Principle Of Sufficient Reason Research Articles

Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the principle of sufficient reason

Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu on the principle of sufficient reason

Can We ‘Crown’ Anarchy? A Critical Approach to Deleuze’s An-archic Notion of Difference

The aim of this paper is to problematise the idea of Deleuze as an anarchic thinker on the ground of his metaphysics. Focusing on his early work, it investigates the notion of ‘crowned anarchy’ that Deleuze borrows from Antonin Artaud and which he uses to describe his conceptualisation of the univocity of being. While this notion has recently been used as a catchphrase in post-anarchist writings, it has received little to no critical investigation. The first section of the paper investigates the relation between ontological anarchy and difference for Deleuze. The second part aims to show the problems surrounding a coronation of anarchy, and goes back to Artaud’s Heliogabalus, or The Anarchist Crowned (1934). The third section problematises the anarchist status of Deleuze’s ontology by arguing that the idea of difference serves as the principle of sufficient reason. With this, I argue that Deleuze does not leave the archic paradigm of philosophy – which should make us reconsider describing his ontology as anarchist. The final part concludes with the underlying problem, the relation between metaphysics and politics, and offers a suggestion for the useability of Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) work for the projects of anarchism today.

COMO O PRINCÍPIO DA RAZÃO SUFICIENTE MINA O ARGUMENTO COSMOLÓGICO

ABSTRACT My aim here is to show how the Cosmological Argument (CA) is undermined by one of its own premises: the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). Firstly, I explain the type of CA that I am thinking about (I). Secondly, I explain a traditional modal objection against the PSR, which is ultimately based upon our intuitions in favor of contingency (II). Thirdly, I show how this modal objection begs the question against the necessitarian, and then I reformulate the CA in more neutral terms (III). Fourthly, using this more neutral version of the CA, I argue that the main problem with the PSR goes way beyond its apparent necessitarian consequences. As an argument used by Bradley shows, embracing the rationalist path that underlies the PSR seems to commit us to a form of Radical Monism too (IV). Finally, I conclude by showing how this result ultimately undermines the CA itself (V).

Epistemic humility and the principle of sufficient reason

ABSTRACT According to the unrestricted version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), every truth has an explanation. I argue that there is defeasible methodological justification for belief in an unrestricted PSR. The argument is based on considerations about our cognitive limitations. It is possible that our cognitive limitations prevent us from even recognizing the explanatorily open character of some propositions we can now represent: the fact that these propositions are explicable in the first place. If this is the case, then a proper recognition of our limitations and a standing goal of reasoning to attain complete explanatory knowledge justify the adoption of an unrestricted PSR.

No brute facts: The Principle of Sufficient Reason in ordinary thought

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) has been an influential thesis since the earliest stages of western philosophy. According to a simple version of the PSR, for every fact, there must be an explanation of that fact. In the present research, we investigate whether people presuppose a PSR-like principle in ordinary judgment. Across five studies (N = 1121 in total, U.S., Prolific), we find that participants consistently make judgments that conform to the PSR. Such judgments predictably track the metaphysical aspects of explanation relevant to the PSR (Study 1) and diverge from related epistemic judgments about expected explanations (Study 2) and value judgments about desired explanations (Study 3). Moreover, we find participants' PSR-conforming judgments apply to a large set of facts that were sampled from random Wikipedia entries (Studies 4–5). Altogether, the present research suggests that a metaphysical presumption plays an important role in our explanatory inquiry, one that is distinct from the role of the epistemic and non-epistemic values that have been the focus of much recent work in cognitive psychology and philosophy of science.

Metaphysical Foundationalism and the Principle of Sufficient Reason

AbstractThere is a ubiquitous claim in the grounding literature that metaphysical foundationalism violates the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) in virtue of positing a level of ungrounded facts. I argue that foundationalists can accept the PSR if they are willing to replace fundamentality as independence with completeness and deny that ground is a strict partial order. The upshot is that the PSR can be compatible with both metaphysical foundationalism and metaphysical infinitism, and so presupposing this fixed explanatory demand need not beg the question in favour of either view.

How to Trace a Causal Process

AbstractAccording to the theory developed here, we may trace out the processes emanating from a cause in such a way that any consequence lying along one of these processes counts as an effect of the cause. This theory gives intuitive verdicts in a diverse range of problem cases from the literature. Its claims about causation will never be retracted when we include additional variables in our model. And it validates some plausible principles about causation, including Sartorio's ‘Causes as Difference Makers’ principle and Hitchcock's ‘Principle of Sufficient Reason’.

Wie ist die Welt zu erklären, wenn sie einer Erklärung bedarf?

