Prudential Authority Research Articles

Towards a Reinvigoration of the Risk Management Framework for the Scope of Upgrading Prudential Surveillance

This article discusses financial stability related notions of risk, the issue of convergence and cross financial sector prudential intervention. It elucidates the Basel framework shortcomings and enunciates the requirement of setting a reinvigorated prudential framework before proceeding to its essentials in terms of engineering. It highlights an early warning approach dealing with the issue of time reaction mismatch of the prudential authority and the priority of setting a long run forwarded guided approach. The objective of this research is to provide a clue into enhancing prudential setting of instruments, the forwarded guided purview of surveillance as well as hedging and the Balanced Score Card.

An Overview of the Roles and Functions of Selected Financial Role Players to Protect Financial Stability and Promote Market Integrity in South Africa

The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and other financial role players such as the Prudential Authority (PA), the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (FSCA), the National Credit Regulator (NCR), the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), the Financial Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC), the Financial Sector Contingency Forum (FSCF), the Financial Sector Council of Regulators (FSCR) and the Financial Sector Inter-Ministerial Council (FSIC) play a significant role in the protection and promotion of financial stability and market integrity in South Africa. The SARB has the primary financial stability mandate, whilst the FSCA was established to primarily promote market integrity and enhance market efficiency through protecting and promoting the fair treatment of financial customers and promoting financial literacy programs. As technology advances and new players enter the market, traditional financial institutions are faced with increased competition and the need to adapt and innovate to stay relevant. In this regard, regulatory frameworks and the functions of regulatory bodies should be constantly reviewed to conform to financial technology (fintech) developments and safeguard consumer interests. This article examines the roles and functions of the aforementioned financial role players as regulated by the Financial Sector Regulation Act (FSR Act) and other relevant financial sector laws. This is done to evaluate the effectiveness of their roles and functions to protect and promote financial stability and market integrity in line with fintech and Artificial Intelligence (AI) developments. The paper also evaluates the importance of cooperation and collaboration between the financial role players to fulfil their roles and functions.

Exploring causal interactions between macroprudential policy and financial cycles in South Africa

This study investigated the causal interactions between macroprudential policy, measured by the Macroprudential Policy Index (MPI), and financial cycles represented by the Aggregate Financial Cycle (AFC) and the Credit and Asset Prices Financial Cycle (CAFC) in South Africa from 1970q1 to 2023q2. Additionally, the study explored the effects of macroprudential policy during different phases of financial cycles. Using the time-varying Granger-causality model, the study found that the MPI Granger-caused financial cycles during the 2003/07 credit boom in South Africa, while the AFC and CAFC Granger-caused macroprudential policy during the Covid-19-induced collapse of financial markets. The results suggest that macroprudential policy is employed more proactively during financial booms and more reactively during financial busts in South Africa. The Markov switching dynamic regression model used to assess the MPI's effects revealed that macroprudential policy's effectiveness is stronger during financial busts and weaker during financial booms in South Africa. This is because financial institutions in South Africa tend to resist stricter regulations during boom phases due to heightened optimism about future prospects. Conversely, they are more receptive to stimulatory interventions during bust phases. Based on these findings, it is recommended that the South African Reserve Bank and the Prudential Authority use macroprudential policy more assertively during financial booms to enhance its effectiveness. This could involve setting more stringent parameters upon activating macroprudential policy tools or complementing macroprudential policy with monetary policy during financial booms.

Can Language Prevent Flexible SCR Calculations? New Duties for Auditors in The Prudential Authority v Constantia Insurance Company Limited, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, Case Number 2022-19765

This article analyses the importance of the solvency capital requirement (hereafter SCR) and the minimum capital requirement (hereafter MCR) formulae and why an insurer's external auditor should audit these and disclose its contents in the insurer's financial statements. When calculating the SCR, the reason for requiring such a disclosure is to allow the Prudential Authority an opportunity to understand whether the assumptions, parameters and techniques (also referred to as economic considerations) applied by actuaries comply with section 36 of the Insurance Act 18 of 2017. Administrative costs and written premiums are considered when calculating the MCR, although written premiums could be subjected to different interpretations, which might affect this formula. Accordingly, had Constantia Insurance Company Limited's auditor audited these formulae in 2018 and disclosed their contents in the financial statements, the Prudential Authority would have commenced liquidation procedures in 2019, not choosing instead to wait and monitor the company's solvency requirements on a weekly basis for four years. As a result, owing to the lack of transparency in the financial statements and non-compliance with the SCR and MCR, Constantia spent nearly R733 000 000 over the three-year period to fund its business activities.

A theoretical foundation for prudential authorities decision making

In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, financial regulation uses micro and macroprudential rules, most of the time motivated by empirical studies. This article suggests a theoretical explanation for countercyclical and progressive capital requirements that incorporate micro- and macro-prudential stabilization objectives. The Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) imposed to individual banks by a Prudential Authority (PA) would thus represent an optimal regulation whose aim is to avoid individual and systemic risk accumulation by imposing minimal constraints to financial institutions. This corresponds to the implementation of optimal time-varying prudential capital requirements to banks, with non-linear structure, that allows PA to take progressive countercyclical actions in order to ensure financial stability. We also test the mechanism in a DSGE model and show that it would be more suitable for the financial and real stability compared to the existing fixed prudential ratios.

