Prime-age Men Research Articles

Self-Worth Through Expertise: Experiences of Prime-Age Men Who are Out of the Formal Labor Force

ABSTRACT Research on masculinity finds that men who are socioeconomically excluded or otherwise marginalized may create subcultures that eschew the values of mainstream society, such as by valuing and engaging in heavy drinking, fighting, bar culture, sports, and crime, as well as rejecting school success; recent discussions have also examined the rejection of expertise and experts as a related backlash to mainstream institutions. Using in-depth interview data, the present study examines how rural, prime-age men (n = 61) who are out of the labor force develop a sense of their own value without formal employment and the role expertise plays in them doing so. Most claim expertise and do so constructively, as they assert a positive sense of their own worth through their knowledge and skills (“I am a person who can … ”). Men make claims to the dignity of holding expertise while outside institutionalized employment roles. This suggests the portability of this cultural tool and that its use is not contingent on institutional endorsements. Men’s self-identity of expertise could be challenged in formal employment settings, making formal work less attractive to them. To understand labor force participation, our focus must go beyond compensation to attend to how work opportunities are aligned or in conflict with men’s identities.

Road to perdition? The effect of illicit drug use on labour market outcomes of prime-age men in Mexico

This research addresses the impact of illicit drug use on labour market outcomes of men in Mexico. We leverage statistical information from three waves of a comparable national survey and make use of the Lewbel’s heteroskedasticity-based instrumental variable strategy to deal with the endogeneity of the drug consumption. Our results suggests that drug consumption has fairly negative effects in the Mexican context: it reduces employment, occupational attainment and formality and raises unemployment of local males. These effects seem larger than those estimated for high-income economies.

The impact of ICT and robots on labour market outcomes of demographic groups in Europe

We study the age- and gender-specific labour market effects of two key modern technologies, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and robots. Our sample includes 14 European countries between 2010 and 2018. We use the variation in technology adoption between industries and apply the instrumental variables strategy proposed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) to identify the causal effects of technology adoption. We find that exposure to ICT and robots increased the shares of young and prime-aged women in employment and in the wage bills of particular sectors. However, it reduced the shares of older women and prime-aged men. We do not detect significant effects of technology adoption on the relative wages of most demographic groups. Between 2010 and 2018, the growth in ICT capital played a larger role than robot adoption in the changes in the within-sector labour market outcomes of demographic groups.

Marriage and Work Among Prime-Age Men

Marriage and Work Among Prime-Age Men

Marriage and Work among Prime-Age Men

Marriage and Work among Prime-Age Men

“Disconnected” Men: Understanding Men’s Joint Roles as Workers and Romantic Partners

A growing portion of men are disconnected from the formal labor market. Scholars have relied on men’s absence from the pool of “marriageable men” to explain declining marriage rates. Using interviews with sixty-one prime-age men who are out of the labor force, we examine the understanding men in nonmetropolitan areas have about how their workforce status conflicts with, comports with, or is unrelated to their role in a romantic union. Most do not judge their work status as making them “unmarriageable.” Some cite relationship obligations as conflicting with employment; others believe they fulfill the provider role through activities such as cash work and self-provisioning. Researchers should recognize the alternative ways men fulfill roles as resource providers, which we find go beyond formal employment. Men do value work, but they do not always define and prioritize work in the ways that have been the dominant focus of research.

Relationships between elderly employment and labor market outcomes of young and prime-age adults: Evidence from Korean longitudinal and cross-sectional data

ABSTRACT Along with an increase in the aging population, the elderly poverty rate is on the rise in Korea. As older people extend working years and delay retirement to secure their financial stability, it raises a concern that an increase in elderly employment may cause high youth unemployment. To understand the relationship between elderly employment and labor market outcomes of other age groups, we use the 1998–2017 Korea Labor and Income Panel Study and 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 Korean Population Census. Using a logistic regression model, we find that elderly employment has no relationship with youth employment but a statistically significant relationship with prime-age employment that varies by gender. While older men are likely to substitute for prime-age men, both older men and women are likely to complement prime-age women. Similar results hold for hours of work and weekly wages. The substitutability between older workers and prime-age workers varies by education, occupation, and industry type. The complementarity holds between older male and female workers and prime-age female workers in the less-educated group and the unstable and low-wage industry group and between older male workers and prime-age male workers in the sales and clerical occupation group and the production and service-related occupation group. Overall results suggest the need for expansion of employment opportunities for older adults in the areas with limited substitution to mitigate elderly poverty and improve economic security as older adults appear not to crowd out young and prime-age adults from the labor market.

