Provincial Reconstruction Teams Research Articles

The Security-Development Nexus in Practice: Lessons Learned from the US Provincial Reconstruction Team in Panjshir in Afghanistan

The article holistically assesses the US application of security-development nexus (SDN) through the most known example of SDN in practice – provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) – to elucidate what lessons learned can be drawn from there. The PRT's unique small footprint approach aimed to skip combat phases and focus on development in Panjshir. The research detected fourteen lessons learned from PRT's Panjshir wrongdoings and relatively successful initiatives. Lessons learned include defining mission objectives, early identification of instability sources, unified funding, emphasis on security sector reform, cultural awareness, empowering locals, and continuity in leadership and mission. PRT Panjshir's approach is debated, emphasizing managing, not fully resolving, complex conditions. Depending on contextual factors and learned lessons, the model's duplicability in future conflicts remains uncertain.

Discretion and military frontline workers: investigating civil-military relations policies in Afghanistan

ABSTRACT This article explores how military ‘frontline workers’ use their discretion to interpret and then comply, breach or bypass policies that reach into the tactical level, and why. Based on extensive primary sources including in-depth interviews, end-of-tour reports and data from records, the case study explores the implementation of policies on civil-military relations by military commanders in the Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan in 2005–2012. This article finds that the commanders used their considerable discretion to implement policies that parted from national directives. In doing so, the Norwegian military strove to align their approach with close allies and NATO and became actual policy-makers. This article contributes to the debate on how western militaries behave at the tactical level by employing the concept of ‘discretion’.

The Role of the Polish Military Contingent in the Reconstruction of Ghazni Province

The article outlines the activity of the Polish army as part of NATO operations in Afghanistan. The analysis concerns humanitarian aid in particular, and identifies the most important activities of the PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) carried out in the field of reconstruction and security in the city of Ghazni from 2001. The PMC (Polish Military Contingent) worked for the stability of the city, starting in mid-2008. The author concludes that the objectives pursued by the PMC related to the reconstruction of the city of Ghazni increased the level of security of the local community and the overall stability in the region. The methods used in the article (comparative, research, systemic and genetic explanation method) make it possible to examine and present the processes and changes taking place.

Experiences May Vary: NATO and Cultural Interoperability in Afghanistan

This article examines the coherence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) coordinated military strategy during the war in Afghanistan. We argue that much of this coherence can be lost when decision makers adopt multinational strategic guidance that is then interpreted by different national contingents operationally. Different strategic and military cultures across troop-contributing countries may account for observed variation in operational outcomes, but better theoretical tools are needed to examine this phenomenon. Our aim is to further scholars’ understanding of how cultural variables can affect mission outcomes. This assumed effect of strategic and military cultures is explored empirically with reference to the Canadian and German Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, which formed part of the NATO-led ISAF operation.

A Good Ally - Norway and International Statebuilding in Afghanistan, 2001-2014

ABSTRACTThe article examines the findings of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Norwegian government in 2014 to evaluate all aspects of Norway’s civilian and military contribution to the international operation in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. Concerned with the wider implications of the Commission’s findings, it focuses on two issues in particular: (1) Norway’s relations with the US, a close and long-standing strategic ally whose resources, capabilities and dominance of decision-making dwarfed that of all other coalition partners in Afghanistan; and (2) Norway’s record in the province of Faryab, where, from 2005 to 2012, a Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team was charged with bringing security, good governance and development to the province. How Norway prioritised and managed relations with the US highlights and helps to problematise the challenges – political, practical and moral – facing small and medium-sized powers operating in a coalition alongside the US. Norwegian efforts in Faryab are revealing of the dilemmas and contradictions that plagued and, ultimately, fatally undermined the international intervention as a whole. As such, Norway’s experience provides a microcosm through which the inherent limitations of the attempt to transfer the structures of modern statehood and Western democracy to Afghanistan can be better understood.

Losing Afghanistan: An Obituary for the Intervention. Noah Coburn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016, 246 pp. $70.00, cloth; $22.00, paper. ISBN 978-0-8047-9777-1.

<i>Losing Afghanistan: An Obituary for the Intervention</i>. Noah Coburn. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016, 246 pp. $70.00, cloth; $22.00, paper. ISBN 978-0-8047-9777-1.

