Prudential Rationality Research Articles

The Varieties of Prudence

We sometimes face personal choices that are so momentous they appear to give rise to an intrapersonal analogue to the non-identity problem. Where the non-identity problem presents as a problem for morality, the intrapersonal analogue presents as a problem for prudence. The analogy has been explored recently by Das and Paul, and although, as this paper argues, their analysis fails—there is no intrapersonal analogue for the non-identity problem—it functions to highlight a persistent and perplexing puzzle for prudential rationality. This paper offers its own explanation: namely, that the phenomena that motivate the purported intrapersonal problem are better accounted for by conceiving prudence as disjunctive. To this end, I sketch a theory of two varieties of prudence.

Bocheński’s Minima Moralia

Late in life, Józef Maria Bocheński set out to examine the age-old preoccupation with the question “how to live as well and as long as possible?” A traditional answer has been, “live wisely.” In his Handbook of Worldly Wisdom (2020), Bocheński analyzes this answer arguing that, conceptually, living wisely is distinct from obeying moral commandments, prescribing ethical rules, and recognizing authority (e.g., piety, free submission to divine authority). He claims that ethics consists solely in what moral philosophers label as “metaethics” — a theoretical discipline interested in the conceptual status of moral discourse qua discourse. However, Bocheński remains silent about a substantive ethics — that is, how a life led one way or another subscribes to some guiding value-set. As regards wisdom, therefore, the consequence of this position is that Bocheński’s account is ethically neutral. I argue that such a position entails a tension and dichotomy between, on the one hand, prudential rationality concerned with getting on in the moment — that is, wisdom — and, on the other hand, unconditional moral commandments. For his part, Bocheński does not recommend living according to wisdom’s precepts as he analyses them; his own path through life, he tells us, has been a commitment to Christian values, piety abetted by observance of moral commandments, a perspective that, I submit, is not ethically neutral: on the contrary, it entails thick, substantive value-choice. Bocheński’s avowal suggests a second dichotomy and tension, that between the worldly conduct of life, with moderate acknowledgment of moral principles, and an extra-worldly perspective (the “folly of the Cross”). Bocheński does not attempt to resolve either dichotomy, to seek a possible point of their convergence and integration, for instance by inquiring into moral psychology (i.e., the construction of self, the nature of the will, etc.). I believe that this set of views stems from conclusions Bocheński reached in advance of producing the Handbook that bear on, first, how philosophy should be conducted — as logical analysis hostile to grandiloquent speculation and synthesis (“worldviews”); and second, his utter dismissal as nefarious of anthropocentric views. Indeed, Bocheński asserts, without a blush, that almost everything “we” have come to believe about ourselves is superstition writ large. I trace what I consider to be difficulties with Bocheński’s account of wisdom — in relation to his take on morality, (meta-)ethics, and piety — to these idiosyncratic views.

Prioritarianism, Timeslices, and Prudential Value

ABSTRACT This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.

The fragility of rationality: George Eliot on akrasia and the law of consequences

ABSTRACT George Eliot often uses the language of determinism in her novels, but we do not understand her view very well by treating such phrasing as addressing debates about the freedom of will directly. Instead she uses seemingly deterministic terms, like the ‘law of consequences', to depict and analyse a particular problem in moral psychology: those instances where we ourselves make it impossible to act on our own best judgements. When we fail to act on our best judgement, this has downstream effects, since it can produce a gap between prudential rationality and one's all-things-considered judgement. Surveying depictions of this problem in Silas Marner, Adam Bede, and Romola, I argue that it's a revealing problem for Eliot’s larger view, bringing together her objections to consequentialism, her recognition of the fragility of virtue, and her account of the role of sympathy in practical deliberation.

