Phenomenological Problems Research Articles

Thomas K. Gaisser, a pioneer of particle astrophysics

We describe the pioneering contributions of Thomas K. Gaisser to the birth and development of particle astrophysics, a new field of research at the intersection of cosmic ray physics, astronomy, astrophysics, and particle physics that has emerged in the last few decades. We will especially focus on his studies of natural beams of neutrinos: those generated by the interactions of cosmic rays in the Earth’s atmosphere and those emitted by astrophysical sources. Tom actively participated in the discovery of these cosmic neutrinos as well. His contributions also extend to gamma-ray astronomy, the study of the cosmic ray spectra and composition, and the modeling of cosmic ray interactions in the atmosphere and in astrophysical environments. Tom invariably focused his research on the theoretical and phenomenological problems of greatest interest at the time, producing frameworks that transparently interpreted often complex data. These studies have been very influential and have shaped the development of the field.

Cinematic Rehearsals of Phenomenology: On the Ontic-Ontological Schema and Heideggerian Film Theory

This article argues that the strengths and problems of Shawn Loht's Phenomenology of Film: A Heideggerian Account of the Film Experience (2017) are rooted in its method, which derives from a specific interpretation of Heidegger's existential analytic and from the critical strategy implemented by Heidegger – and thus later adopted by his readers and applied to various disciplinary domains – in his polemical engagement with the history of philosophy. Central to this method is what I refer to as the ontic-ontological schema, and the article maps out the ways in which it operates in Loht's book: how it shapes his critical intervention into film studies and his claims about film ontology and spectatorship. My argument is that the ontic-ontological schema, while allowing the author to make interesting inroads into debates in film-philosophy, nonetheless undermines the coherence and efficacy of his claims about the cinematic experience as well as his attempts to mobilize these claims in the analysis of specific films. That is, Loht's disciplinary application of the ontic-ontological schema makes for a compelling discursive polemic, but it also exposes a crucial conceptual incompatibility in the work's configuration of and navigation between ontology, aesthetics, and criticism.

The artifact reading experience: “Pushkin notebook” by Alexei Remizov

The article actualizes the range of problems of phenomenology of the text in relation to such specific objects of the creative heritage of A. M. Remizov as his albums. Based on the basic provisions of semiotic analysis, the author of the article proposes to investigate the Remizov’s artifact in the field of scientific concepts was formulated by Y. M. Lotman and R. Barth — in relation to the myth of the modern times. For the first time the article introduces a complete description of the insufficiently researched archive document of the so-called “pushkin notebook”. Fragments of this artifact — are printed other people’s texts. The dominant topic is directly or indirectly related to the name “Pushkin” and the development of the Pushkin myth. Optional topics is connected to the Remizov’s role as an actor of cultural process of 20th century. To detect the projection of textual and iconographic artifact fragments on hidden episodes, the authoruses the term “after-text”, meaning the domain of biographical and cultural connotations. The aim is to verify the productivity of reading of the author’s artistic composition as the sign system. As a result, the Remisov’s idea of “pushkin notebook” as a “monument” of culture was restored. There was revealed the principle of the organization of artifact’s “text” by analogy with the models of Remisov’s cultural chronicles of the beginning 1920s and 1930s. The structural-semiotic approach to verbal and iconic artifact fragments, as well as the using of archeographic description to reveal the author’s reflection provides a new perspective on the phenomenon of Pushkin myth in the paradigm of the literary reception of the 20th century.

On the Personal, Intersubjective, and Metaphysical Senses of Death: An Inquiry into Edmund Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenological Approach to Death

In this short study, I attempt to reconstruct the main conceptual components of Edmund Husserl’s concept of death following the leading clue of his late transcendental phenomenological methodology. First, I summarise his thoughts on death, from the point of view of “the natural attitude”, as an event in the world. Then, I try and explore the manifold senses of the limit phenomenon of death as a multidimensional transcendental phenomenological problem in all of its intersubjective-world constitutive, personal-primordial, and metaphysical-constructive layers of meanings, respectively. By doing so, I also hope that the path we travel can serve the reader as an opportunity for a personal and reflective confrontation with death.

