Mind In Primates Research Articles

Multiple Perspectives on Body Image Research

Representation of the body is a nuclear aspect of self-image. Body representation includes both subjective and intersubjective experiences. The importance of visual body representation in our social life is demonstrated by the time we spend to take care of our physical appearance, including use of plastic surgery, as well as by the severe mental disorders associated to its alteration, including eating disorders (EDs) and body dysmorphic disorders. In spite of these issues, (neuro)psychological research on body representation has so far mainly focused on the body as a motor device, devoted to the perception of and interaction with objects. The complexity of factors involved in the development, maintenance, and plasticity of body image representations requires an integrated approach that facilitates the evaluation and treatment of EDs with novel, evidence-based, and more efficacious protocols. This special issue of European Psychologist aims to advance such an integrative approach, with a collection of papers that gather different perspectives on the phenomenological, cognitive, (neuro)psychological, and cultural aspects of body representation disorders.

The Primate Mind: Built to Connect with Other Minds. Based on a meeting held at the Ettore Majorana Center in Erice, Sicily, Italy, 4–7 June 2009. Edited by Frans B. M. de Waal and Pier Francesco Ferrari. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press. $49.95. xiii + 392 p.; ill.; index. ISBN: 978-0-674-05804-0. 2012.

Previous articleNext article No AccessReviews and Brief NoticesThe Primate Mind: Built to Connect with Other Minds. Based on a meeting held at the Ettore Majorana Center in Erice, Sicily, Italy, 4–7 June 2009. Edited by Frans B. M. de Waal and Pier Francesco Ferrari. Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press. $49.95. xiii + 392 p.; ill.; index. ISBN: 978-0-674-05804-0. 2012.Louise BarrettLouise BarrettPsychology, University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Quarterly Review of Biology Volume 88, Number 3September 2013 Published in association with Stony Brook University Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/671493 Views: 5Total views on this site Copyright © 2013 by The University of Chicago Press. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Bridging the Not-So-Great DivideThe Primate Mind: Built to Connect with Other Minds. Edited by Frans B. M. de Waal and Pier Francesco Ferrari. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Previous articleNext article No AccessBridging the Not-So-Great Divide The Primate Mind: Built to Connect with Other Minds. Edited by Frans B. M. de Waal and Pier Francesco Ferrari. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.Craig StanfordCraig StanfordDepartments of Biological Sciences and Anthropology, PED 107, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089, U.S.A. ([email protected]). Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Current Anthropology Volume 53, Number 5October 2012 Sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/667625 Views: 11Total views on this site HistoryReceived April 04, 2012 © 2012 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. All rights reserved. For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected]PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The Primate mind: built to connect with other minds

The Primate mind: built to connect with other minds

Book review: The primate mind: Built to connect with other minds

American Journal of Human BiologyVolume 24, Issue 4 p. 582-583 Book Review Book review: The primate mind: Built to connect with other minds Alain Morin, Alain Morin Psychology Department, Mount Royal University, Calgary, Alberta, CanadaSearch for more papers by this author Alain Morin, Alain Morin Psychology Department, Mount Royal University, Calgary, Alberta, CanadaSearch for more papers by this author First published: 26 May 2012 https://doi.org/10.1002/ajhb.22292Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume24, Issue4July/August 2012Pages 582-583 RelatedInformation

Personality profiles of cultures: Patterns of ethos

Culture and the human mind are deeply interdependent, because they co‐evolved. Personality traits were a preexisting feature of the primate mind and must have left an imprint on forms of culture. Trait taxonomies can structure ethnographies, by specifying institutions that reflect the operation of traits. Facets of ethos can be assessed by expert ratings or objective indicators. Ratings of ethos in Japan and the US were reliable and yielded plausible descriptions of culture. However, measures of ethos based on the analysis of stories were not meaningfully correlated with aggregate personality traits or national character stereotypes. Profiles of ethos may provide another axis that can be used with aggregate personality trait levels to predict behaviour and understand the operation of culture. Published in 2009 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A comparative psychophysical approach to visual perception in primates

Studies on the visual processing of primates, which have well developed visual systems, provide essential information about the perceptual bases of their higher-order cognitive abilities. Although the mechanisms underlying visual processing are largely shared between human and nonhuman primates, differences have also been reported. In this article, we review psychophysical investigations comparing the basic visual processing that operates in human and nonhuman species, and discuss the future contributions potentially deriving from such comparative psychophysical approaches to primate minds.