The rationality of political experimentation

Theorists from John Stuart Mill to Robert Nozick have argued that citizens can gain insight into the demands of justice by experimenting with diverse forms of political life. I consider the rationality of such experimentation, arguing for three distinct but related claims. First, rational citizens will not be highly incentivized to conduct experiments in living. Here I develop an account of what I call the ‘prudential rationality constraint’ (PRC). The PRC implies that rational citizens will be undermotivated from the standpoint of social value to conduct experiments in living. Second, despite the success of various radical political experiments (e.g., democracy after 1648), citizens generally ought to engage in moderate rather than radical political experimentation. The latter will nearly always be prudentially irrational to conduct, hard to learn from, and quite possibly harmful to participants and third parties. Finally, there are important but overlooked ways, including through entrepreneurship, in which institutions can incentivize citizens to engage in socially valuable political experimentation.

Reflective Judgement and Prudential Rationality: A Contribution to an Inclusive Practical Application of Law

Hannah Arendt has developed a theory of the importance of judgment of taste for political manners, founded on the Kantian aesthetic theory. Nowadays this theory is considered a current theoretical reference for establishing a political way to reconcile the demands of the radicalization of deliberative democracy with the need for political inclusion (Iris Marion Young, Seyla Benhabib). Albena Azmanova in her The Scandal of Reason: A Critical Theory of Political Judgment proposes an inclusive political rhetoric. The political theory founded on judgment is based on Kant’s philosophy; it was developed by Arendt and has greatly influenced the current debate, as an alternative theory in which the moral basis of law can be more sensitive to human contexts; a universalist theory more adequate for dealing with the tragic dimension of human life. The theory of political judgment uses the concepts of reflective judgment and ‘enlarged thought’ as its main concepts. As a starting point, a theory like this considers the singular judgments of justice that each person makes. The background, therefore, is not a rational foundation of principles, but the capacity of rational beings to make judgments. This post-metaphysical theory of law, based on a theory of judgment, is a critique of legal positivism, but presents itself as an alternative to the idealistic theory of law. But this theoretical project has received some criticism related to the adequacy of Arendt’s rereading of Kantian philosophy and her attempt to approximate Kant’s reflective judgment to the Aristotelian concept of phronêsis. Some critics, such as Bryan Garsten, believe that Kant’s rhetoric of public reason diminished and displaced the prudential faculty of judgment that Arendt is to be interested in reviving. Arendt’s attempt to find a theory of judgment in Kant’s aesthetic theory is not successful, in Garsten’s view. Our purpose is to show that a critical theory of judicial judgment is not only possible, but necessary; Arendt’s theory of judgment offers an important contribution to a critical theory of judicial judgment, particularly one devoted to the construction of a legal theory that prioritizes a politics of social inclusion. This theory proposes a critical approach to the project of the procedural conception of democracy, since it can mask social exclusion. An adequate understanding of judicial argumentation cannot forget that it happens in a rhetorical context: it is not only important what a discourse says, but how it says it. The radicalization of deliberative democracy supposes a revision of the ways judicial deliberation is thought: not by reference to universal or at least general principles, but taking into consideration what is ‘critically relevant’, with a view to remedying social injustice (following Azmanova).

The Rehabilitation of Practical Reasoning and the Persistence of Deductivism: An Impossible Challenge?

Exploring certain specific dimensions of practical reasoning in law—namely the possibility of recognizing an autonomous (structurally dialectic and intentionally dialogic) subject/subject rationality—this paper concentrates on one of the main challenges that the theory of legal argumentation, or a certain standard trend within this theory (emerging from Alexy, MacCormick, Aarnio and Peczenik), considers when invoking Wroblewski’s legacy (the analytical reconstitution of argumentation as a process of justification, with different horizontal or vertical levels). In effect, this challenge means on the one hand responding to the question of “how decisions can be justified when no deductive argument is sufficient to justify them” and, on the other hand, defending the thesis that syllogism “provides” the “framework” in which all “the other arguments make sense as legal arguments” (MacCormick). Is this a plausible challenge or does it encourage possible convergence? In order to answer this question, I will allude to some relevant “anti- deductive critiques” (from the founding fathers Viehweg, Perelman and Toulmin) and a very specific jurisprudentialist understanding of legal rationality (which explores the judicium/legal system connection and a dialectics between problem and system), and I will refer to the stimulus of a certain alternative logical perspective (“legal logic beyond deduction”) that can be identified in Sartor’s “doxification of practical reasoning”. In addition, one of the main concerns of our common thematic core must not be forgotten: the confrontation between the democratic (discursive) legitimation of jurisdictio as potestas and the apparently non deliberative and non-democratic possibilities of practical–prudential rationality.

