Pro Tanto Reason Research Articles

Fregean Aletheic Objectualism, the Flaw of False Assertion, and Truth as a Norm of Assertion

Gottlob Frege is an aletheic objectualist who regards truth as an object. For him, truth is the truth-value True, which is an object referred to by true sentences. Some interpreters argue that Frege’s claim that the True is an object is merely a byproduct of the technical features of his formal logic, Begriffsschrift. However, Frege’s works instead suggest that aletheic objectualism constitutes his philosophical position on the metaphysics of truth. Although Fregean aletheic objectualism may seem counterintuitive and unfruitful, it is, in fact, quite useful. Viewing truth as an object provides a new explanation for why there is a pro tanto reason to consider false assertion flawed. This explanation in turn strengthens support for the popular view that assertion is a norm-laden speech act.

The Point of Blaming AI Systems

As Christian List has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems requires, among other things, that we ask whether it makes sense to extend our blaming practices to these systems. In this paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising thesis that this question should be answered in the affirmative: contrary to what one might initially think, it can make a lot of sense to blame AI systems since, as we furthermore argue, many of the important functions that are fulfilled by blaming humans can also be served by blaming AI systems. The paper concludes that this result gives us a good pro tanto reason to extend our blame practices to AI systems.

Cancelling fiduciary excuses

ABSTRACT In trust relationships, one person has a ‘beneficial interest’ in another’s performance. The former not only would but should benefit from the latter’s action, and the latter has a ‘fiduciary duty’ toward the former to so act. But where that act would otherwise be wrong, the first person’s beneficial interest would be providing a pro tanto reason for the second person to do something that is pro tanto wrong. That reason can – and should – be removed by the former renouncing their beneficial interest in the latter’s pro tanto wrongful action. Doing so would cancel the fiduciary’s excuse for wrongdoing on the beneficiary’s behalf.

Partial Reasons

AbstractPartial reasons are considerations in favor of something that, taken individually, are not sufficient to establish an obligation. I consider the extent to which partial reasons are reasons, and why they cannot be reduced to or identified with pro tanto reasons. I lay out two approaches to the content of reasons, the flat theory and the structured theory. I argue that parts of reasons are not partial reasons, by showing that natural ways to represent parts of reasons in the flat theory and the structured theory lead to overgeneration problems with regard to partial reasons. I then formulate two notions of partial reasons: one based on a notion of partial support, which is in turn captured by the notions of full support and partial content, and one based on the notion of in exact verification. I show under which conditions the two notions of partial reasons (based on partial content, and based on inexact verification) coincide.

The standard of proof and crime prevention: A theoretical and empirical analysis

Since fallibility is unavoidable, any criminal justice system must decide how the risk of error should be distributed. The traditional view holds that a false conviction is morally far worse than a false acquittal. Therefore, erroneous outcomes must be distributed asymmetrically to avoid, to the highest possible extent, convicting the innocent. This article casts doubts on this assumption. It postulates that the traditional view defends a markedly asymmetrical distribution of erroneous outcomes, because it neglects the preventive cost of acquitting the guilty. After a theoretical and empirical analysis, this article concludes that crime prevention must be considered when establishing the level of the standard of proof; and, when it is considered, pro tanto reasons emerge to adopt a weaker standard than that normally deemed appropriate in criminal cases. The article also examines three possible reasons why preventive arguments are not considered when establishing the criminal standard of proof. It concludes that ignoring the consequences of the standard of proof on crime cannot be justified by the distinction between statistical and individualised victims, or by that between distribution and concentration of harm, or ultimately by that between action and omission.

In Defense of Shirking in Capitalist Firms: Worker Resistance vs. Managerial Power

Shirking, the act of avoiding the demands of one’s job, is generally seen as unethical. Drawing on empirical evidence from the sociology of work, I develop a normative conception of shirking as a form of worker resistance against illegitimate managerial power. In doing so, I present a new approach to the political theory of the firm, which is more adversarial and agent-centered than available alternatives. It is more adversarial as it recognizes the political value of counterproductive and disruptive behavior in capitalist firms. It is more agent-centered because it theorizes the firm from the perspective of workers, asking what pro tanto reasons they have to shirk. I show that shirking under the structural domination of capitalism has diagnostic, agential, and epistemic values. The paper contributes to the wider methodological ambition to tailor political theorizing to the positionality of social actors by shifting attention from the institutional design of the firm to the methods of worker resistance.