Parenthood, Gender, and the Risks and Consequences of Job Loss

Abstract Job loss can be difficult to navigate for individuals and their families. However, we know very little about the relationship between parental status and job loss. Drawing on rich data from Statistics Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey, we analyse differences across gender and parental status groups in both risks of job loss and its consequences: re-employment, unemployment, and quality of new jobs relative to those that were lost. We find that parenthood reduces the probability of job loss for prime-age men with young children, but only when employer discretion is involved. This advantage is not shared by otherwise similar mothers or fathers of school-aged children, suggesting that employers are particularly sympathetic to risks to men’s breadwinning role in the early years of fatherhood. Despite similar risks of job loss relative to other groups, mothers of young children are the least likely to be re-employed in the subsequent year, mainly because of their higher levels of labour market withdrawal rather than unemployment. Holding out for “family friendly” work arrangements does not seem to account for this pattern. Overall, our results show that the risks and consequences of job loss strengthen connection to employment for fathers of young children while weakening connection for mothers. Job loss dynamics thus not only reflect but also reinforce asymmetrical breadwinning and caring roles for mothers and fathers of preschool-aged children.

The Evolution of Labor Market Disparities Between Black, Hispanic, and White Men: 1968-2019

We describe how racial and ethnic disparities among prime-aged men have evolved over the last 50 years. We examine several outcomes including annual earnings, employment, measures of income, and home ownership status using data from the March CPS, the Census, and the ACS. Both Blacks and Hispanics have experienced a 20-25% earnings disadvantage relative to whites since 1980. In terms of employment, the gap has been increasing for Blacks but decreasing for Hispanics. These differences are reflected in income and home ownership status. The disparities in earnings are similar across education groups but the disparities in employment are driven primarily by workers who have not completed high school. Comparing Hispanic immigrants with natives reveals that while native Hispanics fare better than Blacks, many of the employment and earnings gains are attributable to Hispanic immigrants.

Estimating the effects of the minimum wage using the introduction of indexation

Abstract We examine the impacts of the minimum wage on employment using the minimum-wage hike induced by the introduction of indexation of the local minimum wage to the local cost of living. The revision of the Minimum Wage Act in 2007 of Japan essentially required the government to set the minimum wage indexed to the local cost of living, with a five-year moratorium period. The government subsequently increased the minimum wage in areas where the cost of living was high relative to the local minimum wage. Allowing for different trends in labor-market outcomes across regions in the pre-treatment period, we find that the minimum-wage hike raised the wages of low-wage workers, but reduced the employment of less-educated young men. A panel analysis based on matched Labor Force Survey data indicates that the minimum-wage hike decreased the job flows of prime-age men and women.

Estimating the Effects of the Minimum Wage Using the Introduction of Indexation

We examine the impacts of the minimum wage on employment using the minimum-wage hike induced by the introduction of indexation of the local minimum wage to the local cost of living. The revision of the Minimum Wage Act in 2007 of Japan essentially required the government to set the minimum wage indexed to the local cost of living, with a five-year moratorium period. The government subsequently increased the minimum wage in areas where the cost of living was high relative to the local minimum wage. Allowing for different trends in labor-market outcomes across regions in the pre-treatment period, we find that the minimum-wage hike raised the wages of low-wage workers, but reduced the employment of less-educated young men. A panel analysis based on matched Labor Force Survey data indicates that the minimum-wage hike decreased the job flows of prime-age men and women.

Employment inequality: Why do the low-skilled work less now?

Low-skilled prime-age men are less likely to be employed than high-skilled prime-age men, and the differential has increased since the 1970s. I build a search model encompassing three explanations: (1) automation and trade reduced the demand for low-skilled workers; (2) health, welfare, and recreational gaming/computer technology reduced the supply of low-skilled workers; and (3) factors affecting job search, such as online job boards, reduced frictions for high-skilled workers. I find a shift in demand away from low-skilled workers was the leading cause, a shift in supply had little effect, and search frictions actually reduced employment inequality.

Automation and labor force participation in advanced economies: Macro and micro evidence

Technological advances raise productivity and growth, but are also likely to reshape labor markets. We examine the impact of automation on aggregate labor force participation rates and individuals’ attachment to the workforce in advanced economies. Cross-country analysis, which leverages the variation in the routinizability of occupations and occupational composition, points to significant negative effects of automation on the participation rates of prime-age men and women. Individual-level analysis confirms that workers previously employed in routinizable occupations are more likely to drop out of the labor force. Encouragingly, higher spending on active labor market programs and education are, however, associated with smaller negative effects of technological change on participation.

