Purification Of Equilibria Research Articles

On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium

Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable strategy vector implies the existence of an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies that is also expost stable. Through examples we demonstrate the ‘bounds obtained on the approximation’ are tight.

Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for non-atomic games

In this paper we establish the existence of a symmetric approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for an anonymous non-atomic game with acontinuum of strategies. This result is a consequence of the fact that in an abstract game with measure valued profiles [as in Schmeidler (1973, Journal of Statistical Physics 7) and Khan (1986, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 293)] the degenerate best-response profiles are dense in the set of all best- response. We also present a corollary on assignment games with additively separable payoffs and comment on the difficulties with the purification of equilibrium in general assignment games.