Public Support For European Integration Research Articles

The impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on public support for EU enlargement

ABSTRACT The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has become one of the greatest security crises since World War 2, with profound geopolitical and socio-economic implications for Europe and beyond. The upsurge of political and media attention to this war may have increased public support for EU enlargement, with new countries in the Eastern neighbourhood and the Western Balkans receiving the official EU candidate status. By drawing on mechanisms of securitisation and solidarity, this paper tests to what extent the Russian invasion has generated a positive politicisation of EU enlargement. While this crisis may have indeed fostered a permissive consensus in EU public opinion regarding Ukraine’s future accession, I observe no such effects for the Western Balkans or Turkey. This finding also remains robust to identity and socioeconomic controls, which have traditionally structured public support for European integration. The empirical part is based on descriptive and regression analyses of data from a representative survey of 7678 respondents in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain conducted at the end of 2022.

Welfare Euroscepticism and socioeconomic status

While the European Union (EU) increasingly strengthens its social integration, opposition towards this process can also be observed, here defined as ‘welfare Euroscepticism’. To better understand this newly defined policy paradigm, this article aims to explain longstanding cleavages in both social policy and EU research: socioeconomic status (SES) divides. Contrary to the literature on public support for European integration, this article argues that higher SES groups are more likely to be welfare Eurosceptics than lower SES groups. This argument and its underlying explanations are examined through a multilevel approach using European Social Survey data from 18 EU member states, using the example of a potential EU-wide minimum income scheme. First, the results demonstrate that welfare Euroscepticism is indeed more prevalent among higher SES groups than lower SES groups (measured through occupation, education, income, and employment). The results indicate robust self-interest patterns among higher SES groups that do not want to carry (perceived) financial burdens of EU social policies. The opinion patterns also emphasize the multidimensionality of attitudes towards EU policies since the SES cleavages can reverse, depending on the policy in focus. Overall, the results indicate much potential to mobilize the larger proportion of the public to support EU social policies, that is, lower SES groups. However, potential conflicts may arise when the EU expands on policies that their traditional supporters – higher SES groups – are more likely to oppose. The article also shows that welfare solidarity on the individual and the country level can mitigate such conflicts. This is because higher levels of welfare generosity and lower levels of welfare chauvinism on the individual and the country level are related to smaller SES cleavages.

Bringing geography back in: Borderlands and public support for the European Union

AbstractWhat explains the variation in public support for European integration? While the existing literature has predominantly focused on economic, cultural and political factors, the influence of geography has been largely overlooked. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by examining the impact of residing in the European Union (EU) border regions on voters' perceptions and attitudes towards the EU. Contrary to previous research, our study reveals a remarkable pattern, indicating that individuals living in border regions exhibit a higher propensity to vote for Eurosceptic parties and hold negative views on the EU. Through the utilization of both behavioural and attitudinal indicators in years ranging between 1999 and 2021 and employing statistical matching, our analysis robustly supports this finding. Moreover, we delve into the underlying mechanisms driving these negative attitudes in border regions, highlighting the significance of institutional factors. A mediation analysis reveals an interesting and previously unexplored theoretical twist: We find that residing in a border region is associated with lower trust in national political institutions, which translates into distrust in the EU. These findings suggest that it might be policymakers residing in the capital of the country rather than people on the other side of the border that make borderland inhabitants' attitudes distinctly negative.

Public Support for European Integration in Greece and Italy Between 2015 and 2020

<p>The consecutive crises of the last decade have eroded public support for the EU, especially so among Southern European member states. A long-standing scholarly debate centers around whether it is economic or cultural considerations that drive public support for the EU. However, it is still unclear whether public attitudes toward European integration are driven primarily by economic evaluations or concerns associated with growing immigration flows. To explore this question, we draw on data from the Eurobarometer in Greece and Italy between 2015 and 2020. We find consistent evidence that diffuses public support for the EU and specific support for EU institutions are associated positively with economic evaluations of the European economy and household finances and negatively with opposition to immigration. Our study provides further insights into the dynamics of public support for the EU in the European periphery during critical times.</p>

Ritual and Affect in Europe Day Celebrations: Institutional Practices of European Identity Construction in Crisis

AbstractThis article analyses Europe Day celebration practices and explores the role of ritual and its utility in eliciting the affective dimension of European identity construction in crisis. The article reflects on the considerable variation of Europe Day celebration practices, proposes a typology of Europe Day events and reflects on their merit in eliciting reason‐ and affect‐driven institutional approaches in the strategic promotion of European identity to the public. The article employs affect theory to reflect on the relationship between emotions and identity. It argues that institutional efforts aimed to promote European identity within the Europe Day platform rely on actualizing the affective potential underpinning collective identities with the view to compel public support for European integration by inciting emotional engagement and boosting the public's affective investment.

