Principle Of Religious Liberty Research Articles

Permitting gender equality in Abrahamic circumcision: the central argument – in retrospect and reply

To the extent that the Dawoodi Bohra custom of circumcising girls as well as boys (1) has broad support among Dawoodi Bohra women, (2) is motivated by a gender-equal interpretation of the Abrahamic covenant (Genesis 17 of the Hebrew Bible) traceable to the views and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed, (3) is less physically invasive than a legal male circumcision as practised by Jews and Muslims, and (4) there is scant evidence of serious harms associated with the procedure, it seems reasonable to suggest that space should be made in a liberal, multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multicultural society for this particular long-standing family life custom. When and if those four conditions hold, the custom is arguably protected by principles of religious liberty, family privacy, parental rights and equal protection for both females and males before the law.

Digitizing the Records of Philadelphia's Historic Congregations

In 2018, the Council on Library and Information Resources (CLIR), funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, awarded a Digitizing Hidden Collections project grant to Christ Church Preservation Trust to digitize the records of eleven of Philadelphia’s historic congregations. Founded by William Penn in 1681 upon the principle of religious liberty, Philadelphia drew worshippers of all denominations. By 1750, the Society of Friends, Christ Church, First Presbyterian, Gloria Dei, Mikveh Israel, and others were providing spiritual inspiration to their various congregations. Their records reflect an emerging society, providing a glimpse into political and social changes before much other official record keeping was in place. These largely hidden records allow access to historical data of great use to scholars, students, and family historians. It is a collaborative project with resources shared generously by the congregations and their partners in this initiative: the Athenaeum of Philadelphia, Atla, and the University of Pennsylvania.

Kant on the Relations between Church and State: An Introduction to the Special Edition

This introduction is divided into two parts. First, drawing on Paul Guyer’s suggestion that we should turn to Kant to reinvestigate the foundations of religious liberty, I outline Kant’s views on the relations between the ethical (‘church’) and the political (‘state’) community, as presented in Part Three of the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, focusing in particular on his arguments for separation between religion and the state. Examining critically the idea to employ Kant in contemporary debates, I claim that Kant’s account of pure moral faith and the church as its ‘vehicle’ may pose difficulties for any argument for religious liberty that appeals to his thought. For Kant is better equipped to offer resources to overcome rather than to accommodate the fact of so-called “moral pluralism,” i.e. the condition in which the principle of religious liberty can find its application. In the second part, I summarise the arguments of the authors who contribute to this volume: D. Jakušić, W. Kozyra, S. Lo Re, G.E. Michalson Jr., and S.R. Palmquist.

From the Mountains to the Cities: A History of Buddhist Propagation in Modern Korea by Mark A. Nathan

