Disarmament Process Research Articles

Uniqueness, Reproducibility and Discrimination of Nuclear Warhead Gamma Signatures

Nuclear verification includes confirmation measures of nuclear weapons and fissile material, which often rely on the detection of radiation signatures. It is an open research question whether these signatures are unique. Or in reverse, could a malicious actor imitate these signatures and compromise verification of disarmament processes by using hoax objects instead of real warheads? This article presents several warhead emission models and a simulation framework to assess the uniqueness of their passive gamma radiation signatures. A red team approach includes detailed simulations of three proposed confirmation systems: The Information Barrier eXperimental, and the Information Barrier eXperimental II, both developed at Princeton University, and the Trusted Radiation Identification System, developed at the Sandia National Laboratories. For these simulations, various hoaxes are analyzed: warheads using reactor-grade plutonium instead of weapon-grade plutonium, combinations of different gamma emitting isotopes, and combinations of neutron sources with radioactive isotopes. Our findings reveal that numerous radioactive signatures are not unique and may be susceptible to imitation. Moreover, confirmation systems based on passive gamma radiation signatures using low bin numbers demonstrate a limited ability to accurately handle warheads of varying ages.

Nuclear archaeology to assess fissile-material inventories for nuclear safety and security, transparency, and disarmament

Uncertainties about the size of fissile-material stockpiles are large; states routinely observe differences between measured physical inventories and “book inventories.” Nuclear archaeology can reduce these uncertainties. A new, integrated approach would make use of data-analysis techniques that take into account direct fissile-material measurements, a variety of forensic measurements for shut-down facilities and radioactive wastes, and fuel-cycle operational records with related simulations. This article describes that approach and includes a hypothetical case illustrating its potential to probe declared histories and detect falsifications. The article reviews past efforts to fully capture fissile-material stockpiles. Future scenarios in which methods of nuclear archaeology could be used or will be required are also discussed, including improving nuclear safety and security through better knowledge of fissile materials and radioactive waste. International exercises for transparency purposes could be carried out in either nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon states. During any disarmament process, baseline declarations of fissile materials will need to be verified to assess the potential for a warhead buildup during arsenal reductions and eventually to verify the disposal of all weapons-related fissile materials.

The Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: The Crucial Role of the European NATO Allies

This article makes the argument that the role of the European NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies, and especially the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), may and should play a key role in the future of nuclear disarmament. Once the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is signed and ratified by more or less 100 NNWS, mostly from the Global South, it will be up to the allied NNWS to make up their mind about their role vis-à-vis nuclear disarmament. Will they continue to behave as protégés by (and in some way also protectors of) the nuclear-armed states and break the disarmament process further, or will they shake off the nuclear “protection” in the interest of making progress toward a world without nuclear weapons? This article zooms in on the European NATO allies in particular. The TPNW can and will be used to put pressure on the European NATO allies to switch sides, and it can, on its turn, be used by the European NATO allies to stigmatize the nuclear-armed states in order to make progress in the direction of nuclear elimination. The article starts by reviewing the origins and objectives of the TPNW. In the next section, its impact will be scrutinized. We then turn to the current and possible future role of the European NATO allies.

The “latecomers” of Bougainville: The difficult completion of post-conflict disarmament processes

Post-conflict disarmament processes inherently grapple with definitional challenges regarding definitive endpoints and measures of completion. This paper examines the phenomenon of delayed disarmament through the case study of so-called “latecomers” in Bougainville—ex-combatants who voluntarily surrendered their weapons following the cessation of formal demobilisation, disarmament, and reintegration programming. This study proposes a behavioural model that conceptualises late comer decisionmaking dynamics pertaining to temporary small arms retention. Pivoting upon an iterated security dilemma framework, the model posits that contextual environmental stressors and temporal factors serve as key variables initially sustaining weapons possession in the absence of hostilities. However, this intermediate status carries risks of eventual escalation to renewed violence or protracted and arduous disarmament engagement. The latecomer case reveals the inherent fluidity and uncertainties surrounding delimitations of the disarmament process. Further interrogating ex-combatant dilemmas could strengthen post-conflict policy and practice. Fundamentally, this research demonstrates the enduring temporal ambiguities inherent to disarmament, highlighting the need for pluralistic understandings attentive to issues of indigeneity, humanity, and interpretive meaning central to sustainable peace-building.