P3-l02 A novel behavioral and endocrinological analysis with PCA for examining the development of social mind in primates

The effect of indomethacin on human menopausal gonadotropin/human chorionic gonadotropin-induced ovulation was studied in marmoset monkeys. Indomethacin was effective in preventing follicular rupture and ovum extrusion when administered simultaneously with gonadotropin. The production of progesterone and luteinization of the granulosa cells were not affected by indomethacin treatment. Histologic examination of corpora lutea from indomethacin-treated animals revealed the presence of entrapped oocytes surrounded by luteal cells. These results suggest that prostaglandin synthesis is required for ovulation in this species, but not for luteinization and progesterone production.

Social intelligence in Old World monkeys: ecological and developmental view

Primates are social animals. This article reviews the studies concerning the social behavior of Old World monkeys and describes the following three points: (1) primates live in a complex and dynamic social group, (2) they have the relatively large neocortex and the relatively long juvenile period as an extended learning period to manage their complex social environments, and (3) primate infants are socialized and acquire complex social skills through the interactions with their mothers. Because the sociality of primates plays an important role in their daily lives, a better understanding of the primate minds is required to investigate the effects of the social environment on their social intelligence.

Beautiful Minds—For How Long?

Beautiful Minds—For How Long?

The Primate Mind: Built to Connect with Other Minds

The Primate Mind: Built to Connect with Other Minds

“If they’re so smart, why can’t they talk?” Science and the study of primate minds in the home, the laboratory and the field

Cet article s’intéresse aux études sur les capacités cognitives des primates non humains qui furent réalisées au cours du xx e siècle, dans au moins trois lieux de recherché différents: la maison, le terrain et le laboratoire. Les chercheurs se sont eux-mêmes trouvés à avoir à faire face à un nombre de différentes tensions théoriques, pratiques et méthodologiques, souvent centrées autour du problème de savoir où situer la frontière entre l’homme et l’animal, et encore plus amplifié par le fait qu’il existait différentes règles d’investigation scientifique relativement à la question de la cognition dans les lieux où la recherché était menée. Cela rend le débat sur l’esprit des primates extrêmement intéressant dans lequel peut être explorer le caractère contingent des contextes dans lesquels le problème de la démarcation entre science et non-science est traité par les scientifiques. Cet article démontre le caractère perméable de cette frontière dans la pratique et indique que, alors que la primatologie peut actuellement représenter un cas spécial (dans lequel les recherches ont été formés dans des traditions disciplinaires différentes), l’intensification du caractère interdisciplinaire basée sur une approche de terrain au début du xxi e siècle, suggère que le problème de la démarcation n’est pas prêt d’être résolu dans le futur.

Are Animals Just Noisy Machines?: Louis Boutan and the Co-invention of Animal and Child Psychology in the French Third Republic

Historians of science have only just begun to sample the wealth of different approaches to the study of animal behavior undertaken in the twentieth century. To date, more attention has been given to Lorenzian ethology and American behaviorism than to other work and traditions, but different approaches are equally worthy of the historian's attention, reflecting not only the broader range of questions that could be asked about animal behavior and the "animal mind" but also the different contexts in which these questions were important. One such approach is that represented by the work of the French zoologist Louis Boutan (1859-1934). This paper explores the intellectual and cultural history of Boutan's work on animal language and the animal mind, and contextualizes the place of animal behavior studies within late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century French biology. I explore the ways in which Boutan addressed the philosophical issue of whether language was necessary for abstract thought and show how he shifted from the idea that animals were endowed with a purely affective language to the notion that of they were capable of "rudimentary" reasoning. I argue that the scientific and broader socio-cultural contexts in which Boutan operated played a role in this transition. Then I show how Boutan's linguistic and psychological experiments with a gibbon and children provide insights into his conception of "naturalness." Although Boutan reared his gibbon at home and studied it in the controlled environment of his laboratory, he continued to identify its behavior as "natural." I specifically demonstrate the importance of the milieu of the French Third Republic in shaping Boutan's understanding not only of animal intelligence and child education, but also his definition of nature. Finally, I argue that Boutan's studies on the primate mind provide us with a lens through which we can examine the co-invention of animal and child psychology in early-twentieth-century France.

