Psychological States Of Others Research Articles

Two social brains: neural mechanisms of intersubjectivity.

It is the aim of this article to present an empirically justified hypothesis about the functional roles of the two social neural systems, namely the so-called 'mirror neuron system' (MNS) and the 'mentalizing system' (MENT, also 'theory of mind network' or 'social neural network'). Both systems are recruited during cognitive processes that are either related to interaction or communication with other conspecifics, thereby constituting intersubjectivity. The hypothesis is developed in the following steps: first, the fundamental distinction that we make between persons and things is introduced; second, communication is presented as the key process that allows us to interact with others; third, the capacity to 'mentalize' or to understand the inner experience of others is emphasized as the fundamental cognitive capacity required to establish successful communication. On this background, it is proposed that MNS serves comparably early stages of social information processing related to the 'detection' of spatial or bodily signals, whereas MENT is recruited during comparably late stages of social information processing related to the 'evaluation' of emotional and psychological states of others. This hypothesis of MNS as a social detection system and MENT as a social evaluation system is illustrated by findings in the field of psychopathology. Finally, new research questions that can be derived from this hypothesis are discussed.This article is part of the themed issue 'Physiological determinants of social behaviour in animals'.

Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task.

Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of circumstances requires an understanding of their psychological states. Humans’ nearest primate relatives, the great apes, understand many psychological states of others, for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so far there is little evidence that they possess the key marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human 1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may possess at least some basic understanding that an agent’s actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such understanding might not be the exclusive province of the human species.

Behavioral Study on Emotional Voice Perception in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Previous studies conducted on children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and their abilities to recognize the psychological states of others have primarily focused on visual aspects such as facial expression and perception. The aims of this study were to clarify the characteristics of auditory information processing mechanisms in individuals with ASD in order to expand our understanding of those with ASD and to contribute to improvements in their social adaptability. The behavioral characteristics of voice cognition in ASD were investigated in 12 individuals with ASD (mean age = 11.83 years) and 12 matched typical development (TD) controls (mean age = 11.58 years). Participants were asked to judge the emotional valence of vocal stimuli with happy, angry, or neutral expressions (emotion task) and select illustrations that best correspond to the semantics of the vocal stimuli (semantic task). The ASD group had significantly (p = 0.013) longer reaction times in the emotion task, suggesting that they have difficulty distinguishing emotional valence. In the semantic task, the ASD group had lower understanding of the meaning of sentences when voices were presented with angry expressions. These results suggest the importance of the emotions conveyed in verbal speech during conversations with individuals with ASD.

The tip of the language iceberg

AbstractArbib's How the brain got language is a major achievement in defining a trajectory for the evolution of complex imitation and the language-ready brain leading to human language. In addition to these capabilities, I will suggest that it is useful to consider two additional components of human brain function that are intricately related to the emergence of language. These are, first, the profound human motivation to represent and share the psychological states of others, and second, the related complex semantic system that represents the contents of what is communicated in language. In this sense, these two components represent part of what is under the iceberg, where language is the emerging tip.

A Meadian account of social understanding: Taking a non-mentalistic approach to infant and verbal false belief understanding

Performance on false belief tasks has long been considered a key indicator of the development of social understanding in young children. We consider the enabling conditions for performing non-verbal and verbal false belief tasks as well as a typical developmental path toward false belief understanding. We argue that, in early ontogenesis, children anticipate the coordination of activity with others rather than read, probe, or reflectively engage with the psychological states of others. As linguistically mediated reflective thought emerges, children gradually become able to parse and isolate the myriad of incipient somatic, affective, and intentional responses that arise in any given moment. With reflective thought, children also begin to develop distinct and temporally coherent understandings about the minds of self and other. We provide an account of how the reflective thought that facilitates false belief understanding emerges. Our account focuses on a gradually developing refinement of social coordination and the shared perspectival understandings inherent in social coordination.

From Hominoid to Hominid Mind: What Changed and Why?