The Experience of Others: A Phenomenological Approach

Phenomenology places the experience of otherness at the core of its philosophical perspective. However, the meaning of this form of experience is complex and varies according to each thinker. Husserl started an investigation that led to many other different approaches, all related to that of the founding father, but also entertaining mutual connections between them. In this paper the outline of Husserl’s position is offered with some discussions, and then a sketch of Sartre’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and Levinas’s is provided in order to show some of the main issues involved in this question. Husserl outlines his position in an apparently paradoxical way, as he poses the problem of solipsism not so much to refute it, but to deepen it, radicalize it, and thus also identify an unexpected and fruitful solution. Faithful to the principle according to which the phenomenological science of experience must be “in the first person”, he thus assumes the paradox of solipsism, that is, the problem of how I can understand and experience the experience of another I, of an alter ego, to show that in fact this is not only plausible but also perfectly understandable. Otherness is thus seen to be not only a major problem of phenomenology, but the question concerning the foundation itself of this particular approach. The debate issued from Husserl’s original outline allowed other thinkers to deepen the question and bring the investigation further, toward a direction that directly involves other disciplines and is still debated among phenomenologists today.

Absurdity as an inconsistently conducted reduction

The subject of the study is the connection between the absurd and phenomenology.The texts of representatives of the absurdist trend in literature and philosophy (Camus, Kafka, Musil), as well as the works of academic philosophers of the phenomenological direction (Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Fink) are considered. The commonality of phenomenological interpretations of reality for some texts of the absurdist genre is proved. As a hypothesis, the existence of an epistemological dimension of meaning in the works of the absurd is put forward, interpreted by the author as a reception of the views of phenomenologists, problematized in the inconsistent reduction of phenomena. The methodological basis was the general scientific methods of analysis and synthesis, as well as the critical analysis of the text. The scientific novelty lies in the attempt to present phenomenology as a precursor of absurdism, connected with it through the sphere of axiology. The main contribution of the author is the actualization of the epistemological layer of such a multifaceted phenomenon as the absurd, namely, the elaboration of the hypothesis that in many works of absurdists, the metamorphoses of the characters' consciousness are in fact an inconsistent reduction consisting in explicit metamorphoses of the Ego, as well as violating subject-object relations but not actually bracketing the idea of the world. Many literary contemporaries of Husserl devote their thoughts to the problems of phenomenology to one degree or another, which makes the connection between absurd literature and the key theses of early phenomenology logical.

Figurative Speech as Phenomenological Problem

This article aims to investigate the nature and role of linguistic “images” in Husserl’s philosophy. At first, I will explain the idea of rigorous language emerging in relevant pages of Ideas I as well as the challenges that linguistic “images” pose to it. I will then examine the nature of linguistic “images,” relying on the reflections collected in Husserliana XXIII to show their nature of intuitive-imaginative syntheses. Finally, I will focus on the role that such “images” play in phenomenologizing. Taking decisive cues from Fink and Adorno, I will show the figurative essence of Husserl’s operative concepts and the productivity of “conceptual constellations” in phenomenology. The main contention of this article is that the rigor of phenomenological language essentially relies on a peculiar imaginative experience.

AUDITORY IMAGE: PHENOMENOLOGICAL LOCALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM

The article aims to concretize the phenomenological account concerning the problem of an auditory image. The author considers auditory imagery as a scientific object and compares different treatments of the problem to fix the potential and advantages of its phenomenological interpretation. In the first stage of the study, the author distinguishes the key characteristics of the image by means the lexical analysis. This is the perceptual (predominantly visual) nature of an image, integrality, and essentiality (image as an idea). In the second stage, the understandings of the mental and auditory imagery in physiology, experimental psychology, music psychology, musicology, and interdisciplinary studies are described. In the third stage, the peculiar phenomenological ways of the comprehension of an auditory image are revealed. The phenomenological interest is to pick out consciousness which perceiving of an image equally from the process of perceiving and from entailing in an image. The specific phenomenological stance is placing an auditory image on the bound of transcendent (the process of perceiving) and immanent (an image that is already perceived). The auditory image is conceived as the unity of Modi of its givenness. Most fecks of this Modi are original, they cannot be transferred into other science scopes: they are the interconnection of all moments of the temporal unfolding, self-organization in the time, self-referentiality, non-semanticity, periodicity/randomness, eventuality, quasi-embodiment (physicality). Solely phenomenological problems are problems of the constitution of an auditory image, its life-horizon, intersubjectivity, and regional matching. The author infers that phenomenology does not conceive auditory image as sustained auditory representation, associated with acoustic memory. Its perceptual nature does not play a key role here. Moreover, the perceptual-semantic duality of the image is not fixed by the phenomenological description. The phenomenological approach is unique because it researches auditory data exhaustively but does not use semantic and referential analysis of them. The main feature of phenomenological description is the focus on the unity of auditory image: All the elements of auditory data are interpreted in their synthesis as the different levels of the unity of hearing image. Thus, the phenomenological approach as a whole is the most promising for comprehending such a dominant quality of the auditory image as integrality.

