Progressive Problemshifts Research Articles

What kind of science for dual diagnosis? A pragmatic examination of the enactive approach to psychiatry.

The recommended treatment for dual diagnosis - the co-occurrence of substance use and another mental disorder - requires seamless integration of the involved disciplines and services. However, no integrative framework exists for communicating about dual diagnosis cases across disciplinary or sectoral boundaries. We examine if Enactive Psychiatry may bridge this theoretical gap. We evaluate the enactive approach through a two-step pragmatic lens: Firstly, by taking a historical perspective to describe more accurately how the theoretical gap within the field of dual diagnosis initially developed. Secondly, by applying the Enactive Psychiatry approach to data from a longitudinal study on the trajectory of cannabis use in psychosis disorders. By applying the theory rather than simply presenting it, we position ourselves better to evaluate whether it may assist the purpose of achieving a more expedient pragmatic “grip” on the field of dual diagnosis. In our discussion, we suggest that this may very well be the case. Finally, we consider the enactive approach as one of a small handful of new theories of mental disorders that draw on systems thinking and ecological psychology, and discuss whether they have the potential for a wider progressive problemshift within psychiatry. The case in favor of such potential, we argue, is less strong unless the role of complexity, similar to that seen within the dual diagnosis field, may be demonstrated for other fields of clinical practice.

Defining Learning in Educational Leadership: Reframing the Narrative

Purpose: The purpose of this article is to reframe our field’s narrative around the science of learning. We seek to (1) describe the patterns within educational leadership and administration that are conceptually tethered to scientific management and highlight the absence of clearly defined conceptions of learning, (2) provide a synthesis of the science of learning, and (3) offer a “progressive problem shift” that promotes such a reframing. Methods: An integration of theory building methods with problem posing/identification strategies is designed to deconstruct the field of educational leadership through a science of learning lens and build toward theory that is more adaptive to our goals of leading for learning. Findings: Our findings stem from the central observation that educational leadership and administration has to date produced no conceptual or explicit operational definition of learning. Lacking such a definition, the field has been vulnerable to outlooks about learning that default to assumptions notably shaped by scientific management. This is in contrast to our review of the learning sciences literature, which emphasizes that learning is dependent on the active and deliberate agency of the learner and a host of introspective outlooks and behaviors and that these individual learning characteristics are situated within complex and dynamic social contexts that serve to mediate and shape learning. Implications and Conclusions: We argue that the future of our field rests, in large measure, on our ability to address the incongruences between our field’s foundations in scientific management and the science of learning.

Power Shifts and Problem Shifts

This article analyzes the evolution of power transition theory from the perspective of Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programs. The authors reconstruct the development of the power transition research program by analyzing its hard core of irrefutable assumptions, its negative and positive heuristics, and exemplary works contributing to its protective belt of testable auxiliary hypotheses. It is argued that some developments (e.g., Lemke's multiple hierarchy model) constitute progressive problemshifts, but other areas of the research program exhibit signs of degeneration. These include the treatment of the timing and initiation of wars associated with power transitions and causal mechanisms driving such wars. Findings show that the evolution of the power transition research program has generally been progressive in Lakatosian terms, but its future vitality will require continued efforts to explain the above-mentioned theoretical and empirical anomalies in a way that is consistent with the hard core of the research program and that generates new testable propositions.

On Theory Development: Applications to the Study of Family Formation

The field of demography has benefitted from its opening up to the paradigms used in other social sciences. That opening has turned modern demography into a sort of multicultural society in which the different cultures benefit from each other. Demographers do however sometimes retrench and isolate themselves from outside influences. Lakatos strategy of progressive problem shifts is considered as a way of avoiding a war of paradigms and integrating the varied elements and influences now found within demography. Furthermore while we can also go beyond the anchored narratives approach such narratives will remain key intermediate steps since they provide partial theories ready for inclusion into a broader new theory. No overarching theory in the social sciences can be mono-paradigmatic or mono-causal. It must therefore be located at a higher level of generality but in such a way that it remains flexible enough to permit more rigorously formulated specifications created to fit historical experiences and their variation.

Progressive Research on Degenerate Alliances

Our article (1990) on alliance dynamics in multipolarity, which John Vasquez criticizes, differs from some neorealist approaches by incorporating variables from the theory of the security dilemma, including perceptual factors. Nonetheless, our argument meets Imre Lakatos's criteria for a progressive problem shift insofar as it explains more than the original theory, does so parsimoniously, has been successfully applied to new domains, and does not introduce new assumptions that contradict the core of the original theory.