The living great apes, and in particular members of the genus Pan, help test hypotheses regarding the cognitive skills of our extinct common ancestor. Research with chimpanzees suggests that we share some but not all of our abilities to model another's perspective in social interactions. Large-scale comparisons among human infants, bonobos, chimpanzees, and orangutans on both social and physical problem-solving tasks demonstrate that human infants are unique for their early emerging social cognitive skills, which facilitate participation in cultural interactions. Comparisons between bonobos and chimpanzees also reveal cognitive differences that are likely due to developmental shifts. These comparative studies suggest that our species' capabilities to assess the psychological states of others are built on those abilities that were present in our last common ape ancestor and were derived, in part, owing to shifts in cognitive ontogeny that likely account for species differences among other apes as well.

Chimpanzees deceive a human competitor by hiding

There is little experimental evidence that any non-human species is capable of purposefully attempting to manipulate the psychological states of others deceptively (e.g., manipulating what another sees). We show here that chimpanzees, one of humans’ two closest primate relatives, sometimes attempt to actively conceal things from others. Specifically, when competing with a human in three novel tests, eight chimpanzees, from their first trials, chose to approach a contested food item via a route hidden from the human’s view (sometimes using a circuitous path to do so). These findings not only corroborate previous work showing that chimpanzees know what others can and cannot see, but also suggest that when competing for food chimpanzees are skillful at manipulating, to their own advantage, whether others can or cannot see them.

Chimpanzees are sensitive to some of the psychological states of others

Animals react and adjust to the behavior of their conspecifics. Much less is known about whether animals also react and adjust to the psychological states of others. Recent evidence suggests that chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) follow the gaze of others around barriers, past distracters, and check back if they find nothing. Chimpanzees can gauge the motives of a human experimenter and distinguish his intentional from accidental actions. These results suggest that chimpanzees interpret the perceptions and actions of others from a psychological perspective -they seem to know what others can and cannot see and what goals others pursue. It is hypothesized that the co-operation of (1) the ability to operate on psychological states and (2) the motivation to share emotions and experiences with others are key ingredients in the making of human minds.

Chimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent

New data suggest that relatively drastic revisions are needed in our theoretical accounts of what other animal species understand about the psychological states of others. Specifically, chimpanzees seem to understand some things about what others do and do not see, or have and have not seen in the immediate past, as well as some things about others' goal-directed activities. This is especially so in competitive situations. They clearly do not have a human-like theory of mind, however, and so the challenge is to specify precisely how ape and human social cognition are similar and different.

How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality

AbstractAs adults we believe that our knowledge of our own psychological states is substantially different from our knowledge of the psychological states of others: First-person knowledge comes directly from experience, but third-person knowledge involves inference. Developmental evidence suggests otherwise. Many 3-year-old children are consistently wrong in reporting some of their own immediately past psychological states and show similar difficulties reporting the psychological states of others. At about age 4 there is an important developmental shift to a representational model of the mind. This affects children's understanding of their own minds as well as the minds of others. Our sense that our perception of our own minds is direct may be analogous to many cases where expertise provides an illusion of direct perception. These empirical findings have important implications for debates about the foundations of cognitive science.

The origins of empathic concern

Recent developments in research cast doubt on early conceptions of young children as primarily egocentric and uncaring of others' needs. Studies reviewed indicate a broad range of social competencies children bring to their interpersonal relationships. As early as 2 years of age, they show (a) the cognitive capacity to interpret, in simple ways, the physical and psychological states of others, (b) the emotional capacity to experience, affectively, the state of others, and (c) the behavioral repertoire that permits the possibility of attempts to alleviate discomfort in others. Both temperament and environment may contribute to individual differences in concern for others. Early socialization experiences that lead to adaptive and maladaptive patterns of responsiveness to others' needs are described. Examples of environmental risk conditions include parental depression, marital discord, parental maltreatment. Implications of this work for broadening existing conceptualizations of empathy and related prosocial orientations are addressed.