Qaddafi Regime Research Articles

Qaddafi’s Downfall in Libya

Abstract Muammar Qaddafi’s downfall arguably came as a surprise to many given that he had been able to successfully run a personalist regime from 1969 to 2011. This paper examines the factors that led to Qaddafi’s downfall and seeks to determine which ones can be primarily credited with causing the end of his rule. The paper theorizes that there are four main factors that led to Qaddafi’s downfall: a) governance, b) military, c) media, and d) international intervention. It argues that governance and the military proved to be a source of strength up until the Arab Spring—which was an exogenous shock in itself. Out of the four variables, the paper also finds that during the Arab Spring, the external intervention proved to be a detrimental factor for the Qaddafi regime as it destroyed the military apparatus. The protests also brought to the fore the polarization and grievances of the people that had been simmering under the wraps of the personalistic governance model of Qaddafi. Thus, the Arab Spring converted governance and military from sources of strength into sources of weakness, thereby contributing towards Qaddafi’s downfall.

When waiting means trouble: an enquiry into the approach toward prevention against jihadism in Senegal

In the last decade, West Africa has experienced increased activities by Jihadist groups, especially after the fall of the Muammar Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2012. The activities of these groups have gradually spread in the region, with countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso experiencing continued attacks. Taking the current socio-economic, religious and political context of Senegal into consideration, this study interrogates the factors that have so far prevented attacks by Jihadist groups in Senegal, the role that women and youth could play in mitigating jihadism in Senegal, and how the existing social capital in the country, could be further mobilized to foster trust building and social cohesion, thereby enhancing the prevention of violent extremism in the country? Furthermore, the study explores the need for a regional approach in dealing with the existing and emerging threats posed by Jihadist activities in the region. Methodologically, this study uses interviews and Focus Group Discussions to collect primary data from government officials, academics, civil society and international development partners. Secondary data from a wide range of sources are used to analyze the case of Senegal.

UN Security Council Sanctions and Mediation in Libya

Abstract The UN frequently employs sanctions on the same conflicts where it attempts mediation. While both efforts carry a UN stamp, they follow different political logics that are not always coherent with each other: sanctions are enacted by the UN Security Council, while mediation is led by a special representative/envoy of the UN Secretary-General, often on the basis of a Security Council mandate. This article explores two UN interventions in Libya that combined mediation with mandatory sanctions: the conflict leading to the overthrow of the Muammar Qaddafi regime (2011) and the civil war that ensued when the country was split between the first elected parliament and its successor (2014–2015). The Libyan case illustrates that the coherence of mediation and sanctions ultimately depends on the UN Security Council unity of purpose.

A Social and Economic Perspective on the Libyan Conflict. Tribalism and Oil Cases

Abstract The Libyan conflict has become an issue at the global level since its beginning. The foreign aid and support help got by the revolutionaries in their attempt to overthrow the Qaddafi regime and the role of tribes not only during these events but also afterwards, the country’s strategic position and oil reserves are the main points of interest when considering the North African internationalized civil war. While the role played by the tribes in stabilizing the political and social framework still lays at crossroads, being extremely controversial, the economic value and strategic importance of oil, for domestic actors as well as the international ones, are above any doubt.

The Protracted Civil War in Libya: The Role of Outside Powers

The collapse of the Muammar Qaddafi regime was ostensibly the prelude to a democratic Libya. The 2012 election elicited much optimism. By 2014, the domestic situation had taken an unexpected turn for the worse, resulting in two governments, one in the east and one in the west, each supported by numerous militias. While the civil war has pitted Libyans against Libyans, foreign interventions on behalf of opposite side in the conflict have hindered the end of the civil war. Indisputably, foreign interference had begun well before the civil war; however, the military backing to the protagonists has become more pronounced since 2014. The foreign powers involved in the Libyan conflict aim to fulfill specific interests, some of which deriving from the rivalries between those countries. Unless those foreign powers have achieved their goals in Libya, an end to the civil war anytime soon remains unlikely, occasional ceasefires notwithstanding.