Abstract The essay explores in four steps the question of whether the world needs an ex­planation and how it is to be explained in the case of its need for explanation. The first step argues that the principle of sufficient reason is valid and may be applied to the world as a whole. The three following steps examine different possibilities of explaining the world. It is shown that neither an immanent nor an axiogenetic explanation is possible, but that only an ontotheological explanation has a chance of success.

Descartes’s argument for modal voluntarism

ABSTRACT Descartes famously espouses modal voluntarism, the doctrine that God freely creates the eternal truths. God has chosen to make it true that two plus two equals four, for instance, but he could have chosen otherwise. Why, though, does Descartes endorse modal voluntarism? Many commentators have noted that he regularly appeals to divine omnipotence to justify his doctrine. This strategy is usually thought to be unsuccessful, however, because it seems to presuppose—question-beggingly—that the eternal truths are in the scope of God’s power. This paper argues that Descartes’s appeal to divine omnipotence has more going for it than meets the eye. Like many other medieval and early modern philosophers, Descartes assumes that God has the power to control everything that remains unfixed by his own essence. At the same time, though, he denies that the eternal truths are fixed by, or grounded in, the divine essence. The combination of these two commitments leads to modal voluntarism. The paper also argues that the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) may play an important role in the reasoning that leads Descartes to endorse modal voluntarism. This is surprising, given that the PSR appears to be deeply at odds with modal voluntarism.

Localizing Violations of the Principle of Sufficient Reason—Leibniz on the Modal Status of the PSR

The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)—the principle that everything has a reason—plays a central role in Leibniz’s philosophical system. It is rather difficult, however, to determine what Leibniz’s attitude towards the modal status of the PSR is. The prevailing view is that Leibniz takes the PSR to be true necessarily. This paper develops a novel interpretation and argues that Leibniz’s PSR is a contingent principle. It also discusses whether a merely contingent PSR can do the metaphysical heavy lifting that Leibniz aims for. The paper shows that, despite appearance to the contrary, this is possible. In a nutshell, the argument is that the only possible PSR violation Leibniz allows for is God’s creation of a suboptimal world; there is no Leibnizian possible world, though, which intrinsically violates the PSR. Despite its contingency, then, Leibniz’s PSR is modally robust enough to serve as a foundational principle of his metaphysics.

The Concept of Motion in Ancient Greek Thought: Foundations in Logic, Method, and Mathematics

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God Can Do Otherwise

Abstract This paper locates a source of contingency1 for Leibniz in the fact that God can do otherwise, absolutely speaking.23 This interpretative line has been previously thought to be a dead-end because it appears inconsistent with Leibniz's own conception of God, as the ens perfectissimum, or the most perfect being (Adams 1994). This paper points out that the best argument on offer which seeks to demonstrate this inconsistency fails. The paper then argues that the supposition that God does otherwise implies for Leibniz (at least) that God would not be praiseworthy, which is an absurd implication—or a violation of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR)—but that this is not, strictly speaking, an inconsistency—or a violation of the principle of contradiction (POC).4 While praiseworthiness is a perfection—and is compossible with God's other perfections—and so God must in some sense instantiate it, this paper argues that, given the nature of praiseworthiness for Leibniz, it in fact makes sense to say that praiseworthiness is merely a contingent perfection of God.5

In Leibniz’s Wake: Rationalist Paradise Lost

AbstractThe eighteenth-century German rationalist tradition is, broadly speaking, committed to (what I call) ‘the principle of rational cognition’: the grounded must be rationally cognizable from its sufficient ground. Whereas the prevailing view takes the fundamental challenge to rationalist paradise to stem from the principle of sufficient reason, I argue that it instead stems from this principle: How is it possible to rationally cognize anything at all from its ground? By investigating the opposing responses of two of Leibniz’s most influential immediate successors, Christian Wolff and Christian Crusius, we find no easy way to remain in rationalist paradise.

Science, Dualities and the Phenomenological Map

We present an epistemological schema of natural sciences inspired by Peirce’s pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the phenomenological map, that connects reality and our ideas about it. The schema has a recognisable mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the requirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are both implied by the schema, as well as Popper’s concept of falsifiability. We show that the schema has some power in demarcating science by first comparing with an alternative schema advanced during the first part of the 20th century which has its roots in Hertz and has been developed by Einstein and Popper. Further, the identified differences allow us to focus in the construction of Special Relativity, showing that it uses an intuited concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in Peirce. While the main mathematical observation connected with this issue has been known for more than a century, it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of view. A probable reason could be that the socially dominating epistemology in physics does not encourage such line of work. We briefly discuss the relation of the abduction process presented in this work with discussions regarding “abduction” in the literature and its relation with “analogy”.