Apes, monkeys, children, and the growth of mind

What can the study of young monkeys and apes tell us about the minds of young humans? In this fascinating introduction to the study of primate minds, Juan Carlos Gomez identifies evolutionary resemblances - and differences - between human children and other primates. He argues that primate minds are best understood not as fixed collections of specialized cognitive capacities, but more dynamically, as a range of abilities that can surpass their original adaptations. In a lively overview of a distinguished body of cognitive developmental research among nonhuman primates, Gomez looks at knowledge of the physical world, causal reasoning (including the chimpanzee-like errors that human children make), and the contentious subjects of ape language, theory of mind, and imitation.

Theory of mind and other domain-specific hypotheses

The commentators do not contest the target article's claim that there is no compelling evidence of theory of mind in primates, and recent empirical studies further support this view. If primates lack theory of mind, they may still have other behavior control mechanisms that are adaptive in complex social environments. The Somatic Marker Mechanism (SMM) is a candidate, but the SMM hypothesis postulates a much weaker effect of natural selection on social cognition than the theory of mind hypothesis (on inputs to cognitive mechanisms, not on the mechanisms themselves), and there is currently no evidence that it is specific to social stimuli or to primates. "Two Guesser" training would make the goggles test too chauvinistic, and in its current form the goggles problem could not be solved by physical matching because, while wearing goggles, an individual cannot see itself seeing.

Théories des primates sur l'esprit des primates

Primate theories of primate minds : conceptual and methodological issues Casual observation of spontaneous behaviours in non-human primates (especially apes) reveals complex social behaviours that appear to be symptomatic of some Theory-of-mind abilities. However, when experimentally tested, their performance fails to convince experts of their having any real ability to understand mental states. In this paper I suggest reasons for this paradox : First, there might be some methodological inadequacies in the experimental procedures developed to assess tom functions with non-verbal procedures. Secondly, there is a conceptual confusion about what is meant by having a theory-of-mind in non-human primates and therefore what should count as evidence of mentalising abilities in non-human primates. I consider some possible avenues for future studies of non-human mentalism that are capable of overcoming these problems. I present some recent studies that avoid the pitfalls of extensive preliminary training and favour the spontaneous performance of apes. Secondly, I discuss the notion of having an implicit theory of mind as the proper level to conceptualise apes' mentalism and suggest some implications of these comparative studies for our understanding of human theories of mind.

Liberalism, chauvinism, and experimental thought

The target article argued that there is currently no reliable evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman primates and proposed research methods for future use in this field. Some commentators judged the research proposals to be too chauvinist (in danger of falsely denying that primates attribute mental states), but a majority judged them to be too liberal (in danger of falsely affirming theory of mind in primates). The most valuable comments from both camps exemplified “experimental thought,” the obverse of “thought experiments,” and recommended specific alterations and alternatives to the studies I proposed. This Response evaluates these recommendations and presents a revised version of the proposals that appear in the target article. Other valuable commentary cast doubt on the assumption that people have a theory of mind, aired the possibility that language may be a prerequisite for either possession or detection of a theory of mind, questioned the notion of critical experiments, and emphasized the distinction between attribution of sight and belief. In addition to commenting on these issues, I respond to objections to my interpretation of existing research on self-recognition, imitation, and deception.

Intraspecies theory of mind in primates: The evolution of social intelligence

Intraspecies theory of mind in primates: The evolution of social intelligence

Toward a taxonomy of mind in primates

Toward a taxonomy of mind in primates

Self-awareness and the emergence of mind in primates.

To date humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans are the only species which have been shown capable of recognizing themselves in mirrors. Several species of macaques have now been provided with years of continuous exposure to mirrors, but they still persist in reacting to their reflection as if they were seeing other monkeys. Even gibbons (apes) and gorillas (great apes) seem incapable of learning that their behavior is the source of the behavior depicted in the image. Most primates, therefore, appear to lack a cognitive category for processing mirrored information about themselves. The implications of these data for traditional views of consciousness are considered briefly, and a recent attempt to develop an operant analog to self-recognition is critically evaluated. Finally, an attempt is made to show that self-awareness, consciousness, and mind are not mutually exclusive cognitive categories and that the emergence of self-awareness may be equivalent to the emergence of mind. Several indices of "mind" which can be applied to nonhuman species are discussed in the context of an attempt to develop a comparative psychology of mind.