The Constitution of the State as a Problem of Phenomenology

Roman Ingarden the early phenomenologist is regarded as a theorist in the area of aesthetics and ontology rather than being a political philosopher. The aim of the article is to reconstruct a non-existent philosophy of the state, one that could have been developed by Ingarden by taking as a starting point his ontological analysis of the structure of a literary work of art. In his book of 1931 Ingarden defined very broadly the literary work of art, including as its borderline cases among others scientific works, letters, memoirs etc. The thesis of the article is that state constitution may be also interpreted as a borderline case of that work. In reference to Ingarden’s analysis of stage play as the concretisation of a piece of drama, an attempt will be made to reconstruct in terms of his ontology the relation between the state constitution and the state itself.

Phenomenology and the Digital World: Problems and Perspectives

The last years’ achievements in neuroscience are key for a philosophical analysis focused on the mind-body problem, such as the phenomenological approach.The digital evolution, on the one hand, faces us with the interaction between the world of reality and the world of possibility. This means more than a mere coexistence between these two dimensions. Rather, a concrete feedback occurs among them, and this brings out unprecedented and unavoidable issues with regard to perceptual processes. On the other hand, the digital evolution allows for analyzing data and monitoring environmental systems, thus reasoning in a predictive way, anticipating problems, and checking ex ante their evolution and outcomes.Neuroscience, for its part, with the experiments of Libet and their subsequent interpretations, has highlighted a consciousness of the unconscious made of ballistic and automatic processes, which constitutes the starting phase of our decisions and actions. This further confirmed that sequential and linear thinking is unable to address the brain-environment relationship that is key in understanding any cognitive process.This analysis confirms the relevance of different aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology. There is, however, a “but,” which significantly reduces the extent of adherence to his point of view. Husserl assumed that an implicit horizon precedes or accompanies the acts of conscience. This is the material, impressional, passive, receptive, and, in some way, tacit dimension, strictly connected to the issue of genesis, i.e. the process of constitution of the analyzed entities. Thus, he drew a clear dividing line between this dimension and the phases of the self-controlling, vigilant conscience and its activity. In fact, his approach to the phenomenological problem is mainly oriented toward these phases.

Phenomenology as Philosophy of Revelation

In this article I offer an interpretation of the fundamental problem of phenomenology in terms of a philosophy of revelation proposing in this way the renewal of the last important development of Western philosophy both in terms of its metaphysical aspiration and scientific relevance. After the general introduction, I outline the philosophical problem of revelation. I show how this philosophy influenced early phenomenology. I explain the underlying subject matter in the history of phenomenology, i.e. the notion of disclosure. I also outline what I term “apocalyptic phenomenology” in order to focus on the understanding of revelation. In this part I offer details of the notion of newness and the appropriate method applied here. Finally, I summarize the scientific relevance of my approach in the context of logic, methodology, disciplinarity with a special emphasis on the study of religion.

Dirac dark matter, neutrino masses, and dark baryogenesis

We present a gauged baryon number model as an example of models where all new fermions required to cancel out the anomalies help to solve phenomenological problems of the standard model (SM). Dark fermion doublets, along with the iso-singlet charged fermions, in conjunction with a set of SM-singlet fermions, participate in the generation of small neutrino masses through the Dirac-dark Zee mechanism. The other SM-singlets explain the dark matter in the Universe, while their coupling to an inert singlet scalar is the source of the $CP$ violation. In the presence of a strong first-order electroweak phase transition, this "dark" $CP$ violation allows for a successful electroweak baryogenesis mechanism.

Rethinking Husserl’s lifeworld: The many faces of the world in Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses

This paper examines the concept of the world elaborated by Heidegger in the early Freiburg lecture courses of the years 1919 to 1923, in which he proposes a renewed conception of phenomenology through a comparison with Husserlian phenomenology. First, I show that although the theme of the lifeworld became central only in late Husserlian works, especially in The Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl began to deal with this concept before 1920, anticipating some fundamental issues of the Crisis, as it results from the lectures of 1919 on Natur und Geist. Husserl had addressed the concept of the world already in the lectures of 1910/11, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and, subsequently, in the second book of Ideas, which was published posthumously, but which was known to the young Heidegger. Then, I discuss the way in which Heidegger revisited the issue of the world in the early Freiburg lecture courses by means of a critique of Husserl’s analysis, focusing on perceptual experience as “environmental experience” and on the “world-character” of life. Particular emphasis is placed on the distinction between “environing-world,” “with-world,” and “self-world,” which Heidegger introduces in the lectures of 1919–1920. Finally, I point out that the Heideggerian rethinking of the concept of lifeworld is closely connected to the recognition of the immanent historicity of life, while Husserl only later takes into account the historicity of the lifeworld.