South Africa: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Technical Note on Banking Regulation and Supervision

The implementation of a twin peaks model represents a significant change to the South African financial supervisory architecture. The Prudential Authority (PA), operating within the administration of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), is responsible for promoting and enhancing the safety and soundness of financial institutions that provide financial products and securities services. A separate authority, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority2 (FSCA), is responsible for market conduct regulation and supervision. The introduction of the twin peaks architecture was motivated by a need to increase the robustness of the financial sector regulatory and supervisory system, reinforce financial stability, improve protection of customers, and enhance cooperation among the regulators.

Forecasting macroeconomic effects of stablecoin adoption: A Bayesian approach

This study analyzes the effect of stablecoin adoption on key macroeconomic factors in Montenegro. The main explanation for the adoption of stablecoins is their one-to-one peg to various currencies and commodities. Previous studies have relied on the relationships among cryptocurrencies and thus could not disentangle the country-level macroeconomic effects of stablecoins from the effects of other cryptocurrencies. Using data from January 2006 to December 2019, we decompose the correlation between cryptocurrencies and their effects on the economy due to (a) shocks to stablecoins and (b) shocks to Bitcoin. Contrary to assumptions, stablecoins do not maintain their peg in “crash times” but do promote economic growth. Bitcoin's volatility deanchors investor expectations, disrupts markets, and destabilizes key macroeconomic factors. Our novel findings indicate that stablecoin adoption should not be based only on a one-to-one assumption and reveal the mechanism of key gaps by a prudential authority.

South Africa: 2021 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for South Africa

South Africa’s subpar economic performance over the last decade has weakened its macroeconomic fundamentals and social indicators. In response to formidable COVID-19-related challenges, government expenditure surged, and, amid declining revenue, the budget deficit widened significantly. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and the Prudential Authority (PA) preserved adequate liquidity conditions and financial-sector stability. The cyclical recovery from the deep contraction has been faster than expected but its strength is unlikely to be sustained. Benign global market conditions have supported asset performance, although term premia are elevated due to fiscal risks. Bank soundness indicators remain solid, but a deepening bank-sovereign nexus raises some concerns.

Accountability in the twin peaks model of financial regulation in South Africa

The Financial Sector Regulation (FSR) Act 9 of 2017 implemented the first stage of the Twin Peaks model of financial regulation in South Africa. The Act established the Prudential Authority and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority to make the financial sector safer by using a more robust prudential and market conduct framework. The South African Reserve Bank received an enhanced mandate to promote and maintain financial stability. Since accountability is a core goal in financial regulation, this paper analyses the notion of accountability and specifically the accountability of the regulators in a Twin Peaks model of financial regulation. The legislative framework put in place by the FSR Act goes a long way in adhering to principles of accountability. The financial sector regulators are obliged to consult with various stakeholders such as the Minister of Finance and financial institutions. The regulators are subject to control measures, and Parliament holds them accountable. Nevertheless, the authors suggest that one more step is necessary. There should be more debate and engagement by the regulators with the general public to increase public knowledge of financial sector regulation in South Africa.

Notes: Investigations, natural justice and reviewability: Msiza v Motau NO & another

The case of Msiza v Motau NO & another 2020 (6) SA 604 (GP) dealt with a report prepared by the first respondent pursuant to an investigation into the VBS Bank looting scandal. The investigation was conducted on behalf of the second respondent, the Prudential Authority. The applicant applied for, and was granted, an order reviewing and setting aside aspects of the report that reflected adversely on him. This was because the first respondent had not afforded the applicant an opportunity to be heard before he wrote the report and submitted it to the second respondent. As such, the case raised questions about the applicability of the right to procedural fairness in investigative proceedings and about the reviewability of reports produced by investigators. This note explores whether (and, if so, in what circumstances) investigations conducted by or on behalf of public bodies constitute administrative action that must be performed in accordance with the audi alteram partem rule. It concludes that the reasoning for the court’s view (that it is incumbent on an investigator who should foresee that his findings will have adverse consequences for another person to hear that person before making such findings) lacked depth and nuance. In determining whether there is a right to be heard in an investigative context, due attention should be given to the applicable statutory framework, the powers of the investigator, the potential impact on affected persons, and relevant precedent.

