Problem Of Distributive Justice Research Articles

Constitutional Reform and the Problem of Distributive Justice

While Americans celebrate the Constitutional Convention of 1787, they are not nearly as enthusiastic about the prospect of another constitutional convention through the Article V process. The stakes would be high, including the possibility of rewriting the entire document. At present, calls for a new convention come much more from conservatives than progressives. Afraid of the risks, many progressives oppose such a convention, with the notable exception of Sanford Levinson, who for decades has railed against its antidemocratic features and adverse political effects. What is absent from the recent scholarship about a convention is a serious discussion about distributive justice. As an alternative to the dominant progressive approach underscoring democratic reform, my focus will be on how to protect the most vulnerable persons from financial insecurity through the constitutionalization of positive economic rights. This article also explains why progressive scholars must appreciate the deliberative and civic educational potential of a convention. For the time being, another convention is highly unlikely to result in meaningful constitutional reform. However, this situation could be a blessing in disguise. A new convention could spark a national conversation about distributive justice and what could be done to reduce economic inequality and alleviate poverty.

Distributive justice, equality and the enhancement of human cognition: A commentary on fairness and ‘cognitive doping’

What implications might the use of techniques to enhance human cognition have for the kind of polities or civil societies we inhabit? What might political philosophy, if anything, have to tell us about the desirability of using drugs to increase our intellectual powers? Much of the focus in contemporary debates about human enhancement has been upon the ethical desirability of endeavouring to enhance our capacities: should we be meddling with ‘human nature’, as it were? Therapeutic uses of drugs are regarded as acceptable but enhancement is frowned upon in much of this literature. This rejection of enhancement is especially prevalent in the area of sport where there is a great deal of opposition to doping. Herein I take a somewhat different approach and explore enhancement as a problem in political philosophy and, more specifically, as a problem of distributive justice. Should the enhancement of human intellectual functioning be rejected on distributive grounds of equality? Alternatively, might it be plausibly be argued that distributive justice requires such enhancement? In this paper I shall outline two contemporary theories of justice—namely, the Egalitarianism and the Rawlsian Prioritarianism—and then consider what these principles might tell us about the political legitimacy (or otherwise) of ‘doping for intellect’.

Against selection: Educational justice and the ascription of talent

This essay starts from the observation that the issue of talent, in relation to the problem of distributive justice, can be approached from two different angles. First, it is common to discuss the justificatory function of talent, that is, its role in the justification of educational or social inequalities. In addition, however, this essay proposes to look at practices of talent ascription and their causal role in the distribution of educational prospects. These practices tend to exacerbate educational inequalities due to social background, especially when they are tied to selective educational settings. There is reason to avoid talent-based selection in education, in order to contain the negative effects of practices of talent ascription.

A Problem of Distributive Justice, Solved by the Lasso

The problem of dividing an estate among creditors, when their claims total more than the value of the estate, was posed in the Talmud and has been analyzed in the game theory literature. Here, we reveal a close connection between schemes for estate division and linear regression solution paths obtained by least angle regression or by the lasso. We focus primarily on the division scheme known as constrained equal awards, but also consider a more complex approach described by Aumann and Maschler. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.

HCV: the best cure possible or the best possible cure?

Progress in medicine goes along with an exponential growth of the cost of drugs and devices. While any person has the right to obtain the best possible benefit from medical care, a state needs to strike a balance between granting the optimal personal benefit to each individual and the needs of the society as a whole. Health systems in all countries therefore are facing a huge problem of distributive justice, as while they should guarantee individual rights, among which the right to health in its broader sense, including physical, psychological and social well-being (therefore not limited to healing, but extending to compliance and quality of life), they must also grant equal access to the healthcare resources and keep the distribution system sustainable.

