Principle Of Opposites Research Articles

The evolution of narrative identity in a "returning home" man: The psychological and cultural place of farming in the Chinese psyche.

This study attempts to illustrate the process of reconstructing adaptive self-identity by tracking the development of imagery in Mr. Z's dreams and sandtrays. The authors adopted amplification and Narrative Identity Process Analysismethods, and developed an Imagery NPCS tool to analyze the farming images in therapy sessions. It provided insights into Chinese culture from an applied, non-Western lens on identity theory. The subject of the study was a Chinese man who had lost his social identity due to stressful events, the results of which were reflected in the interplay between his personal narrative related to farming images and their cultural narrative framework. The authors propose a practical mode of developing narrative identity based on the dynamic organizing principle of opposites which are united in a persona-shadow personality system. Development of an integrated narrative identity can be facilitated by the dialectic between the cultural narrative offered by the psychotherapist and the client's personal narrative.

How to Cultivate the Philosophical Thinking Ability of Science and Engineering Students in Classroom Teaching

In order to make the teaching of signal and system course more vivid, philosophical thinking is introduced in the process of classroom teaching by introducing the principle of universality and particularity of contradiction into the interpretation of Fourier series, the principle of unity and opposites of contradiction into the explanation of rectangular function and shock function, the principle of quantitative change and qualitative change into the theory of square wave function expansion, and the unity of finite and infinite opposition into the spectrum analysis of shock function. It can be closely combined. Teaching practice shows that this teaching method can effectively mobilize students’ learning enthusiasm, expand students’ thinking depth, and achieve better teaching effect.

“Abracadabra!” the magic of poetic healing

ABSTRACTThe author explores the connection between magic and poetry therapy, examining the two key principles of magic, the isoprinciple, and the principle of opposites. Other components include imagery, condensation, and displacement. Examples are given to demonstrate the magic of metaphor. “Abracadabra” is an age-old incantation, the roots of which may hold significance for magicians as well as poetry therapists.

Descriptive matrix factorization for sustainability Adopting the principle of opposites

Climate change, the global energy footprint, and strategies for sustainable development have become topics of considerable political and public interest. The public debate is informed by an exponen...

The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle (review)

Reviewed by: The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle Karen Margrethe Nielsen Hendrik Lorenz . The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 240. Cloth, $74.00. In this fine study, Hendrik Lorenz revisits Plato's argument for a tripartite soul in Republic IV. He proposes an interpretation that seeks to explain how the Principle of Opposites ("the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing, and at the same time," Rep. 436b8–9) when supplemented by examples of motivational conflict, can show that reason, spirit, and appetite are basic, non-composite parts of the human soul. The discussion of parts of soul is merely a prelude to Lorenz's discussion of non-rational cognition in Plato and Aristotle in the final two parts of the book. Even readers who wish to quibble with Lorenz's analysis of psychic parts are likely to find his detailed and textually astute analysis of non-rational cognition intrinsically rewarding. Here is how the themes connect: Lorenz holds that in order to prevent the principle of opposites from running amok, yielding a number of psychic subparts, Plato must deny the ability to reason, or even to understand the deliverances of reason, to the non-rational parts of the soul. How, then, can Plato account for the fact that non-rational parts are capable of giving rise to fully [End Page 477] formed motivating conditions? Many critics have thought that Plato attributes a capacity for means-ends reasoning to appetite. He calls it the "money-loving" part, because we most of all satisfy the desires for food, drink, and sex through money (Rep. 580d10–81a 1 ). But if appetite can reason about means to ends, then it seems that appetite will be vulnerable to internal subdivision. The oligarchic person could, for instance, be averse to making large-scale public donations, but simultaneously desire it as a means to the achievement of a goal, say cultivating his reputation. Critics have responded to this puzzle by narrowing down the part-revealing conflicts, attributing to Plato the view that only conflicts between first-order and second-order, evaluative desires reveal parts. Lorenz rightly rejects this view, insisting instead that the appetitive part is incapable of using reason. He defends what he calls the "simple picture." The simple picture makes the simultaneous occurrence of a desire and an aversion towards one and the same object sufficient to expose a partitioning of the soul. Means-ends reasoning as well as evaluative reasoning about the good must belong exclusively to the rational part. When the non-rational parts motivate, they do so through perception, memory, and the ability to envision prospects. On Lorenz's reading, the brute within turns out to be a rather sophisticated animal, even if it lacks reason. Lorenz acknowledges that the simple picture risks preserving the integrity of one part of the soul at the expense of another. Let us assume that I have a strong, appetitive desire for cigarettes, and infer that I must walk down to the corner store to buy some. But I am also averse to smoking on the ground that it is bad for my health. In such cases, it may seem like I have a rational desire to pursue a course of action that I have a rational desire to avoid (50). Lorenz responds that despite its dependence on reasoning, the former desire is still appetitive. Importantly, it does not involve the representation of a means-ends relationship on the part of appetite. Reason can cause appropriate representations to arise in the appetitive part without this part itself being capable of understanding or articulating means-ends relationships. The remainder of the book is devoted to fleshing out this proposal by examining such loci classici as the painter and scribe passage in the Philebus, as well as the analysis of perception and belief in the Republic, Theaetetus, and Timaeus. He segues into a discussion of the roles that perception and phantasia play in Aristotle's discussion of animal locomotion in De anima and De motu animalium. The analysis reveals...