Inquiry and Metaphysical Rationalism

ABSTRACT According to an important version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, every fact has a metaphysical explanation, where a metaphysical explanation of some fact tells us what makes it the case that the fact obtains. I argue that, so long as we have not yet discovered that any fact is brute, we ought to be committed to this version of the principle—henceforth ‘the PSR’—because it is indispensable to a species of inquiry in which we ought to engage. I argue, first, that a practical indispensability argument applied to this species of inquiry supports a commitment to the PSR. I then show that we ought to engage in this inquiry. If my argument succeeds, then our attitude at the outset of such inquiry should not be agnosticism about whether any particular fact has a metaphysical explanation. Instead, we ought to be committed to the PSR.

Was Clarke a Voluntarist?

The distinction between voluntarism and intellectualism has recently been criticized for inaccurately characterising early modern theories of divine freedom. In response, defenders of the distinction have argued that these labels are needed in order to account for the famous correspondence between Leibniz (intellectualist) and Clarke (voluntarist). In this paper, I argue that the voluntarism/intellectualism distinction is unable to account for the opposition between Leibniz and Clarke. In the first part, I provide an analysis of Clarke’s theory of divine freedom, and show how he employs the distinction between activity and passivity in order to account for the separation between God’s will and intellect, which ultimately safeguards God’s freedom. I also analyse Clarke’s correspondence with Leibniz, and show how Clarke deals with choice among equals, the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle of the best. In the second part, I argue on the basis of this analysis that Clarke is not a voluntarist, but should instead be interpreted as an intellectualist (if one wants to keep the labels). Therefore, the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence cannot be explained as a clash between voluntarism and intellectualism.

Why God Thinks what He is Thinking? An Argument against Samuel Newlands’ Brute–Fact–Theory of Divine Ideas in Leibniz’s Metaphysics

According to the most prominent principle of early modern rationalists, the Principle of Sufficient Reason [PSR], there are no brute facts, hence, there are no facts without any explanation. Contrary to the PSR, some philosophers have argued that divine ideas are brute facts within Leibniz’s metaphysics. In this paper, I argue against brute-fact-theories of divine ideas, especially represented by Samuel Newlands in Leibniz and the Ground of Possibility, and elaborate an alternative Leibnizian theory of divine ideas.

Is There Reason to Believe the Principle of Sufficient Reason?

Shamik Dasgupta (Nous 50: 379–418, 2016) proposes to tame the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to apply to only non-autonomous facts, which are facts that are apt for explanation. Call this strategy to tame the PSR the taming strategy. In a recent paper, Della Rocca (PS 178: 1101–1119, 2020a; The parmenidean ascent, Oxford University Press, 2020b) argues that proponents of the taming strategy, in attempting to formulate a restricted version of the PSR, nevertheless find themselves committed to endorsing a form of radical monism, which, in turn, leads right back to an untamed-PSR. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Della Rocca is right. My question is this: Is there reason to believe the principle of sufficient reason (in its untamed version)? In this paper, I argue that it is impossible for there to be a reason to believe the untamed-PSR.

Du Châtelet on Sufficient Reason and Empirical Explanation

AbstractFor Émilie Du Châtelet, I argue, a central role of the principle of sufficient reason is to discriminate between better and worse explanations. Her principle of sufficient reason does not play this role for just any conceivable intellect: it specifically enables understanding for minds like ours. She develops this idea in terms of two criteria for the success of our explanations: “understanding how” and “understanding why.” These criteria can respectively be connected to the determinateness and contrastivity of explanations. The crucial role Du Châtelet’s principle of sufficient reason plays in identifying good explanations is often overlooked in the literature, or else run together with questions about the justification and likelihood of explanations. An auxiliary goal of the article is to situate Du Châtelet’s principle of sufficient reason with respect to some of the general epistemological and metaphysical commitments of her Institutions de Physique, clarifying how it fits into the broader project of that work.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Critique of Pruss

Alexander Pruss’s Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that every contingent true proposition has an explanation. Pruss thinks that he can plausibly maintain both his PSR and his account of libertarian free will. This is because his libertarianism has it that contingent true propositions reporting free choices are (virtually) self-explanatory. But I don’t think Pruss can plausibly maintain both his PSR and libertarianism without a rift occurring in one or the other. Similar to the old luck/randomness objection, I contend that Pruss’s libertarianism is susceptible to what I call “the inexplicability objection”, which attempts to show that agents’ free choices involve contingent brute facts. Pruss may be able to partially explain a proposition such that Jones freely chose A for reason R, but he cannot adequately explain a contrastive proposition such as that Jones freely chose A for R rather than B for R*. The result is that either PSR is too explanatorily permissive for libertarianism, or libertarianism is too explanatorily impermissive to satisfy PSR. After considering what I take to be Pruss’s best response to the inexplicability objection, I conclude that his attempt to reconcile PSR and libertarianism is unsuccessful.