compliance-monitoring. Fighting boredom and other psychological stresses of quarantine, muting the forces of stigma against those in quarantine, and crafting and delivering effective and believable communications to a population of mixed cultures and languages also were critical. The need for officials to develop consistent quarantine policies, procedures, and public messages across jurisdictional boundaries was paramount.

Battling 21st-Century Scourges with a 14th-Century Toolbox1

A range of quarantine approaches were used in five jurisdictions heavily affected by the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003. Implementation of modern quarantine was resource intensive, involved coordination of multiple sectors of society, frequently required new legislative actions or authorities, and was highly dependent on effective communication. In Toronto, Ontario, Canada, quarantine ranged from home quarantine with active surveillance to enhanced passive surveillance augmented by education about prevention and a contact number to call if symptoms developed. Healthcare workers were occasionally required to adhere to quarantine. New legislation in Ontario authorized compulsory quarantine with active follow-up for compliance. Although 30,000 people in Toronto were recommended for quarantine, enforcement orders had to be issued in only 27 instances. A comprehensive infrastructure was developed to support those in quarantine; masks, thermometers, food, and financial assistance, as well as psychosocial support, were provided. Should SARS return to Toronto, the same measures would be used to ensure that close contacts of infected persons are isolated and actively monitored. In Taiwan, from April 28 to July 4, 2003, travelers arriving from World Health Organization–designated SARS-affected areas were quarantined for 10 days (level B quarantine). During the SARS epidemic, 50,319 persons who were close contacts of SARS patients were placed under level A quarantine; suspected or probable SARS was diagnosed for 112 (0.22%). A total of 80,813 persons were placed under level B quarantine; 21 (0.03%) of these cases were diagnosed as suspected or probable SARS. The strategies were later modified as understanding of the infectivity of SARS increased, so that close contacts and travelers from local transmission areas were required to follow guidelines of self health management, including isolation at home only when they had a fever. Fever monitoring at international ports initially continued year-round; its ongoing utility will be further examined. Singapore relied on effective quarantine of all persons who had unprotected close contact with symptomatic case-patients. Critical systems were implemented for quarantine policy and practice, legislative backing, communications, enforcement and surveillance, safeguards on public transport and hospital visits, financial support, operational costs, and compensation. As the gravity of the situation became clear, the Infectious Diseases Act was invoked to impose quarantine on exposed, potentially infectious persons. A Quarantine Board was set up to assist with decisions on a case-by-case basis. An important lesson was the value of clear communication. As part of a comprehensive financial and social support system, the government offered an allowance to self-employed persons to compensate for part of their lost income and to establishments with affected employees. In Hong Kong, medical services were severely disrupted when 380 healthcare workers became ill with SARS. From April to June 2003, the economy lost an estimated U.S.$3 billion, gross domestic product growth fell by 3.7%, and exports slumped by 13.9%. SARS was controlled by a combination of measures, including disease surveillance, isolation of cases, heightened infection control, contact tracing, quarantine, entry and exit screening, and community engagement. Hospital isolation facilities and infection control training were strengthened by adding 1,000 extra isolation beds and a U.S.$20 million training fund. Retrospective analysis showed that SARS developed in 2.7% of household contacts in home quarantine, and approximately 90% of all case-patients had an identifiable epidemiologic link. Entry and exit screenings that use health declarations and temperature checks, which detected only two cases during the outbreak, have covered 90 million passengers, 5,000 of whom had fever. Addressing surge capacity was a key issue, in which the private medical sector and nongovernmental organizations proved pivotal in providing medical services, community education, and support for emergency operations, including quarantine both at home and at dedicated residential facilities. Beijing, China, experienced the world's largest outbreak of SARS in spring 2003 with 2,521 reported probable cases. Quarantine played an important role in controlling the outbreak. By July 1, a total of 30,178 persons, 0.21% of the Beijing population, had been quarantined. Most close contacts were quarantined at home (60%); the rest were at designated sites, including hotels, universities, and construction worksites. In late April, fever checks were instituted at the airport, major train stations, and all 71 roads connecting Beijing to other areas; these sites used infrared thermometers to screen and axillary thermometers to confirm fever among passengers. As of June 30, 2003, of almost 14 million people screened, only 12 probable cases of SARS were identified. All healthcare workers in SARS-designated hospitals had to stay in designated hotels close to the hospitals rather than at home. After finishing their work with SARS patients, they were sent to resort areas for 2 more weeks. Top challenges for implementing quarantine included tracing contacts, maintaining movement restrictions even at home, and finding the resources to provide 10,000 people with supplies and psychological care. Nonetheless, the same quarantine measures will be implemented if SARS returns.

