ABSTRACTThis article responds to the familiar characterisation of Mary Warnock as someone whose major achievements as a public intellectual, such as the Report on human fertilisation and embryology, were at the expense of philosophical rigour and integrity. I explicate her lifelong commitment to practical morality, and her understanding of ethics and of the role of feelings in moral judgments, before analysing her important distinction between the private and public moral attitude. ‘Public philosophy’ is what she believes is necessary for those seeking to make a difference in the world of law and policy. I highlight the importance for her of securing ‘acceptable’ legal outcomes, especially on issues of bioscientific development which are the subject of irreconcilable moral disagreements. I compare her distinction with others and contrast its use with relevant writing by John Rawls and Thomas Nagel. Finally, I defend her against misjudged criticism from her philosophical contemporaries, most notably Richard Hare.