Pro-democracy Activists Research Articles

The “Ironic Impact” of Pro-Democracy Activists: How Pro-Democratic Frames Undermine Support for Local Policy-Based Protests in Authoritarian Regimes

Many protesters under authoritarian rule are “narrow in scope, involving only one or a few neighborhoods, villages, or groups of laid-off workers” and focus on demands that “have to do only with material interests and local grievances” (Lorentzen, 2013, p. 131). These protests typically blame local authorities and express loyalty to the political system. However, in the internet age, pro-democracy advocates often endorse and co-opt these local policy protests for their own ends. Does being endorsed by pro-democracy activists undermine support for these local policy protesters? Building on research suggesting that non-activists often perceive activists as extreme, I theorize that associating with pro-democratic frames can undermine support for local policy protesters by making the protesters seem more extreme and their protests less legal. Using an internet survey experiment in Vietnam, I find support for my argument. These findings highlight a challenge to building pro-democracy coalitions under authoritarian rule.

The Disorientation of the Political Capacity of Indonesian Pro-Democracy Activists

This study examines the political performance of pro-democracy activists in Indonesia after the end of the New Order. Using a democratic transformative politics approach, this study confronts aspects of the political capacity of pro-democracy activists with the need for popular control to work effectively. It finds that activists have been disoriented towards the development of political capacity and popular control. This study contributes to the study of Indonesian democracy by placing the issue of political capacity for building popular control as an integral part of the problem of democracy. The problems of democratisation are not only caused by the domination of political elites who have established oligarchies, but also by pro-democracy activists themselves ignoring the importance of developing collective political capacity as a means of advancing popular control. This study urges pro-democracy activists to re-orient their political capacity building and work with an agenda of consolidating the demos for civic democracy. Pro-democracy activists need to develop a systematic strategy of politicisation to strengthen citizens’ collective power through civic associations as a substitute forconstituents and voters.

Myanmar’s Coup d’état and the Struggle for Federal Democracy and Inclusive Government

This article reviews the first twelve months of the civil disobedience movement in Myanmar following the 1 February 2021 coup d’état and its many dynamics and manifestations. Myanmar’s ‘Spring Revolution’ generated a shared sense of national unity—overcoming gender, ethnic, religious and class boundaries, but raising questions about the long-term sustainability of nonviolent civil resistance in a state where the military has for decades wielded political and economic power. Since the coup, Myanmar has been in turmoil, paralysed by instability which escalated after the military’s deadly crackdown on pro-democracy activists. The article charts the growth of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), its multiple methods of strategic resistance and non-cooperation, and the radicalisation of the resistance agenda. It analyses the formation of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the creation of the interim National Unity Government (NUG), the founding of the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the inauguration of the People’s Defence Force (PDF). It examines the implications for Myanmar when the crisis reached a more complex phase after the military’s open use of force and terror on the broader civilian population prompted the NUG to declare war on the junta, and to urge ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and newly formed anti-junta civilian militias (PDF) to attack the State Administration Council (SAC) as a terrorist organisation. The NUG now opposes the military junta by strategic and peaceful non-cooperation, armed resistance, and international diplomacy. This paper considers whether the predominantly nonviolent civil resistance movement’s struggle for federal democracy and inclusive governance is laying the foundations for eventual transition to a fully democratic future or whether the cycles of violence will continue as the military continues to control power by using intimidation and fear. It notes that the coup has destroyed the economy and expanded Myanmar’s human rights and humanitarian crises but has also provided the opportunity for Myanmar’s people to explore diverse visions of a free, federal, democratic and accountable Myanmar. It finally examines the possibilities for future peaceful nation building, reconciliation, and the healing of the trauma of civil war.

Weaponization of Mandarin Chinese

This article investigates the weaponization of Mandarin Chinese by analyzing four components of weaponized language: propaganda, disinformation, censorship, and mundane discourse deployed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The weaponization of Mandarin Chinese particularly targets religious people, including Christians, Falun Gong practitioners, and believers of sects unsanctioned by CCP, minorities, and prodemocracy activists. The weaponization of the Chinese language demonstrates that the CCP authorities possess the power to manipulate language so that it shapes public discourse and affects public perception, opinion, and behavior.

