Private-collective Innovation Research Articles

All of the same breed? A networking perspective of private-collective innovation

Much research on open source software development has highlighted the best-of-both-worlds benefits generated by private and collective contributions from a broad base of developers. However, these studies have tended to overlook the heterogeneous nature of various developer groups including firm-sponsored developers. To unveil the behavioural differences between developer groups, we expand upon the private-collective innovation model using a networking approach, linking network closure and positional embeddedness with technical contribution. We tested our predictions using a lagged analysis based on communication and networking behaviours on the Linux kernel mailing-list in the production of the Linux operation system over a three-year period. Our findings support our predictions, showing that network closure has an adverse impact on technical contribution. Additionally, the relationship between positional embeddedness and technical contribution follows an inverted U-shape. In addition, high positional embeddedness counteracts the negative influence of extensive network closure on technical contribution. These effects are partly moderated by respective developer groups. Our model and results offer important theoretical and practical implications for community management within the framework of private-collective innovation.

Acceptance of Monetary Rewards in Open Source Software Development

The open source software (OSS) movement thrives on innovation and volunteer effort of developers. Scholars have expressed widespread concern about the sustainability of the OSS movement due to high levels of volunteerism. In this paper, we address a central challenge to the sustainability of OSS- developers’ acceptance of monetary rewards. We strive to explain why some OSS developers accept monetary rewards and others do not. Viewed through the theoretical lens of the private-collective innovation model (Von Hippel and Von Krogh 2003, 2006), this allows us to describe when developers will accept private financial rewards. Our main research objective is to clearly map the web of relationships between causal antecedents, and developers’ acceptance behavior. Using a unique dataset that combines survey and behavioral measures, we find that- a) intention to accept monetary rewards mediates the impact of motivational elements on developers’ acceptance of monetary rewards; b) intrinsic and extrinsic motivations positively affect their intention to accept monetary rewards, community motivation negatively impacts intention and ideological motivation does not affect the intention to accept rewards and c) these effects are obtained even after inclusion of several control variables. The theoretical and managerial implications of our work are described.

Can creative firms thrive without copyright? Value generation and capture from private-collective innovation

Can creative firms thrive without copyright? Value generation and capture from private-collective innovation

Can creative firms thrive without copyright? Value generation and capture from private-collective innovation

Accounts of the copyright industries in national reports suggest that strong intellectual property (IP) rights support creative firms. However, mounting evidence from sectors such as video game production and 3-D printing indicate that business models based on open IP can also be profitable. This study investigates the relationship between IP protection and value capture for creative industry firms engaged in collective/open innovation activities. A sample of 22 businesses interviewed in this study did not require exclusive ownership of creative materials but instead employed a range of strategies to compete and capture value. Benefits for some firms resemble those for participants in private-collective innovation (PCI), originally observed in open-source software development. Advantages of PCI include the ability to commercialize user improvements and a reduction in transaction costs related to seeking and obtaining permission to innovate existing ideas. Some creative firms in this study were able to generate and capture value from PCI in two directions: upstream and downstream. These dynamics offer a mechanism to understand and articulate the value of openness for creative industries policy and management of creative organizations.

"Conditions for Private-Collective Innovation: The Role of Rivalry, Excludability, and Incentives"

This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the private-collective model of innovation. Specifically we aim to comprehend under what conditions it is able to induce free revealing and technological progress. The main conditions are the rivalry of designs (innovations) and their excludability. We also consider the kind of incentives for participating in collective innovation and their strength. An agent-based model allows us to experiment with the conditions and their interactions. The model shows (1), consistent with prior literature, that rivalry makes it less likely that a system of voluntary exchange will emerge. However, rivalry increases innovation performance when there is knowledge exchange because rivalry induces greater design heterogeneity. (2) Excludability is essential for voluntary sharing. This is not reflected in the extant literature, which stresses non-excludability as a conditions fostering private-collective innovation. (3) We find that if agents’ incentives are based directly on reputation, performance can be higher than if they are based on the utility of the design only. The paper contributes to our understanding of the emergence and system-level performance of private-collective innovation. We add to the literature on cumulative innovation by providing an explanation for the variance of performance in innovation communities.

Acceptance of monetary rewards in open source software development

The open source software (OSS) movement thrives on innovation and volunteer effort of developers. Scholars have expressed widespread concern about the sustainability of the OSS movement due to high levels of volunteerism. In this paper, we address a central challenge to the sustainability of OSS-developers’ acceptance of monetary rewards. We strive to explain why some OSS developers accept monetary rewards and others do not. Viewed through the theoretical lens of the private-collective innovation model (Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003, 2006), this allows us to describe when developers will accept private financial rewards. Our main research objective is to clearly map the web of relationships between causal antecedents, and developers’ acceptance behavior. Using a unique dataset that combines survey and behavioral measures, we find that – (a) intention to accept monetary rewards mediates the impact of motivational elements on developers’ acceptance of monetary rewards; (b) intrinsic and extrinsic motivations positively affect their intention to accept monetary rewards, community motivation negatively impacts intention and ideological motivation does not affect the intention to accept rewards and (c) these effects are obtained even after inclusion of several control variables. The theoretical and managerial implications of our work are described.