Hippocrates in Context (review)

Reviewed by: Hippocrates in Context David Leith Philip J. van der Eijk , ed. Hippocrates in Context. Papers read at the XIth International Hippocrates Colloquium, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 27-31 August 2002. Studies in Ancient Medicine, vol. 31. Leiden: Brill, 2005. xvi + 521 pp. Ill. $199.00, €149.00 (90-04-14430-7). The chosen theme for the eleventh Hippocrates Colloquium was "Hippocrates in Context," and the twenty-nine published contributions have accordingly been arranged into five parts. J. Jouanna begins the first part, on the epistemological context of Hippocratic medicine, with a more refined approach to the interactions between fifth-century medicine and historiography. Three subsequent papers emphasize the epistemological innovation of Ancient Medicine: J. Barton examines the precise nature of the author's arguments for the rejection of postulate-driven medicine; F. Dunn concentrates on the author's unique conception of progress in medicine, placing it within the context of the later sophistic; and M. J. Schiefsky elucidates the work's positive contribution to an experience-based theory of human nature necessary for medicine. The remaining two papers are a reevaluation of the development of "conjectural/stochastic" medicine by V. Boudon-Millot, and a study of the semiotic use and cataloging methods of nonverbal signs by D. Fausti. The social context of Hippocratic medicine is the theme of part 2. J. Wilkins considers the social context and composition of Regimen II by examining contrasts with similar works, especially by Galen and Diocles. M. Gorrini explores the relationships between Hippocratic "rational" medicine and religious healing [End Page 653] practices in Attica. H. Chang offers a study of the spheres in which Hippocratic physicians worked, by examining the economic evidence for the cities mentioned in the Epidemics. J. Laskaris argues that therapies involving excrement and human milk found in the Corpus derive from misunderstandings of their original ritual context. E. Craik analyzes On the Organ of Sight in terms of its relationship to the rest of the Corpus, especially Places in Man, and speculates on its geographic origins. E. D. Nelson offers a close study of the Speech of the Envoy and suggests its identification as an excerpt from Macareus's lost History of Cos. The papers in part 3 explore the Corpus's relationship with non-Hippocratic medicine. A. Thivel attempts to set the Corpus against his reconstruction of the development of theories of respiration up to Aristotle. F. Le Blay examines the use of analogy to extrapolate the nature of meteorological phenomena from human physiology, identifying its presence in On Sevens as unique in the Corpus. P. Demont considers aspects of Platonic and Aristotelian responses to humoral theory. E. Garcia Novo compares, rather superficially, the ways in which truth is attained in Plato and the Corpus. D. Manetti convincingly reevaluates the evidence for the identification of physicians named Herodicus. D. Nickel argues for the independence of Praxagoras of Cos in relation to Hippocratic pathology. A. Debru searches for Hippocratic influence on Theophrastus's shorter biological works. Part 4 is devoted to linguistic and rhetorical analyses: of Prorrhetic 2 by T. Stover; of Internal Affections by P. Pérez Canizares; and the verbalization of the principle of opposites in the Corpus by M. Martinez. A. Hanson begins part 5, on the reception of the Corpus in later antiquity and beyond, with an attempt to explain the presence of high-level medical treatises in find contexts associated with Egyptian priests in Tebtunis as the result of deliberate distribution by a metropolitan elite with property in this village. M. Pardon considers Celsus's passages on eye disease in order to show his improvements on Hippocrates. A. Roselli analyzes the functions and mechanics of Aretaeus of Cappadocia's use of the Corpus. I. Yeo illustrates an aspect of Galen's exploitation of Hippocrates with reference to his theory of the classification of fevers. I. Garofalo examines the textual history of the surviving fragments of Galen's commentary on Humours. A. Guardasole considers evidence for the Byzantine reception of the Corpus provided by a fragment of On Haemorrhoids inserted into two Galenic manuscripts. T. Rütten discusses the circumstances of publication of F. Tissard's recently rediscovered 1508 edition of the Oath...

