Protect Laboratory Workers Research Articles

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Bacillus anthracis and Brucella melitensis.

Brucella melitensis and Bacillus anthracis are zoonoses transmitted from animals and animal products. Scientific information is provided in this article to support biosafety precautions necessary to protect laboratory workers and individuals who are potentially exposed to these pathogens in the workplace or other settings, and gaps in information are also reported. There is a lack of information on the appropriate effective concentration for many chemical disinfectants for this agent. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling of contaminated materials. B. melitensis is reported to have the highest number of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) to date in laboratory workers. A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, LAIs, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Scientific literature currently lacks information on the effective concentration of many chemical disinfectants for this agent and in the variety of matrices where it may be found. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of PPE during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling contaminated materials. Clarified vulnerabilities based on specific scientific evidence will contribute to the prevention of unwanted and unpredictable infections, improving the biosafety processes and procedures for laboratory staff and other professionals such as veterinarians, individuals associated with the agricultural industry, and those working with susceptible wildlife species.

Vox Sanguinis International Forum on Hospital Transfusion Services' Response to COVID‐19: Responses

Question 1Demographics:a. Beer Yaakov, Israel.b. Large academic medical center.c. 956 beds.d. 9034 RBC units issued in 2019, approximately 9000.e. 4831 confirmed SARS‐CoV‐2 cases and 17 deaths (March 31, 2020, 12:40 pm, data from the Israeli Ministry of Health).f. 9,136,000 inhabitants.g. The spread of SARS‐CoV‐2 in Israel is still increasing, but as of yesterday the rate of increase is declining sharply (from almost 30% of samples tested per day at the peak to 12% yesterday).

FAKTOR YANG BERHUBUNGAN DENGAN PERILAKU PENGGUNAAN APD PADA PETUGAS LABORATORIUM RUMAH SAKIT PHC SURABAYA

Laboratory workers had high risk of being exposed to biological factors such as HIV/AIDS, HBV, HCV viruses and mycobacterium tuberculosis germ. It was obligatory to protect laboratory workers from all contagious diseases by using Personal Protection Equipment (PPE).This researchhad done to learnfactors related to laboratory workers behavior of PPE usage at PHC Surabaya Hospital. This was a descriptive observational research with cross-sectional design. Sample of this research was total population of all PHC Surabaya Hospital laboratory workers (medical analyst/health analyst) in June 2014. Data were taken by questionnaires, observation and interview. The independent variables were predisposing factors (age, sex, time worked, education level, knowledge and attitude), enabling factor (the availability of PPE), reinforcing factors (regulation/policy, socialization, monitoring and reward and punishment). The dependent variable was behavior of PPE usage. The result of this research was acquiredthat 53,3% respondents were < 31 years, 73,3% respondents was woman, had time worked about 5 – 10 years,80% respondents had education level diploma, 86,7% respondent had good knowledge and 53,3% respondents had good attitude, 60% respondents stated that the availability of PPE were laboratory coats, gloves, and masks, 86,7% respondents stated that there was socialization, 73,3% respondents stated that there was monitoring and 80% respondents stated that there wasn’t punishment. The younger age, the lower time worked, and more complete the availability of PPE, the better the behavior of PPE usage.Keywords: PPE usage, laboratory worker, hospital

A highly secure method for rearing Aedes aegypti mosquitoes

BackgroundVector-borne infectious diseases are caused by pathogenic microorganisms transmitted mainly by blood-sucking arthropod vectors. In laboratories, the handling of insects carrying human pathogens requires extra caution because of safety concerns over their escape risk. Based on standard insect containment practices, there have been cases where costly enhancements were required to definitely protect laboratory workers and neighbors from potential infection through mosquito bites. Here, we developed a mosquito rearing method that provides a reliable and cost-effective means to securely contain pathogen-infected females of the yellow fever mosquito Aedes aegypti.ResultsTo debilitate the motility of A. aegypti females, mosquitoes were rendered completely flightless by ablation of either wing. The “single-winged” mosquitoes exhibited a severe defect in flying ability and were incubated in a container with inside surfaces covered with a net stretched to approximately 1-mm mesh, which helped the mosquitoes hold on and climb up the wall. In this container, flightless females consistently showed similar blood feeding and egg laying activities to intact females. Eighty-five percent of the flightless mosquitoes survived at 1 week after wing ablation, ensuring feasibility of the use of these mosquitoes for studying pathogen dynamics.ConclusionsThis mosquito rearing method, with a detailed protocol, is presented here and can be readily implemented as a highly secure insectary for vectors carrying human pathogens. For researchers in an environment where highly strict containment practices are mandatory, this method could offer appropriate opportunities to perform research on pathogen–mosquito interactions in vivo.

