Problem Of Nuclear Proliferation Research Articles

Науково-теоретичне осмислення проблем розповсюдження ядерної зброї у підходах західних вчених

Myronenko V. V. Scientific and theoretical understanding of the problems of nuclear proliferationin the approaches of Western scientists. – Article.The article examines the characteristic features in the approaches of scientists of Western political scienceschools on the problems of nuclear proliferation. The factors of influence of political regimes in states anddoctrinal foundations of the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons have been determined. In the courseof the study, methods from the sphere of political science were used, in particular, the method of comparativeinstitutional analysis, the essence of which is to compare various scientific and theoretical characteristics ofstate policy in the field of nuclear proliferation. Much attention is paid to the classical normative-institutionalmethod of the normative approach, operating with value assessments of scientific-theoretical and analyticalapproaches and research results, which is carried out using the criteria of such assessments contained in thedoctrinal assessments of political programs in the focus of which are nuclear missile potentials. The use of themethod of comparative institutional analysis made it possible to form the key point of the methodologicalsection of applied research, which consists in the operationalization of the concepts of the theoretical hypothesisof the research of scientists, whose scientific approaches are in the focus of this article.The study of scientific approaches indicates the presence of a common position of scientists regardingthe peculiarities of the types of political regimes of states, in which the state can be a potential participantin the nuclear missile policy as a subject. In particular, it should be summarized that among such states theleaders with democratic regimes (USA, Great Britain, France, etc.), however, states with authoritarian andtotalitarian regimes are represented in smaller numbers among the subjects of nuclear missile policy (Russia,China, DPRK). A characteristic feature of the policy of states with nuclear missile complexes, researchers haverecognized the tendency towards most compliance with the norms of international legal regulation of nuclearpolicy, which affected the low world trend of proliferation of nuclear missile weapons. Scientific researchshows one of the dominant economic factors and the factor of international economic integration, which affectthe containment of the proliferation of nuclear missiles.

Application of the ideas of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism in Iranian nuclear policy

The article examines two antagonistic theories of international relations – neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism using the case of Iran's nuclear policy. The author compares the approaches of neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists to the problem of nuclear proliferation and analyzes how these approaches can explain the evolution of Iran's military nuclear program. Iran is a country with significant energy resources, namely second place after Saudi Arabia in terms of oil reserves and second in terms of natural gas reserves after Russia; Iran also has a unique geographical location in such regions as the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. Also, a certain policy of Iran is formed on the basis of the Shiite branch of Islam, which already distinguishes this country, given the particularly unfavorable historical conditions under which the Shiite Islam was formed and the events of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988, when Iran faced Iraq alone and use of chemical weapons by Iraq, which deepened Iranian isolation thoughts. The fact that there has been no international response to Iraq's use of chemical weapons has heightened Iran's sense of isolation. This experience was certainly imprinted in the Iranian national psyche and caused even greater distrust in international arms control treaties. Relations with the United States in Iran are extremely tense and unstable, depending on the US administration and the political situation in Iran, as Iran has traditionally maneuvered between radical conservatives and more moderate politicians. The US elections in 2020 and the elections in Iran in 2021 will be an important stage in the further development of relations and the fate of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The article examines the extent to which the theoretical considerations of proponents of theories of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are reflected in Iran's practical nuclear policy and what impact these two theories may have on the future nuclear strategy of the Iranian leadership.

Article The problem of nuclear proliferation and its impact on the formula of strategic balance in the Middle East after the events of September 11, 2001

