Principles Of Public Accountability Research Articles

Power dynamics in Australian public sector accounting reform: A Machiavellian interpretation

AbstractDuring the era of New Public Management from the 1970s to the 1990s, government accountability in Australia underwent a significant transformation from compliance to performance evaluation. This change underscores a Machiavellian interpretation presented in this paper, emphasizing the politicized and power‐driven nature of public sector accounting reforms. The Australian Government employed a commercial accounting model to legitimize these reforms, leveraging Machiavellian principles to strengthen political power. Despite the accounting profession's role in legitimizing public sector financial reporting, its control over Australian accounting standard setting diminished. The new public sector accountability framework allowed the shifting of blame to the profession when problems arose. An analysis of the New South Wales Government's journey through the reform, from embracing accrual accounting to rejecting heritage assets measurement and applauding fair value, illustrates the complex interplay between self‐interest and the protection of public interest. The Australian Government strategically enlisted the support of the outer fringe accounting profession and successfully instituted reforms premised on the principle of public accountability and liberty for Australian society. Once the reformer's goals were achieved, the facilitating elites found themselves marginalized from the bureaucratic group and power reclaimed deftly to the Government with CLERP reforms paving the way for the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards. This shift exemplifies Machiavelli's perspective, where liberty is used as a means to garner public support and ultimately attain power, a strategy that continues to hold validity in contemporary political contexts.

Принципи взаємодії органів державної влади і громадських структур як основа гармонізації суспільства

Охарактеризовано рівні співпраці між державними і громадськими структурами: інформування про діяльність державних органів влади, яке здатне видозмінити уявлення про владу, що склалося в суспільній думці, а отже, сформувати позитивний або негативний імідж; консультування, коли влада запитує громадськість щодо думки про конкретну політику, напрями розвитку чи інші державні ініціативи; діалог як двосторонню комунікацію про потенційно спільні цілі з метою розробки конкретної політики; партнерство як вищий рівень спільного державно-громадського управління із взаємними обов’язками кожної сторони. Визначено три основні принципи взаємовідносин органів державної влади з громадськістю, без дотримання яких співпраця буде неефективною: 1) участь громадськості у процесі прийняття державно-управлінських рішень; 2) соціальна довіра, яка передбачає повагу, взаємну надійність і чесну взаємодію між суб’єктами та секторами громадянського суспільства та органами державної влади; 3) відповідальність, прозорість та підзвітність. Обґрунтовано основні перешкоди для дотримання принципів забезпечення ефективної координації та співробітництва між державними органами влади та громадськими структурами. На основі аналізу функцій та принципів взаємовідносин між досліджуваними суб’єктами визначено основні шляхи подолання бар’єрів, які утруднюють необхідну співпрацю.

JUDGEMENT STATE AUDITOR ON AUDIT OPINION FOR GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL STATEMENT WITH PERSPECTIVE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

Background. The Audit Act no 15, 2004 stated that audit opinion is based on 4 (four) criterias, which are accounting standard, compliance on law and regulation, effectivity internal control system and full disclosure. Public accountability quality of financial statement that audited by BPK RI should be based on State Finance Audit Standard (SPKN) and audit system or guidelines to attest the truth and fairness of the judgement. State finance auditor will make audit judgement for audit opinion based on all material of financial statement, not only in quantitative but also qualitative manner of significance financial information as part of public accountability. However, audit process is not only depends on structured standard system approach but also influenced by individual (auditor) subjectivity. Auditor subjectivity is difficult to be avoided during the audit process and may play a role in the audit judgement and final audit opinion. Objective. Our study aims to analyze the role of BPK RI auditor subjectivity during audit judgement in government institution and in making final audit opinion, using interpretive hermeneutic phenomenology. Methods. Our study analyzed audit judgement with interpretive process hermeneutic and phenomenology perspective. Results. We conducted in-depth interviews with BPK audit opinion signing auditors and analyzed how auditor interpreted audit data, in regards with the basic principles of public accountability, audit standard, law and regulation, internal control and complexity organization in the auditee institution. Our study found differences among auditors in interpreting audit data based on different perspective and understanding of standard system, law and regulation and complexity of organization, mostly because they did not use basic principles of public accountability during the process and making audit judgement and final audit opinion. Conclusion. Our results came to understanding that auditors should be using basic principles of public accountability when interpreting audit data, audit standard, law and regulation to improve quality of audit judgement. Auditors of BPK as supreme audit institution in Indonesia should combine all aspects in auditing process and making final audit judgment. Key words : Audit Opinion, Public Accountability, Audit Judgement, Hermeneutic Phenomenology.