Reviewed by: From the Mountains to the Cities: A History of Buddhist Propagation in Modern Korea by Mark A. Nathan Florence Galmiche, Associate Professor From the Mountains to the Cities: A History of Buddhist Propagation in Modern Korea by Mark A. Nathan. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2018. xii, 196 pp. This book is a useful contribution to several fields of research. It adds to current research on the relationship between the state and Buddhism and also offers a global vision of the history of mainstream Korean Buddhism since the end of the nineteenth century. This ambition—to present the contemporary history of Korean Buddhism in an accessible and concise volume in English—is extremely helpful. Despite the magnitude of the task, Mark Nathan manages to give a coherent account by following a specific approach: the development of propagation (p'ogyo) within Buddhism. This clear angle leaves some themes aside, but Nathan presents this focus on propagation in a very convincing way and shows the relevance of this issue for understanding the contemporary history of Buddhism in Korea. The development of Buddhist propagation [End Page 351] strategies in the twentieth century is the opposite of an epiphenomenon. As this book demonstrates, they have not only strengthened the role and status of Buddhism in society but also contributed to its profound reform. The merits of this approach are twofold: it makes it possible to draw lines of continuity in the contemporary history of Korean Buddhism that contribute greatly to the understanding of its evolutions and it also makes it possible to address less investigated aspects of Buddhism such as the evolution of its legal framework or its media. The book is organized chronologically. The introductory chapter situates the concept of propagation within Buddhist traditions in Asia. It describes how the place of propagation within the history of Buddhism has been debated and provides useful conceptual clarifications (for example, on the difference between dissemination and conversion). After this introduction, chapter 2 discusses the end of Chosŏn and highlights the relation between the concept of modernity, the normative framework for what constitutes a religion, and the valorization of propagation. It sheds light on the many factors that contributed to the lifting of the ban on Buddhist nuns and monks entering major cities. It also explores the meaning and influence of the "mountain Buddhism" trope. Nathan shows how the relation between the principle of religious liberty and the freedom to propagate one's religion was established at the end of the nineteenth century. Clarifying the relation between these two notions as well as the consequences of this connection is an important contribution of this book. Like Vincent Goossaert in the case of China, Nathan disentangles the relationship between different legal frameworks, a normative definition of religion, and the evolution of religious practices. Chapter 3 furthers this reflection on Buddhism in the context of Japanese colonization. It shows how the anchorage of propagation within the normative and legal framework of recognized religions allowed monastics to legitimately engage in this activity but also allowed the colonial government to ensure control over these issues. Nathan thus contributes to the debate about the influence of colonization on the evolution of Buddhism in Korea and shows how the new legal context surrounding temples and their activities has served both as leverage for the spread of Buddhism and as an instrument of control and domination for the colonial government. Chapter 4 discusses the period from 1945 to the end of the 1970s. It describes how divisions ignited by colonial rule were complicated by government intrusion—both by the US Army Military government and the South Korean government—into monastic affairs, facilitated by the legal framework resulting from colonization. Nathan points out that despite all the major crises and [End Page 352] difficulties, propagation has continued to be a major reference for Buddhist reformers and the main guideline for the monastic community's engagement with society. Moreover, he also analyses how the transformation of the political and legal framework surrounding Buddhism in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to renewing its propagation strategies. In particular, he emphasizes the development, from the 1970s onward, of individual propagation initiatives and sheds light...

Book Review: Frank Lambert. Separation of Church and State: Founding Principle of Religious Liberty

Book Review: Frank Lambert. <i>Separation of Church and State: Founding Principle of Religious Liberty</i>

Separation of Church and State: Founding Principle of Religious Liberty

Separation of Church and State: Founding Principle of Religious Liberty

Religione, politica e secolarismo negli Stati Uniti: una prospettiva storica

In the United States, the idea that modernity brings about secularism and that is in the long term incompatible with has been proved wrong. In fact, the development of modernity has not led to a progressive dismissal of and secularization coexists with traditional forms of religion. The principle of religious liberty - guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution - is a dynamic principle that has requested a continual adjustment to new social, political, and economic conditions. Wall of the metaphor used by Thomas Jefferson to designate the separation between church and state, has been misleading because nowhere in the Constitution and in the Bill of Rights Church, separation, or wall are mentioned. The relationship between church and state in the United States must be considered on the background of the religious pluralism that has characterized the society since the colonial times, and it is better described as a line dividing two different spheres without excluding an exchange or a relation. Throughout American history, has played an important public role in relation to three issues: war and peace, economic structures, and racial justice. It should also be noted that there is a religious dimension of American society. This so-called civil religion is the result of a gradual merging between old and new myths and symbols.

Government Has No “Religious Agency”: James Madison's Fundamental Principle of Religious Liberty

Religious liberty has reemerged as a problem in liberal democracy. For guidance we can turn to James Madison. Unfortunately, his fundamental principle of religious liberty has been misunderstood. Madison believed that power over religious conscience always remains with the individual, which means that government never has a power to attempt to cause or prohibit religious opinions or profession and only has the power to prohibit religious practices that are “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” Madison's fundamental principle of religious liberty is therefore that government has no “religious agency.” In matters of religious establishment, “no agency” means that government lacks even the power to cognize religious opinions or practices. But in matters of free exercise, “no agency” means that government can accommodate citizens’ religious consciences, even if that accommodation requires cognizing their religious opinions. An important but widely overlooked example of Madison's complex but principled approach to religious liberty is his 1790 proposal for a statutory exemption from federal militia service for religious objectors.