Game Theory on the Problem of Distributive Justice

Game Theory on the Problem of Distributive Justice

The Concept of Yi (义) in the Mencius and Problems of Distributive Justice

This paper examines attempts to find a conception of justice in early Confucian contexts, focusing on the concept of yi (translated as ‘appropriateness’, ‘right’, ‘rightness’, even ‘justice’) in the Mencius. It argues against the approach of deriving principles of dividing burdens and benefits from the discussions of concrete cases employing the concept of yi and instead shows that Confucian ethical concerns are more attentive to what kinds of interpersonal relations are appropriate in specific circumstances. It questions the exclusive emphasis in justice-centred ethical discourse on assessing actions, and even more narrowly actions of governments and other public institutions, and their consequences regarding distribution of rights and material resources and goods. Instead of applying some abstract principles of justice, whether of equality or some other priorities according to individual characteristics, distributive problems are approached from the perspective of the effect of any proposed distribution on interpersonal relationships. Principles of justice treat opportunities, resources, and goods that are supposed to be distributed as possessions or potential possessions of individuals always competing for resources and goods. Confucians treat them not as objects to be possessed by one and denied to others, but as facilitators of personal cultivation effecting appropriate interpersonal relationships constituting harmonious communities. The Mencius offers a different perspective on distributive problems by shifting our ethical attention from ‘who gets what?’ to ‘how should we relate to others?’ within a different conception of the good life and the ideal society or polity.

Complete Lives in the Balance

The allocation of scarce health care resources such as flu treatment or organs for transplant presents stark problems of distributive justice. Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel have recently proposed a novel system for such allocation. Their “complete lives system” incorporates several principles, including ones that prescribe saving the most lives, preserving the most life-years, and giving priority to persons between 15 and 40 years old. This paper argues that the system lacks adequate moral foundations. Persad and colleagues' defense of giving priority to those between 15 and 40 leaves them open to the charge that they discriminate unfairly against children. Second, the paper contends that the complete lives system fails to provide meaningful practical guidance in central cases, since it contains no method for balancing its principles when they conflict. Finally, the paper proposes a new method for balancing principles of saving the most lives and maximizing life-years.

Liberal internationalism and global social justice

Theories of global justice have moved from issues relating to crimes against humanity and war crimes or, furthermore, ‘negative duties’ with respect to non-citizens, towards problems of distributive justice and global inequality. Thomas Nagel's Storrs Lectures from 2005, exemplifying Rawlsian internationalism, argue that liberal requirements concerning duties of distributive justice apply exclusively within a single nation-state, and do not extend to duties of this nature between rich and poor countries. Nagel even argues that the demand for global equality is not a demand of justice at all. In the present article I will try to offer a normative basis for the criticism of such a view. Following Kant and more recently Philip Pettit, I locate this normative basis on political freedom conceived as non-domination. Such a conception opens up the possibility of a political cosmopolitanism, which is based not on an empirical interdependence among people at a global level, but on a normative interdependence. Subsequent cosmopolitan duties extend both to the elimination of domination everywhere in the world and to the equal enjoyment of non-dominated choice. Thus, it will be argued that modern republicanism is falsely identified with a particular, bounded community, but supports a political, not simply a moral, cosmopolitanism. This kind of cosmopolitanism conceives of sovereign states neither as useless constructions, nor as mere instruments for realizing the pre-institutional value of justice among human beings. Instead, their existence is what gives the value of justice its application. Cosmopolitanism is not after all about the abolishment of all boundaries, but about the essential capacity to draw and redraw them infinitely under conditions of global justice.

Evaluating the Veil

John Rawls was the most influential political philosopher of the 20th century. His magnum opus, A Theory of Justice, revolutionised moral and political philosophy by offering a deductive way out of the intellectually unsatisfying reliance on brute intuitionism while avoiding the pitfall of irrelevance by implausibility that had plagued other contract arguments. Rawls’s elegant, novel and iimovative approach provided a parsimonious solution to the problem of distributive justice by using, mutatis mutandis, the familiar device of the social contract. His was an ambitious project that attempted to “provide a deductive basis for the principles that account for [our considered] judgements” (1971: p. 185). Indeed, Rawls stated categorically that his argument was meant to be “strictly deductive,” going as far as to say “we should strive for a kind of moral geometry with all the rigor which this name connotes” Q,. 121). Rawls’ grand ambitions, however, did not long survive: under intellectual pressure from several directions he retreated into a somewhat relativistic intuitionism, saying he no longer wanted to discover universal moral principles, but rather principles ‘appropriate’ to modern democracies. I will not attempt engage with or summarize the vast literature of responses to A Theory ofJustice that led Rawls down this path. Instead, I will diverge from the later Rawls and defend his original conclusion - i.e. his principles of justice - while modif\\jing parts of his argument. Specifically, I will argue that it is crucial to notice that the veil of ignorance screens out two different types of particular information: information about individuals and information about society. A veil that screens out only the first type of information is a “thin” veil, while one that screens out both the first and second types is a “thick” veil. I will conclude that Rawls’ own methodological commitments - particularly, pure procedural justice - are compatible only with a thin veil of ignorance but, despite this, that broadly Rawlsian principles still emerge from the original position.