The Uneven Recovery in Prime-Age Labor Force Participation

The labor force participation rate of prime-age individuals (age 25 to 54) in the United States declined dramatically during and after the Great Recession. Although the prime-age labor force participation rate has been increasing since mid-2015, it remains below its pre-recession level. Understanding the reasons for this decline requires detailed analysis; aggregate statistics on labor force participation may mask potential differences in labor market outcomes by sex or educational attainment. Didem Tzemen and Thao Tran identify these differences, finding that prime-age men and women without a college degree experienced larger declines in their labor force participation rates during the recession than their college-educated counterparts. The disappearance of routine jobs over the last few decades may explain these declines. In addition, they find that only prime-age women with a college degree have seen their labor force participation rate fully recover to its pre-recession level, although their participation rate remains well below that of both college-educated and non-college-educated men.

Disappearing Routine Occupations and Declining Prime-Age Labor Force Participation

I study the effect of disappearing routine occupations on the decline in the labor force participation rate of prime-age individuals since the 1990s. I use multiple data sources and empirical models to study this relationship. First, I exploit state-level variation and show that the long-term trends of declining routine employment and prime-age labor force participation are highly correlated. Second, I narrow the geographic unit to local labor markets and quantify the causal effect of declining routine employment on the labor market outcomes of prime-age individuals. My results imply that the decline in routine employment was an important contributor to the declines in the labor force participation rate and employment-to-population ratio since the 1990s, especially for prime-age individuals without a bachelor's degree. Additionally, I show that the decline in routine employment was not limited to prime-age men in the manufacturing industries, but was observed across most major industries and affected women as well. More strikingly, disappearing routine employment had a larger negative effect on the labor force participation rate of prime-age women without a bachelor's degree than their male counterparts.

The Effects of Work Hours on Physical and Mental Health of Late Prime Age Men and Women

Our results show that negative returns to health outcomes set in at around 50 work hours per week, and that the negative effects of working long hours manifest earlier for women than men. Increased work hours are associated with higher incomes and better access to medical care. However, increased work hours also generate greater physical and mental stress, which may cause health problems. We examine these questions empirically with data from the 2006 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), using two-stage least squares to account for endogeneity of work hours and income in the health outcomes model. JEL Classifications: I10, J22, C36

The missing obese men? Labour force participation and obesity among prime-age men in the United States

The declining labour force participation among men between the ages 25 and 54 in the United State has attracted the attention of policymakers and the public. I document this trend by obesity status during the period 1990–2016 using the Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance System Survey. I find that the likelihood of being out of the labour force has been increasing by approximately 0.22 percentage points every year on average for non-obese men, while that of obese men has been increasing by approximately 0.28 percentage points. This indicates that the difference in the propensity to be out of the labour force has widened by 1.6 percentage points between the obese and the non-obese during 1990–2016. It seems that the labour force participation gap between obese men and non-obese men started to increase during the housing bubble period, 2001–2007. The difference in the trends seems to be driven by non-Hispanic whites, men without a college degree, and men aged 25–44.

When Labor’s Lost: Health, Family Life, Incarceration, and Education in a Time of Declining Economic Opportunity for Low-Skilled Men

The economic progress of US men has stagnated in recent decades. The labor force participation rate of men ages 25–54 peaked in the mid-1960s and has declined since then (according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics), while men’s real median earnings have been flat since the early 1970s. These population averages mask considerably larger declines in participation among less-educated and non-white men as well as substantial increases in wage inequality. In this paper, we seek to illuminate the broader context in which prime-age men are experiencing economic stagnation. We explore changes for prime-age men over time in education, mortality, morbidity, disability program receipt, family structure, and incarceration rates. We focus on prime-age men, namely those ages 25–54, and on the years 1980–2016 (or 2017 when possible), encompassing much of the period of reduced economic progress for low-skilled men.

The Declining Labor Market Prospects of Less-Educated Men.

Over the last half century, US wage growth stagnated, wage inequality rose, and the labor-force participation rate of prime-age men steadily declined. In this article, we examine these worrying labor market trends, focusing on outcomes for males without a college education. Though wages and participation have fallen in tandem for this population, we argue that the canonical neoclassical framework, which postulates a labor demand curve shifting inward across a stable labor supply curve, does not reasonably explain the data. Alternatives we discuss include adjustment frictions associated with labor demand shocks and effects of the changing marriage market—that is, the fact that fewer less-educated men are forming their own stable families—on male labor supply incentives. In the synthesis that emerges, the phenomenon of declining prime-age male labor-force participation is not coherently explained by a series of causal factors acting separately. A more reasonable interpretation, we argue, involves complex feedbacks between labor demand, family structure, and other factors that have disproportionately affected less-educated men.

Editorial

Editorial