Is Brexit an outlier? Euroscepticism and public support for European integration

ABSTRACT This paper uses data from six rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), between 2004 and 2016, to examine attitudes towards European integration across countries. Using both individual responses and country-level variables, we analyse factors influencing Euroscepticism; how these factors are changing over time; and whether they may signal a latent potential for Brexit-like outcomes in different countries. Controlling for a unique combination of demographic, political and macroeconomic factors, we find individuals with higher levels of income and education, and those with more left-leaning political views to be more supportive of European integration, while those who are older and right-leaning to be less supportive. Using predicted values from our empirical analysis, we find median voters’ attitudes diverging across European countries over time, with an increasing number of countries moving closer to the threshold values observed among voters in the United Kingdom in 2016.

Measuring public support for European integration using a Bayesian item response theory model

This study proposes the use of Bayesian item response theory models to measure aggregate public support for European integration. This approach addresses the limitations of other indicators and produces valid estimates of public attitudes over long time periods, even when available indicators change over time or present interruptions. I compare Bayesian item response theory models with alternative approaches used in the study of support for European integration, and demonstrate that they produce more accurate estimates of latent public opinion. The estimates are validated by showing their association both to alternative public opinion measures and to the vote share of Eurosceptic parties across Europe. I show that Bayesian models solve unaddressed issues like ensuring cross-country comparability of the estimates and modelling responses with multiple answer options.

Economic determinants of public support for European integration, 1995–2018

European support for integration is shaped by a range of economic, cultural, and political factors. However, in recent decades, scholars have argued that utilitarian calculations have become less important as European integration has advanced, and political entrepreneurs have mobilized nationalist identities. We analyze 24 years of responses to the Eurobarometer (1995–2018) to assess the influence of economic factors on public attitudes toward European integration. We find strong evidence that utilitarian factors are important across the entire panel. The performance of the macro-economy, as measured by unemployment, and an individual’s position in the labor market, are consistent predictors of public support for and satisfaction with the European Union. Collective identity is also associated with attitudes toward the European Union. However, an individual’s identity is also shaped by economic circumstances.

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Public Support for European Integration: Evidence from Germany

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Public Support for European Integration: Evidence from Germany

The impact of EU institutional advertising on public support for European integration

Utilitarian theories propose that support for the EU is based on an instrumental calculus about the costs and benefits of European integration. Drawing on these theories, we analyze whether and how ads produced by European institutions affect public support for the EU. Our findings, based on a panel survey experiment, indicate that these ads increase support for the EU, and that ads emphasizing the policy benefits of European integration are more effective than ads emphasizing its reduced costs. However, these positive effects are short-lived, since they had disappeared one year after citizens were initially exposed to the ads. In a context of increasing negativity towards the EU, these findings, based on realistic treatments, have relevant theoretical and policy implications.

The Meaning of the European Union and Public Support for European Integration

AbstractThis paper proposes a cognitive approach that focuses on the cognitive representations that underpin public support for the European Union. Its objectives are threefold: (1) to describe systems of representation associated with support for the EU; (2) to illustrate the importance of less commonly studied representations, such as liberal cosmopolitan representations; and (3) to demonstrate that at the beginning of the 2000s, the EU often represented greater economic prosperity and/or social protection for many Central, Eastern and Southern European countries, although the situation has changed significantly since then. This paper uses Eurobarometer data from 2004 to 2017 as well as multilevel models to examine how cognitive representations of the EU can explain public support for the EU, including variations across countries.

Divided but united: explaining nested public support for European integration

Academic and general interest in public support for European Integration is on the rise. Theoretically, the utilitarian, identity, reference, cue-taking and signalling models have been developed to explain this perplexing phenomenon. While these models have been tested, there is no comprehensive up-to-date account of how well they perform separately, relative to each other and across levels. Empirically, this study utilises a data set with 110,873 respondents from the European Social Survey. Methodologically, a multilevel model is used to address causal heterogeneity between levels. The study shows that ‘attitudes towards multiculturalism’ at the individual level and ‘corruption’ at the country level are the strongest predictors. When interacting levels within models, it is demonstrated that individual trust in the national political establishment is being moderated by the level of corruption in a country in influencing support for European integration. On this basis, two models are proposed, named the ‘saviour model’ and the ‘anti-establishment model’.

Measuring Public Support for European Integration across Time and Countries: The ‘European Mood’ Indicator

Measuring Public Support for European Integration across Time and Countries: The ‘European Mood’ Indicator

Returning to Europe as Reluctant Europeans: Revisiting Trends in Public Support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe Twelve Years after the 2004 EU Accession

