Principle Of National Self-determination Research Articles

Хроника государственных объединений на территории России в период Революции и Гражданской войны (1917-1922 гг.)

The article analyzes the collapsing of the Russian Empire and the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The process is presented as a chronicle of the creation and liquidation of state formations from 28 February 1917 to 30 December 1922 on the territory of the country, including Poland, Finland and the territories of Turkey and Austria, where Russian troops were stationed. The chronicle records the formation of 150 different authorities that claimed to be all-Russian or regional power, organized by Russian political forces or interventionist troops. The chronicle is based on information from encyclopedias and reference books. Statistics on the creation of organizations show that state construction was most intensive in 1917 (24 new formations were created), 1918 (60), and 1918 (22). During this three-year period, Anti-Bolshevik forces were more active than others and formed 50 governments, interventionists formed 17 governments, the Soviet authorities established 31 states. Some governments claimed the all-Russian status -- the Omsk government of Alexander Kolchak, the Special Meeting of Anton Denikin, the Government of the South of Russia of Pyotr Wrangel. The governments of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Finland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Khiva and Bukhara had nationwide claims. Most of the governments were regional and opportunistic, formed by local political and military circles, which were supported by the Whites, the Reds, or the interventionists. In 1920-1922, anti-Soviet forces were able to organize 4 governments, the interventionists 1, the construction of Soviet state structures was confidently underway = 32 states of different levels and 3 democratic state structures were created in the Far East under the control of the Bolsheviks. The result of state construction on 30 December 1922 recorded 7 sovereign states (USSR, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Tannu-Tuva People's Republic) and two governments without territory - the Belarusian People's Republic and the Karelian United government in Vyborg. The Soviet Union was a unique, extremely complex state entity: it included 4 union republics - the RSFSR, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belarusian SSR. The Transcaucasian SFSR consisted of the Azerbaijani SSR, the Armenian SSR and the union of the Georgian SSR and the Abkhaz SSR. In addition, formally, the Soviet Union did not include two People's Soviet republics - Bukhara and Khorezm, with which the RSFSR had union treaties. The USSR included 2 labor communes, 8 autonomous republics and 12 autonomous regions. The basis of Soviet state-building was the principle of national self-determination. The Soviet experience of assembling a single state is now in demand again due to the growth of nationalism on the territory of the former USSR and the desire of Russia's geopolitical opponents to use it to destroy the country and seize its resources.

송진우의 국제지역 인식과 국가건설 사상

Song Chin-woo(宋鎭禹) learned the advanced ideas of the West while studying in Japan and laid the foundation for national self-reliance based on nationalism. During the March 1st Movement in 1919, Song Chin-woo adhered to Wilson’s principle of national self-determination, but independence from the United States and the West failed. Nevertheless, Song Chin-woo focused on self-reliance and independence in the 1920s and was wary of the American and Western order, simultaneously seizing that order’s legitimacy. Song Chin-woo maintained a confrontational stance toward the Soviet Union and communism but also expressed a willingness to cooperate with them in the interest of independence. He refused to follow China's religion and politics but emphasized friendly relations. He thought of Europe as a champion of universal human rights and ideas, but he was wary of its expansionary policies in Asia. Song Chin-woo insisted on establishing a Western democracy immediately after liberation based on longstanding international recognition, while emphasizing the injustice of establishing a communist government.

End of War or End of State? 1918 in the Public Memories of Post-Communist Croatia and Serbia

AbstractThis article investigates the role of 1918, the end of the First World War, and the establishment of the Yugoslav state in public memories of post-communist Croatia and Serbia. Analysing history schoolbooks within the context of major works of history and public discussion, the authors trace the developments of public memory of the end of the war and 1918. Drawing on the concepts of public memory and historical narrative, the authors focus on the ways in which history textbooks create historical narratives and on the types of lessons from the past that can be extracted from these narratives. While Serbia and Croatia have rather different patterns of First World War memory, the authors argue that both states have abandoned the Yugoslav communist narrative and now publicly commemorate 1918 as a loss of national statehood. This is somehow paradoxical, since the establishment of the South Slav State in 1918 was supposedly an outcome of the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination. In Serbia, the story of loss is packed in a fatalistic narrative of heroism and victimhood, while in Croatia the story of loss is embedded in a tale of necessary evils, which nevertheless had a positive outcome in a sovereign Croatian state.