A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War by Williamson Murray, Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh

Reviewed by: A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War by Williamson Murray, Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh Mark Hertling A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War. Williamson Murray and Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0691169408. 616pp., cloth, $35.00. Students expect several things from a composite history, and A Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War delivers for our nation’s most destructive conflict. It provides incisive, accurate, informed, and flowing accounts of each of the major campaigns along the timelines of the Civil War. The authors accurately describe the actions on the ground in the eastern, western, and trans-Mississippi theaters in effective detail, and the ground analysis is complemented with extensive information on the effects of the blue and brown water naval campaigns. Descriptions of the flow of battle are supplemented with keen insights regarding the personalities of key commanders on both sides, and the authors provide substantive information on how various positive or toxic leadership styles influenced results of campaigns and battles. There are requisite strategic, operational/campaign and tactical battlefield maps to supplement the narrative and additional graphics contribute to understanding the uniqueness of this conflict; two of my favorites are an overlay comparing the U.S. continent with Napoleon’s Europe and another showing the proliferation of railroad lines between 1850 and 1860. Additionally, many early reviews correctly proclaim how this book is valuable for two additional key reasons. First, the authors draw on more recent Civil War scholarship, especially regarding the culture and the motivations of the two different field armies. Second, this work posits the Civil War as the first “modern war,” due to size and scale of the two armies, the continuous fighting conducted over a long period of time, and the projection across a continent made possible by the Industrial Revolution. All of these strengths add to the fact that the book is certainly well written and carefully edited as a composite history. [End Page 320] Two unique things about this book make it a required addition to any Civil War student’s bookshelf. First, authors Murray and Hsieh are not typical historians. Murray has penned insightful works on a range of subjects, and he has written on myriad topics, such as military effectiveness, net assessments, innovation, grand strategy and hybrid warfare. His ability to weave information from those fields into various historical analyses has contributed to the education of a generation of military officers—majors through generals—at different service schoolhouses. His analysis is almost like applying sabermetrics to military history. Hsieh—while younger than Murray—is of a similar ilk. Hsieh’s service as professor and resident scholar for the sea services at the U.S. Naval Academy likely keeps him on his toes, but one must understand he started at Annapolis only after gaining pragmatic understanding of the battlefield by serving an operational stint as a State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team chief during the surge in Iraq. Prior to that, he was a postdoctoral fellow in strategy and security studies at Yale, and these experiences likely allow him a measure of understanding of the dynamics of conflict few historical scholars possess. These two authors are not typical historians, so it comes as no surprise that A Savage War is not a typical work of history. Second, military histories appropriately and properly focus on what occurred, searching for details on the movements, the commands, the effects of resources and actions on reaching a military objective. Works where historians attempt to address why things occurred or how lessons from a conflict might be applied in the future are appropriately subjected to extensive critiques and continuous debate. This is to be expected, as historians usually can’t read the minds of long-dead commanders. But this work cites the philosophy, military theory, and even psychology of the day in interjecting the works of Clausewitz, Thucydides, de Tocqueville, and the training model provided by Thayer and others. All these masters contributed to the teachings of the day, and given the majority of commanders on both sides matriculated from West Point, it’s helpful to explain how this scholarship...

The Limits to Learning in Military Operations: Bottom-up Adaptation in the Norwegian Army in Northern Afghanistan, 2007–2012

ABSTRACTThis article – based on interviews with Norwegian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders and the lessons-learned database of the Norwegian Armed Forces – argues that what appear to be an inability or unwillingness to learn and adapt in war may have other explanations. The ambiguity of experiences makes lessons contested, contradictory, and fluid interpretations of confusing events. Consequently, they do not provide unequivocal guidance for adaptation. Even when lessons learned are fairly clear and agreed upon, adaptation does not automatically follow, as force autonomy may be quite limited, at least for small states in coalition operations conducted in partnership with indigenous forces.

TURKEY’S STRATEGY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Providing assistance to the least developed countries has remained one of the top priorities for leading international actors in the XXI century, and the Republic of Turkey is no exception in this regard. The Justice and Development Party's ascension to power in 2002 led to a drastic revision of the Turkish foreign policy and adoption of a novel approach to the least developed countries accounting for the complex interdependence between security and development. This approach was tested in Afghanistan where Turkey contributed to both post-conflict reconstruction of the country and to the activities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Since 2015 Turkey has been actively engaged in the new NATO 'Resolute Support' mission, while continuing its economic support to Afghanistan on bilateral and multilateral basis. This paper aims to unveil the particularities of the Turkey's Afghan strategy, which has yet escaped the Russian scholars' attention, with the help of the Turkish primary sources and academic works. It studies the specificity of bilateral relations and their determinants, including historic ties and religious and cultural proximity. It provides an in-depth analysis of the activities of both Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and the Turkish Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan and examines the challenges of Turkish troops' presence on the Afghan soil and the way how the Turkish elites and Turkey's NATO allies perceive it.