Scientists' Ethical Obligations and Social Responsibility for Nanotechnology Research.

Scientists' sense of social responsibility is particularly relevant for emerging technologies. Since a regulatory vacuum can sometimes occur in the early stages of these technologies, individual scientists' social responsibility might be one of the most significant checks on the risks and negative consequences of this scientific research. In this article, we analyze data from a 2011 mail survey of leading U.S. nanoscientists to explore their perceptions the regarding social and ethical responsibilities for their nanotechnology research. Our analyses show that leading U.S. nanoscientists express a moderate level of social responsibility about their research. Yet, they have a strong sense of ethical obligation to protect laboratory workers (in both universities and industry) from unhealthy exposure to nanomaterials. We also find that there are significant differences in scientists' sense of social and ethical responsibility depending on their demographic characteristics, job affiliation, attention to media content, risk perceptions and benefit perceptions. We conclude with some implications for future research.

Live Vaccine Strain Francisella tularensis Is Detectable at the Inoculation Site but Not in Blood after Vaccination against Tularemia

Live vaccine strain (LVS) Francisella tularensis is a live, attenuated investigational tularemia vaccine that has been used by the US Army for decades to protect laboratory workers. Postvaccination bacterial kinetic characteristics of LVS at the inoculation site and in the blood are unknown and, therefore, were assessed in a prospective study. LVS vaccination of laboratory workers provided the opportunity to compare culture with polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for the detection of F. tularensis in human clinical samples. Blood and skin swab samples were prospectively collected from volunteers who received the LVS tularemia vaccine at baseline (negative controls) and at 5 specified time points (days 1, 2, 7 or 8, 14 or 15, and 35 after vaccination). Bacterial culture and PCR of whole blood samples (17 volunteers) and inoculation site swabs (41 volunteers) were performed. The culture and PCR results of all blood samples were negative. Results of real-time PCR from the inoculation site samples were positive for 41 (100%) of 41 volunteers on day 1, for 40 (97.6%) of 41 volunteers on day 2, for 24 (58.5%) of 41 on day 7 or 8, for 6 (16.7%) of 36 on day 14 or 15, and for 0 (0%) of 9 on day 35. Positive results of bacterial cultures of the inoculation site samples occurred significantly less frequently, compared with PCR testing, with 4 (9.8%) of 41 volunteers having positive results on day 1 (P<.001) and 4 (9.8%) of 41 on day 2 (P<.001); all results from subsequent days were negative. F. tularensis LVS genomic DNA was detected in the majority of samples from the inoculation site up to 1 week after LVS vaccination, with real-time PCR being more sensitive than culture. Our data suggest that bacteremia does not occur after LVS vaccination in normal, healthy human volunteers.

Viability testing of material derived from Mycobacterium tuberculosisprior to removal from a Containment Level-III Laboratory as part of a Laboratory Risk Assessment Program

BackgroundIn the field of clinical mycobacteriology, Mycobacterium tuberculosis (MTB) can be a difficult organism to manipulate due to the restrictive environment of a containment level 3 (CL3) laboratory. Tests for rapid diagnostic work involving smears and molecular methods do not require CL3 practices after the organism has been rendered non-viable. While it has been assumed that after organism deactivation these techniques can be performed outside of a CL3, no conclusive study has consistently confirmed that the organisms are noninfectious after the theoretical 'deactivation' steps. Previous studies have shown that initial steps (such as heating /chemical fixation) may not consistently kill MTB organisms.MethodsAn inclusive viability study (n = 226) was undertaken to determine at which point handling of culture extraction materials does not necessitate a CL3 environment. Four different laboratory protocols tested for viability included: standard DNA extractions for IS6110 fingerprinting, crude DNA preparations for PCR by boiling and mechanical lysis, protein extractions, and smear preparations. For each protocol, laboratory staff planted a proportion of the resulting material to Bactec 12B medium that was observed for growth for 8 weeks.ResultsOf the 208 isolates initially tested, 21 samples grew within the 8-week period. Sixteen (7.7%) of these yielded positive results for MTB that included samples of: deactivated culture resuspensions exposed to 80°C for 20 minutes, smear preparations and protein extractions. Test procedures were consequently modified and tested again (n = 18), resulting in 0% viability.ConclusionsThis study demonstrates that it cannot be assumed that conventional practices (i.e. smear preparation) or extraction techniques render the organism non-viable. All methodologies, new and existing, should be examined by individual laboratories to validate the safe removal of material derived from MTB to the outside of a CL3 laboratory. This process is vital to establish in house biosafety-validated practices with the aim of protecting laboratory workers conducting these procedures.

