Public Financial Disclosure Research Articles

공직자 재산등록제의 실효성과 고지거부에 대한 태도: 신분에 따른 차이를 중심으로

본 연구의 목적은 우리나라 공직자 재산등록 고지거부에 대한 태도에 재산등록제의 실효성이 미치는 효과를 분석하고, 나아가 인식주체의 신분에 따라 그 효과에 차이가 있는지를 실증분석하는 것이다. 이를 위해 한국행정연구원의 설문조사 데이터를 활용하여 이항 로짓모형으로 분석하였다. 그 분석결과, 재산등록제의 실효성은 고지거부에 대한 태도에 긍정적 영향을 미쳤다. 또한 인식주체의 신분별로 고지거부에 대한 태도를 보면, 기준범주인 국가공무원에 비해 일반국민은 더 긍정적이었으나, 기초지자체 공무원은 부정적이었다. 한편 조절효과를 보면, 일반국민들의 경우 재산등록제의 실효성과 고지거부에 대한 태도 간의 관계를 약화시켰다. 최근 공직자들의 직계존비속에 대한 재산등록이 헌법상 과잉금지원칙과 사생활의 자유를 침해할 여지가 있어 완화해야 한다는 주장이 일각에서 제기되고 있다. 그러나 본 연구의 결과는 재산등록제가 공직자의 부패 예방 및 이해충돌 방지라는 실효적 기능을 수행해야 한다는 전제조건을 충족시켜야만 그러한 주장이 일반 국민들의 지지를 받을 수 있다는 점을 시사한다.

Transparency in Governments: A Meta-Analytic Review of Incentives for Digital Versus Hard-Copy Public Financial Disclosures

Prior research has indicated that information transparency in governments depends on institutional and environmental factors. Nonetheless, previous studies show heterogeneity in the results, and the academic researchers cannot make consistent conclusions. It makes it difficult to know the behavior of governments regarding their information policies. Therefore, making use of meta-analysis techniques, we integrate the empirical results reported by studies to determine the factors favoring the disclosure of public financial information via two modes of information disclosure— online versus hard-copy format. Several moderating effects— administrative culture, accounting regime, impact of measure used on determining variables, and level of government—have been considered and analyzed for their influence on the degree of correlation between the determinants and the disclosure of public financial information in both modes of information disclosure. Our study does not only show that the variables analyzed are positively associated with the disclosure of public financial information, but also that this depends on the context in which the research is conducted. The administrative style and the level of government are the main moderating effects that influence the results of analyzed studies.

Congress Rethinks Reach Of Ethics Law

Congress is taking another look at the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (S. 2038) enacted earlier this year that is primarily aimed at preventing insider trading by lawmakers. The concern lies with a provision in the law to extend public financial disclosure requirements to government scientists and thousands of other federal employees. Lawmakers are responding to fears relating to the required Internet posting of disclosure information. Opponents argue that open access to such data would inadvertently reveal the identity of U.S. intelligence operatives and put diplomats and military officials in jeopardy. Executive branch employees are also complaining that publicly exposing their personal financial data unfairly invades their privacy and would increase the risk of identity theft. The financial disclosure information was originally set to post on the Internet at the end of August. But the posting was put on hold by a measure (S. 3510) unanimously passed by the ...

U. S. Corporate Reaction To GATT: An Analysis Of Managements Public Disclosures

<span>The authors performed a computerized search of recent public financial disclosures in Management Discussion and Analyses and Presidents Letters to Shareholders concerning the reaction of multinational firms to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The intent of the search was to explore 1) the extent of TAGG disclosures made by multinational firms, 2) the tenor of these disclosures (i.e., favorable, neutral or unfavorable), 3) the location of the GATT disclosure (i.e. the Management Discussion and Analysis or the Presidents Letter, and 4) the nature of the corporate response to GATT indicated by the disclosure. A total of 76 disclosures were examined and the majority were overwhelmingly favorable toward GATDD. These responses cited the general positive effect on their firm of increased world trade. Approximately ten percent of the firms with a favorable response to GATT discussed some specific strategic reaction such as a restructuring or increased international manufacturing. Favorable reactions to GATT were more likely to be found in the Presidents Letter, and negative or neutral reactions to GATT were more likely to be found in the Management Discussion and Analysis, perhaps due to the increased legal scrutiny given to the Management Discussion and Analysis. Negative and neutral GATT disclosures were mainly from the textile and agricultural sectors of the economy, and cited the negative effect of increased and/or unfair competition from imports.</span>