A Moravian Rifle Goes to War: Disarming and Arming Pennsylvanians, 1775–1776

ABSTRACT The travels of a Moravian-made rifle reveal that Pennsylvania armed its troops in 1776 by disarming peaceable citizens. Modern judicial rulings often look to eighteenth century-precedents to insist that it is permissible only to “disarm the dangerous” and that America has “no tradition” of disarming “peaceable citizens.” But when Pennsylvania’s efforts at making new arms in 1775 and 1776 failed, it passed laws to authorize taking arms from anybody who was not using them, including a very substantial number of non-associators, often described as “well-affected,” whom nobody considered dangerous. Innumerable receipts kept on scraps of paper, dispersed in local, county, and state archives, enable us to trace not only the afterlife of a singular Moravian rifle but also the disarmament process itself in which military officers entered a home, lawfully but surely without a warm welcome, and took a musket or rifle that the homeowners considered their property.

Realism Impedes the Process of Arms Control and Disarmament: It’s Time to Change the Theory and Strategy

Realism Impedes the Process of Arms Control and Disarmament: It’s Time to Change the Theory and Strategy

Проблема сокращения стратегических вооружений в контексте современных российско-американских отношений

Introduction. The article presents an analysis of the process of reducing strategic arms of Russia and the United States. The author gives an assessment of the Soviet-American détente and the Soviet-American disarmament treaties as laying the political normative and legal foundation for the development of the disarmament process after the end of the Cold War. The study analyzes the Russian-American New START Treaty concluded by Presidents B. Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in 2010. Particular attention is paid to the problem of mutual inspections by Russia and the United States during the implementation of START-3. Materials and methods. The study is based on the analysis of Soviet-American and Russian-American treaties in the field of disarmament, materials from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the American administration of J. Biden, and publications in the American press. A systematic integrated approach, specific historical and comparative historical methods were used. Analysis. According to official data from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the American side resorted to certain “tricks” - not only actually reducing weapons, but achieving final results by converting some weapons into non-nuclear or training ones. The Russian department could not confirm that these strategic weapons were rendered unusable as provided for by the treaty. In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and the beginning of the Russian SVO the following issues became particularly difficult in the process of mutual verification of disarmament: the cessation of regular air traffic, the extension of flight times, which could contribute to the “leakage” of confidential information; the complexity of the visa regime for Russian specialists, especially in transit countries; difficulties in making Russian payments for verification services; the lack of unambiguous guarantees of providing the opportunity for aircraft of the Russian Ministry of Defense with inspectors on board to fly through the airspace of Western countries closed to Russia. Results. A conclusion is drawn about the importance of signing New START treaty, which became a major milestone in the development of relations between Moscow and Washington in the military-political sphere. Violation of mutual inspection activities in the context of sanctions imposed by the West against Russia violated the principles of equal access to the Treaty verification mechanisms, created clear advantages for the American side and led to the suspension of Russia participation in New START.

The Process of Reducing Strategic Offensive Arms in Russian-US Relations: Russia’s Position

The article deals with the problem of reducing strategic offensive arms in Russian-US relations after the end of the Cold War. Particular attention is drawn to the approaches of the Russian Federation to its solution in the course of dialogue with the United States in the post-bipolar period. The reasons that forced the Russian leadership to conclude agreements with the United States in the field of strategic offensive arms are analyzed. It was revealed that the main difficulties of the disarmament process are related to the different vision of Moscow and Washington on the ways and methods of achieving the goals stated in the treaties. It is concluded that the Russian Federation and the United States lack trust in each other, which negatively affects the system of strategic stability and the reduction of nuclear potentials.

New Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies as the Key to Successful Completion of Chemical Weapons Disarmament Process

The fulfillment of international obligations of the Russian Federation under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction required the development and the creation of safe innovative industrial technologies and facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons. The purpose of this work is to give brief characteristics of the technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons developed and commercially implemented at various facilities. The destruction of chemical weapons was carried out at seven facilities specially designed and built for this purpose. These facilities were located in six regions of the country. The choice of technologies for the destruction (utilization) of chemical weapons was carried out on a competitive basis in the period from 1992 to 1995.The priority was given to the so-called two-stage technology. At the first stage, the toxic chemicals were extracted from the munitions or the containers and detoxified chemically in «soft» controlled conditions. Then the empty munitions were degassed. At the second stage, thermal neutralization or bituminization of the reaction masses was carried out with their subsequent burial. The two-stage technology for the destruction of mustard and mustard-lewisite mixtures was based on the interaction of toxic chemicals with an 80 ± 5% aqueous solution of monoethanolamine, which was supplied into the reactor at a temperature of 60–80 °C in the ratio toxic chemical: degassing formulation - 1:1.2 according to mass. The detoxification process was considered completed if the content of toxic chemicals in the reaction mass did not exceed 3,2×10 -3 %. To destroy lewisite, a «short scheme» in a jet-type reactor was implemented. The mixing of the initial reagents, lewisite and 20% alkali solution, was carried out using a nozzle of a special design, where lewisite was swirled with a special device (swirler) and supplied into the reactor. The first stage of the destruction of V-gases was carried out in munitions cases. The munitions were considered as chemical reactors. The process of detoxification of V-gases was considered completed when the residual content of toxic chemicals was at the level of 5×10 -4 %, and the reaction mass was delivered for thermal neutralization (second stage). In total, 39966,588 tons of toxic chemicals were destroyed. The whole number of destroyed containers with agents and chemical munitions amounted to 4,158,456 units. On September 27, 2017, the last chemical weapon was destroyed at the Kizner chemical weapons destruction facility, thus completing the process of complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles in the Russian Federation.

Disposal, Destruction and Disarmament: Comparative Analysis of US Chemical Weapon and Weapons Plutonium Stockpile Reductions

The elimination of stockpiled weaponry constitutes a key step in arms control and disarmament processes, lending permanence and irreversibility to arms reductions. Yet it has proven challenging in practice. The destruction of advanced weapon components, like lethal chemical agents and the fissile materials from which nuclear weapons are constructed, is often technically complex and costly. To elucidate the dynamics of this back-end of arms control and disarmament processes, this article compares two representative cases involving analogous challenges but divergent outcomes: the nearly complete elimination of the US chemical weapon stockpile and stalled efforts to shrink the US weapons plutonium stockpile. Drawing from both engineering and organisation theory, technical and social distinctions between these efforts are assessed to identify key factors governing their outcomes. This analysis shows that the technical bases for stockpile reductions were broadly analogous between the two cases, and thus fail to explain their divergence. Rather, differing organisational characteristics among the responsible institutions proved decisive. These fostered either adaptive (in the chemical weapon case) or path-dependent (in the weapons plutonium case) organisational planning, influencing the ability of the responsible entities to pivot from stockpile maintenance to an unfamiliar reductions mission.

New Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies as the Key to Successful Completion of Chemical Weapons Disarmament Process

The fulfillment of international obligations of the Russian Federation under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction required the development and the creation of safe innovative industrial technologies and facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons. The purpose of this work is to give brief characteristics of the technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons developed and commercially implemented at various facilities. The destruction of chemical weapons was carried out at seven facilities specially designed and built for this purpose. These facilities were located in six regions of the country. The choice of technologies for the destruction (utilization) of chemical weapons was carried out on a competitive basis in the period from 1992 to 1995. The priority was given to the so-called two-stage technology. At the first stage, the toxic chemicals were extracted from the munitions or the containers and detoxified chemically in «soft» controlled conditions. Then the empty munitions were degassed. At the second stage, thermal neutralization or bituminization of the reaction masses was carried out with their subsequent burial. The two-stage technology for the destruction of mustard and mustard-lewisite mixtures was based on the interaction of toxic chemicals with an 80 ± 5% aqueous solution of monoethanolamine, which was supplied into the reactor at a temperature of 60–80 °C in the ratio toxic chemical: degassing formulation - 1:1.2 according to mass. The detoxification process was considered completed if the content of toxic chemicals in the reaction mass did not exceed 3,2×10-3%. To destroy lewisite, a «short scheme» in a jet-type reactor was implemented. The mixing of the initial reagents, lewisite and 20% alkali solution, was carried out using a nozzle of a special design, where lewisite was swirled with a special device (swirler) and supplied into the reactor. The first stage of the destruction of V-gases was carried out in munitions cases. The munitions were considered as chemical reactors. The process of detoxification of V-gases was considered completed when the residual content of toxic chemicals was at the level of 5×10-4%, and the reaction mass was delivered for thermal neutralization (second stage). In total, 39966,588 tons of toxic chemicals were destroyed. The whole number of destroyed containers with agents and chemical munitions amounted to 4,158,456 units. On September 27, 2017, the last chemical weapon was destroyed at the Kizner chemical weapons destruction facility, thus completing the process of complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles in the Russian Federation.