THE LEGAL ASPECT OF THE NATIONAL EDUCATION BUDGET ALLOCATION

Education is part of the constitutional rights owned by the citizens and should be fulfilled by the State. Better proportion of educational budgetting will expand the access of education for the citizens. Article 31 Paragraph 4 of the 1945 Constitution explicitly states the number of 20 percent of the fulfillment of the education budget as a guarantee of citizens' educational rights. Nevertheless, the implementation of the aforementioned provision has been interpreted in various policies. This research answers the issue of law aspect regarding the implementation of educational budget allocation nationally. This is a doctrinal research with different approaches namely: statute, conceptual, and case. In this research, three important things are concluded: (1) The constitutional framers were lack of comprehend consideration in formulating provision related to educational budget. (2) The inconsistency of several principles such as the principle of Justice, Principle of Efficiency, Principle of Transparency, Principles of Public Accountability, and Principle of Effectiveness in the educational budget policy (3) Ineffectivity of administrative sanction since it has no significant effects to the substantial aspect of education equality and its improvement. The research offers several solutions (1) Constitutional amendment on the provision of educational budget allocation provided with reliable academic papers. (2) Designs effective supervision mechanism towards the local public budgeting (APBD) (3) Open the access for public participation.

Healthcare regulation as a tool for public accountability

The increasing costs of healthcare delivery led to different political and administrative approaches trying to preserve the core values of the welfare state. This approach has well documented weaknesses namely with regard to healthcare rationing. The objective of this paper is to evaluate if independent healthcare regulation is an important tool with regard to the construction of fair processes for setting limits to healthcare. Methodologically the authors depart from Norman Daniels' and James Sabin's theory of accountability for reasonableness and try to determine if new regulatory models-namely independent agencies-perform better with regard to the public disclosure of the reasons and rationales of healthcare rationing. In publicly financed healthcare systems independent regulation is an important tool to assure fair and reasonable procedures of prioritising services. In accordance with the principle of public accountability, independent regulatory agencies are particularly well suited to assure publicity of the decision-making processes, relevance of the rationale involved and particularly mechanisms for challenge and dispute resolution regarding limit setting decisions. It follows that independent healthcare regulation could be regarded not only as an instrument for performance improvement but also as a tool of social justice. The authors conclude by stating that accountability for reasonableness should be regarded as a landmark of any healthcare reform. And therefore regulators have the social task of assuring that the rationales for limit-setting decisions are clearly accessible to the public.

Development of the Design-Build Procurement System in Hong Kong

Various procurement systems were developed to help the client complete a construction project within the constraints of time and cost and to the required quality. Design-build (D&B) is one of such alternatives to deal with the problems of the traditional project delivery system and its use is on the rise in many countries. Participants should be equipped with proper D&B knowledge for better project performance. This paper investigates the development of the design-build procurement method by means of structured interviews with the client, contractor and contractor's consultants in the Hong Kong setting. Results show that D&B research is conducted by experience sharing among D&B practitioners. The definition of D&B is also recognized by the practitioners who suggested the transfer of risks to the contractor, the need to make use of resources and expertise from the contractor, better meeting the principles of public accountability and variation avoidance as the four main reasons for the wider adoption of D&B in the public sector. Such a study can reveal the development of the design-build procurement system in Hong Kong and establish a platform for information exchange among project practitioners in the construction industry.

Contractual or Responsive Accountability? Neo-Centrilist ‘Self-Management’ or Systemic Subsidiarity? Tasmanian Parents' and other Stakeholders' Policy Preferences

WHEN state governments decentralised many administrative responsibilities to schools in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was assumed that they would develop better capacities to manage, develop and govern themselves. In general, such decentralisation attempted to replace bureaucracies with corporate management, focus school evaluation onto the auditing of performance indicators, cut ex-school support structures in favour of locally contracted expertise, and displace hierarchy with collegial networks. The principle of public accountability in public education was redefined as a local obligation to be discharged through managerial, market and political mechanisms. The research reported here shows that Tasmanian parents actually prefer a far more educative and communitarian approach to accountability, and that this view is broadly shared with other key stakeholders: teachers, principals and state government officials. The empirical findings reported contradict orthodox structures, practices and theory and have substantial implications for policy making.

