Scalar Implicatures Research Articles

Relevance without existence: Experimenting on blind implicatures with empty domains

The present paper presents experimental evidence confirming that contextually mismatching scalar implicatures can be generated even when quantifiers range over empty domains. In the literature, this possibility has been interpreted as providing further evidence for a grammatical approach to scalar implicatures. The main result presented here is that scalar sentences with empty domains are judged as more infelicitous when associated with a mismatching implicature than variants with the same empty domains but associated with a non-mismatching implicature. We interpret this result as suggesting that the infelicity judgment associated with the first kind of sentence stems from the cumulative effect of the mismatching implicature and the contextual domain emptiness. Compared to previous literature on blind implicatures, our results indicate that the body of knowledge involved in relevance assignments is restricted to ignoring existential determination while still considering the properties attributed to nonexistent entities. They also show that, while not blocking implicature generation, contextual domain emptiness plays a role in speakers’ evaluation of scalar sentences, reflecting the unconscious nature of scalar implicature generation.

Quantity implicature interpretations in bilingual population: the case of Imbabura Kichwa.

Most studies on the pragmatic interpretation of existential quantifiers have been conducted in major Indo-European languages like English, Spanish, French, and Greek, focusing mainly on monolingual participants. However, in indigenous linguistic research, especially experimental research, it is crucial to consider several linguistic and extra-linguistic factors for successful implementation. Our research centered on the experimental investigation of the pragmatic interpretation of the quantifier wakin, meaning some in Kichwa, with Kichwa-Spanish bilingual adults from the province of Imbabura Ecuador. We employed the Truth Value Judgement Task (TVJT) for our experiments and incorporated the explicit Question Under Discussion (QUD) paradigm to facilitate pragmatic interpretations among our participants. Our initial experiment revealed a 78% acceptance level for the pragmatic interpretation of "some, but not all" in Kichwa, significantly lower than the 95% acceptance range observed in other languages. We hypothesized that access to technology and formal education might influence these results, leading us to simplify our experiment by eliminating the technological components of the research. In our subsequent experiment, adult speakers of Imbabura Kichwa achieved a 97% accuracy level, comparable to speakers of other languages. To benchmark our results against speakers of other languages under similar conditions, we evaluated whether Spanish speakers from two varieties in Ecuador (Quito and Guayaquil) could generate the "some, but not all" scalar implicature with the Spanish quantifier algunos. Our findings indicated that speakers achieved 95.5 and 97.4% accuracy for both varieties, respectively. Therefore, this study infers that under optimal conditions, speakers of indigenous languages in rural communities demonstrate commendable performance in experimental linguistic studies. Nonetheless, it underscores the necessity for meticulous planning and distinct handling in experimental studies involving speakers of these languages residing in rural areas without access to technological elements. We propose that such research broadens our comprehension of language utilization in minority communities and positively influences language restoration efforts by expanding experimental linguistics studies to indigenous languages.

Pragmatic competence and pragmatic tolerance in foreign language acquisition—revisiting the case of scalar implicatures

Abstract Previous L2 studies used binary Truth-Value-Judgment (TVJ) tasks to investigate L1–L2 differences in scalar implicature derivation (some X implicates some but not all X). They examined participants’ judgments of sentences with weak scalar expressions (“Timothy ate some of the pretzels”) when stronger ones are true (“Timothy ate all of the pretzels”). Some studies indicate adult L2 learners are less likely than L1 users to accept such statements while others found the opposite, concluding that implicature derivation is “costly” for L2 learners, rendering them less pragmatically competent than L1 users. Importantly, related L1 research suggests that TVJ tasks only capture sensitivity to under-informativeness. This sensitivity might be completely overridden by metalinguistic attitudes in binary tasks, whereas graded tasks reveal nuanced judgment patterns. Exploring L2 response behaviors, we tested English L1 speakers and competent German L2 English learners using binary and graded tasks. In both tasks, we found evidence of pragmatic responding with no evidence of differences between groups. Bayes factor analyses of the graded data favored H0 over the hypotheses that L2 learners provide fewer or more rejections to under-informative input than L1 learners. We explore implications for L2 learners’ pragmatic abilities, differences with previous studies, and the role of TVJ tasks in under-informative contexts.