Environmental hazard assessment of Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus vaccine candidate strain V3526

A hazard assessment of Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus sub-types and vaccine candidates was performed according to standard risk assessment procedures. Data from published literature demonstrates a considerable degree of safety of V3526 when compared to TC-83 vaccine, the protective measure that has been used to protect laboratory workers for over four decades. V3526 is a new recombinant vaccine candidate that is a vastly different product with a diminished hazard to public health and the general environment. A weight-of-evidence (WOE)-based scheme was employed to assign weights for relevance, quality, and adequacy of evidence in published literature on medical pathology, epidemiology, pre-clinical investigational studies, and environmental studies. The results of this assessment indicated that V3526 has a low adverse impact on public health and the general environment. Although there are currently no human infectivity or pathogenicity data for V3526, existing evidence from published experimental animal studies reveals a diminished hazard for environmental transmission and distribution. Recently, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) excluded V3526 from select agent requirements set forth under the Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations in Title 42 C.F.R. Part 73 and the US Department Agriculture (USDA) regulations set forth in Title 7 C.F.R. Part 331 and Title 9 C.F.R. Part 121. This paper summarizes the background, rationale, and hazard analysis used for assessing the environmental hazard of the VEE vaccine candidate strain V3526.

Solvent vapor concentrations following spills in laboratory chemical hoods

Chemical hoods are universally recognized as an important engineering control for protecting laboratory workers from chemical exposures. However, recent discussions have renewed questions about possible fire and explosion hazards following spills of flammable liquids inside hoods, and the subsequent potential impacts on laboratory design. In response to similar concerns about systems planned for our institution, we simulated a series of spills with flammable solvents to evaluate the potential for generating explosive atmospheres in laboratory hoods. As part of these tests, we also evaluated the effect of different face velocities and volumetric flows on evaporation rates and flammable vapor concentrations. We found that under the normal range of laboratory room and hood operating conditions, the principal determinant of chemical concentration in exhaust air is vapor pressure, and that volumetric airflow has a significantly greater impact on peak vapor concentration than hood face velocity. Based upon these tests, laboratory-scale spills of common flammable liquids are unlikely to create explosive atmospheres in chemical hood exhaust systems.

Protecting service and maintenance workers during laboratory chemical hood repairs

Laboratory chemical hoods may be the single most important engineering control for protecting laboratory workers from chemical exposures, but their maintenance and repair can present potential health and safety hazards to facilities staff. We performed a comprehensive survey of chemical hood systems in laboratory intensive buildings here at Yale University, including an assessment of air quality in Chemistry Department mechanical rooms where fan systems must be accessed by service and maintenance staff. Air monitoring in these mechanical rooms showed intermittently measurable concentrations of many laboratory chemicals, but their magnitudes when present were very low, ranging from about 10 to more than 6,000 times below their applicable permissible exposure limits. Despite the perception by many facilities staff that chemical exposures are their greatest hazard, we found that traditional physical safety issues are the most prevalent source of risk to those responsible for laboratory hood maintenance.

A diagnostic guide

A diagnostic guide

High-performance liquid chromatographic evaluation of the effect of heat treatment on trimethoprim and sulfamethoxazole stability in serum.

Heat treatment of patient samples is utilized as a method to decrease the risk of accidental transmission of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Heat treatment has been reported to affect the outcome of drug analysis. In this study, the effects of heat treatment (56 degrees C for 5 h) and storage for 2 months at -20 degrees C on the stability of trimethoprim (TMP) and sulfamethoxazole (SMX) at three different concentrations in serum (10/100, 1/20, and 0.1/5 microgram/mL) each were evaluated. Simultaneous determination of TMP, SMX, and sulfamethazine (SMeth), the internal standard, in serum was performed by a reversed-phase high-performance liquid chromatographic (HPLC) procedure with isocratic elution and ultraviolet detection. The peak/height ratios (PHRs) for each sample from untreated and heat-treated groups were compared. No statistically significant differences were found between untreated and heat-treated groups for TMP. Heat treatment decreased the PHR for SMX at 100 micrograms/ml concentration (p = 0.042) and increased the PHR for SMX at 20 micrograms/ml concentration (p = 0.049). These marginal differences are unlikely to be significant. Storage of samples for 2 months at -20 degrees C had no statistically significant effect on sample PHRs. Thus, heat treatment of serum does not alter clinical interpretation of TMP and SMX at clinically relevant concentrations and may protect laboratory workers from accidental HIV exposure.