The Informational Content Of The VaR Measures Associated With The Trading Activities Of Canadian Banks

This paper examines the informational content and the usefulness of Canadian banks' market risk public disclosures. Risk managers use Value at Risk (VAR) as a measure of the dollar amount of a large potential loss to a bank's trading income and common shareholders' equity as a result of extreme and low-probability market price changes. Five different VAR metrics (high, low, range of estimates, average and end-of-period values) are now published and recognized benchmarks for measuring market risk exposure, and its potential impact on a bank's financial position. At the explicit request of regulators, financial analysts and competitive pressures, most large commercial banks in North America are now reporting the five forms of VAR numbers described above in their quarterly and annual financial reports. To examine preliminary evidence on the informational content of such public financial disclosures, we composed a sample of seven of Canada's largest commercial banks. In particular, we investigate if "ex ante" VAR numbers help financial analysts, investors, and regulators to explain the subsequent variability of commercial banks' trading income and of their ratio of market value to book value of common shareholders' equity over time.

Liquidity Risk Financial Disclosure: The Case Of Large European Financial Groups

This paper examines the informational content and the usefulness of financial groups' liquidity risk public financial disclosure. This theme is of interest since the factors that influence the level of liquidity risk are complex, and they strongly interact with other originating factors from related financial risks. These characteristics have made it more difficult for financial services industry regulators and private sector ERM experts to recommend a practical and well defined framework for the management and subsequent public disclosure of liquidity risk financial information. The results of the study are based on an in-depth content analysis of the Annual reports (2004) published by twenty-one of Western Europe's largest financial groups using the liquidity risk management factors proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and its Joint Forum (2003, 2006). The results of the study revealed a disparity between commercial banks from the same or different European countries as to the level and extent of liquidity risk public financial disclosure. The same was also found for the description of the risk management structures and the accompanying explanatory comments on liquidity risk management practices. In addition, the study documented the overall scarcity of quantitative data which supports qualitative discussions on liquidity risk management. There were also areas of more complete financial disclosure that apply to factors explaining the origins of cash flows, and the explanations and discussion about foreign exchange risk management.

Cap And Trade Allowance Accounting: A Divergence Between Theory And Practice

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This study concerns one of the most significant and glaring divergences between theory and practice that has emerged since the accounting discipline’s conceptual framework was developed in the late 1970s.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>Through an extensive empirical examination of extant practices with respect to cap and trade allowances allotted to U.S. electric utilities under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, this research demonstrates a surprising—and possibly unsupportable—divergence between expected and actual practice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>The results of this research show that practice and theory diverge in a substantial and negative way.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>EPA-issued emissions allowances meet the accepted definition of an economic resource that will provide a future benefit, i.e., an asset.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>Yet, examination of five years’ of public financial disclosures for the entities affected by the CAAA shows scant recognition for the acquisition, disposition, or year-end existence of these tradable emissions permits.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>Financial statement users and other stakeholders of the affected entities may be seriously misled by the failure to recognize the allowances.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">  </span>This divergence between theory and practice does not appear to be justifiable.</span></span></p>

Analysis And Comments On The Consultative Document: International Framework For Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards And Monitoring