The issue of nuclear proliferation is one of the most vital issues as it reflects a form of dealing in the field of international relations. Therefore, the Middle East region has taken great interest in reducing the levels of nuclear armament and acquiring nuclear power within the strategic framework of the international and regional powers. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region is currently one of the most important international and regional arrangements for controlling the levels of nuclear proliferation and attempting to build a state of stability and balance. In the Middle East and the world. The importance of the research comes from the fact that it deals with an important and vital issue: the issue of nuclear proliferation and its implications for the equation of the strategic balance in the Middle East after the events of September 11, 2001, which gained great importance in the post-cold war era. And to achieve some kind of stability and balance within the framework of the international and regional environment, especially in the Middle East, which has increased the importance of efforts in this regard the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries, it is possible to obtain nuclear technology by enhancing levels The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become one of the most important facts for the post-Cold War era. At a time when only five countries possessed nuclear weapons (the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain) , As well as the possibility of other countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel, which suggests that the post-Cold War era has seen a widening of the circle of States possessing or manufacturing such weapons (Pakistan, North Korea and Iran) The emergence of regional tensions as in the case of William Middle East. Thus, the issue of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a central issue in the context of the post-Cold War American strategy, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, as a result of the convictions that there is an interrelationship between the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the global fight against terrorism. In keeping with this, the research started from the premise that the continuity of the Middle East countries in seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities is in itself an essential brake or determinant of the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the lack of guarantees to establish security among countries The Middle East, which is reflected negatively on the regional and international security approaches to the Middle East, and of course lead to the adoption of their respective security policies against each other within the framework of the growing levels of nuclear weapons to achieve some kind of balance towards the nuclear capabilities of each of these countries And then more nuclear armament policies in the region, as a result can not promote positive security perceptions that are based on the employment of enablers of smart power, which is reflected negatively on the strategic balance in the territory of the Middle East equation. Keywords: nuclear proliferation, the Middle East, strategic balance, the events of September 11, 2001, regional and international security, doctrine of preemptive war, preemptive war, nuclear deterrence, strategic perception, terrorism, nuclear power Nuclear proliferation.

The prospect of gas cooled fast reactors for long life reactors with natural uranium as fuel cycle input

Gas cooled fast reactors are among the Generation 4 nuclear power plants (NPPs) with hard neutron spectrum characteristics which can be utilized to create power reactors with high breeding/conversion ratio capability. In this study the gas cooled reactor system is combined with modified CANDLE burn-up scheme to create long life fast reactors with natural uranium as fuel cycle input. Such a system can utilize natural uranium resources efficiently without the necessity of enrichment plant or reprocessing plant. Therefore, by using this type of nuclear power plants optimum nuclear energy utilization, including in developing countries, can be easily obtained without the problem of nuclear proliferation. In this paper, a design study of 800MWt long-life gas cooled fast reactors with natural uranium as fuel cycle input has been performed. Due to the thermal hydraulic constraints, the average power density of the proposed design is limited to 70W/cc. The system has excellent performance and is at least comparable to that of Pb–Bi cooled system. The average discharge burn-up is about 258GWd/ton HM.

Optimization of Small Long Life Gas Cooled Fast Reactors with Natural Uranium as Fuel Cycle Input

In this study gas cooled reactor system are combined with modified CANDLE burn-up scheme to create small long life fast reactors with natural circulation as fuel cycle input. Such system can utilize natural Uranium resources efficiently without the necessity of enrichment plant or reprocessing plant. Therefore using this type of nuclear power plants optimum nuclear energy utilization including in developing countries can be easily conducted without the problem of nuclear proliferation. In this paper, optimization of Small and Medium Long-life Gas Cooled Fast Reactors with Natural Uranium as Fuel Cycle Input has been performed. The optimization processes include adjustment of fuel region movement scheme, volume fraction adjustment, core dimension, etc. Due to the limitation of thermal hydraulic aspects, the average power density of the proposed design is selected about 75 W/cc. With such condition we investigated small and medium sized cores from 300 MWt to 600 MWt with all being operated for 10 years without refueling and fuel shuffling and just need natural Uranium as fuel cycle input. The average discharge burn-up is about in the range of 23-30% HM.

An analysis of development and research on spent nuclear fuel reprocessing

Nuclear energy comes back to the discussions on the world stage as an energy source that does not contribute to global warming during production process. It can be chosen as the main source of power generation in some countries or complement the energy matrix in others. In this context, there is the need to develop new technologies for the management of radioactive waste generated by the production process. Final repositories for spent fuel are not yet in commercial operation, and techniques for fuel reprocessing have been developed, because after use, the fuel still has materials that produce energy. Some countries already use reprocessing, and develop research to make it more secure and more competitive, while others prefer to adopt policies to prevent developments in this area due to the problem of nuclear proliferation. In another line of research, new reactors are being developed in order to reduce the amount of waste in energy production and some will be designed to work in closed loop, recycling the materials generated.