«DOBRUDJA QUESTION» IN FOREIGN POLICY OF ROMANIA AND POSITION OF THE GREAT BRITAIN EVE OF AND DURING A PERIOD WORK PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE (1918–1919)

In the presented article the author highlights the main direction of its foreign policy Romania on Southern Dobrudja lands at the end of the First World War and the period of the Paris Peace Conference (1918–1919 ). The article highlights the work and the struggle for peace with the Balkan states of Romania and Britain politicians, diplomats and civil society towards preserving peaceful relations in the period of operation of the Paris Peace Conference.The most radical departure from the principle of national self-determination which practiced Foreign-Office came in relation to Romania’s frontier with Bulgaria. The tasks are to characterize the content of the work of the Romanian diplomatic commission in the direction of the defending the rights to South Dobrudja and the determination of the position of Great Britain as for territorial independence of the region. The main thesis of the article is that after First World War Romania sought to large an alliance with t least on of the Great Powers in case of an attack on South Dobrudja, in this sense, Romania’s diplomatic success was only partial. The Romanian government realized that only the permission of the Great Powers, such as Great Britain, would strength its presence in the region.The Great Britain treated ambiguously towards such aspirations of Romania. For the first, Foreign Office was not forgotten for Bucharest the separate peace with the Central Powers in 1918. For the second, Britain diplomatic and military mission at Southern Dobrudja did not take the politics of the terror of Romanian in Bessarabia. The Great Britain provided a summary of the position in Southern Dobrudja: provisional British military occupation is the only possible solution for the moment, in spite of the unrest this causes to the Rumanian Government.From the first of the being in Paris, the Romanian diplomats were sounded actively the question how the Great Britain and France would see the future status of Southern Dobrudja. The Romanian demand for Southern Dobrudja was strongly citing national self-determination and protecting peace in Balkan. Most in the British delegation hoped that this could be agreed.However, the British and French refused absolutely to compel an ally to surrender territory to an enemy. The decision, British politics believed, lay with Romania: such readjustment could only be made after friendly conversations with the Rumanian Government. It is important that the Rumanian politics themselves should be a consenting party to the cession of Southern Dobrudja and that Romanians should not be left with the feeling that they have been robbed by their Allies to placate their enemies.In the Parice Peace Conference Foreign Office took the legalistic view that, because Southern Dobrudja was secured by Romania before the war, its future was beyond the remit of the Peace Conference. The Britain Commission stated in its projects that it was not authorized to recommend a modification of the frontier which would involve the cession to an enemy State of a territory forming de facto et de jure an integral part of an Allied State.The Romanians, angry about losing part of the Banat, never offered to give up Southern Dobrudja. The Americans pushed their view in the Council of Heads of Delegations between July and November, but the British were unyielding. The issue was not even mentioned in the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria in November. Thus, in the words of a member of the Bulgarian Delegation, the settlement proclaimed the principle that no land can be claimed from the victors. It has been argued here that Bucharest gained territory not because of the wartime treaty that promised her so much, and not because of the dubious diplomatic skills of Romanian delegation, but because the Roma nians had a strong case and it was effectively presented by Romanophiles like Britain delegation. There was one other reason, however, that tended to shine its harsh light on every issue, the simple idea that these people are our friends and those are our enemies. This was stated most starkly and frequently by the French, but it was also evident in the British unwillingness to coerce the Romanians over Southern Dobrudja.The consequence of making a settlement which dealt severely with losers was that they became revisionist and eventually allied themselves with those who would undo the hated treaties. Romania remains much bigger than she was in 1918, but the settlement that created Greater Romania did not survive the vengeance of its enemies.