The Reception of Husserl’s Phenomenology in Japanese Philosophy

The Reception of Husserl’s Phenomenology in Japanese Philosophy Shinji Hamauzu When we talk about the influence of Husserl’s phenomenology, we should discuss in advance what can justify this talk. When we mention keywords— for instance, intuition of essence, intentionality, inner time-consciousness, rigorous science, natural attitude, phenomenological reduction, transcendental phenomenology, noesis-noema, my living body, genetic phenomenology, empathy, intersubjectivity, life-world, and so on—which keywords should we use when talking about the influence Husserl’s phenomenology had on Japanese philosophy? But we should also ask the following question as well: Which of Husserl’s texts could be available for scholars of Japanese philosophy? Interestingly, there were few works, beyond attending Husserl’s lectures, that one could access, because he only published six books and six articles while he was alive. After Husserl died in 1938, many manuscripts were rescued from the Nazi’s hands and placed at Leuven University in Belgium where the Husserl Archive was first established. The manuscripts were edited and published as Husserliana beginning in 1950 (which now has 42 volumes). Given this, we can think of Husserl’s work as consisting of two periods: the period before and the period after the publication of Husserliana. I myself am interested in the problem of “intersubjectivity” within Husserl’s phenomenology. It is on the one hand the problem of “other-experience (Fremderfahrung)”—i.e., “how I experience the other”—which is the problem of other-experience in the empirical dimension. But it is on the other hand the problem of “intersubjective constitution”—i.e., “how the objective world is the correlate of intersubjective constitution through other-experience,”1 which is the problem of how the other participates in the transcendental dimension. It is characteristic of Husserl’s phenomenology that these two problems are discussed together inseparably. [End Page 1] The manuscripts on the problem of “intersubjectivity” from 1905 to 1935 are collected in volumes XIII to XV of Husserliana. Although the fifth meditation of Cartesian Meditations (first published in French translation in 1931) is often mentioned as the representative work on this theme, it is no more than the tip of the iceberg after Husserl struggled for many years on this problem. The genesis of this theme in the manuscripts dates back to 1905 when terms such as “other” (ein Anderer) and “foreign” (fremd) appeared in manuscript 1, or terms such as “empathy” (Einfühlung) and “intersubjective” appeared in manuscript 2. Husserl wrote later that he had discussed this theme to a relatively large extent in the lecture Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology (Hua XIII) in 1910–1911. In the period of 1905–1910, after the “problem of intersubjectivity” was first introduced, we can also find the idea of “phenomenological reduction” appear for the first time in the literature. This tells us that the problem of intersubjectivity and the idea of phenomenological reduction were born as two sides of the same coin. When Husserl’s phenomenology was first introduced to Japan, Japanese scholars were already reading the first volume of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, where the “intersubjective world” is thought to refer to a “correlate of experience mediated by empathy,”2 and so the task is to clarify the “intersubjective constitution of the objective world.”3 However, when we consider Husserl’s influence in the history of Japanese philosophy and examine whether the problem of intersubjectivity is discussed as a fundamental problem of philosophy, it can be doubted, in my opinion, whether or not there were any researchers who ever faced this problem seriously. In what follows, I survey several generations of philosophers in Japan who engaged with Husserl’s rehabilitation, to investigate the problem of intersubjectivity in his reception and extent of his influence. Nishida Kitarō’s Interest in Phenomenology Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) looked back at the revision of his first book in 1936 and wrote, The standpoint of this book [An Inquiry into the Good (1911)] is that of consciousness, which might be thought of as a kind of psychologism . . . I came to realize that it is not that experience exists because there is an individual, but that an individual exists because there is experience. I...

