Public-private Scheme Research Articles

Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services Across Europe – Main Approaches and Examples from Slovakia

Abstract Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are flexible, financial mechanisms for utilisation of available finances for environmental improvement. Payments for forest ecosystem services (PFES) have gained increasing policy acceptance at national and international levels. However, evidence about their implementation is limited and rather mixed. PES design is a complex task. There are a number of PES design features that need careful understanding of the specific ecological and socio-economic context. The aim of this article is to analyse main approaches to PFES and types of PES schemes or financial arrangements with the emphasis on three basic schemes: (i) public schemes or government-financed PES (Pigouvian type), (ii) private schemes or user-financed PES (Coasean type) and (iii) public–private schemes (a mixed type). The empirical part is based on the review of PES schemes implemented in different Forest Europe signatory countries. The main features of PES schemes are described on chosen examples from Slovakia.

The Global Governance of Trafficking in Persons: Toward a Transnational Regime Complex

ABSTRACTTwenty years ago, international cooperation against trafficking in persons was close to nonexistent. This changed suddenly and irreversibly in 2000, with the signing of the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons (TIP), especially Women and Children. Since then, regional and bilateral cooperation initiatives on TIP have proliferated. In addition to these interstate agreements, recent years have witnessed the emergence and spread of novel forms of soft or voluntary rule making, developed by intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and private actors. As a result, the governance of TIP has evolved from a state-centric regime to a transnational regime complex, in which public and private actors share responsibilities over various global governance tasks, including information sharing, standard setting, and monitoring and evaluation. In seeking to map out and shed light on the different components of this transnational regime complex, the article proposes a typology of transnational governance initiatives and illustrates its usefulness with an original dataset of 58 private, and public–private schemes involved in various aspects of the governance of TIP. The article then considers the implications of this increasing institutional complexity for international efforts to stop human trafficking. I argue that despite these remarkable institutional transformations and the growing role of private actors, the implementation of TIP rules and norms remains uneven and driven by state interests. Notwithstanding the increasing participation of nonstate actors and IGOs in the governance of TIP, states’ security concerns and their reluctance to cooperate on migration issues continue to drive anti-trafficking policies worldwide.

Taking responsive regulation transnational: Strategies for international organizations

AbstractResponsive Regulation(RR) introduced important new ways of thinking about regulation. ButRRwas designed for domestic settings in which a single agency had clear jurisdiction, full regulatory capacity, and extensive information, and could (contingently) deploy stringent sanctions against well‐defined targets. Under globalization, many regulatory problems have shifted to the transnational arena, characterized by multiple regulators, public and private, with limited capacities, authority, and information, and modest sanctioning ability; globalized production also renders the targets of regulation diffuse and difficult to identify.RRholds important lessons for transnational regulation, but it must be adapted to these challenging conditions. Some components of transnationalRRare already emerging, including numerous private and public–private schemes that regulate business through voluntary norms: “transnational regulatory standard‐setting” (TRSS). Alone, however,TRSSschemes face serious limitations. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are best positioned to “takeRRtransnational” by supporting and working with the nascentTRSSsystem. Two regulatory strategies are particularly promising: collaboration and orchestration. In “regulatory collaboration,”IGOspromote business self‐regulation, much as inRR; they can escalate in response to defection by deploying reputational and market sanctions. In “orchestration,”IGOssupport and steer intermediaries, includingTRSSschemes andNGOs, which use their material and ideational capacities to regulate target behavior. Orchestration cumulates regulatory competencies, creates avenues of escalation, and provides many benefits ofRR“tripartism.”

Taking Responsive Regulation Transnational

Ayres and Braithwaite’s Responsive Regulation (RR) has opened up important new ways of thinking about regulation in the 20 years since its publication. But RR was envisioned as a tool for domestic agencies. Thus, although RR focused on encouraging business self-regulation, it was designed for a setting in which agencies had clear jurisdiction, full regulatory capacity and extensive information, and could (contingently) deploy stringent sanctions against well-defined private targets. Since 1992, however, the locus of many regulatory problems has shifted to the transnational arena, characterized by multiple regulators, public and private, with limited capacities, authority and information and modest sanctioning ability. As production has globalized, moreover, targets have become diffuse and difficult to identify.RR holds important lessons for transnational regulation, but it must be adapted to these challenging conditions. Some components of transnational RR are already emerging. These include many private and public-private schemes that regulate (and self-regulate) business through voluntary norms: “transnational regulatory standard-setting” (TRSS). Acting alone, however, TRSS schemes face serious limitations. International organizations (IGOs) are the best-positioned transnational responsive regulators, but lack agency-like authority. To adapt RR to the transnational context, IGOs should focus on strengthening and working with the nascent TRSS system. Two techniques are particularly promising. In “regulatory collaboration,” IGOs engage with business to promote self-regulation, much as in RR. IGOs have limited ability to escalate in response to defection, but can deploy reputational and market sanctions (negative and positive). In “orchestration,” IGOs catalyze, support and steer intermediaries, including TRSS schemes and NGOs (PIGs), which use their own material and ideational capacities to regulate and promote self-regulation. Orchestration cumulates regulatory competencies and creates avenues of escalation. It also provides many benefits of RR “tripartism:” deterring capture, promoting contestability and experimentation, empowering societal groups and disciplining “zealous PIGs.” Orchestration can also be applied internationally in regulating states, and domestically in regulating business.

Private funding and management for public interchanges in Madrid

Interchanges are key elements for improving seamless mobility in metropolitan areas where multi-stages trips are increasing. Interchange facilities make transfers short, easy and comfortable, and therefore Public Transport (PT) trips became more attractive and competitive. However, good quality interchanges are rather expensive, especially with regard to construction and operation. The solution launched in Madrid was a public–private scheme where all stakeholders involved play a key role. The first experience was Avenida America Interchange in the border of Madrid CBD, which opened in 2000. The construction was carried out through a Build and Operate and Transfer (BOT) tender. Three public bodies were involved: Municipality, Regional Government and Public Transport Authority. The concessionaire was a company constituted by a transport operator, several construction companies and a national bank. The revenues came from a fee which pays every bus using the facility, some shops, two parking lots, and other business. This positive experience has been extended to the construction of four new interchanges that were inaugurated in the years 2007 and 2008.