СЛОВ’ЯНСЬКА ІДЕЯ У ТРАКТУВАННІ ОЛЬГЕРДА БОЧКОВСЬКОГО

Background: Slavic idea, which was based on the idea of the ethnic, linguistic-cultural and historical affinity of the Slavs, was intensified at the beginning of the twentieth century in conditions of political enslavement of the majority of Slavic peoples. It became an integral part of such concepts as Austro-Slavism, Illirism-Yugoslavism, Russian imperial Pan-Slavism, and neo-Slavism. In the interwar period, the ideas of Slavic unity aroused interest in almost all Slavic states and became the subject of discussion on the pages of the special periodicals. The Ukrainian intellectual O. Bochkovskii outlined his point of view. Purpose: The purpose of the article is to analyze the interpretation of O. Bochkovsky (in 1916, investigating so-called non-historical nations, distinguishing three phases in the process of their national revival: national awakening, economic emancipation, politicization of the movement), the idea of Slavic unity in all its manifestations at various stages of historical development . Results: O. Bochkowski believed that in the process of national revival, the desire of small Slavic peoples to rally on the grounds of belonging to the Slavs played a positive role: in uniting, the peoples hoped to stand in the struggle for their own existence, seeking support from the most numerous and strongest people. Therefore, among the Balkan and Austrian Slavs, Slavophilism was often identified with Russophilism. O. Bochkovsky criticized the philosophy of Slavophilism for lack of concrete measures in the program to solve the most important - the national problem in Russia. In Pan-Slavophilism, he identified two opposite directions: Pan-Russianism and Austro-Slavism. Pan-Russianism (Russian political Pan-Slavism) was used by the official Russian authorities outside the Russian Empire (in Austria-Hungary, the Balkans) to mask their imperialist goals. Austro-Slavism regarded as a typical manifestation of the Slavophilism of the enslaved Slavic peoples, who began on the path of rebirth. O. Bochkovsky considered contradictory statements of the new course of Neo-Slavism: taking the principle of national self-determination and independence of the Slavic peoples, Neo-Slavism neglected the national movement of the Ukrainian people. Scientist called the First World War, which actualized the national question, a signal for the enslaved peoples, a process that initiated the formation of future interethnic relations. Evaluating the difficulties of the process of national consolidation of Yugoslavia after the end of the World War, the scientist assessed Illrimism as a consonant ideology, believing that Serbo-Croatian dualism was primarily due to cultural differences. He positively appreciated the formation of the "Kingdom of Serbia, Croats and Slovenes" and expressed regret over the degeneration of Illirism-Yugo-Slavism in Pan-Serbian central-ism. The scholar explained the formation and effective functioning of the Czechoslovak state in the absence of the Czech-Slovak antagonism. O. Bochkovsky assessed negatively appearance in the 1920-th a new Russian ideology – Eurasianism. O. Bochkovsky acknowledged for every nation the right to independence and the formation of their own state. He considered Pan-Slavism to be utopia, since after the First World War, there was an urgent need to protect the Slavs, and the isolation of a single Slavic people, which could have become a leader for the whole of the Slavic region, would constitute a threat to the independence of the weak Slavic peoples . More he considered the creation of political unions within continents, such as Pan-Europe, Pan-Asia, Pan-Africa, Pan-Amerika. Key words: Austro-Slavism, O. Bochkovsky, illirism, Eurasianism, neoslavism, Pan-Slavism, slavophilia, Yugoslavism.

A world safe for empires? A. J. Toynbee and the internationalization of self-determination in the East (1912–1922)

ABSTRACT The article excavates the early international thought of the British historian and expert on international affairs Arnold J. Toynbee. It focuses on Toynbee’s shifting views on nationality, internationalism and imperialism during a decade of global war and conflict. Toynbee understood national questions as imperial problems requiring solutions and in the immediate aftermath of the Great War he was among the first to systematically reflect on the diffusion of nationalism in the East. The article argues that the evolution of Toynbee’s thinking on the question of self-determination can be seen a response to debates on imperial reform and to challenges stemming from rival, non-western traditions of thinking on self-determination. Furthermore, the reconstruction of Toynbee’s thought challenges linear accounts of his engagement with nationalism in terms of enchantment and disenchantment with the principle of national self-determination and makes manifest the intricate links between nationality, liberal internationalism and imperial order in British commentary on the near and middle east.

“An orgy of licence?” Democracy and property redistribution in Poland and the Baltics in their international context, 1918–1926

The article argues that property redistribution was a major tool of democratization and nationalization in Poland and the Baltics. It provided governments with a means to give peasants a stake in the new democratic states, thus empower the new titular nations and at the same time marginalize former elites, who became national minorities. The most significant acts of property redistribution were the land reforms passed between 1919 and 1925, which achieved the status of founding charters of the new states. Activists of the disenfranchised minorities conceptualized minority protection as the “Magna Carta” of the international order, which should contain the principle of national self-determination and thus safeguard private property, the protection of which was not clearly regulated by international law. By examining the contingencies of the aftermath of the war in East Central Europe as well as discussions about changing conceptions of property ownership in both East Central and Western Europe, the article shows that land reform was meant to counter Bolshevism, but, at the same time, created the impression abroad that the new states themselves displayed revolutionary tendencies and did not respect private property — an image that became a significant argument of interwar territorial revisionists.