Models of infection: person to person

When faced with a spreading infection, public health workers want to predict its path and severity so they can make decisions about vaccination strategies, quarantine policy, and the use of public health resources. This is true whether the pathogen's dispersion is natural (for example, the spread of influenza in 1918) or deliberate (for example, the spread of anthrax via terrorism). Effective mathematical models can help us test a public health policy's potential outcome and initiate an effective response. In this problem, we focus on a simplified model of the spread of an infection and develop some tools that lend insight into its behavior. To make our problem as easy as possible, we impose some rather artificial assumptions. Suppose we have nm patients in a hospital ward and that their beds are arranged as n rows of m beds. For convenience, we'll let m be an even number. Suppose also that one of the patients, the one in bed m/2 in row [n/2], becomes infected and can infect any patient in a neighboring bed. How will this infection spread through the ward? The article presents a Markov model and a Monte Carlo simulation to solve this problem.

MSJAMA. Politics of quarantine in the 19th century.

MSJAMA. Politics of quarantine in the 19th century.

MSJAMA. Human immunodeficiency virus and quarantine in Cuba.

IN 1986, 1 YEAR AFTER DOCUMENTING ITS FIRST CASE OF AIDS, Cuba instituted the world’s only mandatory quarantine policy for people with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection. The Cuban Ministry of Health began widespread HIV testing, focused on but not limited to members of groups considered to be at high risk due to their travel or sexual histories. In 1986 alone, the ministry invested $3 million in testing equipment. By 1993, 12 million tests had been conducted in a country with 11 million citizens. Cubans with HIV infection were confined in newly constructed sanatoriums across the island and were questioned by health workers about past sexual partners for contact tracing and testing. Critics of Cuba’s quarantine policy charged that it violated human rights, while supporters applauded Cuba’s commitment to HIV control. In 1994, the quarantine was officially lifted. However, by 2003, half of all HIVpositive Cubans still lived in the sanatoriums. Cuba’s early response to HIV was unique in the world, but so were the circumstances of its quarantine. First, as an island and a Communist country, Cuba was geographically, politically, and socially isolated from North American and Western European countries that reported high HIV infection rates. Second, Cuba’s Communist political culture did not recognize individual rights as an impediment to its public health measures. Third, compared with other resource-poor nations, Cuba had a well-developed health care system that assigned a primary care physician to all citizens and conducted routine surveillance for infectious disease, and in which universal HIV testing and contact tracing was theoretically feasible. In addition, the Cuban government prioritized HIV care and by the 1990s devoted $15 million to $20 million annually to providing antiretroviral drug therapy, intensive medical care, high-quality food, and housing to quarantined patients. In 2002, the Cuban government reported an HIV prevalence of 0.03%, nearly 11 times lower than that in the United States. International health organizations have reported confidence in Cuba’s HIV reporting system. While Cuban government officials have stated that HIV screening and quarantine were both necessary to maintain the low HIV prevalence on the island, at least 3 other factors could explain the epidemiology of HIV in Cuba. First, since Cuba has been politically and socially isolated from countries with a high prevalence of HIV, social-sexual exchange with regions with high HIV prevalence in the 1980s was limited. Second, Farmer has argued that because of guaranteed minimum levels of income and access to education, housing, and health care, Cubans were less susceptible to important risk factors of HIV transmission such as poverty and social inequality. Third, aggressive HIV screening and subsequent contact tracing and counseling of infected individuals may have slowed the rate of HIV transmission independent of quarantine. No systematic epidemiological studies of HIV infection in Cuba have been published that would clarify the relative effects of quarantine, social/political isolation, living standards, or testing and tracing on HIV infection rates. Although residence in HIV sanatoriums is no longer mandatory for HIV-positive Cubans, Cuba continues to rely on the sanatorium system as transitional counseling and care facilities. In 1997, the Cuban health ministry announced that Cuba’s HIV infection rate was rising. Since Cuba’s economic crisis in the early 1990s, tourism has generated 43% of Cuba’s balance of payments. No longer socially isolated, Cuba is home to what the international press describes as a prominent sex trade in Havana centered on tourists. Cuba’s prohibition of unofficial community-based health activism may have impeded grassroots HIV prevention efforts, especially among groups contributing to the majority of new infections, such as men who have sex with men. Meanwhile, sexually active Cubans in Havana have reported feeling less susceptible to HIV infection via sexual transmission because of Cuba’s rigorous and successful public health measures in controlling infection rates.