Challenges with computing scalar and ad-hoc implicatures in Mandarin-speaking 4–8-year-old autistic children

IntroductionMixed findings have been reported about the computation of scalar or/and ad-hoc implicatures in primarily school-age autistic verbal children and adolescents: while some studies reported their struggles with both implicatures, others observed their strengths in computing scalar implicatures. This study extends the previous investigation by testing the derivation of scalar (including both number and quantifier) and ad-hoc implicatures of a younger group of Mandarin-speaking autistic 4–8-year-olds; moreover, we assess the biological, linguistic, and cognitive factors affecting children's implicature acquisition. MethodsThe participants included 22 4–8-year-old autistic verbal children (mean age = 67.64 months) and 19 typically developing (TD) children who did not significantly differ in age, receptive vocabulary, and non-verbal IQ. Both groups completed a computer-based Truth Value Judgment task, assessing their knowledge of scalar (involving the number ‘three’ and the quantifier ‘some’) and ad-hoc implicatures. We also examined whether their implicature computation was linked to age, receptive vocabulary, non-verbal IQ, and Theory of Mind (ToM). ResultsCompared with the TD controls, autistic children derived significantly fewer scalar and ad-hoc implicatures. Specifically, TD children successfully computed number and ad-hoc implicatures, contrasting to the bimodal distribution of their pragmatic vs. logical responses to quantifier implicatures. Though autistic children performed better with number implicatures slightly above the chance level, they had difficulties in computing quantifier and ad-hoc implicatures. Further, autistic children's knowledge of the number and ad-hoc implicatures was linked to their ToM skills. ConclusionsThese findings underscore the overall delayed implicature knowledge of young autistic children, and their low sensitivity to the implicatures is related to the core ToM deficits. Furthermore, our data confirm the coherent pattern of the earlier acquisition of number over quantifier implicatures and illuminate the distinct mechanisms underlying the computation of scalar vs. ad-hoc implicatures.

<i>Not very easy</i>: Towards the unification of scalar implicature and understatement

Modified and unmodified gradable adjectives give rise to two distinct and opposing varieties of pragmatic enrichment: scalar implicature and understatement. While earlier work in pragmatics took these to be complementary inferences derived from opposing conversational principles, more recent work in the formal tradition has placed the focus firmly on scalar implicature and related phenomena, with no attempt to also account for understatement. In this paper I argue that there are good reasons to pursue a unified treatment of the two, and outline one possible way of doing so, framed within the commitment approach to assertion, where I take the commitments that come with asserting a proposition to encompass not only liability for its truth but also acceptance of the social consequences of expressing it. I further discuss how this approach can shed light on recent experimental findings regarding the role of lexical semantics in the pragmatic inferences available to gradable adjectives, as well as a puzzle that these findings pose.

Scalar implicature

Abstract Scalar implicature is a very interesting topic in linguistic pragmatics. This study is intended to argue that, based on the Cognitive Grammar paradigm, scalar implicature is contextually activated by schematic networks. From a hierarchical perspective, those linguistic units sharing the same schema can be compared; from a horizontal perspective, these units are distributed from the stronger to the weaker in terms of semantic inclusion. The encyclopedic nature of context determines that using a weaker lexical item to implicate the denial of a stronger statement has become a cognitive routine which is presumed to be shared by the speaker and hearer. The study concludes that scalar implicature lies in between semantics and pragmatics.

Implicature priming, salience, and context adaptation

Recent experimental research has observed two kinds of priming effects on quantity implicatures. One is the Strong–Weak contrast, where more quantity implicatures are observed after prime trials forcing interpretations with quantity implicatures (‘Strong primes’) than after prime trials forcing interpretations without quantity implicatures (‘Weak primes’). The other effect is the Alternative-Weak contrast, where prime trials mentioning alternative expressions (‘Alternative primes’) similarly lead to more quantity implicatures. It has been claimed that both of these effects should be understood in terms of increased salience of alternative expressions used to compute quantity implicatures. We present experimental evidence that speaks against this hypothesis. With the help of novel baseline conditions, which were absent in previous studies on implicature priming, we observe that the results in the priming paradigm commonly used in the literature are inverse preference effects in the sense that robust priming effects are observed towards interpretations that are normally unexpected, and depending on the baseline expectation, each of the three prime types mentioned above may have priming effects. We furthermore investigated different types of alternative priming for so-called ad hoc implicatures and found that for these implicatures, presenting an alternative expression in a simple sentence does not have a priming effect on the implicature of a similarly simple sentence, but presenting it in a more complex conjunctive construction does. Our results also show that conjunctions of similar but irrelevant expressions have a similarly robust priming effect and that conjunctive sentences with two conjuncts do not give rise to priming effects on the interpretation of sentences of the same syntactic complexity, but those with three conjuncts do. To make sense of these observations, we propose that what crucially matters for priming implicatures is incremental change in one’s probabilistic expectations about the current conversational context brought about by a process we call context adaptation.