A Public Accountability Model Of Accounting Regulation

Accounting as a social choice function has an important impact on societal welfare. The significance of two important societal intermediate goals, efficiency and equity, is highlighted. It is argued that corporate reporting must give explicit consideration to both these criteria. The accountability framework is selected as the most appropriate societal viewpoint because of its broader perspective. The principle of public accountability is advocated and the need to report financial and non-financial information to stakeholders with a legitimate interest in the enterprise is advanced. The accountability paradigm views corporate reports as essential to provide feedback to stakeholder groups. Goals of efficiency and equity are explicitly incorporated. Regulation is advanced as an important instrument to promote such accountability. The model offered in this paper is derived from theories of accountability and regulation. An initial framework for operationalising the model is also given. The model calls for the provision of a greater amount of data than is now provided in corporate reports. As advocated in the proposed model, wider board representation by stakeholders (including producers) is likely to increase the acceptability of accounting rules. This structural change along with legal backing of accounting standards in all probability would increase the level of compliance. The combination of these elements will create a more equitable and efficient environment for the reporting of corporate information congruent with the precepts of public accountability.

Is Education Getting Better?*

My thesis is a simple one. This question is education getting better? is relevant, and important at a time when society is concerned to reassess its priorities and the distribution of resources and yet it cannot be answered definitively at the present time. We just do not have sufficient information. Despite the usually optimistic anecdotal reports of classroom innovations from progressive educators and the depressing reports of general decline from the Black Paperites (not to mention the almost daily headlines in the popular press), there is little hard evidence of change either way of the level of success of our educational enterprise. I apologise for the way my question is formulated, but it is the sort of question the layman asks people who are identified as educational researchers. Is education getting better? can start a whole series of debates. What should be included as education? What do we mean by better, and for whom? I accept that there are a number of different interpretations, and that this makes the task of providing answers more difficult, but the question itself must be attacked, evidence must be sought, and we, as educational researchers, have a major responsibility in this regard. Not that I am implying that all educational research should be directed to answering this question in one form or another. It should be no more than a part, maybe a very small part, of our total research endeavour. Yet at a time when the principle of public accountability has legitimately been raised I feel that we have an obligation to provide much more hard evidence. This would help to balance the mass of anecdotal reporting which presently fuels the somewhat irrational political debate.

Community Boards in Search of Authority

T whom should publicly financed hospitals be responsible? In the case of city hospitals the principle of accountability to city residents and taxpayers is at least given lip service. Yet translating the principle of public accountability into practice is always fraught with conflicting alternatives and difficult choices. For example, which publics are to be served and which are to govern, it' any? What private influences are and should be involved in governing and receiving benefits? The New York City municipal hospitals began, over one hundred years ago, as charity institutions supported by public funds tor the direct benefit of the poor and the indirect benefit of the rich (who had the sick poor quarantined in the hospitals). New York City now has the largest municipal hospital system in the country. Nineteen municipal hospitals provide nearly onehalt' of the city's seven and one-half million residents with at least part of their medical care, and are the primary source of medical care for over a million and one-half persons, especially members of minority groups, the poor, the young, and the old. Until 1970 the city government exercised nominal control over the city hospitals, which were, at first, directly governed by physicians who volunteered their time, and later increasingly by persons connected with medical schools and teaching hospitals. Influence was also exercised by hospital administrators, by Blue Cross, by politicians, and by others. In 1970 the New York State Legislature established the Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC) as a quasi-public benefit corporation, outside of the direct control of city hall. The new organizational scheme avoided some of the municipal bureaucratic regulations originally designed to insure public accountability, but more recently responsible for delays in the purchasing and construction of new facilities. The mayor and city council did retain influence in the Health and Hospitals Corporation through their power to appoint members to its board of directors and through the city's financial contributions to the corporation. While the establishment of the corporation reduced formal accountability, at least at the city-wide level, to the people of New York