Power without Influence: The Bush Administration's Foreign Policy Failure in the Middle East

The administration of President George W. Bush was deeply involved in the Middle East, but its efforts did not advance U.S. national security. In the realms of counterterrorism, democracy promotion, and nonconventional proliferation, the Bush administration failed to achieve its objectives. Although the United States did not suffer a second direct attack after September 11, 2001, the terrorism situation worsened as many other countries came under attack and a new generation of terrorists trained in Iraq. Large regional powers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia did not become more democratic, with no new leaders subject to popular mandate. The model used in Iraq of democratization by military force is risky, costly, and not replicable. Bush's policy exacerbated the problem of nuclear proliferation, expending tremendous resources on a nonexistent program in Iraq while bolstering Iran's geopolitical position. The administration failed because it relied too heavily on military force and too little on diplomacy, disregarded empiricism, and did not address long-standing policy contradictions. The case of the Bush administration makes clear that material power does not automatically translate into international influence.

Mutual distrust and threats in the Middle East: Is there a chance for dialogue?

S&F Sicherheit und Frieden , Seite 82 - 85

Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and U.S. National Security Policy

In late 1964, Lyndon Johnson and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy convened an ad hoc group of distinguished citizens to consider the problem of nuclear proliferation. The creation of this group, known as the Gilpatric Committee, signaled Johnson's fear that a number of foreign policy issues related to proliferation had reached a crisis point in 1964. It also signaled his dissatisfaction with existing bureaucratic arrangements to resolve these problems. After several weeks of deliberation, the committee gave Johnson a report that advocated a sharp intensification of U.S. nonproliferation policy. The committee challenged key aspects of the administration's foreign policy and urged the president to rethink the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Although Johnson shied away from implementing some of the committee's more controversial proposals, the administration eventually embraced the basic philosophy of the report. The Gilpatric Report provided a conceptual foundation for important departures in U.S. foreign relations and national security policy from 1965 until the end of Johnson's presidency.

The Threat of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

The Threat of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

South Asia after the nuclear tests: Prospects for arms control?*

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 have threatened the norms of nonproliferation while at the same time raising the possibility of an accidental nuclear war in South Asia. Ideally, this situation could be improved by India and Pakistan renouncing their nuclear option and opting for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia. The existing realities in the region, however, militate against these ideals. Both the Indian and Pakistani governments have declared their intentions of developing and maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent capability. Public opinion in these two states supports such a stand. Therefore, a need exists for adopting a flexible approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Instead of insisting on Indian and Pakistani membership of the Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT), attention should be focused on securing their agreement to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut‐Off Treaty (FMCT). These international attempts need to be supplemented by regional arms control moves aimed at taking into account both Indian and Pakistani threat perceptions. By implication this means going beyond the South Asian scene and including the Sino‐Indian equation as part of the discussion. Sino‐Indian and Indian—Pakistani nuclear relations, however, could best be managed and arms control regimes developed if, in each bilateral relationship, the stronger power acknowledges the fears and concerns of the weaker partner. At the same time, such ‘major power benevolence’ would need to be reciprocated by realism on the part of the smaller state in the relevant bilateral equation. To assist this process, the international community, and especially the United States, needs to develop a more realistic understanding of the psychological and emotional context in which nuclear weapons have entered the South Asian region. Effectively it means avoiding the temptation of linking sanctions to a change in the nuclear policies of India and Pakistan.

Deterring nuclear weapons proliferation

In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the problem of nuclear proliferation has become one of the primary issues of strategic concern The proliferation problem is an old one, but the problem today is very different from that of even a few years ago. calling for new approaches. By considering demand and supply factors, the old approaches that rely on limits on the technology or supply appear inadequate in the current situation Rather, the best approaches today are those that influence demand, making it less attractive for nations to develop nuclear weapons. The constraints on the United States that inhibit it from using its nuclear weapons to threaten new nuclear states make both nuclear deterrence and guarantees to countries not acquiring such weapons ineffectual in preventing further proliferation. The use of conventional forces to prevent proliferation or to protect threatened nations may also be politically difficult unless there are clear national interests at stake.A possible way out of this dilemma is to develop a system of conventional deterrence using precision guided munitions and other recent technological developments that have increased the accuracy of weapons delivery systems. Such a system of conventional deterrence could play an important role in making nuclear weapons of less perceived value to potentially proliferating nations and in protecting regions that these nations threaten.