Libertad religiosa y fuerzas armadas

The article deals with the relationship between the principle of religious liberty and the professional model of the Armed Forces. The right to religious freedom as a key piece of a social and democratic state under the rule of law in which we find ourselves extends, without doubt, in its application to the professional military person and to certain military acts and ceremonies in which this right has an important part to play. Further, the article tries to fix the boundaries between the principle of religious liberty and collection of rights and obligations inherent and proper to a professional military person, taking as its basis article 16 of the Spanish Constitution, which grants active legitimization to individuals and communities without further limitation, in their manifestations, other than that necessary for the maintenance of public order protected by law. But the question arises: is there any limit to the exercise of the right to religious freedom by the professional military? The answer to this question has to be affirmative. In Law 17/1999, on the regime of military personnel, the applicability of this right to the professional military is recognised even though its exercise will be regulated by the criteria of National Defence and by what is established in the Royal Orders for the Armed Forces. From this we deduce that the exercise of this right, as with any other fundamental right, is not absolute, and de facto, is subject to limitations in the sphere of military activity. Subsequently, the author tries to pull together all those situations in which the principle of religious liberty could possibly come into conflict with the day to day activity of the armed forces, paying particular attention to those acts or military ceremonies which include worship, basically catholic; above all he highlights the ways opened up by the juridical framework which make relationships between both factors smooth and which do not provoke any kind of discrimination on religious grounds within the Armed Forces.

Religious Rights in the Founding Era

The eighteenth-century American founders distinguished six principles of religious liberty - liberty of conscience, freedom of exercise, equality of faiths, plurality of confessions, disestablishment of religion, and separation of church and state. They incorporated these six principles into the original state constitutions, though with different emphases and applications. They also incorporated these six principles into the First Amendment religion clauses. The free exercise clause outlawed government proscriptions of religion-actions that unduly burdened the conscience, restricted religious expression, discriminated against religion, or invaded the autonomy of churches and other religious bodies. The disestablishment clause outlawed government prescriptions of religion-actions that coerced the conscience, mandated forms of religious expression, discriminated in favor of religion, or improperly allied the state with churches or other religious bodies. Both the free exercise and the disestablishment clauses thereby provided complementary protections to the first principles of the American experiment in religious liberty.

James Madison's Principle of Religious Liberty

Although James Madison has been invoked by justices and judicial scholars for over 100 years, Madison's principle of religious liberty has never been fully grasped or adopted by the Supreme Court. Judges and scholars have failed to understand Madison's radical but simple teaching that religion is not part of the social compact and, therefore, that the state may not take religion within its cognizance. In this article I set forth Madison's principle of “noncognizance” in light of the social compact theory he articulates in the “Memorial and Remonstrance.” I then attempt to show how it consistently explains Madison's political actions and writings on religious liberty. I conclude by explaining how a “Madisonian” approach, properly understood, would adjudicate the First Amendment's religion clauses.The author would like to thank Mark Blitz, Charles R. Kesler, Nicholas May, Ralph A. Rossum, and Michael Uhlmann for their comments on drafts of this article.

The Case Against Legislative Codification Of Religious Liberty

In response to a highly controversial Supreme Court decision (Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)), the U.S. Congress and a number of state legislatures have enacted statutes designed to protect the right to religion-based exemptions from general laws. The Supreme Court has invalidated in part one such federal law, but Congress is seriously contemplating a replacement and a number of states are actively considering their own versions of such a law. This paper argues, primarily on institutional grounds, that such legislation (state or federal) is both unnecessary and unwise. The first part of the paper argues that judge-made, constitutionally-based principles of religious liberty are more vital and dynamic than proponents of such legislation will allow, and that the results in practice of religious liberty statutes are considerably more feeble than these legislative proponents will admit. The second part of the paper argues that, even apart from this comparative assessment of the achievements of constitutional and statutory law on this subject, such legislation is intrinsically flawed as a method for protecting religious freedom. These flaws include the constitutional vulnerability of the legislation; the impossibility of drafting such legislation in ways which adequately guide the exercise of authority by judges and other decision makers; the tendency of such legislation to retard growth or cause atrophy in constitutional principles of religious liberty; and the hazards, constitutional and otherwise, of politicizing (as such legislation inevitably will) the enterprise of protecting religious liberty.

Is There a Principle of Religious Liberty?

Is There a Principle of Religious Liberty?

Three Models of Secular Constitutional Development: India, Israel, and the United States

As a subject for serious investigation, constitutionalism in faraway places seems finally to have come of age. To appropriate the famous metaphor from the First Amendment arena that is the concern of this paper, it is as if, until relatively recently, a “wall of separation” had shielded both scholarly and judicial analysis of American constitutional issues from the experience of other polities. As a result, too often constitutional inquiry has been denied the illumination and insights of comparative research. My specific aim in this article is to explore the concept and practice of the secular constitution within three nations that are committed, albeit in different ways, to the principle of religious liberty.

