One prominent intellectualist position in the debate on the nature of skill, famously defended by Stanley and Williamson (2001; 2017), claims that skill and knowing-how are reducible to knowledgethat. To defend this claim, Stanley and Williamson argue that skill and knowledge-that develop in a sufficiently similar way through different learning stages. In this paper we offer a novel argument to reject this version of intellectualism on methodological, descriptive, and conceptual grounds. We do so by drawing on the work of Heidegger, Dreyfus, and Ryle on skill. We first offer a descriptive account of skilful action based on the work developed by these authors, and we then move on to show that skill and knowledge-that exhibit significant differences. First, while skills cannot be imparted merely linguistically, some forms of knowledge-that can be exclusively imparted and learned verbally. Second, weshow that the temporal learning curves of skill and knowledge-that are importantly different: the former usually requires a more or less extensive training process, whereas the latter may be acquired in a relatively sudden fashion. Finally, we show that, while the structure of most forms of knowledge-that is aggregative, the structure of skilful understanding is dynamic and holistic, which entails that prior skill stages cannot be retrieved and re-enacted at will.
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