The Polish Development Programme for Ghazni Province (Afghanistan): Outputs and Challenges

Polish bilateral development aid program for Afghanistan is perceived as an integral part of international efforts to rebuild the war-torn country. It was focused on Ghazni province in South Eastern part of Afghanistan, where a Polish part of a local Provincial Reconstruction Team was established in 2008. This paper analyses the outputs and challenges of the Polish Development Program for Ghazni province. Based on a field research, it shows that Polish development aid program for Ghazni was not well thought out in the then and current development and security situation. Research results indicated that Polish development aid in Ghazni had some major weaknesses, and in fact, it was contributing mainly to the infrastructure development in the province capital.

Neither security nor development? Czech and Hungarian identities and interests in the provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan

This article builds on the securitisation and post-development literature and it scrutinises the Czech and Hungarian legitimising discourses of the two countries’ respective Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the Logar and Baghlan provinces of Afghanistan from 2007 to 2013. In spite of the hybrid civil–military character of the PRTs, their security–development nexus was absent and they were respectively securitised and “developmentalised” only indirectly and to a varying extent. The PRTs were mostly justified by the Czech Republic's NATO membership as an identity issue and they were justified as a Hungarian national interest and as both an obligation and an opportunity. Rather than merely importing NATO's arguments as suggested by the previous literature, the depoliticisation and positive connotation of the intervention in Afghanistan was constructed by the domestic NATO-related identities and interests in the Czech Republic and Hungary.

Mapping the Heart of Mesopotamia: A Bittersweet Legacy in the Landscape of War

With the destruction of significant portions of the heritage sites in Iraq and Syria, scholars are working to document and assess the damage. It may be years before security allows onsite evaluation; in the meantime, satellite imagery and limited visual confirmation are the only methods available, often resulting in delays in reporting and misinformation. One tool being used for analysis of several key sites in northern Iraq is a set of surveys and photos created between 2008 and 2010 by members of the joint military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), the Iraq Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, the State Board of Antiquities and Tourism, and representatives from UNESCO in Erbil and Amman, Jordan. These joint efforts, along with other activities conducted various partners, are presented as a model for future cooperative conservation efforts when conditions allow.

Bureaucratic Politics, Role Conflict, and the Internal Dynamics of US Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

Among the many challenges confronting the United States and its allies in Afghanistan were cohesion and communication problems in state-building programs. Merging role theory and bureaucratic politics approaches, this article argues that US Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the composite groups charged with implementing these programs, suffered from incompatibilities between sectors of government, among which the military was dominant. US PRTs were affected by role conflict, resulting from varying and often competing organizational cultures with divergent role conceptions.

Blurred Lines? Provincial Reconstruction Teams and NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan, 2010–2011

Members of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been critical of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) initiative in Afghanistan since its inception, claiming that the mixture of military and humanitarian operations has resulted in ‘blurred lines’ that inhibit insurgents from identifying who is and is not a combatant. Certain organizations have hypothesized that aid workers are more likely to come under attack as a result of this mixture. Although this claim has surfaced in multiple outlets over the years, there was a lack of empirical evidence to support it. This study tests this hypothesis using a panel-corrected standard error regression model of all 34 Afghan provinces in 2010 and 2011. Preliminary results show that NGOs were likely to encounter a greater number of security incidents in provinces with PRTs; however, further analysis reveals this was only the case in provinces with teams not led by the US. This calls into question the validity of a general ‘blurred lines’ explanation for decreased aid worker security.

Sharing the Burden? Assessing the Lithuanian Decision to Establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan

The paper assesses theories explaining the states’ burden-sharing decisions in an alliance and uses them to evaluate the Lithuanian decision to establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan. In the literature, several influences on such decision-making are identified. These fall into two broad categories of systemic and domestic factors. From the former, threat perception, alliance dependence, systemic pressures of alliance politics are analysed; and from the latter three clusters of aspects such as: state autonomy, elite consensus, space of manoeuver of the executive; bureaucratic politics and organizational interests, and third, some additional elements of strategic culture/state identity. While most factors have some explanatory value, the analysis invites the conclusion that in case of the decision to lead a PRT, the two most important elements were alliance dependence from the first cluster and strategic culture and bureaucratic politics from the second.

Contradictions of Counter-Insurgency and Peacebuilding

The Canadian intervention in Kandahar from 2005 to 2011 has mainly been based on the concept of stabilization. This is particularly true from 2009 to 2011. Stabilization had some successes in Kandahar. It also had important challenges. Contradictions remain to ensure best implementation on the ground. This article is based on firsthand experience in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) and the Dand District Forward Operating Base (FOB). Using Kandahar as a case example, the author aims to provide policy recommendations to the Canadian Government to increase the effectiveness of future stabilization operations.