Pergeseran Orientasi Politik Mantan Aktivis Pro-demokrasi di Bali: Dari Idealis ke Pragmatis

This article discusses the change in the political orientation of former pro-democracy activists in Bali after more than 20 years of the reformation. The change in their orientation from idealistic to pragmatic is allegedly one of the catalysts for the decline of democracy. This study aims to determine the causes of the change in the political orientation of former pro-democracy activists in Bali and to make a categorization from the political orientation of these former activists. The theory used as the analytical tool is the rational choice theory from Barbara Geddes. This research uses qualitative methods with a case studies approach. There are two important findings in this study: (1) The change in political orientation from idealistic to pragmatic is caused by the rational choices made by former pro-democracy activists by calculating their career and needs factors. (2) If career motives are more prominent than transactional and partisanship motives, then former pro-democracy activists tend to fill the positions in non-political party institutions. On the contrary, if the partisan motive is dominant in a former activist, then they tend to fill the position in a political party.

The Paradoxes of “Vernacularised” Liberalism in Southeast Asia

ABSTRACT In response to “indigenous” justifications of illiberalism (e.g., “Asian values”) and the cronyism of electoral authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, some pro-democracy activists constructed a “vernacularised” liberal discourse that framed demands for human rights and “good governance” in religious-communalist terms. This countered charges that activists were overly Westernised and supported their calls for ethical rule. Yet, after authoritarian rule gave way to democratic transition, liberals often turned against elected governments or were reluctant to challenge extremists who targeted ethno-religious minorities. In analysing these paradoxes, this article uses a contextualist rather than a stipulative, benchmarking approach that ignores contradictions in Western liberalism. Anti-majoritarianism in the Philippines and Thailand was driven by the fear that corrupt populists threatened religious-communalist values, with liberals ultimately turning against democracy. Another paradox is that in Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar liberals first used culturalist arguments to justify upholding civil liberties, but later became reluctant to criticise exclusivist forms of ethno-nationalism that endangered human rights. In the face of democratic backsliding in Southeast Asia, liberalism is being reconfigured, for instance through resistance by a middle-class youth movement against military-monarchical rule in Thailand, through multi-ethnic resistance to the 2021 coup in Myanmar, and by traditionalist Islamic groups in Indonesia.

Finding the “Humanity” in Human Rights: LGBT Activists and the Vernacularization of Human Rights in Hong Kong

Through an ethnographic analysis of Hong Kong LGBT activists’ fight for a gender recognition ordinance (GRO) that would simplify the process for transgender Hongkongers to change their legal gender, a paradox emerged: Why was a human rights framing of LGBT issues problematic when human rights were central to locals’ understanding of what it meant to be Hongkongers? Local LGBT activists’ vernacularization of human rights—or the process of localization of international human rights law into culturally relevant frameworks—hinged on reframing the need for a GRO as a matter of humanity, not human rights law. Relying on citations of human rights law among “ordinary citizens” violated the existing ways in which Hongkongers talked about human rights as a method of distinguishing Hong Kong from the rest of the People’s Republic of China. Furthermore, this need to differentiate emerged from the 2014 Umbrella Movement in which prodemocracy activists occupied various urban centers in Hong Kong for seventy-nine days. The Umbrella Movement caused a shift in which ordinary citizens became responsible for each other and defending what made Hong Kong unique. Ultimately, the vernacularization process requires closer attention to the ways in which human rights are being talked about on the ground.

The #MilkTeaAlliance: A New Transnational Pro-Democracy Movement Against Chinese-Centered Globalization?

In April 2020, in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, memes addressing the Thai monarchy in a critical way appeared on Twitter under the hashtag #MilkTeaAlliance, which for a couple of days trended worldwide. Initially, the Twitter account of a Thai TV star was attacked by Chinese nationalists. But, different from similar incidents in the past, a new pan-Asian solidarity of Twitter users emerged, fought back the attack, and defeated the Chinese nationalists through highly self-ironic, witty, and political memes. In our article, we will discuss the meme war in its historic, political, and social context. Firstly, we claim that it can count as the inception of a new transnational movement comparable to the globalization-critical movement of the early 2000s, in so far as it targets the present, Chinese-led version of globalization. Secondly, we will challenge the dominant interpretation that the meme war was a confrontation between young Thai, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese pro-democracy activists versus state-sponsored trolls from the People’s Republic of China. Despite all distortions caused by censorship measures from the side of the Chinese government and Twitter, the meme war seemed to have opened a transnational space for debate.