How to Not Go All-In on Public Justification

Political liberals hold that the exercise of state power is legitimate only if it can be publicly justified—justified on the basis of public reasons. Many find this requirement too demanding and propose instead that there are just pro tanto reasons for laws and policies to be publicly justified. Here I argue that this alternative proposal fails to recognize that there are also distinct pro tanto reasons to have institutional requirements that laws and policies are publicly justified. This suggests an intermediate position between political liberals and their critics, which holds that states have reasons to adopt the kinds of institutions that political liberals favor—institutions that require public justification—but whether they should do so will depend on the costs and benefits of those institutions. This allows for a more practical approach to public justification by focusing on its application in particular political contexts.

How words matter: A psycholinguistic argument for meaning revision

Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process of conceptual improvement.

Fit and Well-Being

AbstractIn this paper, I argue for Fit, a prudential version of the claim that attitudes must fit their objects, the claim that there is an extra benefit when one's reactions fit their objects. I argue that Fit has surprising and powerful consequences for theories of well-being. Classic versions of the objective list theory, hedonism, desire views, and loving-the-good theories do not accommodate Fit. Suitable modifications change some of the views substantially. Modified views give reactions a robust role as sources of well-being, and they accept that objects call for some attitudes but not others. I argue that objective list theories and loving-the-good theories require the most minimal changes to accommodate Fit, so we have a pro tanto reason to favor these views over alternatives.

The Exclusionary Power of Political Directives

AbstractI defend the exclusionary power of political directives. The prevailing account, which I call the additive account, holds that a legitimate directive only provides a pro tanto obligation for subjects to comply. I show that it falls into a Goldilocks dilemma, giving either insufficient or excessive weight to these obligations. Pace the additive account, I argue that a legitimate directive not only gives subjects a pro tanto reason to comply but also excludes all the reasons bearing on its justifiability regarding subjects’ actions as required by the directive. Unlike Raz, who grounds the exclusionary power of legitimate directives on authorities’ supposedly superior epistemic competence, I justify it by drawing on Kantian political philosophy, which grants states a unique moral standing to make coercive decisions on behalf of their citizenry as a solution to the problem of unilateralism.

Economic inequality and the long-term future

Why, if at all, should we object to economic inequality? Some central arguments – the argument from decreasing marginal utility for example – invoke instrumental reasons and object to inequality because of its effects. Such instrumental arguments, however, often concern only the static effects of inequality and neglect its intertemporal consequences. In this article, we address this striking gap and investigate income inequality's intertemporal consequences, including its potential effects on humanity's (very) long-term future. Following recent arguments around future generations and so-called longtermism, those effects might arguably matter more than inequality's short-term consequences. We assess whether we have instrumental reason to reduce economic inequality based on its intertemporal effects in the short, medium, and the very long term. We find a good short and medium-term instrumental case for lower economic inequality. We then argue, somewhat speculatively, that we have instrumental reasons for inequality reduction from a longtermist perspective too, primarily because greater inequality could increase existential risk. We thus have instrumental reasons to reduce inequality, regardless of which time-horizon we take. We then argue that from most consequentialist perspectives, this pro tanto reason also gives us all-things-considered reason. And even across most non-consequentialist views in philosophy, this argument gives us either an all-things-considered or at least weighty pro tanto reason against inequality.

How Does Justice Relate to Economic Welfare?

This paper argues—contra some Austro-libertarians—that whether a given exchange is welfare-enhancing or welfare-diminishing does not depend on whether that exchange is just or unjust, respectively. Rather, we suggest that in light of our two thought experiments, Austro-libertarianism has at least a pro tanto reason to conceive of justice and welfare as two logically distinct ideals. This would in turn, most interestingly, predict the possibility of (a) just but welfare-diminishing exchanges and (b) unjust but welfare-enhancing ones. Upon considering possible rejoinders to our points, we suggest that Austro-libertarians abandon a justice-based notion of welfare.

The goods (and bads) of self‐employment

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The value of responsibility gaps in algorithmic decision-making

Many seem to think that AI-induced responsibility gaps are morally bad and therefore ought to be avoided. We argue, by contrast, that there is at least a pro tanto reason to welcome responsibility gaps. The central reason is that it can be bad for people to be responsible for wrongdoing. This, we argue, gives us one reason to prefer automated decision-making over human decision-making, especially in contexts where the risks of wrongdoing are high. While we are not the first to suggest that responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed, our argument is novel. Others have argued that responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed because they can reduce or eliminate the psychological burdens caused by tragic moral choice-situations. By contrast, our argument explains why responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed even in the absence of tragic moral choice-situations, and even in the absence of psychological burdens.

