Psychology Of Procedural Justice Research Articles

Egocentrisme in de psychologie van procedurele rechtvaardigheid

Egocentrism in the psychology of procedural justice Egocentrism in the psychology of procedural justice J.-W. van Prooijen, Gedrag & Organisatie, volume 20, November 2007, nr. 4, pp. 356-368 Whereas it is often assumed that reactions to decision-making procedures are based on norms, values, and moral principles, in the current contribution I suggest that reactions to decision-making procedures often are to a substantial extent shaped by egocentric concerns. Such egocentrism can be observed in various explanatory theoretical models of procedural justice effects. These models converge on the assumption that people's procedural justice judgments are based on the implications of decision-making procedures for themselves. Recent empirical studies provide evidence for two basic propositions regarding egocentrism in the psychology of procedural justice: (1) People respond more negatively to procedural injustice that happens to themselves than to procedural injustice that happens to others, and (2) an egocentric self-focus amplifies people's fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures. It is concluded that egocentric motives play a central role in the psychology of procedural justice.

The Influence of Accuracy as a Function of Leader’s Bias: The Role of Trustworthiness in the Psychology of Procedural Justice

The present research examined the combined effect of accuracy of procedures and leader's bias on fairness judgments and the experience of positive emotions. The results of two studies showed that the strongest positive effects on both types of reactions were found when procedures were accurate and the leader was unbiased. In addition, accuracy of procedures only revealed an impact when the leader was perceived as unbiased rather than biased. Moreover, this interactive effect was found to be mediated, at least partly, by perceptions of trustworthiness. These findings show that more research is needed on examining different types of procedural fairness, both as single and combined predictors of people's reactions.

On the psychology of procedural justice: reactions to procedures of ingroup vs. outgroup authorities

AbstractTheorizing on procedural justice has assumed that people's reactions to outgroup authorities are to a large extent based on instrumental concerns. Therefore, attention is primarily directed to outcomes rather than procedures in encounters with outgroup authorities. In the current article we propose that in order for people dealing with outgroup authorities to be strongly affected by procedural fairness, the available outcome information should be ambiguous. Furthermore, we argue that people confronted with an outgroup authority react particularly negatively to unfair procedures that give them negative outcome expectancies. These patterns are not expected in encounters with ingroup authorities. Two experiments support our line of reasoning. The discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for the integration of theoretical perspectives on procedural justice. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The role of standing in the psychology of procedural justice: Towards theoretical integration

In the current chapter, the authors explore the relation between social standing and procedural justice. Standing is an important construct in procedural justice theories and tends to be broadly defined as the position that people have in social groups. It is argued that the standing construct suffers from conceptual ambiguity: In procedural justice literature two distinct interpretations of standing can be distinguished, one defining standing as intragroup status and one defining standing as the extent to which people are included in social groups. Furthermore, it is argued that research findings on the relation between standing and procedural justice are not conclusive. The authors review recent empirical findings that address these concerns, and conceptually integrate these findings. In closing, the authors outline avenues for future research that the procedural justice field may want to take, and discuss implications of the work reviewed here.

Appropriateness of decisions as a moderator of the psychology of voice

AbstractThis paper focuses on the psychology of the voice effect (the effect that people show more positive reactions when they are allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion in the decision‐making process than when they are denied such an opportunity). It is argued that it is important to ask about what decisions people are allowed voice. More specifically, results of two experiments suggest that when participation in decision making is appropriate (i.e. voice is allowed about decisions that are relatively important to participants) the voice effect is found: People's procedural judgements and other reactions are more positive following voice as opposed to no‐voice procedures. However, when participation in decision making is inappropriate (i.e. voice is allowed about decisions that are unimportant to participants) no effect or even a reversal of the voice effect is found. These people do not react differently or even react more negatively following voice as opposed to no‐voice procedures. It is concluded that these results further our insights into the psychology of procedural justice in general and voice in particular. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The psychology of procedural justice: A test of the group-value model.

The psychology of procedural justice: A test of the group-value model.

The psychology of procedural justice: A test of the group-value model.

The psychology of procedural justice: A test of the group-value model.

Procedural fairness and work group responses to performance evaluation systems

In a variety of settings, procedures that permit predecision input by those affected by the decision in question have been found to have positive effects on fairness judgments, independent of the favorability of the decision. Two major models of the psychology of procedural justice make contrary predictions about whether repeated negative outcomes attenuate such input effects. If such attenuation occurs, it would lessen the applicability of procedural justice findings to some real-world settings, such as organizations, where procedures often provide repeated negative outcomes. The present laboratory investigation examined the procedural and distributive fairness justments produced by high- and low-input performance evaluation procedures under conditions of repeated negative outcomes. Thirty-five three-person groups of male undergraduates participated in a three-round competition. Groups either were or were not allowed to specify the relative weights to be given to two criteria used in evaluating their performance. All groups received negative outcomes on each of the three rounds. A second experimental factor varied whether or not the group learned after losing the second round that it could not possibly win the third and final round of the competition. Measures of procedural and distributive fairness showed that the high-input procedure led to judgments of greater procedural and distributive fairness across all three rounds. The input-based enhancement of fairness occurred regardless of whether reward was possible. The implications of these findings for theories of procedural justice and for applications of procedural justice to organizational settings are discussed.