THE POWER OF THAI DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE ROYAL FAMILY

Thailand has a long history of political riots and protests, but the pro-democracy actions that took place for most of 2020 and are continuing today are the biggest actions in Thai history. The wave of actions bearing the 'Three Fingers' symbol began in February 2020 after the Thai Raksa Chart, the most outspoken opposition political party, was suspended by the Constitutional Court. This freeze is considered by democracy activists to increasingly benefit the ruler of the military junta, Prime Minister Prayuth Chan Ocha. There were at least 10 demands made by the demonstrators, among others, urging the ruling government to step down immediately, demanding amendments to the military product constitution which is not pro-people, immediately holding fair and fair elections, and pressing for reform of the monarchy that has ruled Thailand for decades. The demonstrators were worried that Thailand would again be trapped in an absolute monarchy system as it was before 1932, where the king held full power as head of state as well as head of government. In recent months, demonstrators have taken to the streets to resist resistance. Although the pro-democracy activists were responded to, the demonstrators, who were mostly students, students, and youth ranks, fearlessly continued to embrace to pressure the royal family. Actions against the monarchy like those of the country's demonstrators were both courageous and surprising. Why not, since birth in the realm of the body, Thai citizens have been instilled to love and obey the monarchy unconditionally and are instilled to be afraid to do things that are against or just talk about the royal family. However, the anger, disgust of the Thai people towards the feudal behavior of the royal family who are busier with self-interest coupled with the Military Junta ruling regime that is not pro-people makes their patience limit is on the limit.

The constitution of Myanmar: a contextual analysis

On 8 November 2020 the Myanmar (Burma) electorate once again returned to the polls, with many queuing from the early hours to participate in the third set of nationwide elections since the establishment of the 2008 constitution. Expected results at the time of writing indicate another landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), a party made up of ex-political prisoners and pro-democracy activists. Nevertheless, there has been increasing scepticism about the success of Myanmar's regime transition from military dictatorship to democracy. The continuing ethnic violence in many of the borderlands, including but not limited to the persecution of the Rohingya, would appear to overshadow supposed institutional and electoral progress in the past twelve years. Yet as this book by Melissa Crouch details, the answer to the success of Myanmar's transition and democratic potential lies not in its electoral process but within its constitution. In 2008, Myanmar held a referendum on the newly drafted constitution which passed with overwhelming success despite the vote being held days after Cyclone Nargis devastated much of the central lowlands. The decision to go ahead and the result exemplified the gap between what was democratic transition on the surface and the realities of the environment in which it was occurring. As the first part of the book outlines, both the oversight and participation of the military in the drafting and securing of the 2008 constitution have not only undermined but completely restricted the process. Though the language of democracy may be used when discussing Myanmar, this detailed analysis of the constitution and of the first two elections held under its aegis in 2010 and 2015 paint a very different picture.

Democracy and Political Prisoners in Bhutan

The uprising of 1990 in Bhutan was a wakeup call for Bhutanese monarchy to reform. The response remains the blackest period in the country’s history. Women were raped; political leaders, students, human right activists and other common people were tortured and jailed. Many succumbed to torture; no one has the definite data of how many. Ethnic cleansing took place resulting in the eviction of more than one-sixth of the country’s population. Largest per capita refugees were produced. Movement for dignified repatriation has failed miserably but the resettlement of those Bhutanese refugees in developed countries was declared a great success. The King announced in 2005 that the country will have a ‘democratic’ government. He handed over his authority to his son to govern. The king and the country received massive appreciation for initiating democracy. By nature, the democracy should primarily benefit those who demanded it. Instead, Bhutan is the only democracy in the world where pro-democracy activists are still serving jail sentences. International community remain mute spectator to the sugar-coated Bhutanese democracy. Royal Government of Bhutan fooled them by taking advantage of their interest on geopolitics. This paper entails the story of dissidents behind the bars, their families and response from the international community – including governments, human rights groups and the United Nations. Additionally, this paper highlights the implementation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution of Bhutan and to see if such fundamental rights as enshrined in the constitution are real or not.

