Principles Of Professional Responsibility Research Articles

ОСОБЕННОСТИ ЗАРУБЕЖНОГО ОПЫТА ПОСТРОЕНИЯ И ФУНКЦИОНИРОВАНИЯ МНОГОФАКТОРНОЙ СИСТЕМЫ МОТИВАЦИИ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННЫХ СЛУЖАЩИХ

The article discusses some aspects of labor motivation that have become an effective regulator of civil servants on the example of Finland and the People's Republic of China, where the principles of professional responsibility, respect for the rights of citizens and public openness serve as the basis.

Governing Third-Party Funders

This is the final Article in a series of four articles addressing regulation of the third-party funding industry. It asks and answers three questions. First, is third-party funding a profession? This Article argues that it is a profession and that its professionals should be guided by principles of professional responsibility. U.S. lawyers are familiar with the term professional responsibility, particularly since it is the one course that the ABA requires all U.S. law schools to mandate in their curricula. After concluding that third-party funders are professionals, this article asks and answers a second question, what are the professional responsibilities of third-party funders? The article constructs a list of general principles of professional responsibility of funders from a variety of existing sources. Finally, this Article asks and answers the question, how should funder professional responsibilities be enforced? This Article argues in favor of centralized enforcement of professional responsibilities and examines three existing models for centralized enforcement in three jurisdictions: funder self-governance through a professional association, court oversight, and governmental agency oversight. Any or all of these three modes of centralized enforcement could be employed in the United States, and this Article argues that we should move toward implementing at least one of these centralized models.

Bad advice: Bush's lawyers in the war on terror

From wiretapping American citizens to waterboarding foreign prisoners, the Bush administration has triggered an uproar over its tactics in the War on Terror - and over its justifications for using them. Through a close study of the legal advice provided to President Bush, former Justice Department attorney Harold Bruff provides an incisive and scathing critique of those justifications, which he finds at odds with both American law and moral authority. Bruff rigorously examines legal opinions regarding NSA surveillance, the indefinite detention of terror suspects, the denial of Geneva Convention protection, trial by military commissions, and suspect interrogation techniques. He shows that Bush's claims of executive power exceed anything found in U.S. history or judicial precedent, that clear statutory limitations were treated with contempt, and that Bush and his lawyers strove to exclude both congressional and judicial participation in setting antiterrorist policy. Bruff dissects the legal underpinnings employed by John Yoo, David Addington, Alberto Gonzales, and others to defend an inflated view of presidential power, showing how they combined ideology, policy advocacy, and selective readings of legal precedent to bolster executive actions. Most important, he brings into sharp focus legitimate counterarguments from the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Office of Legal Counsel that challenged or refuted these legally suspect views and yet were largely ignored or even ridiculed by the president's advisers. Offering contrasts with the legal advice provided previous presidents, he also reviews the fundamental constitutional limits on executive action and the principles of professional responsibility that govern lawyers when they counsel government clients. As Bruff observes, bad advice to presidents is never in short supply, but legal advice should be objective and reliable. His book points up the urgent need for advisers to serve both the president and the nation by finding a middle ground between limiting presidential power and allowing it the flexibility it needs to respond to crises. Both highly readable and authoritative, it is a must for legal scholars and an eye-opener for every citizen concerned with preserving our nation's commitment to the rule of law.

THE ANTHROPOLOGIST AS CITIZEN

In the ASAANZ’s Principles of Professional Responsibility ‘responsibility to the wider society’ comes second, immediately after ‘responsibility to research participants’. Anthropologists have a range of responsibilities to the wider society, including, but not restricted to, the responsibility of social criticism. Drawing on my own experience, I explore the varied history, difficulties and dilemmas of our attempts to carry out our responsibilities as citizens.

The professional autonomy of the medical doctor in Italy.

This contribution deals with the issue of the professional autonomy of the medical doctor. Worldwide, the physician's autonomy is guaranteed and limited, first of all, by Codes of Medical Ethics. In Italy, the latest version of the national Code of Medical Ethics (Code 1998) was published in 1998 by the Federation of provincial Medical Associations (FnomCeO). The Code 1998 acknowledges the physician's autonomy regarding the scheduling, the choice and application of diagnostic and therapeutic means, within the principles of professional responsibility. This responsibility has to make reference to the following fundamental ethical principles: (1) the protection of human life; (2) the protection of the physical and psychological health of the human being; (3) the relief from pain: (4) the respect for the freedom and the dignity of the human person, without discrimination; (5) an up-to-date scientific qualification (Art. 5). The authors underline that autonomy is an anthropological--and consequently ethical-- characteristic of the human person. Different positions on autonomy in bioethics (individualistic, evolutionistic, utilitarian and personalistic models) are explained. The relation between the professional autonomy of the physician and the autonomy of the patient and of colleagues is discussed. In fact, the medical doctor is obliged: (1) to respect the fundamental rights of the person, first of all his/her life; (2) to ensure the continuity of the care, even if he can only relieve the patient's suffering; (3) to maintain, except under certain circumstances, professional secrecy and confidentiality regarding patients and their medical records. Moreover, the physician cannot deny the patient correct and appropriate information. He/she should not perform any diagnostic or therapeutic activity without the informed consent of the patient and the medical doctor must give up medical treatment in case of documented refusal of the individual. Furthermore, the medical doctor has the right to raise conscientious objections if he/she is requested to perform medical actions that are contrary to his/her conscience or medical opinion, unless this attitude would seriously and immediately harm the patient. Regarding the relationships with colleagues, the physician is obliged to solidarity, mutual respect, and care of sick colleagues. Finally, the authors discuss the Italian legislation affecting the physician's professional autonomy: (1) the SSN health care Acts; (2) the so-called Charter for Public Health Care Services; (3) the Acts on privacy; (4) Good Clinical Practice.