The second North Korean nuclear crisis

In 2002 the inclusion of North Korea by the Bush administration within the 'axis of evil' portended a break from the Clinton policy of engagement. Despite the apparent inconsistencies of this categorisation, North Korea's undoubted possession of some weapons of mass destruction capability seemed to make it a possible target for US containment if not preemption. However, Pyongyang's chief motive in such weapons development might actually be to guarantee regime survival. The revelation that North Korea had been developing a covert uranium enrichment program led US policymakers in the Bush administration to contemplate a policy of quarantine and containment. The wider policy community is divided on the question of whether Pyongyang was seeking a new bargain with the US, or whether this program was intended to produce a deterrent from possible US attack. These alternatives prescribe, respectively, a new negotiating approach or a strategy designed to dissuade. But the actual policy choice hinges on the outcome in Iraq.

Simulating the Effect of Quarantine on the Spread of the 1918–19 Flu in Central Canada

Quarantine is often proposed and sometimes used to control the spread of infectious diseases through a human population. Yet there is usually little or no information on the effectiveness of attempting to quarantine humans that is not of an anecdotal or conjectural nature. This paper describes how a compartmental model for the geographic spread of infectious diseases can be used to address the potential effectiveness of human quarantine. The model is applied to data from the historical record in central Canada around the time of the 1918–19 influenza epidemic. Information on the daily mobility patterns of individuals engaged in the fur trade throughout the region prior to, during, and immediately after the epidemic are used to determine whether rates of travel were affected by informal quarantine policies imposed by community leaders. The model is then used to assess the impact of observed differences in travel on the spread of the epidemic. Results show that when mobility rates are very low, as in this region, quarantine practices must be highly effective before they alter disease patterns significantly. Simulation results suggest, though, that effectiveness varies depending on when the limitation on travel between communities is implemented and how long it lasts, and that a policy of introducing quarantine at the earliest possible time may not always lead to the greatest reduction in cases of a disease.

Fungal and nematode threats to Australian forests and amenity trees from importation of wood and wood products1

A combination of geographical isolation and effective quarantine practices has excluded many serious pathogens of trees from Australia. The international trade in untreated wood and wood products, including dunnage, has increased the likelihood of the introduction of exotic pathogens and decay fungi and their becoming established and deleteriously affecting the current relatively healthy status of Australia's native and plantation forests, and amenity trees. Forest pathogens such as Heterobasidion annosum, Fusarium circinatum, Bursaphelenchus xylophilus, Puccinia psidii, and Phellinus pini are considered serious threats to plantation forests in Australia. The potential impact, if the more serious exotic pathogens of forests were to be introduced, would not only be the loss of a few seasons' crops, but also the loss of decades of effort and investment in plantations, as well as irreparable damage to the native biota and wood resources. Effective quarantine policies and procedures are necessary to prevent the entry of these pathogens into Australia.Key words: quarantine, wood, fungal pathogens, nematodes, risk.

Exploring the regional implications of interstate quarantine policies in Western Australia

As a signatory of the World Trade Organization Agreement, Australia has a responsibility to ensure the behaviour of its internal markets for food and food-related products abide by the same rules and regulations as international trade. This has generated a need to demonstrate the validity of any measures that restrict competition to avoid disputes and/or retaliatory actions by other signatories. This paper explores a spatial economic evaluation technique that can be used to examine the welfare implications of quarantine policies for regionalised industries, and demonstrates practical application of this technique using two case studies of interstate trade within Australia.