Dewey and Rawls on Education

In this paper I compare the roles that the explicit and implicit educational theories of John Dewey and John Rawls play in their political works to show that Rawls’s approach is skeletal and inappropriate for defenders of democracy. I also uphold Dewey’s belief that education is valuable in itself, not only derivatively, contra Rawls. Next, I address worries for any educational theory concerning problems of distributive justice. Finally, I defend Dewey’s commitment to democracy as a consequence of the demands of productive public inquiry and education.

From Principle to Context: Marx versus Nozick and Rawls on Distributive Justice

The problem of distributive justice has been widely discussed by Western and Chinese scholarship of Marxism. This interest results from the historical transformation of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, and also from the crucial transition in China beginning in the late 1970s. By conceptualizing the basic principle of distributive justice as “reward according to effort and ability,” this paper discusses the differences between liberal thought, as exemplified by John Rawls and Robert Nozick, and the ideas of Karl Marx, from basic principles to context. It deals with the concept of “private property” or even “private ownership.” In Marx's view, the principle of distributive justice is necessarily betrayed under the condition of private ownership—the capitalist exploits workers—and the solution is the replacement of private by public ownership. Ultimately, the principle of justice is replaced by the principle of beyond justice. Nozick sees private ownership as the natural result of the principle, a condition he regards as self-ownership. Rawls shares this position with Nozick, but seeks to improve its operation with “justice as fairness,” which combines the principle of justice with the principle of beyond justice. Neither Nozick nor Rawls intuits that the principle itself would be betrayed under the condition of private ownership.

Allocating Scarce Medical Resources by Worth: Shaw’s Critique in The Doctor’s Dilemma

When the demand for a medical resource exceeds the supply, we have a problem of scarcity. There are many instantiations of this issue. The time of health care providers during an emergency, organs for transplantation, a bed in an intensive care unit, and a slot in a research protocol can all be scarce resources. Interest in this issue has been renewed because of recent concerns about a pandemic and shortages of vaccines. In each of these cases there is a problem of distributive justice. If the resource is lifesaving, then the question is especially poignant: Who shall be saved when not all can be?

Property, Community, and the Problem of Distributive Justice

While it is often taken for granted that the concepts of property and of distributive justice are capable of working together to generate norms which can enhance positive social and political relations, in particular the value of community, this Article argues otherwise. Relying on critical tools deriving from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Marx’s notion of fetishism, the author claims that the Rawlsian conception of distributive justice fetishizes the institution of property, and claims to distribute participation in society amongst its members as if this amounted to a distribution of so many objects. Taken in this way, the concept of distributive justice has no respectable content. What social justice requires is a means to ensure that people are not socially excluded, which requires each individual’s participation in the social and cultural enterprise. This sort of participation can no more be distributed than can life itself, and the realization of this point undermines the cogency of most discussions of distributive justice.

Human Rights and Politicized Human Rights: A Utilitarian Critique

The article provides a utilitarian analysis to argue that the leading organizations of the International Human Rights Movement have lost sight of their own professed values. Instead of functioning to check and balance the power of nation-states which formulate policies based on political and economic interests, the leadership of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of the Red Cross follow the politicized United Nations. Their attention and resources have been diverted from where they are most needed and can do the most good. The problem is most evident in the disproportionate focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There are serious problems of distributive justice, fairness, and equality of treatment, in that the obsessive, lopsided scrutiny placed on Israel is concomitant with the neglect of the far more horrific human rights violations in the Arab world and beyond. There is a tragic opportunity cost in how the major humanitarian and human rights organizations set their priorities and allocate their resources. The moral failure of politicization also damages the credibility of the human rights leadership, their organizations, and the cause of human rights.