Ethics and Responsibility: Themes in the Life and Work of Kathleen Gough

Kathleen Gough epitomized the best anthropology has to offer: important and impeccable scholarship combined with courageous commitment to social justice. Her India research accompanied her admiration for India's freedom fighters; her Vietnam work grew from empathy for the Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence and her informed outrage at the United States' war upon them. Always Gough's actions spoke as loudly as her words. Her scholarship was unquestioned but for her conscience she paid the price of recurrent harassment and lost employment while earning the respect of colleagues, of students, of those about whom she wrote and among whom she struggled. Before we had met, I knew about and admired Kathleen as a result of our shared research interest in India. I became acquainted with her personally through our shared commitment to social in anthropology, and especially through our participation in the anti - Vietnam War movement. We each organized (she with husband David Aberle) anti - war teach - ins on our respective campuses in Berkeley and Eugene -- as did colleagues nationwide -- on March 23, 1965, simultaneously with the prototype teach - in organized by Marshall Sahlins in Ann Arbor.(f.1) Two years later, on March 24, 1967, we both delivered papers on the issue of social at the joint meetings in San Francisco of the Southwestern Anthropological Association and the American Ethnological Society.(f.2) We met frequently during the years that she, David Aberle and their son Stephen Aberle lived in Eugene directly across the street from my parents' home. There is no scholar whose intellect, courage and social conscience I have admired more, whose friendship I valued more. In identifying ethics and as themes in her life and work I want to focus on the positive, assertive she shouldered to act on the understandings and insights she obtained as a research anthropologist and on the values she embraced as an empathetic, humane being. The Principles of Professional Responsibility, to which our professional association was committed during the last 20 years of her lifetime (i.e., from their adoption in May 1971 until their revision and dilution in 1991 [Newsletter 1970; 1989; cf. Berreman 1991]), included this paragraph under itssecond principle, Responsibility to the Public: As people who devote their professional lives to understanding people, anthropologists bear a to speak out publicly, both individually and collectively, on what they know and what they believe as a result of their professional expertise gained in the study of human beings. That is, they bear a professional to contribute to an definition of reality upon which public opinion and public policy may be based. (Newsletter 1970; American Anthropological Association 1983: 1 - 2) This principle, and the to act upon it, are what I mean by the positive responsibility which Kathleen Gough advocated and lived by. She was political in the truest sense, even as she was scholarly in the truest sense. Her values remind me most closely of those of my other hero, the great sociologist C. Wright Mills, whose commitment to the of truth she shared. As he put it: The very enterprise of social science, as it determines fact, takes on political meaning. In a world of widely communicated nonsense, any statement of fact is of political and moral significance. All social scientists by the fact of their existence, are involved in the struggle between enlightenment and obscurantism. In such a world as ours, to practice social science is, first of all, to practice the politics of truth. (Mills 1959: 178) And again: The intellectual does not have any one political direction, but the work of any [person] of knowledge ... does have a distinct kind of political relevance: his [sic] polities, in the first instance, are the polities of truth, for his job is the maintenance of an adequate definition of reality. …

Sexual Harassment, the AAA, and the Principles of Professional Responsibility

Sexual Harassment, the AAA, and the Principles of Professional Responsibility

Our Adversary System: In Search of a Foundation

Rhetoric in praise of “our adversary system” flows freely in the prose of many legal insiders. But unexamined rhetoric, like self-praise, is of itself of little recommendation.I will here (I) state and explain the four defining characteristics of our adversary system: (A) formal proceedings, (B) partisan presentation, (C) a neutral, passive fact finder, and (D) principles of professional responsibility. I will then (II) state, explain, and analyze critically the most common justifications advanced in defense of our adversary system: (A) the truth rationale, (B) the rights rationale, (C) the autonomy rationale, (D) the lawyer as friend rationale, (E) the ritualistic function rationale, (F) the dispute rationale, and (G) the pragmatic rationale. I conclude (III) that to date no convincing justification has been advanced which argues persuasively that our adversary system has independent value or that it serves important societal objectives better than other existing or possible legal systems.

Proposed Code of Ethics Would supersede Principles of Professional Responsibility

Proposed Code of Ethics Would supersede Principles of Professional Responsibility