Qaeda Network Research Articles

Islamophobia Dan Dampaknya Bagi Kehidupan Beragama Di Indonesia

Abstract The collapse of the US superpower WTC and the Pentagon In 2011 which was done by Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, made the negative impact into Islam and Muslims, created image that far from the real essence of Islam. A series of suicide bombings in the name of Jihad, has brought the negative essence of Islam far from its nature; peace. In the end, Islamophobia emerged as a fear of Islam and of all matter that related to it. This study try to to reveal the emergence of Islamophobia in Indonesia and its impact on the harmony between religions in Indonesia. This research is a qualitative research, with the library research methods. The data were taken from journals, e-books, bulletins, dissertations, theses, and other literatures. The purpose of this study is to explain the emerge of islamophobia and its impact. The result of this study is that the emergence of Islamophobia begins with a person's fear of the repetition of the glory of Islam as in its previous golden age. The danger of Islamophobia is always accompanied by suspicious, false perception and in long term can abolish the harmony between religions in Indonesia

Universal soldiers or parochial actors: Understanding jihadists as products of their environments

ABSTRACTWhy did the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN)—two groups that shared similar ideological preferences and were both initially part of the Al Qaeda network—take different paths in the Syrian conflict? Part of the answer lies in the fact that JN is primarily a Syrian organization, whereas Iraqis lead ISIS. A jihadist group’s relationship to its country of origin and domicile (the two are not always the same) helps to explain that organization’s ideological preferences and alliance behavior. Yet no method of categorization based on jihadist-state relations exists. I fill this gap by theorizing an explanatory typology based on a jihadist group’s relationship with its country of origin and/or domicile. This typology consists of two tiers. The first classifies jihadist organizations based on whether they are nationally homogeneous or heterogeneous, and whether they are based in their country of origin, exile, or multiple locations. The second tier categorizes groups based on the nature of their engagement—collaborative, belligerent, or neutral—with a state. This new typology enables the generation of multiple hypotheses and has practical implications given that most U.S. counterterrorism efforts require cooperation from partner nations.

Does Al Qaeda Central still matter?

This article examines whether Al Qaeda Central are still relevant or not. By investigating Al Qaeda Central’s activities, which are aimed at provoking violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as its continuous plots of direct attacks against the US, this article shows that Al Qaeda’s operational capability is stronger than anticipated by the US and other scholars. In addition, Al Qaeda affiliates maintain a close relationship with the group which in turn facilitates Al Qaeda Central’s resiliency. Moreover, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s aggressive support and contribution to the Al Qaeda network indicates that Al Qaeda Central’s longevity depends on its relationship with affiliates. The article concludes that under these conditions, Al Qaeda Central still has a place in global security discussions.

Taking a New Perspective: Mapping the Al Qaeda Network Through the Eyes of the UN Security Council

Network analysis has attracted significant attention when researching the phenomenon of transnational terrorism, particularly Al Qaeda. While many scholars have made valuable contributions to mapping Al Qaeda, several problems remain due to a lack of data and the omission of data provided by international organizations such as the UN. Thus, this article applies a social network analysis and subsequent mappings of the data gleaned from the Security Council's consolidated sanctions list, and asks what they can demonstrate about the structure and organizational characteristics of Al Qaeda. The study maps the Al Qaeda network on a large scale using a newly compiled data set. The analysis reveals that the Al Qaeda network consists of several hundred individual and group nodes connecting almost all over the globe. Several major nodes are crucial for the network structure, while simultaneously many other nodes only weakly and foremost regionally connect to the network. The article concludes that the findings tie in well to the latest research pointing to local and simultaneously global elements of Al Qaeda, and that the new data is a valuable source for further analyses, potentially in combination with other data.

Экстремистская группировка “Боко Харам” в Нигерии: угроза местного или глобального уровня?