The Informativeness/Complexity Trade-Off in the Domain of Boolean Connectives

I apply the model of semantic universals in terms of informativeness/complexity trade-off (Kemp, Xu, and Regier 2018) to Boolean connectives. The model explains the crosslinguistic absence of the connective , once theoretical insights from Horn 1972 and Katzir and Singh 2013 are incorporated. The lack of follows if languages optimize the trade-off between (a) simplicity of the lexicon measured in terms of primitive symbols and (b) informativeness of the lexicon measured in terms of accurate transfer of information, given scalar implicature. The analysis demonstrates that the model provides a promising insight into the nature of lexicalization in logical vocabularies.

Theory of Mind and Evidentiality Acquisition in Heritage Bilingual Aymara-Spanish Children in the North of Chile

Abstract The present work examines the connection between language and conceptual development, investigating whether false-belief reasoning (FBR) and source-monitoring ability (SMA), abilities within the theory of mind (ToM) framework, trigger the comprehension of semantic and pragmatic knowledge (evidential scalar implicatures) encoded in the evidentiality structure (Papafragou et al., 2007). Furthermore, the present work examines whether age modulates the comprehension of ToM abilities, and whether age influences comprehension of grammar knowledge encoded in the target structure. Twenty-one bilingual Aymara-Spanish heritage children performed one FBR task and one SMA task. In addition, the same group and 15 bilingual Aymara-Spanish adults performed one semantic and one pragmatic Aymara evidentiality task. The results showed that age was relevant in developing ToM abilities and comprehending the target structure’s evidential semantic features. Furthermore, the results demonstrated that semantic features had a positive relationship with the acquisition of ToM abilities, as opposed to pragmatic knowledge. These outcomes suggest that the computation of Aymara evidential scalar implicatures is lexically driven as opposed to contextually driven.

The derivation of direct and indirect scalar implicatures in L1 and L2

Pragmatic inference, which examines how words rise in a context, is a crucial aspect of human communication and has been widely studied. This paper aimed to address the gap by focusing on direct (DSIs) and indirect (ISIs) scalar implicatures, which are examples of pragmatic inferences that emerge based on scaled informativity. Although DSIs and ISIs share a common derivation mechanism, they exhibit superficial differences that may impact their processing. To investigate this, a covered box test was conducted on a group of thirty native Arabic speakers learning English at Mutah University in Jordan. Results showed that participants had no difficulty computing both types of scalar implicatures (SIs) and tended to provide more pragmatic interpretations than logical ones. DSIs and ISIs seem to share the exact mechanism of derivation, even though indirect scalar implicatures drew fewer generation rates compared to direct ones. Additionally, the use of ‘partitive of’ had no significant effect on the derivation rates of either type of SIs. The study offers recommendations for future research in this area.

The cognitive cost of deriving implicature: A reaction-time study

If A asks B “Do you like berries?”, and B replies “I like some berries,” B would infer that A does not like all kinds of berries. Such inference derived by negating the stronger alternative (all) is known as the scalar implicature (SI). Earlier experimental studies showed that computation of SI requires additional processing time compared to literal interpretation, and hence they argued that derivation of implicature is cost-demanding. Some recent experiments, however, found that derivation of implicature does not require any additional processing cost. The present study re-examines the comprehension of implicature using a Truth Value Judgement task. The hypothesis of this study is that the computation of implicature is as immediate as the computation of literal meaning if the sentences are preceded by prior context and communicative intent as in real conversation. The study uses a two-between-subject design where 32 native English speakers were required to read a ‘context’, followed by a ‘question’ and an ‘answer’. The context followed by the question either demanded the lower-bounded ‘literal’ meaning or the upper-bounded ‘pragmatic’ meaning of the under-informative answers which is the implicature. The result indicates that when a prior context and a clear communicative intent guide the hearer toward the intended meaning, both literal and pragmatic meaning comprehension is immediate. The result certainly indicates against the Default Inference accounts, but it also opposes the Literal-first hypothesis of the Contextualist school. The result strongly supports the Constraint-Based account of implicature derivation and brings additional support to the studies which argue for immediate implicature computation.

Perspective-taking in deriving implicatures: The listener's perspective is important too

Theories of meaning propose that listeners understand a speaker's implicit meaning thanks to mutually assumed norms of conversation that take into account what the speaker has said, as well as contextual factors, including what the speaker knows. Emerging psycholinguistic research shows that listeners derive a particular kind of implicit meaning, quantity implicatures, when their speaker is knowledgeable about the situation but tend to not derive it otherwise. In this article we focus on if and how listeners use the knowledge that is available only to themselves, i.e., the listener's perspective, while deriving implicatures. To do so, we explore the derivation of ad hoc quantity implicature in situations where the speaker does or does not have full knowledge, while, in the latter case, the listener has two types of privileged knowledge. Two versions of a study with neurotypical English-speaking adults show that listeners are influenced by their own perspective while deriving implicatures, depending on the type of knowledge available to them. We discuss the implications of these findings for models of pragmatic interpretative strategies.