The United Nations mission in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste during and after the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in the years 2000-2004 did not achieve an acceptable level of security. This article, using a DDR maximalist perspective and a liberal perspective in security studies, examines the UN limitations in providing a solid problem-solving process and its implications for DDR. The qualitative data collected from several personal interviews to different stakeholders is analyzed using thematic analysis. Based on these interviews and observations this research finds that the UN had several limitations to carry out DDR in Timor-Leste, being the most salient, the weak legitimacy and the lack of professionalism in human resources.

¡Zapatero, a tus zapatos! Explaining the social engagement of M-19 ex-combatants in education and social work institutions in Colombia

Why do some former rebels transition into social engagement after demobilisation while others do not? How do they adjust their militant aspirations to their context of reintegration? Studies on the political dimensions of rebel groups’ disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes have focused on post-rebel political parties, ex-combatant violence, elite transformation, political participation, and social and community engagement. Despite increased attention to reintegration processes, we know little about the processes that shape community engagement amongst ex-combatants. I address this gap by investigating the lifelong socialisation processes that influence transitions in and out of violence and social engagement. I argue that socialisation across various institutional settings in pre-recruitment and wartime life stages provides ex-combatants with dispositions and resources that, in interaction with post-demobilisation opportunities, shape their post-demobilisation social engagement. Applying a biographical approach, I analyse the trajectories of 32 ex-combatants from M-19, a left-wing nationalist guerrilla group at war with the Colombian government between 1974 and 1990. The study contributes to the literature on the long-term consequences of ex-combatant reintegration, socialisation and violence as well as the legacies of armed violence. It notably highlights how various dimensions of insurgent mobilisation can have lasting effects on individual life courses and society more broadly.

SECURITY WITHOUT JUSTICE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION PROCESSES IN THE NIGER DELTA, NIGERIA

The Niger Delta inhabitants became radicalised after Kaima Declaration under the auspices of Ijaw Youth Movement. The conference extensively considered the activities of the multinational oil companies as related to oil exploration and exploitation, and underdevelopment of the Niger Delta region. The decisions reached at the conference included positive and negative consequences towards peace and security in the region. Following this conference, militant groups were formed by various communities that represented at the conference. The militant groups involved in nefarious activities such as kidnapping and killing of oil workers, government officials and foreigners; they also involved in destruction of oil installations. Nigerian Government deployed military to enforce law and order in the region. The presence of military in the region led to confrontation with the militant groups. To resolve the conflict, government began de-radicalisation processes. Amnesty was given to the militant groups, Ministry of Niger Delta was created; this was followed by disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. It was discovered in this study that radicalisation was a result of neglect, divide and rule, inequality, lack of development. The paper therefore suggested a long process of de-radicalisation programme to sustain fragile peace in the region; this is expected to be combined with transitional justice processes in order to serve the interest of victims of the conflict.

No-first-use of nuclear weapons: Australian perspectives and possible contributions

Nuclear arms control and disarmament processes have stalled in recent years, and there is concern, especially among non-nuclear states, that the nuclear risk-reduction measures previously called for are not being met. One of the most important of these is the need for no first use (NFU) commitments to be given by all the nuclear weapon states (China and India have already done so.) The idea has been given recent impetus in the United States, especially as President Biden prepares the next US Nuclear Posture Review. Some states under the US nuclear umbrella, however, have expressed resistance to this idea, even as NFU would be highly-useful in reducing nuclear dangers. This paper argues that Australia, even though it is not formally under a US nuclear umbrella, has an important role to play in furthering prospects for NFU. The paper suggests ways in which this might be done.

