The paper reports the results of the global web based survey of national governmental authorities responsible for food safety controls. This survey was carried out to get an overview of the collaboration of national governmental agencies with private food safety assurance schemes. The report shows a diverse picture. According to the respondents, food authorities in 13 countries take private food safety assurance schemes into account in their inspection policy, 5 countries consider to do so in the future, 27 do not. The most important reasons to (consider to) take private assurance schemes into account are that it contributes to compliance with regulations, that it implies efficient and effective use of public budget, and that unnecessary duplication of controls is avoided. Several respondents argue that public authorities do not have the capacity to perform frequent controls of all businesses that produce and trade food. Additional private controls can fill this gap. Public controls will then be able to focus the limited resources on areas with higher risk. It is stressed that private controls do not make governmental oversight redundant.Although almost all respondents see advantages, they also see disadvantages or risks. Many respondents fear that integration of private systems may put consumer confidence in governmental safeguarding of food safety at risk. Respondents feel that it is difficult to explain to consumers and even to their government, why cooperation with private systems is beneficial. Countries that cooperate with private control systems differ in the type of organization they chose as primary collaboration partners. A (national) food authority can collaborate with food safety scheme owners, with certification bodies and auditors, and with food businesses. There are three forms of cooperation. 1. Basic: it is taken into account that food businesses participate in private assurance schemes. Inspectors take into account all kinds of data including the results of private audits. This may result in a reduced inspection frequency or scope. This form of cooperation does not necessarily imply a collaborative relationship with private scheme owners or certification bodies. Examples include Finland and Denmark. 2. The competent authority assesses certification bodies or auditors to perform specific audits. Examples include Belgium and New Zealand. Food business operators can choose between a recognized private auditor and a public auditor. The auditor validates the food safety management system or verifies compliance with the (governmental) rules. 3. The third option is to collaborate on the level of the food certification scheme. The public authority recognizes private assurance schemes after assessing its scope and reliability. Examples of this approach include Canada, Netherlands, UK, France, and Egypt. In the questionnaire respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with 13 items intended to measure the opinion of the respondent on private assurance schemes. Most respondents showed a neutral or positive attitude towards private assurance schemes. One third of the respondents had a positive opinion. Surprisingly, none of the respondents showed a negative attitude. Most respondents agreed that accredited third part certification against a food safety standard contributes to an improved level of food safety. Respondents from organizations that do take private assurance schemes into account have a slightly more positive attitude towards private assurance schemes. However, the difference is only small. Asked about the ideal situation regarding the involvement of private assurance schemes in public food safety control, many respondents stress that private assurance should be complimentary to official controls, that responsibilities of the parties should be clear, that a legal base is needed, that private schemes should align with legislation, and a certificate should include conformity to food safety legislation (or all food legislation). It is also mentioned that participation in a private assurance scheme should not be mandatory, and that sharing information is important. Finally, the paper discusses the consequences of incorporating private controls in governmental monitoring and enforcement policy. A summary of the key findings can be found at the beginning of the report.
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