Taxation data as indicators of state-society relations: Possibilities and pitfalls in cross-national research

Cross-national research on taxation is a growth industry in political science. This article discusses key conceptual and measurement issues raised by such studies. First, it highlights the ways in which taxation has been studied as a rich and varied concept, including as a component of the state-building process, as a collective action problem, and/or as a problem of distributive justice. Second, the article identifies the central tradeoffs associated with the construction of taxation indicators used to measure such ideas. It discusses considerations such as which forms of revenue should be included and which should not, whether and how to standardize taxation measures, and how no fine-tune measures through a clear specification of units, universes, and measurement calibration. These choices have important implications for the “scoring” of countries, and for making valid inferences about the relationship between states and societies.

Ethics and Genetics in Latin America

Genetic research in human beings poses deep ethical problems, one being the problem of distributive justice. If we suppose that genetic technologies are able to produce visible benefits for the well being of people, and that these benefits are affordable to only a favored portion of society, then the consequence is obvious. We are introducing a new source of inequality. In the first section of this paper, I attempt to justify some concern for the distributive consequences of applying genetics to human beings. This concern transcends a mere preoccupation for material equality. I argue that genetic inequality can undermine the very basis of social cooperation, at least regarding health care. The second section is more practical. My aim is to defend how, at least in some legal and cultural frameworks (such as those clearly apparent in some Latin American countries), the undesired distributive consequences of genetics are more likely to arise and more difficult to avoid.

Distributive justice in Korean politics after the IMF Bailout*

The Korean reform policy in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis has been confronted with the problem of distributive justice. In relation to distributive justice in the reform process, this paper addresses the communitarian‐liberal solution of ‘more burden on the better‐off, less burden on the worse‐off,’ which accords with the ‘difference principle’ of Rawls. This solution may be reasonably supported by all sectors of society for two reasons. One reason lies in the fact that the current social stratification in Korea has been largely affected by the economic policies of the past developmental state rather than individual choices, and that each individual sector, especially the advantaged group, has a weak legitimate claim over its social position. Thus, it seems fair to share the social burden in the extensive reform process according to the principle of capability. The other reason is based on the principle of minimizing social cost accruing from social economic conflict Indeed, this solution reflects a blend of liberal values and the good of the community.

Introduction: Game Theory and Business Ethics

In 1954, Richard Braithwaite chose as the topic of his inaugural lecture at Cambridge The Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Braithwaite argued that by using the recently developed mathematical theory of games, philosophers could resolve certain problems in moral philosophy previously considered unsolvable. Formal game theory is a product of the twentieth century. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern established game theory as an important new branch of social science with the publication of their 1944 treatise Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. However, the basic idea that motivates game theory has much older intellectual roots in the work of philosophers such as Hobbes (1651) and Hume (1740). This basic idea can be expressed in the following way: How agents behave in a given social interaction depends crucially upon their reciprocal expectations. To give an example adapted from Braithwaite’s lecture, if you and I wish to have a telephone conversation, then exactly one of us must call. I should wait for your call precisely when I expect you to call, which you should do when you expect me to wait. Even in an example this simple, issues of fairness can come into play. We both want to coordinate our behavior and have our telephone chat. But each of us may prefer to call, so as to avoid having the other pay for the call. Braithwaite used game theory to model this example, and to propose a method for assigning the roles of caller and receiver equitably. He conjectured that this method could be applied in general to problems of distributive justice.

Operationalizing Concepts of Equity for Public Project Investments

Decisions for evaluating public project investment most frequently use benefit-cost analysis. The procedure rests on the assumption that an efficient alternative should be selected that maximizes the net aggregate benefits to society as a whole. However, this selection results in projects that invariably provide different levels of benefits to members of a community, thus contravening the principles of equity or distributive justice. Six strategies for dealing with the problem of distributive justice are explored and examined and then applied in a common setting to a public project where several efficient alternatives are proposed. While this research is not prompted by the desire to proclaim a winner from among the strategies, it is evident that some strategies make heroic attempts to reduce inequity. Issues connected with obtaining public consensus are also briefly mentioned.