Italy

Macroprudential oversight in Italy combines local elements with the European framework. At a local level, financial stability is a shared responsibility between Banca d’Italia (BdI), which is the national central bank and the prudential authority for banks and other financial institutions, the markets authority, Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), the insurance supervisor, Istituto per la Vigilanza Sulle Assicurazioni (IVASS), and the pension funds supervisor, Commissione di Vigilanza sui Fondi Pensione (COVIP).2 Each authority exercises its responsibility within a combination of sectoral and activity boundaries and the BdI plays a leading role in surveillance and coordination. Within the European framework, the BdI is both the national competent authority and the designated authority for the macroprudential tools considered under the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) and the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV), which are implemented and activated following the processes described in these regulatory texts and the guidelines provided by the European Central Bank (ECB) – within the competences assigned to it by the SSM Regulation - and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The ubiquitous role of the BdI on both fronts eases the challenges posed by the coexistence of these two frameworks.

Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic: Macroprudential Edition

This paper shows that the recent trend of separating macroprudential and monetary policies (M&Ms) into two autonomous institutions is undesirable. A strategic (game of chicken type) conflict is likely to occur, whereby each M&M ignores exuberant credit booms, trying to induce the other institution to tighten conditions. This has been observed, for example, in Sweden and Norway after 2010. We postulate a generalised concept of stochastic leadership and argue that greater rigidities give the prudential authority the upper hand strategically on the central bank. We show how this leads to a second type of unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and costly economic fluctuations.

Does monetary policy influence banks’ risk weights under the internal ratings-based approach?

This paper studies the extent to which monetary policy may affect banks’ perception of credit risk and the way banks measure risk under the internal ratings-based approach. Specifically, we empirically analyze the effect of different monetary policy variables on banks’ risk weights for credit risk. We present robust evidence of a strong, statistically significant relationship between monetary policy easing and lower implicit risk weights of banks using the internal ratings-based approach. Further, we show that the recent prolonged period of accommodative monetary policy has been instrumental in establishing this relationship. The presented findings have important implications for the prudential authority, which should be aware of the possible side effects of monetary policy on how banks measure risk.

Climate change and fit and proper-testing in the Dutch financial sector

Dutch financial supervisors intend to embed climate-related risks more firmly in their supervision of Dutch financial institutions. As part of this process the Dutch supervisors are identifying which regulatory provisions could, and perhaps, should, form a basis for supervision on climate-related risks. The prudential authority, the Dutch Central Bank, or DNB, has selected “fostering a forward-looking and sustainable sector” as one of the three focus areas in its new Supervisory Strategy for 2018–2022. DNB will devote more attention to sustainability, including the impact of climate risks and policy on the financial sector. As part of this process, DNB will examine how sustainability risks can be included on a more systematic basis in its supervisory practices. This article poses the question whether fit and proper assessments of members of the management body can be regarded as one of the supervisory practices that financial supervisors may use to address climate-related risks.

The Necessity for Regulating the Insurance Market Considering the Implementation of the IDD

In 2018, the Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) was fully implemented by all EU member states. It intends to harmonize the insurance market, provide the right incentives for the agents and protect the consumers. But why? The core business of the banking sector makes it necessary for a prudential authority to intervene and monitor. The question arises if the latest changes in the insurance business require these limitations and monitoring. This paper offers a literature review by compiling findings and setting up profound arguments, why the regulation of insurance companies is relevant. The main arguments for a strong prudential regulation are transparency, information asymmetry and agency problems, wrong incentives, a representation of the policyholder and the inversion of the production cycle. These findings make it necessary to regulate the companies and protect the policyholders. Further research should focus on case studies of insurance companies implementing the changes of IDD into daily business.

Inflation targeting and financial stability in emerging markets

This paper aims at investigating whether emerging market inflation targeters are more financially vulnerable than their non-targeting counterparts. It further assesses the extent to which targeting central banks are less responsive to financial imbalances, compared to those implementing alternative policy strategies. Based on a sample of 26 emerging countries, including 13 targeters, the analysis suggests that monetary policy in targeting countries is relatively more sensitive to financial risks. However, despite stronger central banks’ responses to financial imbalances, the financial sector appears to be more fragile for targeters. Our conclusion therefore challenges the view that central banks, through their policy interest rates, can guarantee the stability of the financial system. It rather suggests that the control of inflation should remain the primary monetary policy objective, while a (macro)prudential authority would be in charge of the financial stability objective.

The Financial Sector Regulation Bill in South Africa: Lessons from Australia

The proposed reforms to financial regulation in South Africa, as embodied in the Financial Sector Regulation Bill, (second draft, 10 December, 2014) (‘FSR Bill’), represent the most important reforms to South Africa’s financial regulatory architecture since the 1987 de Kock Commission. The degree to which these reforms succeed will determine the extent to which South Africa can maintain financial stability, and manage the effects of a future financial crisis. The de Kock Commission’s findings led to the creation of the Financial Rand, and a dual exchange rate system for South Africa (Pieter Cornelis Smit, ‘Economics: A Southern African Perspective’, (1996), p 421). The current proposed reforms introduce two regulators for the Republic’s financial sector – a so-called ‘Twin Peaks’ regulatory model: a Prudential Authority, which ‘will supervise the safety and soundness of banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions’, and a Financial Sector Conduct Authority, which ‘will supervise how financial services firms conduct their business and treat customers.’