This paper investigates how the strategy of deterrence is relevant to understanding responses to disinformation in general, and in the case of Canada in 2014–23. First, it argues that extending a wide lens of deterrence to hybrid threats, including disinformation, highlights many options to deter by denial (mostly resilience) and by imposing widely defined ‘costs and punishments’, and reveals strengths and limits of both. Second, it shows that Canada’s efforts have intensified and shifted over time, resulting in a security and foreign policy approach focused on resilience to deny negative effects, and the imposition of costs and punishments to dissuade harmful actions. Third, it highlights benefits and limits of extending deterrence to disinformation in general and in the case of Canada. It suggests that deterrence principles and practices can further adapt to today’s non-linear information environment by engaging with the emerging academic field of strategic communications. In sum, the paper extends the literature on deterrence to disinformation, adds empirical knowledge about the evolution of the Canadian government’s efforts, and develops key critiques based on its findings. Ultimately, it suggests scholars conceptualise a ‘sixth wave of deterrence’ where the deterrence of complex challenges is communicated more strategically and long term within a contextualised, holistic, and ethically grounded approach.
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