Among issues of the US-Africa summit in August 2014 the problem of religious extremism in Africa was most important. In that context Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram plays a significant role. Kidnapping by Boko Haram militants of about 200 schoolgirls in April 2014 added oil to the fire. This action increased the fears of international community about possible linkage between Boko Haram and foreign Al Qaeda-like terrorist organizations. Initially, the group emerged as a local movement of devout Muslims in Northern Nigeria. But eventually it became a very radical militant Salafi-Jihadist group with ambitious goal to build an Islamic state in Nigeria. As is well-known, Nigerian population is divided not only into relatively rich South and poor North, but also into Christian and Muslim communities. As a result of sectarian clashes in Nigeria, thousands people lost their lives. The sectarian violence in this country is connected in part with the Islamist revolt of 1999 (“Sharia conflict”), after adoption of Sharia law in several Northern Nigerian states. Ethnic-religious violence in Nigeria is connected in particular with the British colonial heritage, but also with current serious social-economic problems (including the unemployment, corruption, cruelty of security services, unbalanced national economy etc.). From some point of view Nigeria may be considered even as a “failed state” because its federal government cannot control the whole territory of the country. While some southern regions are under control of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta militants, some areas in northern states are controlled by Islamists of Boko Haram and other radical groups. It's possible to say that Boko Haram has created its own “state within the state”. Boko Haram's ideology is anti-Western and anti-secular. It supports the revival of “pure” Islamic traditional values. Denying any inter-communion with the Western world, above all, the group claims against corrupted – from its point of view – Nigerian authorities and Muslim establishment (local version of the Islamist "Close Enemy"). An issue of the Boko Haram's engagement to global Jihadist movement is rather unclear. On one hand, ideologically, the group is very close to other Islamist groups (e.g. Al Qaeda and its branches in Maghreb, Somalia and Arabic Peninsula). But on the other hand, Boko Haram prefers to act against domestic (Nigerian) targets with very rare exclusions (for instance, an explosion of UN building in the capital-city Abuja). It must be clear that some attempts to find links between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda's network reflect the interest of Nigeria's authority to win international support for its struggle against local Islamist radicals. But it is impossible to ignore the information about logistical and operational links between Nigerian militants and such terrorist organizations as “Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb” or Somalian “Al Shaabab” (not to speak of common ideological agenda). It is necessary to point out that factional splits inside of Boko Haram (e.g. the emergence of the militant group “Ansaru”) make the picture more complex. Actually, the Boko Haram constitutes a danger primarily for Nigeria and potentially for neighboring countries. But considering the current evolution of the group, there is a great danger of further radicalization and internationalization of its activities both at local and regional (and maybe global) levels.

Al Qaeda’s Post-bin Laden Resurgence: The Paradox of Resilience and Failure

The Barack Obama administration’s May 2013 assessment of al Qaeda’s weakness and fracturing in the post-bin Laden era has been greeted with indignation by both liberals and conservatives. They believe al Qaeda is stronger than ever in the wake of the Arab Spring. These critics, however, misunderstand the network’s dysfunctional direction. Al Qaeda’s “resurgence” is likely to lead to its failure. The argument proceeds on four levels: (1) the dramatic growth of the al Qaeda network masks its internal weakness and organizational splintering; (2) the Arab Spring has led to a burst of al Qaeda activism that is likely to undermine its jihadist cause; (3) al Qaeda’s fragmentation and its multiple trajectories in the post-9/11 era violate bin Laden’s original intent and are beyond al Qaeda Central’s direction; and (4) the dysfunctional nature of al Qaeda’s ideology and its excessive reliance on takfiri violence is paradoxically a source of both persistence and failure.