Abstentions in 2014 and 2019 Indonesian elections: Case study of pro-democracy activists

This article discusses how the dynamics of the abstentions phenomenon among pro-democracy activists in the 2014-2019 general election in Indonesia. While pro-democracy activists have increasingly chosen “struggle within”, there are still critical groups that have voted for abstentions in 2014-2019 general election. Charles Tilly’s concept of collective action and contentious politics is used in this study. This study uses a qualitative approach to the type of case study research. Researchers explore data through in-depth interviews as primary data and secondary data is extracted through library research. The analysis is carried out with the abstractive inductive logic. This research shows that abstentions are contentious collective actions. The abstentions movement was born from a network of pro-democracy activists who have been engaged in advocacy work. Abstentions carried out in protest against the authorities and the boycott of the election. The boycott choice is contentious politics.

South Korea's Democratic Decay

South Korea (hereafter Korea) is following global trends as it slides toward a depression Both the spirit of democracy and actual liberal-democratic standards are under attack The symptoms of democratic decline are increasingly hard to miss, and they are appearing in many corners of Korean society, the hallmarks of zero-sum politics in which opponents are demonized, democratic norms are eroded, and political life grows ever more polarized Unlike in countries where far-right elements play on populist sentiments, in Korea these aggressive and illiberal measures are the work of a leftist government Disturbingly, the key figures in Korea's democratic backsliding are former prodemocracy activists who have now risen to become a new power elite

Networked Protests & State Responses: The Case of Hong Kong 2019-20

Digital technologies and Internet connectivity are enabling rapid mobilization of large groups of individuals around a common cause. The defining feature of such a Radically Networked Society (RNS) is the scale and pace of its operations. Consequently, RNS movements pose a serious challenge for the hierarchically ordered state structures, which tend to lack the dexterity and speed to respond. In this paper, we apply the RNS framework to the 2019-20 Hong Kong protests. We conclude that the protests were the product of underlying fissures over issues of identity and political autonomy. The region’s thriving Internet ecosystem and hyper-connected society enabled the development and expansion of networked communities around these issues. This fueled sustained, leaderless mobilization, resulting in large-scale disruption and electoral advances for pro-democracy activists. Meanwhile, the state’s response was rooted in a strategy of attrition. This minimized costs and proved somewhat effective in that the movement failed to achieve the broader objective of earning universal suffrage for Hong Kongers. Yet, the protests have managed to fundamentally reshape state-society relations and shift the narrative around the region’s future.

Contentious politics and democratization in Hong Kong

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explain why many activists in Hong Kong have shifted from demanding democracy to independence while, at least for a short time, there have been more aggressive tactics which culminated in the Fishball Revolution of 2016.Design/methodology/approachBased on event analysis, participant observation in recent protests, as well as interviews with participants and non-participants in various pro-democracy protests, this paper traces the changes of the democracy movement from 1997 until 2018.FindingsThe paper demonstrates that the inability of the democracy movement to make progress has contributed to a change in the goals and tactics of some pro-democracy activists. The goals have shifted from moderate democratic reforms to much more revolutionary demands including calls for full autonomy or independence while the approach has shifted from an institutionalized approach toward more aggressive tactics such as illegal forms of resistance. During the Lunar New Year in 2016, the growing frustrations over perceived threats to the local culture have, for the first time since the handover, even led to the use of violence.Originality/valueThis paper views contentious politics in Hong Kong through McAdam’s distinction of reform-oriented and revolutionary goals as well as institutionalized and non-institutionalized tactics. This provides a new perspective for explaining the rise of localism and Hong Kong nationalism.

Defending the Egyptian nation: national unity and Muslim attitudes toward the Coptic minority

This article discusses the Muslim discourse concerning the Coptic Christian minority since the 2000s in Egypt. Emphasizing the effects of the January 2011 uprising, the paper analyzes the role of nationalism and the national unity discourse in suppressing the debate regarding discrimination against the Copts. Despite the fissures that were created in the discourse, which rejects any reference to discrimination against the Copts, the Coptic issue remains trapped among the contested interpretations of national unity. All narratives of national unity and Egyptian essence, whether the official one pursued by the regime or the one promoted by pro-democracy activists, require the Copts to suppress their demand for rights for the sake of national unity. Adherence to the national unity discourse by all forces precludes the possibility of developing a form of nationalism or a national culture which embodies pluralism of identities and cultures and reinforces the role of nationalism as a tool for stifling pluralism and democracy for all Egyptians, whether Muslim majority or minorities.