On the Way to Salvation: A Reading of Shinran's Tariki in the Light of Heidegger's Gelassenheit

On the Way to Salvation:A Reading of Shinran's Tariki in the Light of Heidegger's Gelassenheit Tony See (bio) The relationship between Heidegger's thought and East Asian philosophies has been the subject of much discussion in recent years. While these discussions are diverse and varied, they may be classified into three approaches (Ma and van Brakel 2006). The first approach is characterized by the study of how Heidegger's philosophy may have influenced East Asian philosophers, or how Heidegger's philosophy may have been influenced by East Asian philosophers. Reinhard May's work on Heidegger's "hidden sources" is a good example of the latter approach (May 1996). The second approach is characterized by scholarly observations that there are congruences between Heidegger's philosophy and East Asian thought. This is usually done by drawing analogies between the two. A good example of this is Joan Stambaugh's "Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics" (1987). The third approach addresses the relevance and critical importance of Heidegger's philosophy in initiating intercultural dialogue (Ma 2005). It is sometimes characterized by a sense of pessimism with regard to whether such projects can be meaningful at all, for the linguistic and philosophical distances that have to be bridged is great. Lin Ma and Jaap van Brakel, for instance, argue that while Heidegger was genuinely interested in East–West dialogue, he questioned whether such dialogues can be meaningful, since the philosophical barriers between the two seem to be insurmountable. I believe that a more significant reason why such dialogues seem to be impossible is that we are already engulfed in an age of planetary Ge-stell, or enframing. Scholars in East Asia are likely to have been trained in Western-style academies and to possess modern subjectivities, and hence their access to East Asian thought is likely to be enframed by Western categories. To be sure, this does not mean that it is impossible to have a dialogue, but rather that any meaningful dialogue demands a high degree of self-reflexivity so that we may avoid imposing our prejudices and presuppositions on the Other. This paper adopts the second approach and is interested in the resonances between Heidegger's philosophy and the philosophy of Shinran. [End Page 169] The choice of engaging in a comparative study of Heidegger and Shin-ran may seem odd, given that the two thinkers come from vastly different philosophical backgrounds. However, a closer examination of their ideas reveals something in common, namely, what constitutes the right mode of comportment and what sort of experience we can expect. While there are scholarly studies in this area, such comparative East–West studies, which have become more and more important in recent years given the rise of intolerance, they remain a small minority in the field of Heidegger studies. This is why Dennis Hirota's "Shinran and Heidegger on Dwelling: Reading Shinran as a Phenomenology of Shinjin" (2014) is a welcome contribution to this area and deserves more scholarly attention. In this paper we will examine Heidegger's concept of Gelassenheit and temporality and their relationship with Shinran's idea of tariki and its relation to salvation. Gelassenheit is usually translated as "letting be" in modern scholarship. This refers to a comportment of no longer trying to overcome but to be in a relationship of "letting be" with Western metaphysics. This comportment of "letting be" resonates with Shinran's well-known recommendation to give up on "self-power" (jiriki) and to turn toward "other-power" (tariki) for salvation. For Heidegger, when we turn away from "overcoming" to "letting be" we begin to enter a different dimension of time, which he calls "temporality." In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1988), Heidegger already analyzed this experience of temporality in terms of an intensive awareness of one's present existence which encompasses the past and the future. Shinran likewise describes a new temporal experience when we place our faith in the saving power of Amida Buddha. To be sure, Shinran did not use the same terminology as Heidegger, nor should we presume that he referred to the same phenomenon, but he does describe this new dimension of time as being fundamentally distinct...

Is There a Body without Flesh?

Abstract This paper investigates the theme of sense and nonsense as it pertains to the phenomenological problem of “flesh.” It raises two sets of questions: 1) What is the relation of flesh to body and body to flesh? It is possible to admit the materiality of the corporeal condition while maintaining the phenomenological privilege of flesh and life? Or must one deny the privilege of flesh in favor of a more moderate “balance” of flesh and body? 2) How does the phenomenality of flesh and body go together with the theological reality of the Incarnation of the Word? How is the passage into theology effected in phenomenology when it is a question of body and flesh? The article objects to Emmanuel Falque’s interpretation of Michel Henry, enters into recent scholarship relating phenomenology and cognitive science, and questions whether incarnation can be adequately described by a phenomenology in which perception is ultimate.