A corpus-based examination of scalar diversity.

The phenomenon of scalar diversity refers to the well-replicated finding that different scalar expressions give rise to scalar implicatures (SIs) at different rates. Previous work has shown that part of the scalar diversity effect can be explained by theoretically motivated factors. Although the effect has been established only in controlled experiments using manually constructed stimuli, there has been a tendency to assume that the marked differences in inference rates that have been observed reflect differences to be found in naturally occurring discourse. We explore whether this is the case by sampling actual language usage involving a wide range of scalar expressions. Adopting the approach in Degen (2015), we investigated the scalar diversity effect in a corpus of Twitter data we constructed. We find that the phenomenon of scalar diversity attenuates significantly when measured in a corpus-based paraphrase task. Although the degree of "scalar diversity" varies, we find that factors derived from theories of SI can explain nearly two-thirds of the variation. This remains the case whether the variation is observed in controlled experiments or in the context of natural language use. As for the remaining variation, we hypothesize that it may be due to a high level of uncertainty about whether adjectival scalar expressions should undergo scalar enrichment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Priming scalar and ad hoc enrichment in children

Sentences can be enriched by considering what the speaker does not say but could have done. Children, however, struggle to derive one type of such enrichments, scalar implicatures. A popular explanation for this, the lexical alternatives account, is that they do not have lexical knowledge of the appropriate alternatives to generate the implicature. Namely, children are unaware of the scalar relationship between some and all. We conducted a priming study with N = 72 children, aged 5;1 years, and an adult sample, N = 51, to test this hypothesis. Participants were exposed to prime trials of strong, alternative, or weak sentences involving scalar or ad hoc expressions, and then saw a target trial that could be interpreted in either way. Consistent with previous studies, children were reluctant to derive scalar implicatures. However, there were two novel findings. (1) Children responded with twice the rate of ad hoc implicature responses than adults, suggesting that the implicature was the developmentally prior interpretation for ad hoc expressions. (2) Children showed robust priming effects, suggesting that children are aware of the scalar relationship between some and all, even if they choose not to derive the implicature. This suggests that the root cause of the scalar implicature deficit is not due to the absence of lexical knowledge of the relationship between some and all.

A closer look at the sources of variability in scalar implicature derivation: a review

For more than 20 years, studies in experimental pragmatics have provided invaluable insights into the cognitive processes involved in deriving scalar implicatures and achieving inferential comprehension. However, the reports have always contained a notable degree of variability that remained inadequately discussed in the literature. For instance, upon closer inspection of the experimental record, one can always find a group of individuals who tend to be largely pragmatic, overwhelmingly logical, or sometimes mixed not showing a clear preference. There also exist newly-devised paradigms that prompt a radically different type of response than other paradigms, and thus new evidence casting doubt on long-established findings in the field. More recent research on scalar diversity further suggests that differences in the semantic structure of scalar words can lead to differing rates of scalar implicatures and can modulate the time invested in pragmatic processing. Indeed, one can contend that the current empirical landscape on scalar implicatures can be characterized as having three primary sources of variability: inter-individual, methodological, and linguistic. What factor or factors are behind these patterns of variability, and how can we interpret them in light of a pragmatic theory? This paper has a 2-fold objective: one is to review the previous experimental record on scalar implicatures from variability-based lenses, and the other to discuss the factor(s) that could account for this observed variability in the literature. Avenues for future research are provided.

Portions and countability: A crosslinguistic investigation

AbstractWe examine three constructions across several languages in which a mass noun is embedded in what appears to be a count environment, but the construction as a whole remains mass. We argue that the discussed phenomena—“Q-noun” constructions like lots of water, bare measure constructions like kilos of sugar, and pluralised mass nouns in languages like Greek and Persian—all involve portioning-out of the embedded mass denotation. We provide a structural account of portioning out and propose structures that derive both mass and count portioning out. Adopting an overlap-based approach to the mass/count distinction (e.g. Landman 2011; Rothstein 2011; Khrizman et al. 2015; Landman 2016) we provide a compositional semantics for the proposed structures.The examined phenomena all share an inference of large quantity or abundance that, we argue, cannot be reduced to the lexical meaning of the portioning-out expression, nor to a multiplicity inference contributed by plural morphology. We show that our cases of mass portioning-out involve a total order ≤ on portion size and propose to analyse the abundance inference in terms of an uninformativity-based Quantity implicature, following the analysis of the positive form (Mary is tall) in Rett’s (2015) approach to adjectival gradability.