“progressive problemshifts” between different research programs in science education: A lakatosian perspective

AbstractGiven the importance of epistemology and philosophy of science, the Lakatos (1970) methodology is particularly suited to evaluate competing research programs in science education. This article has two objectives: (a) to evaluate critically the interpretations of Gilbert and Swift (1985) and Rowell and Dawson (1989), and (b) to postulate a progressive problemshift between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual‐Leone's metasubject. Regarding the Gilbert and Swift interpretation, it is concluded that the alternative conceptions movement at its present stage of development cannot explain the previous success of its rival (Piagetian school) nor supersede it by a further display of heuristic power as required by Lakatos. If we accept the Rowell and Dawson thesis it would amount to the postulation of Piagetian and integrated (Piagetian and schema) theories as rival research programs. It appears that the Rowell and Dawson approach would enrich Piagetian theory with descriptive content rather than explanatory constructs, and thus would not lead to a progressive problemshift. It is concluded that Pascual‐Leone's theory extends Piaget's negative heuristic by introducing antecedent variables, and at the same time enriches the positive heuristic by introducing metasubjective task analysis, which leads to a progressive problemshift.

From Piaget's Epistemic Subject to Pascual‐Leone's Metasubject: Epistemic Transition in the Constructivist—Rationalist Theory of Cognitive Development

The explanation of the transition from one epistemic theory to another is an important part of Piaget's genetic epistemology. It is argued that this epistemic transition leads to a retrodictable orthogenetic tendency toward optimizing equilibration. The objective of this paper is to establish a relationship between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual‐Leone's metasubject and to demonstrate that the postulation of the latter can be considered as an epistemic transition between two constructivist—rationalist theories, which leads to the development of a theory with greater explanatory power. Epistemic transition in this paper refers to a progressive problemshift (cf. Lakatos, 1970), between the theories of Piaget and Pascual‐Leone. Piaget builds a “general model” by neglecting individual differences, that is, studies the epistemic subject, whereas Pascual‐Leone by incorporating a framework for individual difference variables, studies the metasubject—the psychological organization of the epistemic subject. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate that Pascual‐Leone's theory of constructive operators is a model of the psychological organism (the metasubject), which is at work inside Piaget's epistemic subject. Finally, it is concluded that the greater explanatory power of Pascual‐Leone's theory can be interpreted as an epistemic transition between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual‐Leone's metasubject.

Beyond accuracy

Long-range, political-economic forecasting cannot be appraised in terms of empirically demonstrated accuracy. Yet as ‘scientific research programs’, futures studies can be assessed in terms of methodological dependability and progressive problem shifts. The methodology of developmental constructs meets these criteria; policy debates and international conflicts can be viewed as competitions among developmental sequences, which progress best, if cast as provisional rather than as general laws. Developmental constructs can incorporate historical lessons without the rigidity of single, dominant analogies. The approach applies with equal robustness to long-term economic growth futures studies and international conflict and mediation.

A Critique of the Immaculate Conception: A Comment on Beirne

Beirne's account of positive construction of progressive problem-shifts says nothing of why someone would construct a new theory that has excessive empirical content over its predecessors and competitors. One reason, I contend, arises from the inadequacy of the original theory when confronted with empirical evidence. This assertion by no means implies that enquiring mind is a tabula rasa awaiting impregnation by theory-free or neutral data. The original theory may predict the existence of phenomena that are not found where they are expected. When phenomena predicted by a theory are observed, the patterns of association among these phenomena may still differ from those expected.' What's more, phenomena not expected at all on the basis of my pet theory-phenomena apprehended in categories other than those in this theory (e.g., in categories that have a place in other theories, or in lay terms)-may thrust themselves before my nose, hit me over the head, or shoot me between the eyes. Newton didn't need a theory to tell him it was an apple that fell from the tree. Sometimes it may be possible to translate the categories of one theory into those of another, and if this can be done, I may discover that what seems to lie outside my theory actually doesn't.2 Where this translation is not possible, I may, if I am lazy, simply want to note a limitation of my theory (short of a theory of the entire universe and everything that happens in it, there will be phenomena unknown to any theory). If I am less lazy, I may want to modify, extend or elaborate my theory conceptually so as to be able to say something about the phenomena that are so impolitely hitting me over the head.

Religious Movements and Modern Societies: Toward a Progressive Problemshift

Journal Article Religious Movements and Modern Societies: Toward a Progressive Problemshift Get access Sociology of Religion, Volume 40, Issue 4, Winter 1979, Pages 297–314, https://doi.org/10.2307/3709959 Published: 01 December 1979