New Lab Safety Rules Emphasize Training, Chemical Handling Plan

More than three years after proposed regulations were published, the Occupational Safety & Health Administration has released final regulations aimed at protecting laboratory workers from exposure to hazardous chemicals. The rules, which will become effective May 1, call for employers to develop and carry out a chemical hygiene plan and to provide employee information and training. Affected labs are to be in compliance by Jan. 31,1991. A separate laboratory standard was developed because OSHA had become convinced during the past 10 years that worker exposure to chemicals in labs is fundamentally different than workers' exposure in manufacturing plants. Until this new standard becomes effective, lab employees still fall under the same regulations as production workers. However, the new rule does give lab managers increased flexibility to meet OSHA's requirements. By permitting a greater degree of flexibility to laboratories in developing and implementing employee safety and health programs, says Labor ...

Hot air prevents bunsen burning.

Latex may protect laboratory workers' hands from infection butit is highly inflammable and hazardous around bunsen burner flames. Now Carbolite Furnaces and Sheffield University have produced a device to prevent accidents.

Protective efficacies of live attenuated and formaldehyde-inactivated Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus vaccines against aerosol challenge in hamsters.

Although two investigational vaccines are used to immunize humans against Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus, neither had previously been tested for protective efficacy against aerosol exposure. Live attenuated vaccine (TC-83) protected all hamsters challenged by either aerosol or subcutaneous routes with 4.7 to 5.2 log10 PFU of virulent Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus. Formaldehyde-inactivated vaccine (C-84) failed to protect against aerosol challenge but did protect against subcutaneous challenge. Protection elicited by TC-83 vaccine did not depend solely on serum-neutralizing antibody. These studies suggest that TC-83 vaccine is preferable to C-84 vaccine for protecting laboratory workers at risk to aerosol exposure.

A rift Valley fever vaccine trial. I. Side effects and serologic response over a six-month follow-up.

A formalin-inactivated Rift Valley fever vaccine, originally produced in primary monkey kidney cells, has been used to protect laboratory workers. A trial of a modified vaccine, newly formulated in well-characterized diploid fetal rhesus lung cells, was conducted with 114 men aged 19--24 years. Of the 107 subjects who received up to three injections of 0.1 to 1 ml vaccine (an additional seven received a placebo) one had a local hypersensitivity-type reaction and another a generalized urticarial syndrome. Both cases had a prior history of hypersensitivity states. No pyrogenicity was detected and only insignificant systemic reactions were recorded. Mild and transient local reactions ranged from 5% at the lowest dose level to 43% at the highest. Serologic response, as assessed by plaque reduction neutralizing antibody titers, was dose dependent. Within a single vaccine lot tested at multiple dose levels, peak (day 42) geometric mean titers ranged from 48 (at 0.1 ml x 3) to 436 (at 1.0 ml x 3). Reciprocal titers of greater than or equal to 40 are considered to be protective. Comparison of three lots at the 0.5 ml level indicated between lot variability, though this was not statistically significant. A sharp decline in antibody titers was observed in all vaccination groups by day 84; six months after vaccination apparently protective antibody titers were present only in groups that received 1 ml x 3 and 0.5 ml x 3 of the most antigenic lot of vaccine. These results suggest that 1) the vaccine is generally nonreactogenic, but individuals with a prior history of hypersensitivity states should be observed for allergic side effects; 2) existing vaccine supplies cannot be extended by using lower dose levels without a lower and less sustained serologic response; 3) a booster dose is necessary six months or more following the primary series; 4) although the current TSI-GSD-200 vaccine is immunogenic, a more potent vaccine is needed.