Neooptimists and the enduring problem of nuclear proliferation

Neooptimists and the enduring problem of nuclear proliferation

Changing Security Environment and Problems of Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia

The 1989 Malta Summit between President Bush and President Gorbachev put an end to the Cold War. Europe is no longer politically divided, and the world is now undergoing rapid changes. East Asia was also affected by these changes positively, but is still divided into two conflicting ideological blocks. The problem and the danger of nuclear proliferation was vividly shown by the North Korean nuclear crisis in recent years. This paper reviews the issue of nuclear proliferation of the three non-nuclear states in the region, South and North Korea as well as Japan, and deals with the non-introduction of nuclear weapons in the region by the nuclear powers. The prospects of a nuclear-weapons-free zone as well as of a sustainable security environment in East Asia are briefly discussed. Although the solution to the problem of non-proliferation in East Asia depends on economic and political development in the region, non-proliferation needs to be linked to existing global measures with the ultimate goal of global disarmament. The creation of a regional nuclear organization like EURATOM, to be called EATOM or ASIATOM, is proposed. Balance-of-power strategy and defense arrangements with outside powers need to be adjusted. For a sustainable security environment in the region, new thinking about security is much needed and improvement of relations between the countries including North Korea is crucial.

Social-psychological determinants of nuclear proliferation: A dual-process analysis.

During the Cold War, credible security assurances and strong political and legal restraints limited the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The end of the Cold War weakened or removed significant security assurances, created a power vacuum in numerous regions, and unleashed forces of nationalism and ethnic conflict, thereby setting the stage for severe problems of nuclear proliferation. In this article, I analyze the current psychological impetus toward nuclear proliferation in terms of dual processes. First, powerful pressures having to do with security fears, power, and prestige now propel the quest for nuclear weapons. Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union weakened many of the restraints that had previously limited nuclear proliferation. Together, these processes encourage perceptions that nuclear proliferation is inevitable and that it is necessary to obtain nuclear weapons to protect one's national security. Although many nonproliferation efforts focus on strengthening restraints, the dual, proc...

Nuclear Education in the Post-Cold War Era

Nuclear Education in the Post-Cold War Era Daniel L. Zins (bio) Is it time for nuclear age educators to put their nuclear concerns in abeyance and to begin focusing on global issues, particularly on what is now being called "environmental security"? Even though the end of the Cold War would seem to be a sufficiently compelling reason to stop worrying about the bomb, I believe this admittedly tempting strategy might be premature. Rather than abruptly shifting our attention from nuclear war to global warming, tropical (and Pacific Northwest) deforestation, and sustainable agriculture, perhaps we can serve our students better by helping them to discover the manifold connections between various (past and possible future) holocausts and our most pressing social problems. For example, if young people who are genuinely concerned about the environment can be shown the enormous damage caused by more than four decades of nuclear weapons production and the military's war on the environment, it is quite possible that they will appreciate the continuing necessity to denuclearize and demilitarize the planet if the environment itself is to be salvaged.1 It also might be worth exploring with our students why this additional cost of global militarism has only recently come to light and why so little is being done about it. Nuclear Education and its Critics Even with the hands of the "doomsday clock" on the cover of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists turned all the way back to an unprecedented seventeen minutes before midnight, and even with the sharp reductions in nuclear warheads mandated by the Start II treaty, what we call the nuclear predicament is still very much with us. Moreover—even under the most optimistic scenario—it will not be resolved expeditiously or easily. Because young people will continue to live out their lives in a nuclear world, it behooves educators to provide them with at least a rudimentary understanding of the origins of this unprecedented age, its present perils, and what might be done to prevent new nuclear dangers, particularly the ominous problem of nuclear proliferation. It is instructive to recall that even when the possibility of nuclear war appeared to be much greater than it is today, nuclear war education was highly controversial and attempts to introduce it into the nation's schools were often met with fierce resistance. In a July 1983 speech to the American Federation of Teachers, Ronald Reagan proclaimed that the National Educational Association's initial curriculum, Choices, "aimed more at frightening and brainwashing American schoolchildren than at fostering learning" (qtd. in Loeb 127). Similarly, in a 1985 article, Joseph Adelson and Chester E. Finn, Jr., warn that the introduction of nuclear education into the schools would result in "the serious abuse of children." "To judge by the curricula so far developed," they admonish, "what lies before us will be perversely iatrogenic, a treatment producing the very disease it is designed to cure, and a course of instruction generating or increasing the anxiety it is allegedly trying to allay" (34). Two years later, in an essay contending that the freeze movement was thriving in America's schools, Jill Coleman and Keith B. Payne inveigh against nuclear education for "implicitly or explicitly encourag[ing] students to become anti-nuclear activists." Payne and Coleman do concede that "students should be encouraged to become responsible participants in the democratic process," but argue that "to promote activism in support of a political agenda, as these materials attempt to do, is an intolerable abuse of public education" (62).2 However misguided, distorted or unfair we might find many of the attacks on nuclear-age education, it is very possible that they will reappear—with even greater vehemence—if educators continue to insist that young people should have at least some understanding of the radical break in human history inaugurated by the splitting of the atom. Thus those who believe that nuclear education continues to merit a place in the curriculum must be prepared to address forthrightly, and successfully rebut, such criticisms. If we are to be successful in this endeavor, however, the scope of nuclear education must be broadened to encompass a number of additional issues that are not only closely related...