This paper examines less discussed aspects of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe as a component of the institutional history of the 2004 EU enlargement. A focus on public support for European integration allows us to evaluate the consequences of the EU’s enlargement policy from the perspective of democratic legitimacy, as public attitudes demonstrate how institutions live up to the expectations of the citizens in a democratic setting. It also allows us to relate the legislative history of the eastward enlargement to its social impact and domestic political implications. The paper posits Euroscepticism as an unexpected outcome of the legal-institutional implementation of the EU enlargement policy. It argues that while East-European Euroscepticism defies clear categorisation as it fails to demonstrate consistent longitudinal trends not consistent across its performance evaluation, identity, and democratic legitimacy dimensions, it is indicative of the disconnect between the adjustment dynamics of the EU accession of Eastern Europe, accomplished at the elite level, and the broad-based public response to it. The core of East-European Euroscepticism is declining public trust in the European Union, its policies, institutions, and the economic benefits it generates against the background of general dissatisfaction with the workings of national and European democracy. The East-European publics have become increasingly sceptical of their representation as citizens whose voice ‘counts’ in the EU. They perceive the EU as less relevant to their personal situation although it represents well the interests of the Member States. Such contradictory evidence suggests that the conventional measures of Euroscepticism as a pan-European phenomenon need to be re-examined by exploring trends of continuity and change in public support for the EU in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the 2004 enlargement.

Brexit: initial reflections

Even though the opinion polling before the British referendum on membership of the European Union showed a narrow gap between the two sides, the actual result-a vote to leave-on the morning of 24 June 2016 came as a surprise to many. Yet in truth both the referendum and its outcome had deep roots in British politics. In this article we cast an eye over the history of Britain's relationship with the EU, which has long been marked by a mixture of awkwardness and successful influence. We trace the origins of the referendum in long-run tensions between, and within, the political parties, and in the lukewarm public support for European integration. We also examine more contingent, short-term factors relating to the referendum campaign itself. We conclude by commenting on the divisions exposed by the vote along lines of geography, education, class and wealth, and suggest that reconciling these with the continuing tensions in the party landscape make a clean and speedy exit from the EU unlikely. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public Support for European Integration

Public opinion is increasingly at the heart of both political and scholarly debates on European integration. This article reviews the large literature on public support for, and opposition to, European integration, focusing on conceptualization, causes, and consequences: What is public support for European integration? How can we explain variation in support and Euroskepticism? What are the consequences of public support for elections and policy making in the European Union? The review reveals that although a growing literature has sought to explain individual support for European integration, more work is needed to understand the ways in which opinions are shaped by their national context and how increasing public contestation of the European Union poses a challenge to, and an opportunity for, the future of the integration project.

Fiscal redistribution and public support for European integration

This article contributes to existing debates on public opinion toward European integration by examining when and why fiscal transfers and public support are systematically related. Drawing on economic and identity-related theories, we develop and test hypotheses about the links between European Union fiscal transfers among countries and subnational jurisdictions, and citizens’ support for European integration. Using a three-level analysis of residents in 143 regions in 16 European Union member states, we find a positive effect of European Union transfers among both countries and subnational jurisdictions on support for European integration among those with a European communal identity. We also find that this effect increases the more politically aware individuals are. The article sketches the broader implications of our findings for public opinion research on regional integration beyond the European Union.

Does Immigration Undermine Public Support for Integration in the European Union?

AbstractIt is well established that negative attitudes towards immigrants are strongly associated with lower public support for European integration. But the impact of actual immigration levels on immigration attitudes is still contested. As a result, the relationship between immigration levels and EU public support remains uncertain from a theoretical point of view. We offer an empirical study of the link between immigration from the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and EU support at the regional level in Spain, France, Ireland and The Netherlands. The results of the analyses suggest that in all four countries immigration from CEE had negative effects on support for European integration in the host societies. In short, immigration seems to undermine integration, although internal migration within the EU is necessary for the successful functioning of its economic union and the future of political integration.

Public opinion and the crisis: the dynamics of support for the euro

ABSTRACTFurther integration in the European Union (EU) increasingly depends on public legitimacy. The global financial crisis and the subsequent euro area crisis have amplified both the salience and the redistributive consequences of decisions taken in Brussels, raising the question of how this has influenced public support for European integration. In this contribution, we examine how public opinion has responded to the crisis, focusing on support for monetary integration. Interestingly, our results show that support for the euro has remained high within the euro area; however, attitudes are increasingly driven by utilitarian considerations, whereas identity concerns have become less important. While the crisis has been seen to deepen divisions within Europe, our findings suggest that it has also encouraged citizens in the euro area to form opinions on the euro on the basis of a cost–benefit analysis of European economic governance, rather than relying primarily on national attachments.

The Religious Context in Explaining Public Support for the European Union

AbstractThis article examines contextual explanations for public support for European integration. Apart from economic and identity‐based theories, there may also be a religious dimension that could help to explain why some countries are principally pro‐European while others are largely eurosceptic. It is argued that differences between nations are embedded in historical alliances between Catholic and Protestant denominations and political systems. Hierarchical linear model analyses of data from the European Social Survey (ESS) show that: (1) citizens from Catholic countries are more likely to support European unification than the inhabitants of Protestant countries; and (2) this effect conditions the individual‐level effect of welfare attitudes. This suggests that in Protestant countries support for welfare redistribution is associated with low support for the EU, while in Catholic countries support for welfare redistribution is associated with high support for the EU.