A Reading of Heidegger’s Reading of Immanuel Kant’s Critique Of Pure Reason

This paper intends to argue over these subsequent ideas: first, that Heidegger’s employment of ‘retrieval’, ‘repetition’, or ‘thinking dialogue’ in his interpretation of Kant’s first Critique is, following Macann, quite hazardous and destructive but only on the surface. Heidegger's hermeneutical privilege to employ a specific interpretive frame in reading Kant seems to violate hermeneutics' fundamental maxim. This hermeneutic maxim is the inevitability of multiple interpretations. This can be seen in how Heidegger treated Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, where he announces that he “understand him (Kant) better than he (Kant) understood himself.” At first glance, his declaration exudes a kind of intellectual arrogance. However, I will show this is not so. Secondly, I will argue, based on the question of Heidegger’s appropriation of Kant’s ideas in his philosophical project, that he partly appropriated Kant but in a violent manner. As evident in his interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, Heidegger goes beyond Kant and forces the latter to speak through his text on the issues Heidegger thought to be in Kant. This raises the question of whether Heidegger properly situated and appropriated Kant in his text or not.
 References
 
 Dahlstrom, Daniel. “The Critique of Pure Reason and Continental Philosophy.” In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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 Guignon, Charles B. “Introduction.” In The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. Edited by Charles B. Guignon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
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 Longuenesse, Béatrice. Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Translated by Charles T. Wolfe. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1998.
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Диалектика творения и проективная структура пространства

The article considers creationism as a historically relevant principle in the scientific and philosophic aspects denoting the ontological structure of the world. Outside of the religious interpretation, the author speaks of the dialectics of creation, which is revealed as an implicative connection of the one and nothing. Logical inversion (logical turn), acting from within this implicative connection, is postulated as the principle of a fundamental negation, which, according to the author, forms the true and dramatic essence of the world as a creation. The author distances himself from the widespread discussion between evolutionism and scientific creationism, stating that it does not correspond to the very subject of creationism, understood as the implication of a real from nothing. The author focuses on considering ‘nothing’ as a purely dialectical / metaphysical principle and relies partly on the Hegel’s dialectic of ‘being’ and ‘nothing’, and partly on the neoplatonic concept of the one. Rejecting the medieval interpretation of the temporal beginning and the Hegel’s identity, he deduces a scheme of the logical connection between the one and the difference, which postulates the inversion (turnover) forming the creation - the one and the difference disjunctively change places, the one becomes the real, and the difference out of the one becomes nothing. It is argued that this postulate, in particular, refutes the thesis about the ‘fall into sin’. In the second part of the article, a spatial-phenomenological hypothesis is presented: the author provides a description of the space as a geometrical-semantic plane (projective structure). This hypothesis follows from the phenomenological problem of the duality of a geometric object, which results in the problem of ontological transition between a point and a line (in the aporia of the Eleats) and the related problem of spatial congruence / parallelism. According to the author, the potential for solving these not essentially mathematical, but metaphysical questions is the projective geometry, in which parallel lines intersect at ‘point at infinity’, and space is complemented by the ‘plane at infinity’. The essence of the solution consists, firstly, in the assumption of the single plane, which underlies the transition, and secondly, in the description of the perceived world as a result of a specific turn over and closure of this plane, forming the projective structure. The key in this part is the demonstration of the surface of a three-dimensional object as a phenomenon of perceptual-semantic unfolding, which can be imagined as an action of consciousness, consistently reducing the usual scheme. An important aspect of considering the projective structure is the correlation with ‘the Plane’ by G. Deleuze. The general idea of the article is that the dialectical scheme of creation and the projective structure of the space coincide: the logical inversion (logical turn), acting in connection of the one and nothing, and projective structural turnover – are the same things.

Stein’s Critique of Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism

Stein claims that Husserl’s transcendental idealism makes it impossible to clarify the transcendence of the world because it posits that consciousness constitutes being. Inspired by Aquinas, Stein counters that making thinking the measure of being deprives what is of its epistemological and ontological independence from and primacy over what thinks. She contends that this approach inverts the natural relationship between the mind and the world. Given the complicated relationship between them, however, the question is whether Stein’s argument that Husserl lacked an adequate understanding of and appreciation for the phenomenon of transcendence is sound. In fact, Husserl’s treatments of “limit problems of phenomenology” in his manuscripts from 1908 to 1937, which were only recently published in Husserliana XLII (2014), show that he undertook extensive investigations of metaphysical, metaethical, and religious and theological questions. Tragically, Stein was prevented from gaining an even remotely complete picture of Husserl’s work. In this paper, therefore, I examine Stein’s critique of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in light of the fuller evidence.

The basic problems of phenomenology and being and time: The issue of research methods and ontological difference

The piece considers the relation and connection existing between Heidegger?s main work Being and Time and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), above all when considering their complementary regarding methods of research confirmed as hermaneutic-phenomenological. This attempt to clear the mentioned relations is intended to show how methodical approaches presented in both Heidegger?s works are aimed to reveal ontological difference, which as a sense of being contain the key of understanding his philosophy.