Plato on the Parts of the Soul

To establish a tripartite division of the parts of the soul, Socrates in Plato's Republic introduces a Principle of Opposites. The principle entails that only distinct parts of a soul can be simultaneously engaged in opposed actions directed toward the same intended object. Appealing to the principle, Socrates proposes to distinguish between rational, spirited, and appetitive parts of the soul. He describes two situations of opposed actions in a soul that both desires to drink but chooses not to drink, and desires to indulge in morbid voyeurism but is angry about doing so. Without a sound basis for dividing the parts of the soul in precisely this way, Socrates cannot adequately defend the dialogue's main conclusion that justice in both city and soul is the proper harmonious hierarchical order of their respective parts. I argue that Socrates' efforts to prove the division of the soul into three parts are inconclusive because it is possible to interpret his illustrations as involving unopposed psychological acts directed toward different rather than identical intended objects.

The validating role of humoral theory in traditional Spanish‐American therapeutics

In conventional interpretations of humoral theory in Spanish‐American popular medicine, the “principle of opposites” model (a Hot remedy for a cold illness, and vice versa) is viewed as prescriptive, that is, as a guide to therapy. Anomalous ethnomedical data from Tzintzuntzan, Mexico, suggest the opposite, that the role of theory is to validate empirical remedies administered with little or no thought given to theoretical dictates. It is further suggested that validation of prevailing curing practices is a special case of a broader principle, that the role of many cultural institutions is validation rather than prescription, as often described. [humoral theory, popular therapies, anomalous data, prescription, validation]

How to stay well in Tzintzuntzan

In this paper the basic principles of humoral pathology in Tzintzuntzan, Michoacán, Mexico are outlined, and related to the strategies people follow to avoid illness. It is suggested that most Latin American accounts of humoral pathology are deficient in their failure to give due weight to thermal temperature, as well as to the metaphoric qualities embodied in the ‘hot-cold dichotomy’. Emphasizing preventive rather than therapeutic measures highlights a basic, usually overlooked, characteristics of humoral pathology: whereas the well-known ‘principle of opposites’ explains therapies, a diametrically-opposed ‘principle of the avoidance of opposites’ explains most behavior when people are well. Although scientific medicine is now first choice for villagers for therapy, explanation of illness continues to be based on humoral principles. Since people believe humoral principles account for what has happened to them, and since they believe that humoral precepts in prevention give them a high degree of control over their health, it is likely that humoral pathology—at least as a belief system—will flourish for a long time to come.

Plato's Separation of Reason from Desire

PLATO'S separation of reason from desire, in Republic 435-9, is made in ten propositions. Plato gives a name to none of these propositions. (Names for propositions, such as 'positivism' or 'Fermat's theorem', had not been invented in his day.) But we may find it convenient to name some of them. Some interpreters have found it convenient to name his first proposition 'The Law of Contradiction'. Others have rejected this name as involving a false description of the proposition laid down in 436 b-437 a. I shall call it here 'The Principle of Opposites'. (1) The Principle of Opposites, 436 b-437 a. This is stated first in 436 b, where I translate: 'It is clear that the same will not do or suffer opposites, at least with regard to the same and towards the same, at the same time.' This differs greatly from our Law of Contradiction in not being explicitly and specifically about propositions. Our Law of Contradiction is a statement about propositions and propositions only. But Plato's Principle of Opposites gives no explicit account whatever of what it is about or what it applies to. Its subject is indicated merely by the phrase 'the same', and therefore appears to be any nameable subject whatever. The only word that could be added to this phrase 'the same', without narrowing the reference, is the word 'entity', since this is the word for referring to any nameable subject whatever, without limitation to any class or category. We might roughly write 'the same thing' in the same sense, because 'thing' is often used in the same all-embracing and colourless reference as 'entity'; but we should be liable to be misunderstood, because 'thing' is often used in another sense, to mean substances as opposed to nonsubstantial entities such as qualities and relations. But does the context indicate that Plato really meant to say something about a narrower class than the class of all entities? Perhaps the verb of his Principle implicitly limits and classifies its subject. This verb is: 'do or suffer.' The subject must therefore be something that logically can do or suffer. Whether that is something less than all entities is hard to say. It certainly does not confine the scope of