Preferences and Prudential Reasons

Preference-based theories of prudential value seem to generate an absurd result when combined with commonplace platitudes about prudential rationality: it would seem that if the satisfaction of our preferences is the source (or even a source) of prudential value, then prudential rationality must be neutral (in, at least, a troubling range of cases) between taking steps to achieve the objects of one's preferences and merely engineering one's preferences to take as their object(s) that which obtains. Either way, one seems to conform to the prudential demand to promote one's well-being. But this is widely held to be counterintuitive. In this article, I argue that this verdict arises only given eminently controvertible interpretations of a preference-based axiology and of the constitution of prudential reasons.

Belief and credence: why the attitude-type matters

In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, doxastic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemologists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or in terms of credence and (ii) the success or failure of a reductionist project in the belief-credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally.

The Political Philosophy of Science and the Problem of Rationality

The present article offers an introductory vision to the political philosophy of science. The political philosophy of science is a new field of study where the philosophy of science and political philosophy converge. We will see the main contents of this field. We will also note that it depends on the construction of a model of rationality where science and politics can meet each other. Finally, the article tries to outline such a model of rationality. In order to do so, we will review the relationship between Karl Popper’s scientific and political philosophy. I suggest to read Popper’s critical rationalism in terms of a kind of prudential rationality.

Notes on Contributors

Previous article FreeNotes on ContributorsPDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreDavid Beglin is completing his doctoral work at the University of California, Riverside. His current project explores the moral psychological underpinnings of our responsibility practices in an effort to provide a theory of morally responsible agency. He has also written papers on the relationship between death, agency, and meaning in life. [email protected]Michael Cholbi is professor of philosophy and director of the California Center for Ethics and Policy at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. He has published widely in theoretical and practical ethics, including work on Kantian ethics, paternalism, and death and dying. He is currently completing a book manuscript on philosophical issues related to grief. [email protected]Dale Dorsey is professor and chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Kansas. He works mainly in normative ethics, typically at the crossroads of well-being, morality, and practical reason. He is the author of The Limits of Moral Authority (2016) and The Basic Minimum: A Welfarist Approach (2012) and is currently writing a monograph on the nature of prudential value and prudential rationality. [email protected]Michael Garnett is a senior lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London. He works on the nature of freedom, both as a topic in political philosophy and as one in the philosophy of agency. Recent papers concern indoctrination, the idea of human unpredictability, autonomy, and the relationship between agency and psychological freedom. He is currently writing a book about freedom in all of its many guises. [email protected]Toby Handfield is associate professor in the Department of Philosophy at Monash University. His current research focuses on the evolution of social norms and human cooperation. [email protected]Alex Madva is an assistant professor of philosophy at California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. His research centers on the questions that research in social psychology raises for philosophy of mind, philosophy of race and feminism, and applied ethics, especially prejudice and discrimination. [email protected]Nathaniel Sharadin is the Allan and Anita Sutton Distinguished Faculty Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. His research focuses on normative and metanormative issues in ethics and epistemology. [email protected] Previous article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 128, Number 3April 2018 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/696153 © 2018 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

A Near‐Term Bias Reconsidered

Standard accounts of prudential rationality enjoin temporal neutrality. “Rationality,” or so says Rawls, “requires an impartial concern for all parts of our life.” And while I accept this form of temporal neutrality, I argue in this paper that a powerful rationale exists for a competing form of prudential rationality according to which it is permissible to be biased toward near‐future rather than far‐future parts of one's life. After arguing that traditional defenses of temporal neutrality do not succeed against this rationale, I offer a new proposal, drawn from the phenomenon of intrapersonal reactive attitudes.

