Public-private Partnership Delivery Research Articles

Critical success factors for private sector participation in accomplishing abandoned public sports facilities projects in Iran

Implementing infrastructure development projects using public–private partnership (PPP) delivery method has not been widely successful, particularly in developing countries such as Iran. Therefore, it is essential and indispensable to evaluate the critical success factors (CSFs) for completing abandoned public sports facilities projects (APSFPs) via private sector participation under the PPP model. The current study aims to determine the CSFs for private sector participation in completing APSFPs based in Iran. The significance of this study stems from the criticality of deciding on CSFs as the first step of providing an appropriate platform for completing APSFPs in developing countries, including Iran, and encouraging more successful implementation in practice. This research promotes strategic thinking about PPP strategy and the effective use of resources by identifying CSFs required for completing APSFPs with success. To achieve the research objective, the Delphi survey method was applied to identify CSFs for private sector participation in completing APSFPs in Iran. The hands-on opinions of 10 experts in public sports facilities projects were gathered through three Delphi rounds of survey using a semi-structured questionnaire. The reliability and face, content, and structural validity of the questionnaire were also investigated and checked. A total of 20 CSFs for completion of APSFPs through private sector participation in Iran were determined and analyzed. The identified CSFs were further grouped into five different major factor categories: legal and regulatory, strategic/executive, political/cultural/social, process/structural/human and economic/financial. The findings of this study suggest that practical effective strategies or pragmatic measures need to be developed to enhance the successful completion of APSFPs in Iran and other developing countries under the PPP delivery model.

Power relations in the finance of infrastructure public-private partnership projects

This research investigates the impact of project finance on the ability of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) to deliver infrastructure Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects. The research reports on data that was collected through 46 in-depth interviews with senior executive practitioners involved in PPPs in Australia. Analysis of this data confirms that while SPVs are integral vehicles for PPP integration, organizational power dynamics can generate tensions that restrict SPVs’ ability to manage PPP delivery effectively. Control of the key resource of capital, by debt and equity investors, is central in SPV power plays. Improved understanding of power dynamics will help PPPs better achieve benefits through reforms that enhance managerial agency and develop stronger social and system integration, enabling better alignment of the interests of key stakeholders.

Hyderabad Metro Rail in India: a new record for public–private partnerships

Completed in 2020, the US$3.3 billion Hyderabad Metro Rail project in India set a new record public–private partnership delivery. The 67 km railway has three lines, 57 stations and two depots. Factors ensuring success included stakeholder consultation, ability to access funds, competitive and transparent procurement, a strong delivery consortium and appropriate risk allocation. Modular standardised stations and structures saved time and money, reduced design and quality control efforts and cut maintenance. The use of balanced cantilever construction and the spine and wing method also drastically reduced station footprints. The project has won multiple national and international awards.

Silver, Goldilocks and Platinum – Finding the Sweet-Spot for Health and Housing

How can a social housing provider reinvent itself in terms of housing supply? Are there limits to what dwellings can achieve in terms of health and equity outcomes for tenants? What informed decisions in formulating new housing supply requirements, how were outcomes tested, and what are the implications for further iterations of health/housing related new supply? This presentation will look at the development of design control standards for a major social housing provider from the viewpoint of one of the authors interested in universal design. From designing for working family homes to dwellings for single person households, the times sure are a changing. Using a case study of phase one of a recent social housing redevelopments in Sydney, the presentation will look at the delivered built form and give a recount of the lessons learnt, particularly feedback from access professionals around the dwellings meeting disability, universal design and health need. An interesting aspect of the case study was the public private partnership delivery model, and the process of educating the external design team by an ‘informed client’ with internal policies and procedures above and beyond code compliance, and underpinned by social justice concerns In terms of ‘Goldilocks’ housing, the new dwellings may have been ‘too big’! This verdict may have different if advances and use of assistive technologies over the last 10–15 years had not occurred.

Developing a governance model for PPP infrastructure service delivery based on lessons from Eastern Australia

Public-private partnership (PPP) concession agreements are awarded by National, State and local public agencies that contract with private companies to finance and deliver infrastructure as a long term service to governments and their citizens, rather than having the private firms design and build infrastructure assets to be financed, operated—and, hopefully, maintained—by government. PPPs are similar to the emerging model of selling business or personal software as a cloud-based service (SaaS) rather than as a product licensed by the user—a model that that has transformed and disrupted the enterprise software industry. Australia is a world leader in PPP infrastructure delivery, and has had over two decades of experience in delivering civil and social infrastructure services to its citizens via PPP concessions. Along the way, the public and private participants in infrastructure PPPs have developed practices and a mature institutional framework necessary for this kind of long-term, risky public-private commercial partnership. This study reports the findings from in-depth interviews with 25 senior executives of public and private participants in PPP infrastructure projects from the three Eastern Australian States with the longest history of PPP delivery. Based on the results of those interviews, we develop a governance model for infrastructure service delivery: the government selects infrastructure projects, guided by a non-partisan, expert infrastructure prioritization panel, and contracts for the delivery of these prioritized infrastructure services with a private concessionaire financed by long-term institutional investment capital. The concessionaire is a private entity in charge of financing, designing, constructing, operating, and maintaining the infrastructure service. The government supervises the infrastructure service, to safeguard public interest. The government also provides an institutional framework, with contracts and authorities necessary for the interaction between the public and private actors.

Illustration of a Framework for Benefit–Cost Evaluation of Highway Concession Proposals

Value for money (VFM) analysis is used to evaluate public–private partnership (PPP) concession proposals. However, the VFM approach cannot account quantitatively for benefits to travelers and others from the delivery of a project earlier than would have been possible under conventional procurement. Benefit–cost analysis (BCA) can address this issue and other nonfinancial costs and benefits. In the context of PPP project delivery, BCA may be conducted in three steps, namely, through ( a) project evaluation, with the assumption of conventional delivery of a project on the basis of a financially feasible schedule; ( b) incremental evaluation of an accelerated delivery schedule, with the assumption that the project can be conventionally delivered within the same time frame as would the proposed PPP; and ( c) incremental evaluation of PPP delivery. This project delivery BCA process is demonstrated in this paper with the use of an illustrative highway project.

Infrastructure Procurement: Learning from Private–Public Partnership Experiences ‘Down Under’

The public–private partnership (PPP) market in Australia is considered to be sophisticated and mature. Yet there have been several major failures that have occurred with economic infrastructure projects. Building on the experiences of Australia, we examine the underlying concepts of PPPs and the pertinent issues that have arisen during the procurement of infrastructure projects. Lessons learnt from implementing PPPs with respect to risk allocation, certainty, incentives, intergenerational equity and fiscal sustainability, and the cost of capital are identified and discussed. We conclude by suggesting that future research should focus on examining how PPP delivery can be improved rather than on determining their usage within the marketplace.

NPV Model for Evaluating the Economic Efficiency of Municipal Street Maintenance by Private Providers

Municipal street maintenance can be either performed by a local authority or by a private provider through public–private partnership (PPP) or outsourcing. The choice of either alternative requires proof of economic efficiency at the planning phase of these services. The economic model presented in this paper outlines the basis for the comprehensive probabilistic comparison of the economic efficiency of two approaches: (1) self-performance (public sector delivery) and (2) performance by a private provider (PPP delivery). Based on clear system boundaries, the net present values of the two alternatives are addressed, including possible risk costs. The results of the efficiency comparison are then evaluated using the net present value difference axiom and the net present value efficiency axiom. To ensure that the short-term effects of privatizing or outsourcing street maintenance services are not overrated and the long-term economic efficiency is maintained, the analysis must cover at least two long-term periods.