Asian Ambitions, Rising Tensions

With the end of the Cold War, it is increasingly difficult to justify the existence of nuclear weapons. Their reduction, dismantling, and eventual disposal--especially in the former Soviet Union, which may have lost effective control over its strategic and tactical weapons--present problems of unprecedented gravity. These issues will intensify the already complicated problems of nuclear proliferation in the Third World. This article discusses how nuclear ambitions and political instability may pose serious threats to Asian security. Ways in which Soviet weapons, in particular, relate to Asian security are addressed. The government policies of current and future Asian administrations regarding proliferation are assessed. The possibilities for greater inclusion of Asian countries in verification and inspection of nuclear facilities to promote global nonproliferation is discussed.

American Policy toward Problems of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

I n the mid-seventies, following the Indian nuclear implosion in 1974, a major shift took place in the definition of nuclear capability. Whereas nuclear capability had merely been equated with the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, its significance broadened to include the possession of nuclear materials, most notably highly enriched uranium and/or weapons-grade plutonium, which could be diverted from civilian uses to nuclear weapons and explosives. India's 1974 demonstration also ushered in an era of concern regarding nuclear proliferation in South Asia. This concern was a product of both the increasing tension between India and Pakistan and concern about militarization of the Indian Ocean. It received expression in projects such as the task force report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which addressed the problem of nuclear arms in South Asia.' Chaired by Leonard S. Spector, the task force was made up of American specialists in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, South Asian security, and arms control. It attempted to outline the dynamics of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and made recommendations on slowing down the nuclear arms race in that region. This article examines the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, American policies in the region, and changes that have taken place in the South Asian perception of U.S. policy.

Plutonium Recycling and the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation

A typical 1 gigawatt LWR, the dominant commercial power reactor type today, operating at 70 per cent capacity factor, generates approximately 250kg of plutonium annually. This plutonium, which is produced in the reactor through neutron capture by U-238, is then discharged from the reactor along with the other constituents of the spent fuel. About 0.7 per cent of the plutonium, or 175kg, is fissile (odd) isotopes of plutonium. As long as the plutonium discharged from the reactor is left intermixed with the highly radioactive fission products also contained in the spent fuel, it cannot readily be used for power or for weapons.

Global non-proliferation policies: retrospect and prospect

The 1980 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference will chiefly be remembered for the inability of the delegates to agree on a final document. There were several visible reasons for this, some related to the immediate political concerns of the participants, some linked to the nature of the treaty itself. The statements of the participating states indicated that they held differing conceptions of the purposes of the treaty, and possessed very diverse views on the action that should be taken to achieve them. Four sets of assertions dominated the discussions: that the nuclear states had not fulfilled their obligation to negotiate measures of nuclear disarmament as specified in Article VI of the treaty; that the advanced industrial states had not fulfilled their obligations to assist and encourage the global development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy contained in both Articles IV and V of the treaty; that the attempts by the United States government to discharge its obligations under the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act by threatening to terminate fuel supply contracts to both treaty parties and non-parties, unless they accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear installations, was inequitable and improper (the same accusation was also directed at Canada); and that the major danger of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and Africa originated in the threats posed to the states in these regions by the regimes in Israel and South Africa. One issue on which there did appear to be agreement, however, was that the safeguards regime foreshadowed by Article III of the treaty had functioned satisfactorily, in that no Feaches of it had been reported to the Review Conference by the IAEA. Yet the differing interpretations of the balance of rights and obligations contained in the treaty masks a much deeper set of issues: what precisely is the problem of nuclear proliferation, to what extent is the predominant diplomatic rhetoric of nuclear non-proliferation discussions unrepresentative of the real concerns and interests of the participants, what was and is the relationship between nuclear weapons and nuclear power, and does the NPT itself address (or was it ever intended to address) the problem of nuclear proliferation in the form in which it seems likely to be encountered in the 1980s?