ACS study shows OSHA rules won't work in labs

The American Chemical Society has told the Occupational Safety & Health Administration that setting rigid standards for worker exposure to hazardous chemicals in laboratories is not an effective way to protect laboratory workers' health, and that safety training programs should be the keystone to OSHA's laboratory safety and health policy. A recent ACS survey supporting this view shows that the use of toxic chemicals in labs tends to be in very small quantities for limited amounts of time, and that they are used by professionals and informed workers. OSHA is considering regulations to protect laboratory workers from exposure to hazardous chemicals and is seeking alternatives to the substance-specific standards that are used for protection of chemical plant employees. The agency currently has regulations requiring exposure monitoring for use of 27 chemicals, such as benzene, asbestos, arsenic, and lead. Unless OSHA establishes regulations or guidelines specifically for labs, these employees will ...

OSHA, HEW vie to protect laboratory workers

OSHA, HEW vie to protect laboratory workers

Genetic Sabotage in the Public Interest

It was only supposed to take them six weeks. That's what the molecular geneticists said at anyway. They were going to go back to their laboratories and in six weeks sabotage the emergency preparedness programs that took nature more than three billion years to build into bacteria. Their purpose was to build safety into a brand-new field of research known as genetic engineering. Science reporters, it seems, were the only ones to take that six-week figure seriously, though. tendency with experiments, very often, is to say, 'it's a piece of cake,' one biologist said recently. most of us have been around long enough that if someone tells us it's gonna take 6 weeks, we multiply by a factor of 5 or 10.' All right, 6 weeks times . . . lets say 8.5, brings us to just about now, one year after Asilomar. Exactly what, then, has been accomplished in that intervening time? Biologists, the answer turns out, have not only carried out the biggest debilitation exercise in genetic history, but they did it right on schedule. And without cost overruns. A neat piece of targeted research, all in all. Asilomar, to backtrack for a moment, is shorthand for the International Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules. Last February, about 150 biologists-mostly molecular geneticists-flew from different parts of the world to a sunny California state beach resort called Asilomar. There, with sufficient isolation and a naturally dramatic setting, they made scientific history by deciding to control research in a new field before it even started (SN: 3/8/75, p. 148). About five years ago, molecular biologists discovered a class of enzymes called restriction enzymes. Certain of these suddenly made it fairly easy to graft genes-to excise specific genes from an animal's DNA, splice it into a carrier molecule, send them both into a host organism, clone a batch of these hosts, then pick out the recombinant hosts with the new foreign genes. Genes from rabbits, toads, fruit flies and bacteria have thus far been spliced into other bacteria. The potentials for these techniques were instantly recognized. Scientists had found not only a powerful tool for exploring the inner geography of minute organisms and life mechanisms on the molecular level, but also the means to a number of desirable ends. Corn and other crops could be fitted with nitrogen-fixing genes. Bacteria could be made to produce insulin or other drugs cheaply and easily. Genetic misprogrammings like cancer and diabetes might some day be correctable. But if these unnatural recombinants escaped from the laboratory, particularly during the experimental stages, they might tuck into some econiche where naturally evolved control mechanisms couldn't touch them. And the plasmids (small cir-. cular genetic elements) sometimes used to carry foreign genes into hosts often confer antibiotic resistance. These circular bits of DNA are notoriously promiscuous and could, if things got out of hand, hop into the wrong cells and transfer to them both antibiotic resistance and foreign genes. And besides all this, bacteria would just as happily grow diptheria toxin as insulin (although no one has yet persuaded them to grow either one) if an unscrupulous scientist were so inclined to use the technique. It was to discuss these risks and benefits and possible means of regulation that the Asilomar conference was convened. On the political front, the assembled scientists agreed to regulate each other's experiments with voluntary guidelines. They have by now spent the better part of a year getting the specifics down on paper (SN: 12/13/75, p. 372). An integral part of those guidelines, however, created a challenge of a different sort on the scientific front: the development of new techniques designed to keep genetically recombined organisms in the laboratory and away from those niches they might fill with unpredictable consequences. Many of the experiments, they decided, would have to be done with physical equipment-glove boxes, ventilation hoods, negative air pressure-to prevent the escape of novel organisms and to protect laboratory workers. But, a few bioengineers told the others at if the normal survival programming of these experimental organisms were genetically altered, scientists could have biological containment as well. They could have bacteria, plasmids and viruses as debilitated and dependent as toy Pekinese. The former, theoretically, would provide safety rather than amusement, but would be no less an inversion of nature's survival ethic. The organisms used most often to carry and receive grafted genes-Escherichia coli K-12, bacterial viruses, plasmidsare about as stripped down a collection _ J S ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3: E. coli bacteriophage: Packaged DNA.

Mercury Vapor Trap to Protect Laboratory Workers

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