On the Somalia Dilemma: Adding Layers of Complexity to an Already Complex Emergency

If there were any doubt that the current humanitarian crisis in southern Somalia is more the result of fierce political struggles tiian the reoccurrence of drought, the events of the past eight months would clearly confirm this. The justification and wisdom of Kenya's recent invasion of Somalia (October 2011) to protect its northeastern border with Somalia and its important coastal tourist industry can be widely debated. What is less arguable is that the military incursion is not an isolated issue, but rather is connected to a process in southern Somalia that began in the 1990s and took a turn for the worse in 2006. It was in early that the U.S. government put its support behind a weak and very unpopular alliance of warlords, called die Alliance Against Terrorism and the Restoration of Peace (AATRP), to capture or eliminate individuals in Somalia responsible for the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and to stem the influence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). At the time the radical Islamic element of the UIC was relatively minor, and in fact one of its keys leaders, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, is the current president of die Western-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Not surprisingly, the AATRP was badly routed within a few months by an increasingly popular UIC, and its radical elements and their political control were strengthened greatiy, both numerically and geographically, by this victory. As one Somali colleague noted to me during a conversation in Nairobi around that time, is as if the U.S. scored a goal for the opposing team (interview, June 16, 2006). In short, the outside support provided to a group of very unpopular thugs and their armed followers under the rubric of an alliance to fight terrorism only insured the victory of the UICs radical elements and their increased popularity and power in southern Somalia. The youthful al-Shabaab Islamic group, with its ties to global jihadist groups and the al Qaeda network, grew in power due to its successes in defeating the foreign-backed AATRP. As Roland Marchai indicates, Al-Shabaab 's new strength was demonstrated by the number of seats it held in institutions created by the victorious ICU in June and July 2006 (2009:390). With the invasion of Ethiopian forces later that year and their occupation of Mogadishu until January 2009, the radicalization of Islamic politics and the strength of al-Shabaab, which by then had captured die strategic port of Kismayo, grew to the point that it occupied and administered most of southern Somalia right up to the border of Kenya. The invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia, a neighboring state with a long history of strained relations with Somalia and Somalis, served to further fuel local resentment against outsiders and support for a well-armed group like al-Shabaab, which had the capacity and external connections to stand up to outside (foreign) forces. Ethiopia's departure from Somalia, and the handing over of security responsibility for Mogadishu and the fledgling TFG to a small contingent of African Union (A.U.) forces made up of Ugandans and Burundians, only multiplied local perceptions that foreign occupiers were the main allies of the TFG.1 A religious layer added to the complexity of the situation, since the occupying forces, now including Kenya, could be portrayed by al-Shabaab as Christian crusaders and infidels who wanted to defame Islam and its followers. Fast forward now to the failure of the short rainy season (deyr) of October-November 2010 and the disappointing long rains (gu) of March-May 2011, coupled with increased conflict between the al-Shabaab and TFG and A.U. forces, and the conditions for a humanitarian crisis were manifest. However, the current humanitarian crisis really began with the prolonged fighting (2007-8) in Mogadishu during the Ethiopian occupation and die displacement of more than six hundred thousand Somalis from the area. …

Al Qaeda's Foot Soldiers: A Study of the Biographies of Foreign Fighters Killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan Between 2002 and 2006

This article sheds light on the identity and activities of foreign fighters who were active in Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2002 and 2006. This is done through analyzing a series of “martyr biographies”—short biographical stories of killed militants—issued by the Al Qaeda network in 2008. The study argues that there was little migration of foreign fighters from abroad to Afghanistan and Pakistan in this period, and practically no influx of fighters from Iraq. Al Qaeda's activities in the region were upheld by fighters who managed to flee from Afghanistan during and after the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001. After re-settling in the tribal areas of Pakistan, the main concern for these fighters was to fight a guerrilla war against U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, not to plot terrorist attacks in Western countries. The study demonstrates that over time, the foreign fighters became more integrated in local communities. These early developments may help to explain why Al Qaeda continues to enjoy a strong sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan today.