The Principle of Self-Determination in the Context of Human Rights

The essay presents the issue of the principle of self-determination from the perspective of international human rights law. The author highlights the close relationship between the principle of self-determination and the principle of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In practice, the principle of self-determination is a prerequisite for the effective guarantee of human rights, and, at the same time, guaranteed protection of human rights is a prerequisite for implementing the principle of national self determination. The author presents the issue of self-determination in the context of the basic regulations of international human rights law, considering regulations of both a ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law character.

Соотношение и взаимодействие принципов самоопределения народов и территориальной целостности государств

Соотношение и взаимодействие принципов самоопределения народов и территориальной целостности государств

The Contemporary Relevance of István Bibó’s Theoretical Framework for Analyzing and Settling Territorial and State-Formation Conflicts

International policy makers, even those with a genuine resolve for peacemaking, often shy away from getting involved with political conflicts where the principle of self-determination clashes with that of the territorial integrity of a state, or devise ad hoc plans that don’t have the potential to become a lasting solution. In the Cold War context of the 1970s social scientist Istvan Bibó observed and explained this phenomenon and suggested a mechanism to correct it. His idea was to set up a special international court for impartial political arbitration and to solve “territorial and state-formation conflicts” by the principle of national self-determination. He proposed to recognize the global territorial status quo as the “constitution of international relations” but to “amend it” by fostering ethnic-linguistic separation in the special case of irreconcilable conflicts. Viewed from today Bibó’s case studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cyprus question have shown remarkable foresight and several of his specific suggestions have become core elements in roadmaps for solving them. Additionally, in contemporary political and scientific discourses on other ethnic-territorial conflicts, opinions seem to shift in line with his views as experiences of the last decades seem to corroborate the validity of his analytical framework and general policy recommendations.

The concept of military occupation in the era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars

This article accounts for the existence of a clear concept of military occupation, albeit inconsistently used, in the era of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. It sets out the factors favouring such clarity and those militating against it. It argues that accounts of the concept of military occupation in terms of the principle of national self-determination and the French revolutionary renunciation of the right to conquest are insufficient. A full explanation must refer to the practice of occupation by French revolutionary and Napoleonic authorities and their allied opponents, including non-belligerent occupations. It concludes that the law of occupation and court judgements in this period should not be treated as driven by general principles but rather as often-confused responses to specific contexts and problems created by generals, diplomats and recalcitrant inhabitants of occupied territories.

Reading Beside the Lines: Marginalia, W.E. Gladstone, and the International History of the Bulgarian Horrors

This article explores the marginalia found in the personal volumes of William Ewart Gladstone in the context of the Great Eastern Crisis (1875–8). Diverging from previous narratives, which have lionised Gladstone for his apparently prophetic support for the independence of Christian subjects within the Ottoman Empire, this article argues that Gladstone read and understood little about modern South-Eastern European history, Bulgaria, or the Bulgarians before the publication of his influential political pamphlet, The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East. Gladstone's powerful interjection, based upon widespread, imagined categories of cultural understanding, directly influenced British foreign policy at a critical juncture with profound international consequences. Britain abandoned its traditional support of the Ottoman Empire - allowing Russia to wage a punitive war against its former ally - and instead supported the independence of the ‘Christian races’ of the Balkans along the budding principle of national self-determination. Gladstone's marginalia provide a unique linkage between studies of cultural languages of understanding, individual decision-making, the mechanisms of political power, and the construction of foreign policy. In certain cases, therefore, marginalia may help reveal the nexus between local histories of cultural production and major events in international history.

Institutional morality and the principle of national self-determination

Allen Buchanan proposes a methodological framework with which theorists may evaluate different theories of secession, including the national self-determination theory. An important claim he makes is, because the right to secede is inherently institutional, any adequate theory of secession must include, as an integral part, an analysis of institutional morality. Because the national self-determination theory blatantly lacks such an analysis, Buchanan concludes that this theory is inherently flawed. In this paper, I consider Buchanan’s framework and the responses from supporters of national self-determination theory. I try to clarify the confusion shared by both parties. I conclude that, although Buchanan’s theory of institutional morality is sound, his critiques of the national self-determination theory fails.