Matar’s Representation of Cultural and Political Manifestations of Libya

Writings by Libyans in Western countries remained dormant until recently. Autobiography has been a most favorite genre for the Libyan writers, through which prominent figures on the Libyan scene started communicating their experiences and sufferings under Qaddafi’s regime. They found in literature the means to resist “silence and misrepresentation” (Swindells 7). Ibrahim al-Koni, Ahmed Fagih, and Hisham Matar are some of the Libyan novelists who are familiar with history, landscape and cultural practices of the Libyans. Hisham Matar paints a clear picture of complex and intertwined political events that may have led to the fall of Muammar Qaddafi himself.In almost all of his writings, Matar is profoundly concerned with the Libyan political and cultural affairs. He might have chosen exotic settings and peculiar forms for his novels, but deep inside, and at the core of all he writes, there is that feeling that his target is the Libyan locale and the Libyan citizen, politically and culturally. Underneath the tragedy of the loss of his father, the author devoted a large part of his novels to the atrocities of the Qaddafi regime in a clear token of protest against it yet in the form of cultural rather than violent resistance.Hisham Matar resorts to the cultural and political manifestations of Libya to shape the consciousness of his readers, making them much more aware of the dilemma of Libyan people in the postmodern age. He succeeded to attract the attention of Western society to his father's case, and also he shows the potential of utilizing the English language in expressing the nature and stories of the Libyan community

Gaining Legitimacy in Post-Qaddafi Libya: Analysing Attempts of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood needed to manoeuvre underground for several decades, just as most opposition groups in Libya had to—because of the repression from the Qaddafi regime. In 2012, however, the political wing of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), the Justice and Construction Party (JCP, sometimes also called the Justice and Development Party) participated in popular elections just shortly after its inception. Seven years later, one can unanimously say that the movement was not able to take power in the country. This paper will analyse the LMB in post-revolutionary Libya by concentrating on the attempts of establishing legitimacy in the political sphere—while continuously being informed by historical influences. Methodologically, the paper examines primary sources, key academic texts but also factors in interview data from semi-structured interviews. Overall, the paper addresses the puzzle of why Libya as a predominantly Sunni, conservative country did not translate into a conservative Sunni movement like the LMB faring well; with that, derailing the impression that the whole region was “going Islamist” after the so-called Arab Spring. The LMB today is still influenced by the historical treatment it received under Qaddafi, which lead it to base itself mostly in exile, hence it struggled to entrench itself in the country. The LMB was pointed towards their opponents’ fearmongering of an alleged Islamist takeover, mostly without addressing self-inflicted wounds, such as their inability to unite or to convince major parts of the population of their political programme.

The Conflict Resolution, Security and State-Building Process in Libya

The aftermath of the Libyan conflict and the country instability continues due to the internal political division echo of the Arab Spring and the overall fragile regional context strongly influenced by external powers seeking to impact on the direction the country takes socio-economically and politically. In post-Qaddafi Libya the long transition to sustainable institutions and peace remains fragile. The tensions between political parties, armed groups and non-state security actors with different ideological preferences resulted in the full-scale civil war that broke out in the mid-2014. The large arsenal inherited from Qaddafi regime fell under the armed groups and non-state security actors control increasing the already vast proliferation of weapons escalating political tensions and polarization between religious and secular actors. This research aims to examine the transition process in the post-conflict Libya assessing the political developments within the broader aspects of regional peace, stability and security and in reverse how the political instability in Libya affects broader regional security, the growth of violent extremism and uncontrolled acute forced migrations through Libya’s porous border. Libya is a strategic partner and an international player for the EU engaged with the emerging power in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. The EU interest focuses - beside foster a sustainable economic system – on preserve peace and prevent conflict strengthening its relations with its neighboring countries to maintain security in the region. To reach national, regional and international security is necessary to recognize security as a political matter to be reflected in a long-term process part of the governance reform and economic development through a coherent and effective inter-policy approach.