Uniqueness, Intrinsic Value, and Reasons

Uniqueness appears to enhance intrinsic value. A unique stamp sells for millions of dollars; Stradivarius violins are all the more precious because they are unlike any others. This observation has not gone overlooked in the value theory literature: uniqueness plays a starring role recalibrating the dominant Moorean understanding of the nature of intrinsic value. But the thesis that uniqueness enhances intrinsic value is in tension with another deeply plausible and widely held thesis, namely the thesis that there is a pro tanto reason to promote the good. It is argued that there is a second, distinct type of uniqueness that plays a more interesting and important axiological role: uniqueness imparts irreplaceable value. This gives occasion to develop the surprisingly undertheorized notion of irreplaceable value.

Free Speech and the Legal Prohibition of Fake News

Western European liberal democracies have recently enacted laws that prohibit the diffusion of fake news on social media. Yet, many consider that such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression. In this paper, I argue that democratic governments have strong pro tanto reasons to prohibit fake news, and that doing so is compatible with free speech. First, I show that fake news disrupts a mutually beneficial form of epistemic dependence in which members of the public are engaged with journalists. Second, I contend that laws against fake news enhance rather than thwart personal autonomy. If these suggestions are plausible, then the same considerations about truth and autonomy that underpin the value of free speech give us strong reasons to prohibit fake news.

Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Practical Proposal

ABSTRACTAccording to Persson and Savulescu, the risks posed by a morally corrupt minority's potential to abuse cognitive enhancement make it such that we have an urgent imperative to first pursue moral enhancement of humankind – and, consequently, if we are a long way from safe, effective moral enhancement, then we have at least one good reason to consider opposing further cognitive enhancement. However, as Harris points out, such a proposal seems to support delaying life‐saving cognitive progress. In this article, we first show that Harris's worry can be expanded to show that Persson and Savulescu's proposal also threatens the development of moral enhancement – precisely what they suggest we have pro tanto reason to pursue. From there, we offer our own, alternative proposal – one on which cognitively enhanced researchers play a key role in the production of moral enhancement, and those in the general population who wish to be cognitively enhanced must first accept moral enhancement as an entry requirement. We engage with four substantive objections to our proposal and use these objections to refine and strengthen the details.

Epistemic Paternalism via Conceptual Engineering

AbstractThis essay focuses on conceptual engineers who aim to improve other people's patterns of inference and attention by shaping their concepts. Such conceptual engineers sometimes engage in a form of epistemic paternalism that I call paternalistic cognitive engineering: instead of explicitly persuading, informing and educating others, the engineers non-consultatively rely on assumptions about the target agents’ cognitive systems to improve their belief forming. The target agents could reasonably regard such benevolent exercises of control as violating their sovereignty over their own belief formation. This is a pro tanto reason against such engineering. In addition to the relevant projects of conceptual engineering, paternalistic cognitive engineering plausibly includes certain kinds of nudging and evidence suppression. I distinguish the sovereignty-based concern from other ethical worries about conceptual engineering and discuss how one might justify the relevant conceptual engineering projects despite the sovereignty-based reason against them.

Solidarity and autonomy in the European Union

To determine at which level a particular policy domain ought to be governed, we need normative principles of levelism. In this contribution, I articulate and defend two normative principles of levelism for distributive justice in the European Union. According to the Highest-Level Solidarity Principle, we should transfer distributive solidarity to the highest level of the multilevel polity. In the EU, this is the EU-wide level. According to the Policymaker Pays Principle, policymaking and funding should be located at the same level: the level that makes the policy should also be the level that funds the policy (assuming background justice conditions of justice apply). My conclusion is that, since the funding for core redistributive projects should be Europeanized, and since funding and policymaking should be allocated to the same level, we have a pro tanto reason to Europeanize both the funding and the policymaking over core redistributive powers.

On Unexplained (Modal) Patterns

Some patterns call out for explanation, in the sense that we have a pro tanto reason to reject theories that do not give them an appropriate explanation. I argue that certain modal patterns call out for explanation in this way—and this provides a reason to reject certain theories of modality that fail to explain such patterns. However, I also consider a response to this argument, which claims that the modal patterns do not need explanation. This response might be viable but it involves some substantial commitments about the nature of explanation.