Neutrality, Partiality, and Meaning in Life

Discussion of whether values and norms are neutral or not has mainly appeared in works on the nature of prudential rationality and morality. Little systematic has yet appeared in the up and coming field of the meaning of life. What are the respects in which the value of meaningfulness is neutral or, in contrast, partial, relational, or ‘biased’? In this article, I focus strictly on answering this question. First, I aim to identify the salient, and perhaps exhaustive, respects in which issues of neutrality arise in the contexts of life’s meaning. In addition to providing a taxonomy of the key points of contention, a second aim is to advance reflection about them by considering the most important arguments that have been marshalled in favour of one side or the other, particularly as they appear in recent neutral positions. I conclude that meaning in life is neutral with respect to time but not any other conditions such as agents and patients, with a third aim being to point out that this makes the value of meaning different from the kinds of non/neutrality encountered in some salient conceptions of prudence and morality.

Prudence and past selves

An important platitude about prudential rationality is that I should not refuse to sacrifice a smaller amount of present welfare for the sake of larger future benefits. I ought, in other words, to treat my present and future as of equal prudential significance. The demands of prudence are less clear, however, when it comes to one’s past selves. In this paper, I argue that past benefits are possible in (at least) two ways, and that this fact cannot be easily accommodated by traditional approaches to prudential rationality. Against univocal accounts of prudential rationality, I hold that the possibility of past benefits suggests that a bias toward the present and future is defensible when it comes to some welfare goods, but that prudential reasons are temporally neutral between when it comes to the success or failure of one’s long-term projects.

Mētis and violence in Machiavellian political theory

The quest for winning and preserving political power in Machiavelli’s The Prince is led by the bellicose version of the pre-classical and mythological concept of m  etis or cunning rationality. In opposition to a domestic version of cunning rationality, understood as the rationality of the weak, Machiavellian m  etis is a prudential and deceptive rationality of the strong. Bellicose cunning rationality does not, however, prevent the prince from falling into the hubris of violence, and does not avoid undermining cunning rationality itself. Our article evaluates and circumscribes the contribution, as well as the theoretical and practical limits of the Machiavellian bellicose cunning rationality.

Morality, Prudential Rationality, and Cheating

We have a philosopher friend who was quite ill and required surgery, but she was not ill enough to be admitted to hospital under the “life, limb, and organ preservation” guidelines that control surgical admissions. Her surgeon told her to go to emergency and gave her a list of symptoms to tell the physicians there. Those, he said, would get her a bed, and he would then come and perform the necessary surgery. And that is how our friend (who, ironically, taught ethics out of a textbook called Virtue and Vice in Everyday Life) got her surgery.We are grateful to Don Brown for extremely helpful comments and conversation on the philosophical matters of our paper and to Dan McDonald for stimulating discussion on the culture of healthcare providers.

Morality, Self-Interest, and Two Kinds of Prudential Practical Rationality

In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR (morality) and PPR (self-interest).

Kitcher and the Achievement of Science

Perhaps, the best way to approach a book with as broad a scope and as great an ambition as Philip Kitcher's The Advancement of Science is to think about its main goal. What vision is it trying to convey? Is it a worthy vision? Later one can ask how well it was done. Interestingly, the how-well-is-it-done question is essentially Kitcher's model of rationality. Rationality is a means-end equilibration, deciding what is rational in terms of how well a procedure meets a goal. This is the old theme of pragmatic or prudential rationality which has made its reappearance in the cognitive scientists' problem solving literature. Not surprisingly this influence is strong in Kitcher's work. What are Kitcher's goals? He explicitly raises this question:

Moral Judgment, Action and Emotion

What makes us responsive, however occasionally, to moral demands? Why do people sometimes own up, go off to fight unwillingly in what they consider to be just wars, refrain from stealing a march on friends, and so on, even when they could by doing otherwise reap advantages far outweighing, in the scales of ordinary prudential rationality, any consequent disadvantage? Why has morality such a hold over us?