Prospects for Post-Conflict (De)Stabilisation of Libya

Wraz z wydarzeniami arabskiej wiosny niektóre reżimy z basenu Morza Śródziemnego zostały zmuszone do reform lub obalone i zastąpione przez opozycję demokratyczną. Spośród kilku przykładów takiej rewolucji Libia jawi się jako przypadek szczególny. Osobliwości systemu zbudowanego przez Muammara Kaddafiego, sponsorowane dochodami z eksploatacji złóż ropy, skutkowały destrukcją struktur państwa i nasileniem trybalizmu. Rewolucja z 2011 r. zmieniła wprawdzie konstrukcję polityczną Libii, lecz nie mogła przekreślić minionych dekad neopatrymonialnych i represyjnych rządów. Sam kres reżimu Kaddafiego nie jest zatem przesłanką pokoju po konflikcie, a Libia musi uprawomocnić swoją transformację i wypracować narodowy konsensus. W artykule analizowane są trzy scenariusze rozwoju sytuacji (stopniowa stabilizacja, „dżihadyzacja” oraz defragmentacja) w pokonfliktowej Libii. Celem autora jest rozważenie ich prawdopodobieństwa z uwzględnieniem splotu specyfiki wewnętrznej oraz sytuacji międzynarodowej.

The Law: Presidential Deception in Foreign Policy Making: Military Intervention in Libya 2011

How did a U.S.‐led, U.N.‐ approved military intervention to protect civilians in Libya end up enabling rebels to overthrow the Qaddafi regime? A variety of evidence shows that the Obama administration was dishonest in publicly describing its military purpose as solely humanitarian when it was largely directed towards regime change. Presidential deception prevented the emergence of alternative policies that might have avoided Libya's postwar chaos while obfuscating U.S. responsibility for that consequence. The essence of the deception is set forth below in contrasting statements by President Obama and former Central Intelligence Agency Director and Secretary of Defense Panetta.

From the February 17 Revolution to Benghazi: rewriting history for political gain

ABSTRACTIn February 2011, peaceful demonstrations in Benghazi and other Libyan cities in support of additional housing, more jobs, and a better way life quickly turned into demands for regime change after security forces employed deadly force in an effort to subdue the protesters. As the February 17 Revolution unfolded, the better equipped and trained security forces of the Qaddafi regime soon bested inexperienced and poorly armed rebel units, threatening to retake Benghazi and engage in acts of retribution similar to those the regime had employed in the past to punish acts of dissent or revolt. In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, authorising member states to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians under threat of attack. The policies of the Qaddafi regime in the years before the February 17 Revolution and in the early weeks of the revolt thoroughly justified the UN-supported military intervention that began in mid-March 2011; nevertheless, some academics, journalists, and politicians have distorted events in this time frame to argue that it was not a model intervention but a model failure. Kindred spirits have seized on a contrived, misleading analysis to challenge the foreign policy legacy of the Obama administration and the role in Libya of then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. Historical revisionism enjoys a long and cherished tradition; however, a selective rendering of events for political gain undermines the democratic process in both Libya and the USA and threatens to distort future policy decisions on Libya and other countries, replacing authoritarian regimes with democracies.

The Libyan Crisis in Retrospect: Impacts on the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine?

In 2011, the Arab Springs reached Libya and protests took place. They were harshly reprimanded by the Qaddafi regime and soon transformed into a real civil war. The international community didn’t remain idle. On the contrary, it reacted in an unprecedented rapid manner and intervened militarily. The military campaign turned out however to be questionable, above all in regard to its motives. In any event, the Libyan crisis and the subsequent intervention of the international community hit the headlines of all medias. This thesis tries to analyse the legal background of these events. The legal and political framework in which the Libyan crisis occurred is complex and often unclear. It is mainly based on a body of law which was elaborated in the aftermath of WW2. However, the international situation today is very different than at that time. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a rise of internal conflicts which raises new issues. Moreover, a comprehensive body of human rights law developed. The old law of the use of force and of the United Nations has not adapted accordingly. The debate about humanitarian intervention appeared in this context. The failure of the international community to prevent large-scale humanitarian catastrophes in the nineties created an impetus for the elaboration of a new framework: the concept of responsibility to protect (hereinafter: RtoP). This is an evolving international doctrine that establishes a responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities. After a particularly rapid development and endorsement by the international community, this doctrine had the first occasion to find a practical application with the events in Libya. But was the international intervention of 2011 in Libya really an application of the RtoP doctrine? This is our main research question. We will try to find out to which extent the new concept influenced the events in Libya and, conversely, what impact the Libyan crisis had on the doctrine. First of all, we will look at the RtoP itself (Part 1). The legal background and the concept of humanitarian intervention will be addressed, before handling the development of RtoP and its standing. Then, we will link this knowledge to the Libyan crisis (Part 2). After a look at the course of events, the next step will be to try to assess the legitimacy of the intervention in this specific case. Finally, we will be able to evaluate what impact the Libyan crisis had on the doctrine of RtoP.