From Warriors to Mere Chicken Men, and Other Troubles: An Ordinary Language Survey of Notions of Resilience in Ngakarimojong

ABSTRACT We examine some vernacular concepts that reflect Karamojong understanding and everyday experience of resilience following a devastating disarmament process, and what this means for resilience-driven humanitarian-development processes. We found that whereas humanitarian-development actors view market development, improved security, and accessibility as indicators of increased resilience capacity, local people paint a contrasting picture of a region with mounting inequality. We argue that Ngakaramojong concepts of resilience are, for the most part, unseen or ignored by humanitarian-development programming. In their current form, resilience-based intervention appears to neutralise and dismantle those aspects of communities that make them resilient in the first place.

Social solidarity as a dimension of transitional justice: the case of Cartography and Identification of Mass Graves in post-conflict Colombia

ABSTRACT The field of transitional justice lacks a comprehensive understanding to the role that social solidarity plays in transitional justice contexts. There is a lack of knowledge of the means through which victims can exercise their social agency to explore mechanisms of reparation beyond truth commissions, tribunals, and trials. This article argues that social solidarity is a crucial dimension and a novel perspective from which to develop transitional justice processes from a victims’ point of view in post-conflict societies. Employing a participative action research method, this article’s importance rests in the idea that Colombian victims’ groups from Eastern Antioquia view social solidarity as a crucial dimension of transitional justice in developing the project Cartography and Identification of Mass Graves. It establishes that this effort is a powerful novel mechanism to claim justice, reparation, recognition, and guarantees of non-recurrence from an unofficial angle. It demonstrates that comprehending social solidarity as a vital dimension of transitional justice stresses the importance of victims’ social agency to conduct collaborative collective actions in order to support inclusive processes of disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) beyond official agendas and narratives.

Triangularity of nuclear arms control: Possible implications of China's involvement in nuclear arms talks

Beijing explains its firm unwillingness to join the United States and Russia in nuclear arms control talks by the fact that China’s nuclear arsenal is incomparable with respective potentials of the world’s two leading nuclear powers. China urges Russia and the U.S. to go ahead with the nuclear disarmament process on a bilateral basis, and promises it will be prepared to consider the possibility of its participation in the negotiations only when its counterparts have downgraded their arsenals approximately to China’s level. Washington finds this totally unacceptable and demands that China either join the existing Russian-U.S. strategic New START treaty right away or agree to enter into a trilateral nuclear arms control format. This article studies the prospects of China’s involvement in nuclear arms talks and analyzes the true reasons behind Beijing’s desire to avoid any nuclear disarmament deals at this point. The working hypothesis of this paper is that China’s stance on the above issue is by no means far-fetched or propagandistic, and that it is driven by fundamental political, military and strategic considerations. Disregard for this factor and further forceful efforts to bring China to the negotiating table to discuss nuclear arms control will lead to failure.

The forgotten process: Information disarmament in the Soviet/US reproachment of the 1980s

This article contends that just as an excess of conventional arms requires a disarmament processes, so the weaponization of media should be met with an information disarmament process. The article examines elements of this work deployed to assist in the US — Soviet rapprochement of the 1980s. Cases discussed include a mutual textbook review project, citizento-citizen conferences mounted by the Chautauqua Society and a series of forums held via satellite television links called Spacebridges. The emergence of government-to-government information talks in which the United States Information Agency led by Charles Z.Wick engaged various elements of the Soviet state media apparatus is traced. The meetings from 1986 through 1989 are summarized, including the frank discussion of the challenge of disinformation and of mutual stereotyping. It is asserted that this process was more effective than is generally remembered, but success required a rough symmetry within the US/Soviet relationship. The internal crisis within the USSR repositioned the country as a junior partner and led the US to misperceive the end of the Cold War in terms of victory and defeat, with counterproductive results.

Analysis on the Reinforcement of the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence in Nuclear Disarmament Processes

Analysis on the Reinforcement of the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence in Nuclear Disarmament Processes