Post-9/11 Responses to Mass Casualty Bombings in Europe: Lessons, Trends and Implications for the United States

This report analyzes the actions taken by emergency responders in three case studies of post-9/11 terrorist attacks in Europe (Istanbul [2003], Madrid [2004] and London [2005]). It also assesses the targeting and tactical information gleaned from three European plots that either failed or were foiled by authorities. The focus of this report is on mass casualty, complex attack scenarios involving explosive or incendiary materials. Although such attacks are not limited to one particular strand of terrorism, the case studies assessed in this report are linked to or inspired by the global jihadist movement spearheaded by the al Qaeda network, since this currently constitutes the most significant threat of mass casualty bombings to the United States.

How to Feud and Rebel: 1. Violence-values among the Chechens and Albanians

AbstractThis article focuses on so-called violence-values (a composite term coined by the author), the first variable of the author's Brutalisation theory, which combines elements from disciplines ranging from anthropology to military psychology. It forms part of my ongoing research, which explores the values (norms, customs, beliefs), aims (objectives, aspirations, ideologies) and methods (targets, tactics, techniques) of violence by Chechen and Albanian separatists during the last Cold War and first post-Cold war periods, i.e. between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 24 December 1979 and the attack by Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda (The Base) network on the United States on 11 September 2001. Through a meticulous exposition—and comparison with international norms—of traditional morals on violence that still are salient in the remarkably similar communities of Chechens and Albanians, the author hopes to underpin his post-constructivist position that a genuine “acting-out” of norms, values and beliefs in vendettas, battles and other contests can shape one's identity, irrespective of whether these attributes are primordial, i.e. factual, or constructed, i.e. invented.

The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda (review)

Reviewed by: The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda Aaron M. Hoffman The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, edited by Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007. 474 pp. $24.95. The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda, edited by Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, is a worthy contribution to the literature on sub-national terrorist activity. Cast as a volume about the use of terrorism over the centuries, it contains a wealth of information in its numerous individual chapters covering subjects ranging from the first century Zealots, to anarchist groups of the 19th century, to the history of suicide operations. Especially important contributions include a revised version of Ariel Merari's seminal paper, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency" and essays by Chaliand and Blin on the numerous manifestations of terrorism throughout history and on the "modern" history of terrorism from 1968 to the present. Yet The History of Terrorism is more than a collection of essays on significant periods in the long history of terrorist activity. The book's real goal is to place the modern threat posed by al Qaeda and related jihadist groups in historical perspective. Chaliand and Blin's argument (the two wrote eight of the seventeen chapters, including all of those designed to summarize significant trends within defined historical periods) is that the current terrorist threat differs from previous ones in that modern jihadist groups are more interested in killing as an end in itself. While this point has been made by many others, the argument that emerges from the book is that the interest in inflicting harm on others is only partly the result of the Al Qaeda network's fanatical attachment to its particular brand of Islam. Also important, but frequently overlooked, is that the nature of target selection by terrorist organizations underwent a lengthy transformation in conjunction with the rise of mass politics and the development of technologies (e.g., dynamite) that made indiscriminate killing possible. In the past, terrorist organizations focused on tyrannicide because the key to influencing politics was influencing leaders, not citizens. Technological barriers also made relatively large-scale attacks difficult. The emergence [End Page 136] of politically influential civilian populations and the weapons capable of injuring or killing several people at once ushered in a period in which civilians, not leaders, became the preferred targets for terrorist violence. Chaliand and Blin's argument about the changing nature of terrorist activity echoes, but does not fully adopt, Walter Laqueuer's thesis in his widely read 1977 book, Terrorism. Whereas Laqueuer is famous for arguing that there are no historical constants when it comes to terrorism, Chaliand and Blin suggest that what has really changed are the particular tactics terrorists use to achieve their goals and the conditions under which they use them. The underlying strategy of terrorism—to intimidate an audience using a minimum of force—is reasonably stable across time whether one examines sub-national groups, like the Irish Republican Army, or state actors, like the French government under Robespierre. If The History of Terrorism has a fault, it is that Chaliand and Blin give less attention than they should to Palestinian and Irish terrorist organizations active in the post-1967 period. Both campaigns are notable for their length and for the contributions they made to the internationalization of terrorist activity through the training of disparate groups from around the world. The Palestinian campaign of this period is particularly important because groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine were central to the creation of terrorism as a mass media event that generated international attention. The Palestinian struggle against Israel is also important because of the apparent motivation it supplied non-Palestinian organizations to take up arms against Western powers. No other ethno-nationalist struggle involving the use of terrorism during the modern period produced as many violent sympathizers. Individual chapters on the Irish and Palestinian cases would have been better than the single chapter discussing both simultaneously that The History of Terrorism included. A chapter covering the Israeli government efforts to deal with Palestinian terrorism also would have been a...