Britain's Return to Libya: From the Battle of al-Alamein in the Western Libyan Desert to the Military Intervention in the ‘Arab Spring’ Upheaval

This study examines political, economic, and strategic relations between Libya and Britain from the Second World War to the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’ conflict in Libya. Analysing primary and secondary sources, this study attempts to determine if a connection exists between the British fighting in Libya during the Second World War and the British-led military intervention in the Libyan ‘Arab Spring’ revolt against Muammar Qaddafi's regime. Britain retained a strategic and economic presence in Libya in the period following the country's independence in 1951. The rise to power of Qaddafi in 1969, however, changed the course of bilateral ties. Qaddafi nationalized British assets in Libya, and implemented anti-Western policies. Ties with Britain were strained, reaching a low point during the 1980s and 1990s with Libya's persecution of political dissidents in Britain. A brief rapprochement between Tripoli and London from 2001 to 2011 brought normalization of ties and renewed British investment in the Libyan oil sector. However, in February 2011, Britain and its western partners aided Libyan rebels in their fight against Qaddafi, successfully toppling his regime. Today, as the struggle for power continues in Libya – with Islamist groups representing a serious force vying for power – many questions remain concerning the future direction of the Libyan state and society.

Libya, the Tuareg and Mali on the eve of the ‘Arab Spring’ and in its aftermath: an anatomy of changed relations

This study examines the relatively unknown issue of the ethno-political and strategic partnership that existed between the Libyan regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi and the ethnic Tuareg minority of Sahelian origin, with an emphasis on the period during 1990–2011. Approaching this issue through political history and political science frameworks, this study addresses contemporary issues such as African migration, transnational identities, political mobilisation, Sahel–Maghreb relations, Islamist terror and new regional security structures, as well as the place of ethnic and racial minorities within political life and society. The ramifications of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the subsequent fall of Qaddafi's regime put an end to the unique partnership. Many Tuareg fled the chaos of post-Qaddafi Libya and returned to their native countries, disrupting the sensitive ethnic and political balances in the Sahel belt.

Humanitarian Financial Intervention

Over the past several decades, states have used international asset freezes with increasing frequency as a mechanism for promoting human rights abroad. Yet the international law governing this mechanism, which I refer to as financial remains fragmented. This article offers the first systematic legal analysis of humanitarian financial intervention. It identifies six humanitarian purposes that states may pursue through asset freezes: preserving foreign assets from misappropriation, incapacitating foreign states or foreign nationals, coercing foreign states or foreign nationals to forsake abusive practices, compensating victims, ameliorating humanitarian crises through humanitarian aid or post-conflict reconstruction, and punishing human rights violators. Whether intervening states may pursue these objectives in any given context depends upon the interplay between several international legal regimes, including international investment law, collective-security agreements such as the UN Charter, the customary law of countermeasures, the law of armed conflict, and customary law governing the enforcement of judicial decisions. By disentangling the various international legal regimes that govern humanitarian financial intervention, this article furnishes a preliminary road map for evaluating the legality of past, present, and future financial interventions � including asset freezes directed against the Qaddafi regime during the 2011 Libyan Revolution.

THE LEGALITY OF THE NATO BOMBING IN LIBYA

AbstractOn 17 March 2011 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 authorizing member states to take forceful measures to protect Libyan civilians. Clearly NATO actions to protect civilians were within the mandate. But the authors claim that operations aiming at overthrowing the Qaddafi regime were illegal use of force. The overstepping of the mandate may have a negative effect on the credibility of the responsibility to protect in future gross human rights violations.