Hungarian defence forces in NATO multinational operations (highliting the Polish-Hungarian cooperation)

&lt;i&gt;Nowadays, the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) have several multinational tasks all over the world. These are changing constantly due to the expansion of the different missions. In the beginning, HDF personnal were participating individually (officers, NCOs), and later by sub-level power in NATO and EU operations. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) mission in Afghanistan was the most successful operation of the HDF, which was terminated in March 2013. Hungarian soldiers gained considerable experience in Iraq too, where they served in a Transport Battalion under Polish command (Multinational Division). Based on these facts, this article presents some Hungarian aspects of multinational operations.&lt;/i&gt;

Meeting needs: value chain collaboration in stabilisation and reconstruction operations

Purpose– From the perspective of value chains, the purpose of this paper is to analyse the organization of stabilization and reconstruction operations, most notably in Afghanistan, with the intention to improve the way the beneficiaries are involved.Design/methodology/approach– Case study: the paper first develops a theoretical framework that draws upon value chain literature. To gather empirical data fieldwork was done within the Dutch provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Afghanistan. Methods that were used include interviews, participatory observation and desk study.Findings– In the value chain process six steps are identified: early warning, file and analysis, appraisal/qualification, assignment/management, execution and evaluation. Different categories of personnel (military, reservists, civilians) bring with them different backgrounds. This led to different opinions on who can be considered as the customer of the value chain. Moreover, personnel received different signals in the early warning step as to what needed to be done. From there on, different values and perspectives developed during the sequence of the various stages in the value chain that were not easily aligned. The formal structure of the work activities in the PRT was clear but did not match with the everyday reality. This showed another, much more fuzzy picture. Many mutual contacts were needed to overcome the coordination problems, but that required considerable additional efforts.Originality/value– The paper applies value chain literature to stabilization and reconstruction operations and focuses on the customers. It uses unique data and demonstrates the usefulness of a multidisciplinary approach.

Special Operations Forces’ Turn: Recommendations for Leading the Way in Governance and Development in the Afghan Districts Post-DSTs

The work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and District Support Teams (DSTs) in Afghanistan emphasized building the district government structures, improving their capacity, and mobilizing economic development. With the completion of the mandate of the PRTs and DSTs, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) will take a greater role in governance and development activities in districts and communities throughout the country. In 2014, security responsibility will fall under the Afghan security forces, but the war is not over. SOF will remain in the districts through the early fall of 2014. This practice note examines the role of the DSTs and how SOF should engage in governance and development in the districts. It provides recommendations from the field despite the challenging and minimal resources available in a district. With the right strategic approaches, SOF should be able to maximize the impact of their stability operations; however, it must not be forgotten that achieving stability will depend on whether Afghans are willing to take the lead.

The response of mucosal immunity to stress faced by Lithuanian soldiers as a consequence of deployment to Afghanistan

Objective: The responses of immune system to psychological stress are highly diverse. This study was designated to clarify the stress experienced by servicemen of the Provincial Reconstruction Team of Lithuanian Armed Forces as a response to changed job conditions (deployment to Afghanistan). Also we sought to determine the relationship between documented changes in salivary immunoglobulin (IgA, IgM and IgG) level and psychological stress. Methods: Special questionnaires covering state of health and strain experienced in association with deployment and psychotraumatic events were constructed using Symptom Check List SCL-90 and Peacekeepers Impact of Events Scale PIES-R. Quantitative detection of immunoglobulin was performed by sandwich ELISA. Nonparametric statistics were used to compare the distribution of immunoglobulin. Results: Secretory immunoglobulin A (S-IgA) was the only class of immunoglobulin sensitive to psychological stress associated with the deployment. Comparison of the medians before and after military mission demonstrated an increased amount of S-IgA after the deployment when general stress level was reduced. The amount of stress resistant individuals rose from 34% before the deployment to 77% after it. Chi-square test of independence indicated statistically significant relationship between the stress and S-IgA amount. Four separate psychotraumatic events experienced during the deployment was not associated with S-IgA distribution, but combined psychological variables revealed statistically significant (p>0.05) relationship with S-IgA distribution. Any relation between health parameters and stress experienced was not found. Conclusions: The mucosal immunity responds to stressful circumstances on the job (peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan) by variation in salivary S-IgA amount without manifestation of clinical symptoms. A deeper understanding of the response to stress can assist in finding strategies to overcome the inherent psychological challenges associated with specific professions.