The Post-1989 Era as Heyday of the Nation-State?

It is widely held that contemporary globalization is bringing about the decline of the nation-state. This article questions this assumption, using a historical perspective to make the case that it is only in the wake of the global transformations since 1989 that the principle of national self-determination has truly had the opportunity to come into its own. It is precisely the supranational structures associated with contemporary globalization that have the potential to facilitate political independence for small nations without the attendant geopolitical and economic vulnerabilities that condemned such undertakings to catastrophic failure in earlier eras. Despite the dangers and abuses historically associated with the nation-state, the alternative of unbounded political communities carries even greater potential risks.

The Continuities of West German History

This article considers support for European integration in and beyond Germany between the mid-1920s and the early 1950s. Rather than viewing debates about Europe within an isolated German context, it focuses on transnationally-connected intellectual and political groups from across the ideological spectrum. The article asks whether the growth in support for a united Europe after 1945 was a sign of the Westernization of the Federal Republic, or whether such support grew out of longer-standing dissatisfactions with elements of “western” political culture, such as the principle of national self-determination and the practices of centralized political parties within parliamentary democracies.

A Few Observations Regarding Woodrow Wilson’s Principle of National Self-Determination and its Application

This article briefly discusses traditional interpretations of the principle of national self-determination declared by President Woodrow Wilson. It is believed that the principle of national self-determination cannot be interpreted in isolation from specific historical conditions under which it was declared and implemented. Until the First World War the self-determination of nations was perceived more like the right to choose their (democratic) form of government (‘internal self-determination’). During the war years the ‘external’ aspect of self-determination gained dominance, i.e. the right of a nation to be free from any ‘alien’ rule. Thus, technically the principle of self-determination of nations was supposed to mean both consolidation of national consciousness and democratization of society. However, implementation of the principle demonstrated that national self-determination might become a threat to democracy.

Reform Intervention and Democratic Revolution

Can interventions be used to assist oppressed peoples in overthrowing their governments? According to the influential non-interventionist arguments of J.S. Mill and Michael Walzer, reform interventions are incompatible with a principle of national self-determination. This article challenges Mill and Walzer, arguing that, in limited cases, interventions could in principle support revolutionary movements in such a way as to facilitate democratic transition. It does so by tracing a lack of conceptual clarity back to Mill's argument in `A Few Words on Non-Intervention'. In particular, it is argued that Mill's and consequently Walzer's account of domestic revolutionary conflicts fails to distinguish the salience of military from properly political forces. Mill's Considerations on Representative Government provides the starting point for a clearer set of distinctions through which to reconstruct the principle of non-intervention on a stronger footing.

Territorialisation de l'ethnicité, ethnicisation du territoire. Le cas du système politique soviétique et russe

Despite the cultural, social and economic diversity of the population groups making up the Russian empire, ethnic criteria generally did not play any role in the administrative division of the territory. After October 1917, the Bolsheviks chose the concept of a multi-ethnic state over a nation-state. A multi-ethnic state - or, more specifically, a federation based on ethnic criteria - was derived from the principle of national self-determination. As a result of this political choice, ethnicity has become a central concept of the system of social representation as well as a key instrument in population management.

Ethnic minority issues in China's foreign policy: perspectives and implications

As a multinational state, China's ethnic minority issue (e.g. Tibet and Xinjiang) is always a large political concern. China often treats this issue exclusively as a sovereignty matter and refutes outside criticism. What is the viable explanation of China's position? Is China's behavior consistent with the global norms and international law, especially the principle of national self-determination? This paper addresses these questions through an examination of China's ethnic minority issues in the context of foreign policy and international relations.

The movement for Siberian regional and national autonomy in the early 1920s

This article examines the movement for the achievement of national and regional autonomy for the indigenous peoples of Siberia. Concentrating on East Siberia, the author discusses the various conflicts between advocates of autonomy – political, territorial and cultural – in the region, and the various warring factions during the Revolution, Civil War and the early 1920s. She demonstrates how the native peoples did not necessarily understand the political ambitions of the leaders and politicians. She also demonstrates how difficult it was for the general principle of national self-determination to be achieved with so many conflicting interests during a period of nation-wide upheaval and civil war. Underlying this were also the perennial contradictions between the political aims of the centre and the local interests of the outlying regions and peoples. In conclusion, the author suggests that many of the problems of Siberian autonomous movements in the early twentieth century re-appeared at its end.