And a Child Shall Lead Them: Justice O'Connor, the Principle of Religious Liberty and Its Practical Application

And a Child Shall Lead Them: Justice O'Connor, the Principle of Religious Liberty and Its Practical Application

The Efforts of the United States to Secure Religious Liberty in a Commercial Treaty with Mexico, 1825-1831

The subject of a commerical treaty quickly emerged after the United States recognition of the independence of Mexico in 1822. To negotiate this treaty Joel Roberts Poinsett was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Mexico. Since Mexico had modeled its constitution after that of the United States, Henry Clay, Secretary of State, instructed Poinsett to make himself available to explain the practical operation and advantages of our system to Mexico. Inherent in our constitution and system was freedom of religion, establishment of which in our relations with Mexico constituted an objective of Poinsett's mission. Clay incorporated into Poinsett's instructions those which his predecessor, John Quincy Adams, on May 27, 1823, addressed to Richard Clough Anderson, Jr., Minister Plenipotentiary to Colombia. Adams had emphasized the importance of inserting the principle of religious liberty in the commercial treaty with Colombia. Liberty of conscience and of religious freedom were among the usual objects of a commercial treaty. He expostulated that “civil, political, commercial, and religious liberty, are but various modifications of one great principle founded in the inalienable rights of human nature, and before the universal application of which the colonial domination of Europe over the American hemisphere, has fallen, and is crumbling into dust.”

The Issue of Religious Liberty in the United States Commercial Treaty with Colombia, 1824

The Republic of Colombia was the first Latin American nation to which the United States extended a formal act of recognition in 1822. This country was also the first of these new republics with which the United States negotiated a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. The importance of incorporating the principle of religious liberty in our first commercial treaty with Latin America was revealed in the emphasis that John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, placed on it in his initial instructions to Richard Clough Anderson, Jr., Minister Plenipotentiary to Colombia. Religious liberty was one of the specific articles stipulated by Adams for insertion in the prospective commercial treaty.

Ecumenical Perspectives of the Vatican Declaration on Religious Liberty

Religious Liberty with its clear statements proclaiming full civil religious freedom, both individual and collective, for everybody, everywhere. . . . We are encouraged by the fact that there is now a large measure of agreement among all the churches in these matters. . . . We hope that on the basis of their statements on Religious Liberty, from now on all the Churches will be able to take a common stand for the full application of the principle of religious liberty in all parts of the world and in all possible action to ensure the observance of this principle.

The Principle of Religious Liberty

This is the understanding of the principle of religious liberty, in its present American application, that this paper will spell out: Our American state is impartial toward, but respectful of, ultimate loyalty; it is impartial because it is respectful. Our state is and should be impartial as among the different ultimate beliefs in our society; none is preferred, none discouraged. The state itself is not committed; it is not a confessing state. The state as such is not officially Christian, nor religious, nor affirming belief in God. So far as state action officially is concerned, the United States is not what Will Herberg says it is, pro-religious (the people in general are to be sure, but not the official position of the state). In the broad statement of constitutional principle it is right to say, as the Everson-McCollum doctrine did (to the consternation of many) that the establishment clause of the First Amendment means there shall be no state aid to all religions; there shall be no nonpreferential aid to religion as such, or to religion in general. As an official line of general policy that is ruled out. Insofar as is possible in a real society, the state treats with even-handed equality religious and nonreligious positions— but with the qualification and interpretation, however, that I now want to add. The state is impartial with respect to ultimate beliefs not be cause it is entirely ignorant about and unimpressed with these, pursuing its secular goals without any reference to the religious or irreligious opinion of the people—but rather because it defers to the conscience of the people that it rules. Our state is respect ful of the dimension religion represents, deferring, as far as it can, to it, leaving it insofar as it can, free. Our state leaves re ligious matters aside, not because they are beneath or against its concern, but because they are above its concern. Our free state is a state that knows itself to be limited—indeed, our society is a society that knows itself to be limited—with respect to the ulti mate loyalties of the citizens. These arise from the free action of men and not from the direction of government or the official proc lamation of society. These arise from the hearts of the persons and not from official policy. Our state knows itself to be in