Fighting Cosmic Warriors: Lessons from the First Seven Years of the Global War on Terror

This article argues that a successful strategy for fighting the Global War on Terror (GWOT) requires actions aimed not only at defeating the Al Qaeda network and denying its operatives sanctuary, but also efforts to delegitimize Al Qaeda's ideology; the United States has focused on the former at the expense of the latter. The GWOT requires a new strategy, one that continues to target Al Qaeda operatives and their assets, while undermining Al Qaeda's message. This requires a better understanding of Al Qaeda's ideology, how U.S. foreign policy may fuel that ideology, and a strategy for undermining militant Islam's worldview.

Judicial Review by the European Court of Justice of UN ‘Smart Sanctions’ Against Terror in the Kadi Dispute

In September 2008, the European Court of Justice found EU measures implementing UN Security Council resolutions which had called for the imposition of financial sanctions against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and the Al– Qaeda network to be illegal. In a robust, inward–looking, human rights oriented, constitutionbased judgment, the ECJ provided a venue for indirect judicial review of Security Council resolutions and restored the EU legal order to its constitutional foundations. The ECJ furthermore buttressed the bridges between the EU legal order and the ECHR legal order, while erecting high walls between the former and the international law–UN legal order. The dispute before the EU judiciary highlights the multifaceted nature of modern, multilevel governance (multilateral: UN; regional: European; and national). It juxtaposes multilateralism with regionalism; the need to effectively combat international terrorism with the need to protect human rights; and the predominance in international relations of politics and diplomacy with the predominance of international and EU law. This article tackles all these themes, highlights the importance and complexities of the issues involved and analyses the commendable manner in which the ECJ addressed them.

The London Bombers as “Self-Starters”: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques

The emergence of “self-starter” cells represents a distinct and significant development in the post–9/11 era. These autonomous groups share an ideological affinity with the original Al Qaeda network, but they operate in the absence of any institutionalized training or recruitment. As demonstrated by the case of the London bombers, conventional conceptions of “networks” are ill-suited to analyze groups of this nature. A broader range of sociological models are necessary to deconstruct how and why they form. This phenomenon must be examined with reference to the Internet as an operational tool and “democratizer of violence.”

Theatre in a Time of Terrorism: Renewing Natural Harmony after the Bali Bombing via Wayang Kontemporer

The bombing of the Sari Club on Legian Street, Kuta, Bali, on 12 October 2002 disrupted the natural balance that is sought for in Balinese religion. This article shows how a technically innovative shadow puppet performance that responds to the disaster is informed by the Balinese conception of the natural balance of human life governed by tri hita karana (three elements of harmony) and dasanama kerta (ten elements that cause harmonious prosperity). These ideas provide a context for healing through performance.

Sovereignty under attack: the international society meets the Al Qaeda network

This article examines the complex relations between a violent non-state actor, the Al Qaeda network, and order in the international system. Al Qaeda poses a challenge to the sovereignty of specific states but it also challenges the international society as a whole. This way, the challenge that Al Qaeda represents is putting the survival of the system under risk. Consequently it requires that the international society will collectively respond to meet the threat. But challenges to both the practical sovereignty of states and to the international society do not have to weaken the system. Instead, such challenges if handled effectively may lead to the strengthening of the society of states: a robust international society is dynamic and responsive to threats. Its members could cooperate to adapt the principles and the institutions on which the system is founded to new circumstances. Through its focus on the preservation qualities of the international society this article also reinforces the significance of the English School to the study of international relations. It raises important questions that could be answered in the framework of the English School.