The market turmoil that began in mid-2007 re-emphasized the importance of liquidity to the functioning of financial markets and the banking sector. In December 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) released a consultative document entitled: “International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring”. Interested parties were invited to provide written comments by April 16th 2010. Given our interest in promoting sound liquidity risk management and supervision, three members of the Chair responded to the BIS request. Today, we share with you a summary of our analysis and comments. Our work first supports the adoption of the BCBS proposals on two new liquidity risk management standards which take the form of a 30-day minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) combined with a one-year minimum net stable funding ratio (NSFR), both to be accompanied by a mandatory set of market-related monitoring tools. Second, we share with you several general comments and suggestions we formulated on the following topics: the need for better coordination, both domestically and internationally between macro and micro-prudential supervision, the need to formulate more precise liquidity risk requirements on foreign currency funding, the importance and usefulness of public financial disclosure, suggestions on extending the use of market-related monitoring rules and metrics. Third, we also share with you more specific comments and suggestions formulated on the following topics : areas of further work like intra-group and cross border liquidity risk management, selling to gauge market liquidity, clarifying LCR and NSFR definitions, credit rating downgrades, and defining required stable funding categories. Fourth, the results of the analysis support the need to promote a more level business and supervisory playing field for all internationally active banks. Last but not least, we draw the risk-return and financial implications for Canadian banks of the adoption of the BCBS proposals for liquidity risk management and supervision.

Revisiting the BOT Structure in Direct Foreign Investment Transactions

Revisiting the BOT Structure in Direct Foreign Investment Transactions

Private Equity Investments and Disclosure Policy

In the current study, we analyze voluntary disclosure decisions in unlisted firms around private equity (PE) participation events. First, we disentangle the role of disclosure in attracting PE investments. In addition, we examine the extent to which a firm's disclosure policy is affected by the changing corporate setting and intensified corporate governance after having received PE. We find no evidence that firms would employ increased disclosure to signal their quality in the years preceding the PE financing. However, we document a significant switch to increased financial disclosure from the PE investment year onwards, consistent with the hypothesis that PE investor presence positively affects portfolio firms disclosure decisions. Further, we show that the proportional PE ownership stake is positively related to increased disclosure, but only at very high ownership levels. We explain these results in that both internal and external information demands call for higher public disclosure in PE firms. We conclude that the changing information environment resulting from a PE investment stimulates increased public financial disclosure. Our results contribute to illustrate how an indisputable change in governance resulting from a PE investment affects inter-temporal corporate disclosure decisions in unlisted firms.

Financial Disclosure and Regulation

A portfolio approach is used here to analyze the value of financial disclosure to stockholders and the need for disclosure regulation. This demonstrates that in a portfolio context the degree of public financial disclosure does not influence a firm9s value. Hence, if disclosure is costly, firms have no incentive to disclose information voluntarily. Under partial disclosure, however, investors select inefficient portfolios, implying a substantial welfare loss; hence, we need regulation. The analysis provides a framework for determining optimal disclosure from the point of view of social welfare.

Private Equity Investments and Disclosure Policy

In the current study, we dynamically analyze unlisted firms' voluntary disclosure decisions around private equity (PE) participation. First, we disentangle the role of disclosure in attracting PE investments. In addition, we examine the extent to which a firm's disclosure policy is affected by the changing corporate setting and intensified corporate governance after having received PE. We find no evidence that firms would employ increased disclosure to signal their quality in the years preceding the PE financing. However, we document a significant switch to increased financial disclosure from the PE investment year onwards, consistent with the hypothesis that PE investor presence positively affects portfolio firms' disclosure decisions. Further, we show that the proportional PE ownership stake is positively related to increased disclosure, but only at very high ownership levels. We explain these results in that both internal and external information demands call for higher public disclosure in PE firms. We conclude that the changing information environment resulting from a PE investment stimulates increased public financial disclosure. Our results contribute to illustrate how an indisputable change in governance resulting from a PE investment affects inter-temporal corporate disclosure decisions in unlisted firms.