Casting off the shackles of Libya's Arab-Middle Eastern foreign policy: a unique case of rapprochement with non-Arab Turkey (1970s–2011)

This study offers an analysis of one of the lesser-known chapters in Libya's foreign policy under the Qaddafi regime, and focuses on Libyan–Turkish relations. The study shows that during most of the era of collaboration, spanning the period of mid-1970s–2011, Libya's relations with Turkey constituted an exceptional ‘island’ of pragmatism in Libya's ocean of fanatically and ideologically driven foreign relations. Often plagued by Qaddafi's tumultuous political and ideological whims, as a result of which he often entangled his country in military adventures and conflicts, the study explores the unique nature of Tripoli–Ankara ties, notwithstanding Turkey's Western orientation and amicable links with Israel (at least during the major part of the period reviewed) – both perceived by Qaddafi as pure evil. Tripoli carefully navigated its ties with Ankara, with the exception of the crisis Qaddafi provoked in 1996 when he let his staunchly ideological support of the Kurdish cause eclipse and shake the rational Libyan–Turkish relations. Examining this set of bilateral ties mainly through a Libyan prism, the article also sheds light on the major Turkish crossroads on the bilateral track. Tracing these relations, which flourished mainly within an economic context, the discussion takes into account the two countries' domestic affairs as well as their wider regional and international environs – all of which impacted the convergence or conflict of interests. This article presents original research on these bilateral relations, through a two-pronged academic approach involving political history and political science.

The End of the Libyan Dictatorship: The Uncertain Transition

The 42-year dictatorship in Libya finally collapsed in October 2011; it took the Western-backed armed uprising seven months of intensive fighting to defeat Qaddafi's loyalist forces. The fall of the Qaddafi regime is a welcome development in the Middle East and North Africa region. But, unlike Tunisia or Egypt, Libya does not have a standing army or a reliable potential force that can bring the necessary stability for a political transition. The tribal nature of the country and the difficulty of disarming the rebels and other groups pose serious challenges to the new authorities in Tripoli. Unless these issues are handled effectively, Libya will undergo a long period of unpredictability.

Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria

The international community has reached an impasse. The violence committed by Syrian President Assad's government against opposition forces, who have been calling for democratic reform, regime change, and expanded rights, has necessitated a response from the international community. This article explores various ways the international community could respond to the crisis in Syria and the consequences of each approach. It compares the current calamity in Syria to the crisis in Libya and examines the international community's response to the violence perpetrated by Qaddafi's regime. It further analyzes reports, primarily from the UN and news sources, about the ongoing predicament in Syria. The article concludes that the international community should proceed with achieving a ceasefire via dialogue but must begin by conveying newly imposed sanctions that affect the Sunni merchant class and thus threaten Assad's grip on power to make that dialogue more effective. World leaders should also identify a Syrian leader who could replace Assad, who must be removed from power because of the crimes against humanity that have been committed by his regime. Western states must accept that they will have to engage peacekeeping forces in the region to aid the transition of power in Syria.

Tasting the Brutality of Qaddafi's Regime

Israeli-Tunisian artist Rafram Chaddad traveled to Libya in March 2010 to photograph the synagogues and cemeteries of Libya's vanished 2,500-year-old Jewish community. Libyan secret police arrested him and accused him of spying for Israel. Chaddad withstood electrocution, ten days with no sleep, and savage beatings with a lead pipe before spending months alone in a tiny cell. He was released five months later through back-channel negotiations. Today, what he remembers most is every dish his wardens served him, from cinnamon-stewed camel to stuffed tripe served over turmeric-saturated rice. His prison term sheds light on the brutality and curious generosity of jail under the deposed Muammar Qaddafi. Chaddad's survival strategy revolved around food. Three times a day Chaddad would ask the prison guards for cooking advice as they delivered hot-foil meal trays to his cell. He marked time with tinfoil squares he ripped off the wrapping of grilled chicken. And he rejoiced in the small details of the food, such as dill on macaroni or dried mint in sorba, a tomato, meat, and lentil stew. In Chaddad's case, being a bon vivant was the best defense when all he had was a rotting gray mattress in a tiny room.