This article investigates the multiplayer pursuit-evasion (MPE) differential games in the presence of malicious pursuers. First, three types of malicious pursuers, namely <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">greedy</i> , <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">lazy</i> , and <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">traitorous</i> pursuers are formulated by using two <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">subjectively malicious factors</i> in the performance index. Then, an <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">N</i> -player nonzero-sum game framework is established to study the relationships among healthy pursuers, malicious pursuers, and evaders. The capturability and Nash equilibrium of such a new MPE differential game are rigorously analyzed. Finally, the effects of malicious pursuers on the capture time are explicitly quantified by the <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">minimal pursuit coefficient</i> , whose explicit form is obtained by the solutions from coupled Riccati differential equations.
Read full abstract