Financial Disclosure and Bond Insurance

Regulators typically assume that public financial disclosure is necessary for the efficient functioning of capital markets. Economists recognize that other mechanisms, such as insurance, can mitigate problems that occur when buyers have less information than sellers. We examine whether public financial disclosures and bond insurance are substitutes. Our data are from municipal issuers in Michigan, where financial disclosure is required by the state, and Pennsylvania, where disclosure is unregulated. We study municipal issuers because they are not covered by federal securities laws and state laws often allow issuers to choose the level of financial disclosure. Overall, we find that when disclosure is unregulated, issuers substitute between disclosure and insurance. When disclosure is required by state law, issuers use less insurance. Our results imply that required accounting disclosure is not necessarily optimal since rational issuers will trade off public disclosure and insurance when free to do so.

Financial Disclosure and Bond Insurance

Regulators typically assume that public financial disclosure is necessary for the efficient functioning of capital markets. Economists recognize that other mechanisms, such as insurance, can mitigate problems occurring when buyers have less information than sellers. We examine whether public financial disclosures and bond insurance are substitutes or complements. Our data are from municipal issuers in Michigan, where financial disclosure is required by the state, and Pennsylvania, where disclosure is unregulated. We study municipal issuers because they are not covered by federal securities laws and state laws often allow issuers to choose the level of financial disclosure. Overall, we find that when disclosure is unregulated, issuers substitute between disclosure and insurance. When disclosure is required by state law, issuers use less insurance. Our results imply that required accounting disclosure is not necessarily optimal since rational issuers will trade off public disclosure and insurance when free to do so.

Strategic Financial Disclosure: Evidence from Labor Negotiations

Abstract.Evidence of strategic behavior in public financial disclosure is provided by analyzing 673 disclosures that were made before, during, and after four Canadian labor strikes. Financial disclosures included quantitative and qualitative information about the sampled companies that appeared in print media during the periods of interest. Strategic behavior involved the naming of one actor by another in the disclosures. The analyses showed that disclosure frequency was much higher during and immediately preceding the strikes than in other periods. Network‐analytic techniques were employed to examine the linkages among seven groups of actors that were named in the disclosures. The disclosure networks increased in density during the strikes but became less centralized. Our analysis supports the view that strategic interactions in disclosures are multilateral and dynamic. Thus, any attempt to model financial disclosure during labor negotiations as a bilateral single‐period game would appear to be simplistic. Disclosure management in this setting seems to occur within a complex economic and social setting.

The Ethics in Government Act, Conflict of Interest Laws and Presidential Recruiting

The federal conflict of interest laws are involved in the recruiting and confirmation of the political leaders for the executive branch of our government in ways that warrant careful description and assessment. Central to the description is the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 that requires the president's nominees to disclose publicly the details of their personal financial interests, thereby creating records that the public and the press may scrutinize for potential conflicts of interest.' By manifesting the recent shift to ''sunshine in government that markedly distinguishes public sector posts from jobs in other parts of the economy where personal and financial privacy is carefully protected, the Ethics in Government Act may be in danger of becoming a scapegoat for all that is most difficult and frustrating in presidential recruiting. Whether the Ethics in Government Act has in fact shifted the balance too far, thereby effectively barring otherwise highly-qualified persons from serving in Washington, will be the subject of congressional oversight hearings that are scheduled to take place well before the 1984 presidential election.2 At issue in these hearings will be the relative impact on presidential recruiting of such diverse factors as the Ethics Act, the long-standing conflict of interest statutes and the limitations on executive branch pay levels.3 In the meantime, however, the presidential transition has focused greater attention than ever before on efforts to prevent future conflicts by identifying and resolving problems prior to the time a presidential nominee enters office. For persons who do agree to accept nomination by the president to Senate-confirmed positions, the confirmation process itself can be a most rigorous test. As evidence of how central the conflict of interest issue has become, each committee of the Senate now refrains from reporting presidential nominees to the full Senate for confirmation prior to receipt of assurance from the Office of Government Ethics that the nominees will be able to assume office legally uncompromised by their personal financial interests. Although most of this practice regarding the identification of conflicts of interest is new, the related substantive law is not. President Reagan's administration is the first to come into office since the passage of the Ethics in Government Act which, in addition to its public financial disclosure requirements, also established the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) to provide overall direction of executive branch policies related to preventing conflicts of inter-