버마 민주화 운동가의 난민 살이와 귀환 : NLD-LA 한국 지부를 중심으로

버마 민주화 운동가의 난민 살이와 귀환 : NLD-LA 한국 지부를 중심으로

India-Myanmar Relations: From Idealpolitik To Realpolitik

India's relations with Myanmar was generally cordial and close prior to 1960s. Myanmar Prime Minister U Nu believed it as 'firm Indo-Burmese friendship'. This excellent bilateral relationship between the two countries was generated by political and economic cooperation, plus good personal friendship between U Nu and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Although there were several hiccups along with the relationship of the two countries in the 1960s and 1970s, the bilateral relations were still good. However, after the failed 1988 major demonstration by the Burmese pro-democracy movement against the military rule, the bilateral relations between India and Myanmar was disrupted. India started to criticise strongly the new Burma's military junta - the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). India offered shelters for anti-SLORC dissidents and pro-democracy activists. India criticised strongly Myanmar's poor human rights record and advocated for Myanmar's return to democracy. India gave permission for Myanmar's opposition - the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) to open its office in New Delhi in 1992. During this time, it is clear that India's foreign policy towards Myanmar was to champion democratic ideals, urging and pushing Myanmar to return to democracy. Myanmar saw this as interference in its domestic affairs, but Myanmar lacked a trump card in forcing India to reconsider its stance, prompting Myanmar to turn to China for support. By 1993, India shifted its stances towards Myanmar from advocating democratic ideals to a more realistic policy based on namely the China factor, the economic and strategic interests, and Myanmar's image and international legitimacy, and India's ambition in Southeast Asia.

What Is the Future of Transitional Justice?

INTRODUCTION The term ‘transitional justice’ evokes hope and renaissance. For more than a quartercentury, when the concept of transitional justice was first mooted, postconflict and other tormented societies have attempted to embrace it as a bridge to a more hopeful future. A number of states in the depths of despair and countries wracked by seemingly endless cycles of violence see transitional justice tools as a possible midwife of a democratic, rule-of-law state. In many circles, transitional justice has become an article of faith as a catalyst for reclaiming societies in political and social imbalance and dysfunction. Senior statesmen and leading academics have endorsed the critical place of transitional justice in returning societies to civilization. Diverse regions of the globe – from Europe and Central and Latin America to Africa and Asia – have latched on to the glimmer of hope offered by transitional justice ideas, processes and institutions. Almost three decades later, the body of evidence suggests a mixed record. There have many successes of transitional justice initiatives, but there have also been many challenges. This special issue of IJTJ seeks to excavate these hopes and fears of a relatively novel idea. It has sought out new and divergent voices, many with a critical lens, to ask nagging questions about the enterprise of transitional justice. The emergence of transitional justice roughly coincided with the end of the Cold War and the euphoria of the presumed triumph of free market ideologies and political liberation around the globe. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, one-party regimes and opaque dictatorships – most supported by either the West or the East – gave way to new experiments in democratic rule. Most were emerging from long nights of tyranny and despotism. Such global upheaval and regime change had not been witnessed since the era of decolonization. In Latin America, brutal military kleptocracies were in retreat, and in Africa military fascism and single-party states were put on their back foot by pro-democracy activists and human rights advocates. The close of the last century and the beginning of this one were marked by hope and the promise

Fighting the Hellhounds: Pro-democracy Activists and Party Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia

In the literature on post-Suharto Indonesia, an increasingly dominant stream has portrayed the political system as being hijacked by predatory elite interests associated with the fallen New Order regime. While such characterisations describe important elements of the post-1998 polity, they do not tell the full story. At the same time that patronage-driven career politicians have staked their claims in the newly democratic state, a large number of civil society activists also started to play an active role in formal politics. This article illustrates how human rights advocates, women activists and labour leaders have tried to promote their causes not from the margins of civil society, but from within the power centre of political institutions. To be sure, some activists-turned-politicians have failed in this effort, but others have initiated key pieces of legislation that led to ground-breaking reforms. In comparative terms, the article demonstrates that Indonesian activists have created an effective political niche for themselves, avoiding both the patterns of state co-optation so prevalent in South Korea and the anti-system attitudes of activist politicians in Malaysia.