Bridging the Atlantic Divide

FROM SOLIDARITY TO RECRIMINATION IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH of the September 11, 2001, ter rorist attacks, Americans and Europeans surprised each other in positive ways. George W. Bush, who had faced vast protests during his first visit to Europe earlier that summer and who was widely regarded there as an ill-informed cowboy, confounded Europeans' expectations with his patient, careful, and proportionate action in Afghanistan. In turn, Europeans also broke with stereotypes, strongly supporting military action not only against al Qaeda's network but also against its Taliban hosts. European leaders pronounced their unlimited solidarity with the United States, and in a matter of hours NATO allies invoked the Article V mutual defense clause of the North Atlantic Treaty. In a twist that few could have predicted before September n, within a month of the terrorist attacks the United States was conducting a major war halfway around the world, and the biggest problem for its European allies was that they wanted to send more troops than Washington was prepared to accept. Since then, however, relations between the transatlantic allies have sharply deteriorated. Europeans now regularly accuse the United States of a simplistic approach to foreign policy that reduces everything to the military aspects of the war on terrorism. Americans respond with resentment over Europe's unwillingness to support U.S. efforts to deal with hostile states such as Iraq. In the Middle East, the recent cycle of violence between Israelis and Palestinians has prompted Europeans

The EAPC/PfP as an Instrument to Combat Global Terrorism

There is no multilateral security framework whose mandate has not been reexamined – and, in many cases, fundamentally redefined – in the aftermath of 11 September 2001.1 The search for an effective response at a multilateral level to global terrorist networks and the organized crime structures supporting these networks mirrored the extensive national measures and bilateral efforts undertaken to enhance homeland security. While it has been fashionable in academic circles to refer to the blurring of the distinction between national and international security, the magnitude and the nature of the terrorist attacks delivered the most convincing argument in favor of merging and intensifying the coordination between domestic intelligence, foreign policy, and defense policy. The invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was the swiftest multilateral response to the terrorist attacks on the United States masterminded by the al Qaeda network. On 12 September 2001, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) adopted a package of measures designed to combat the scourge of terrorism. Within a week of the terrorist attacks, more than thirty countries had offered disaster relief assistance to the United States through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Center. By December 2001, the EAPC had adopted the new EAPC Action Plan for 2002–2004 based on innovative counter-terrorist approaches suggested in a joint Finnish–Swedish “food-for-thought” paper.2 One year later, at the Prague Summit, the EAPC member states endorsed a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAPT), including practical mechanisms and an action plan ranging from intensified consultation and information sharing and increased prepared-

More than a donation: education with public purpose

President George W. Bush in his televised address to the US congress and the American people announced the commencement of the bombings of Afghanistan to root out the al Qaeda network and overthrow the Taliban government. He concluded his address by asking each American student to donate one dollar to help the children of Afghanistan. President Bush made clear through this gesture that the US war was against the terrorists and not the vulnerable people of the country. His leadership was steady during this tumultuous time but President Bush, unknowingly, missed an unparalleled educational opportunity for students, teachers, parents, and local communities to connect school learning with participatory democracy. Now that monumental events, tragedies, and emotions have subsided, it is time to reflect upon what we mean by education with public purpose and how we narrow the huge disconnect between education, citizenship, and democracy.

Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11

This article examines what has been learned since 11 September 2001 about the nature of twenty-first-century terrorism, the challenges that it poses, and how it must be countered. It attempts to better understand Usama bin Laden and the terrorist entity that he created and to assess whether we are more or less secure as a result of the U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan and the pursuit of the al Qaeda network. The article considers these issues, placing them in the context of the major trends in terrorism that have unfolded in recent months and will likely affect the future course of political violence.