Private–collective innovation, competition, and firms’ counterintuitive appropriation strategies

We extend theory on private–collective innovation by studying the role of exclusion rights for technology in the competition between private–collective and other innovators. We argue that private–collective innovators both pledge their own and invest in orphan exclusion rights for technology as a subtle coordination mechanism to compete against firms proposing alternative proprietary solutions. We discuss implications of our findings for theories of innovation, particularly appropriation strategy, ownership and control, and coordination and industry self-regulation.

All for the Money? The Ambiguity of Monetary Rewards in Firm-initiated Ideation with sers

In this study, we focus on the question why users participate in firm-initiated ideation. Building on the private-collective innovation model of von Hippel and von Krogh (2003, 2006), we ask the fo...

Exploring social preferences in private–collective innovation

Firms, research institutions and individuals have long realised the advantages of innovating in an open manner. Companies such as IBM, Philips and Procter & Gamble, increasingly seek to cooperate with outside individuals and organisations to tap into their ideas for new products and services. This approach makes good business sense, but it is also difficult to achieve. In particular, mechanisms that motivate innovators to ‘open up’ are critical in achieving the benefits of open innovation. Private–collective innovation (PCI) has become an increasingly important model for explaining innovation at the boundaries of traditional, closed and open innovation regimes. Previous work has examined PCI both conceptually and empirically, and recent scholarship has focused specifically on the initiation of PCI as it relates to problems of collective action. This work shows that a project will not ‘take off’ unless the right incentives are in place for innovators to contribute their knowledge to open innovation from the beginning. Drawing on behavioural game theory, this paper expands on prior work by exploring social preferences in the initiation of PCI. The authors conducted a simulation study that shows how inequality aversion, reciprocity and fairness affect the underlying conditions that lead to the initiation of PCI. The results indicate that reciprocity and the potential gains for other participants explain changes in individual knowledge sharing in PCI.

Commons-Based Peer-Production of Physical Goods: Is There Room for a Hybrid Innovation Ecology?

This paper examines how in commons-based peer-production of physical goods a hybrid, private-collective innovation ecology is developing. Using the Fab Lab community as the field of investigation, it collates three studies: a survey of Fab Lab business models, an interview study asking Fab Lab managers and assistants about the pain and pride of their Fab Lab, and a selection of cases describing innovation in Fab Lab projects. The paper finds that there is a desire and intention to establish a hybrid innovation ecology in the Fab Lab community, but that Fab Labs have not yet established business models that would e.g. replicate the known models from open source software. However, the studies indicated the possibility of such models. The paper finally puts the results in perspective to the free fabbing ecology, and the wider context of peer-production of physical goods.

Initiating private-collective innovation: The fragility of knowledge sharing

Incentives to innovate are a central element of innovation theory. In the private-investment model, innovators privately fund innovation and then use intellectual property protection mechanisms to appropriate returns from these investments. In the collective-action model, public subsidy funds public goods innovations, characterized by non-rivalry and non-exclusivity in using these innovations. Recently, these models have been compounded in the private-collective innovation model where innovators privately fund public goods innovations. Private-collective innovation is illustrated in the case of open source software development. This paper contributes to the work on this model by investigating incentives that motivate innovators to share their knowledge in an initial situation, before there is a community to support the innovation process. We use game theory to predict knowledge sharing behavior in private-collective innovation, and test these predictions in a laboratory setting. The results show that knowledge sharing is a coordination game with multiple equilibria, reflecting the fragility of knowledge sharing between innovators with conflicting interests. The experimental results demonstrate important asymmetries in the fragility of knowledge sharing and, in some situations, more knowledge sharing than theoretically predicted. A behavioral analysis suggests that knowledge sharing in private-collective innovation is not only affected by material incentives, but also by social preferences such as fairness. The results offer general insights into the relationship between incentives and knowledge sharing and contribute to a better understanding of the initiation of private-collective innovation.

The Determinants of Individual Performance and Collective Value in Private-Collective Software Innovation

We investigate if the actions by individuals in creating effective new innovations are aligned with the reuse of those innovations by others in a private-collective software development context. This relationship is studied in the setting of eleven “wiki-like” programming contests, where contest submissions are open for reuse by others, each involving more than one hundred contributors and several thousand attempts to generate, over a one-week period, the “best” software solution to a difficult programming challenge. We find that greater amounts of new code and novel recombinations of others’ code, in a contest submission, increases both the probability of achieving top rank and the subsequent reuse by others in their own submission (community value). While, increasing use of borrowed code in a submission reduces the probability of achieving top rank, but increases the community value of the submission. Code structures that are more non-conforming to commonly accepted programming conventions similarly increase the probability of generating a top performer, but reduce subsequent reuse by others. Surprisingly, greater code complexity in a submission increases both the odds of generating a top performing entry and its community value. We discuss the implications of these findings in light of the literature on private-collective innovation with an emphasis on the importance of considering both individual and community perspectives as they relate to knowledge creation, reuse and recombination for innovation. *Please send comments to klakhani@hbs.edu

Private-Collective Innovation, Competition, and Firms’ Counterintuitive Appropriation Strategies

We extend theory on private-collective innovation by studying the role of exclusion rights for technology in the competition between private-collective and other innovators. We argue that private-collective innovators both pledge their own and invest in orphan exclusion rights for technology as a subtle coordination mechanism to compete against firms proposing alternative proprietary solutions. We discuss implications of our findings for theories of innovation, particularly appropriation strategy, ownership and control, and coordination and industry self-regulation.