Scalar implicatures with discourse referents: a case study on plurality inferences

This paper explores the idea that scalar implicatures are computed with respect to discourse referents. Given the general consensus that a proper account of pronominal anaphora in natural language requires discourse referents separately from the truth-conditional meaning, it is naturally expected that the anaphoric information that discourse referents carry play a role in the computation of scalar implicatures, but the literature has so far mostly exclusively focused on the truth-conditional dimension of meaning. This paper offers a formal theory of scalar implicatures with discourse referents couched in dynamic semantics, and demonstrates its usefulness through a case study on the plurality inferences of plural nouns in English.

Slowdowns in scalar implicature processing: Isolating the intention-reading costs in the Bott & Noveck task

An underinformative sentence, such as Some cats are mammals, is trivially true with a semantic (some and perhaps all) reading of the quantifier and false with a pragmatic (some but not all) one, with the latter reliably resulting in longer response times than the former in a truth evaluation task (Bott & Noveck, 2004). Most analyses attribute these prolonged reaction times, or costs, to the steps associated with the derivation of the scalar implicature. In the present work we investigate, across three experiments, whether such slowdowns can be attributed (at least partly) to the participant's need to adjust to the speaker's informative intention. In Experiment 1, we designed a web-based version of Bott & Noveck's (2004) laboratory task that would most reliably provide its classic results. In Experiment 2 we found that over the course of an experimental session, participants' pragmatic responses to underinformative sentences are initially reliably long and ultimately comparable to response times of logical interpretations to the same sentences. Such results cannot readily be explained by assuming that implicature derivation is a consistent source of processing effort. In Experiment 3, we further tested our account by examining how response times change as a function of the number of people said to produce the critical utterances. When participants are introduced (via a photo and description) to a single ‘speaker’, the results are similar to those found in Experiment 2. However, when they are introduced to two ‘speakers’, with the second ‘speaker’ appearing midway (after five encounters with underinformative items), we found a significant uptick in pragmatic response latencies to the underinformative item right after participants' meet their second speaker (i.e. at their sixth encounter with an underinformative item). Overall, we interpret these results as suggesting that at least part of the cost typically attributed to the derivation of a scalar implicature is actually a consequence of how participants think about the informative intentions of the person producing the underinformative sentences.

Processing cost effects of atypicality inferences in a dual-task setup

Whether pragmatic inferences are cognitively more effortful than processing literal language has been a longstanding question in pragmatics. So far, experimental studies have exclusively tested generalized (scalar) implicatures. Current theories would predict that particularized implicatures should be cognitively effortful – however, this prediction has to date not been tested empirically. The present article contributes to the debate by investigating a specific type of particularized implicature, atypicality inferences, in a dual-task paradigm. In three experiments, we used either a non-linguistic (Experiment 1) or a linguistic (Experiments 2 and 3) secondary task, to modulate the amount of available cognitive resources. Our results show that the strength of pragmatic inferences is largely unaffected by the secondary task, which contrasts with prior predictions. We discuss the implications for traditional and modern accounts of pragmatic processing.

Pragmatic responses to under-informative some-statements are not scalar implicatures

A highly emblematic paradigm in experimental pragmatics consists in presenting participants with an existentially quantified sentence of the form Some X are Y in a context in which all X are obviously Y. Participants who reject such sentences as false or infelicitous are said to adopt a ‘pragmatic’ instead of a ‘logical’ reading of some, and to derive the scalar implicature Some, but not all X are Y. Although there are several competing accounts of scalar implicatures, virtually all of them assume that a participant who responds pragmatically to an under-informative some-sentence mentally entertains a linguistic representation of the negation of a stronger alternative (All X are Y). Yet, there is no evidence that judging an under-informative some-sentence false or infelicitous actually involves the derivation of the some, but not all scalar implicature. We report three experiments consisting of a sentence-picture verification task followed by a forced choice between two paraphrases of the sentence initially assessed. These experiments robustly show that hearers who reject an under-informative some-sentence do so without explicitly entertaining a some, but not all implicature. Our results represent a strong challenge for grammatical accounts of scalar implicature, which all presuppose a mechanism of negation of stronger alternatives, and force a drastic reinterpretation of processing data on scalar implicatures. More generally, our findings show that one should not conflate psychological models of pragmatic processing with a reconstructed link between sentences and their potential meanings.