Pricing Of Sovereign Risk Research Articles

Forecasting sovereign risk in the Euro area via machine learning

AbstractWe test the usefulness of machine learning (ML) for the valuation and pricing of sovereign risk in the Euro area along two important dimensions: i) its predictive accuracy compared with traditional econometric methods, and ii) its assessment of the main economic factors underlying market perceptions of sovereign risk.We find that ML techniques can capture the dynamics inherent in the market valuation of country risk far more efficiently than traditional econometric models, both in the cross‐section and in the time series. Moreover, we show that public sentiment about financial news, redenomination fears and the degree of hawkishness/dovishness expressed in the ECB president's speeches are major contributors to sovereign bond spreads. We also confirm that macroeconomic and global financial factors affect sovereign risk assessment and the corresponding formation of sovereign spreads.

Determinants of credit default swaps implied ratings during the crisis: was sovereign risk mispriced?

This paper addresses the question of whether sovereign risk pricing was related to macroeconomic fundamentals, between 2007 and 2015, in a sample of OECD countries. The authors argue that the conflicting evidence in the literature is due to poor methodology options. The researchers innovate by modelling sovereign credit default swaps implied ratings as our sovereign risk proxy, instead of spreads, avoiding common pitfalls. Furthermore, the authors improve the variable selection, model specification and the econometric procedures used. A panel ordered probit model is chosen, assuring robust inference. The authors relax the parallel lines assumption, allowing for rating-varying coefficients of explanatory variables. The result is the first congruent model of sovereign risk during the years of the financial crisis and of the Euro Area crisis. Fiscal space variables, economic activity indicators, variables pertaining to external imbalances, and contagion proxies are relevant, with effects matching theory priors. The scientists clarify conundrums in the previous literature, posed by lack of significance of some macro fundamentals and by puzzling signs of some estimated coefficients. Moreover, this is the first paper to estimate not only the global risk premium, but also the impact of changing risk aversion. The authors find no support for claims of sovereign risk mispricing during the sample period. The results allow relevant policy conclusions, namely concerning the validity of different fiscal consolidation paths in financially distressed countries.

Financial stability in Europe: Banking and sovereign risk

We analyze the link between banking sector quality and sovereign risk in the whole European Union over 1999–2014. We employ four different indicators of sovereign risk (including market- and opinion-based assessments), a rich set of theoretically and empirically motivated banking sector characteristics, and a Bayesian inference in panel estimation as a methodology. We show that a higher proportion of non-performing loans is the single most influential sector-specific variable that is associated with increased sovereign risk. The sector’s depth provides mixed results. The stability (capital adequacy ratio) and size (TBA) of the industry are linked to lower sovereign risk in general. Foreign bank penetration and competition (a more diversified structure of the industry) are linked to lower sovereign risk. Our results also support the wake-up call hypothesis in that markets re-appraised a number of banking sector-related issues in the pricing of sovereign risk after the onset of the sovereign crisis in Europe.

Financial Stability in Europe: Banking and Sovereign Risk

We analyze the link between banking sector quality and sovereign risk in the whole European Union over 1999–2014. We employ four different indicators of sovereign risk (including market- and opinion-based assessments), a rich set of theoretically and empirically motivated banking sector characteristics, and a Bayesian inference in panel estimation as a methodology. We show that a higher proportion of non-performing loans is the single most influential sector-specific variable that is associated with increased sovereign risk. The sector’s depth provides mixed results. The stability (capital adequacy ratio) and size (TBA) of the industry are linked to lower sovereign risk in general. Foreign bank penetration and competition (a more diversified structure of the industry) are linked to lower sovereign risk. Our results also support the wake-up call hypothesis in that markets re-appraised a number of banking sector-related issues in the pricing of sovereign risk after the onset of the sovereign crisis in Europe.

Sovereign debt in Latin America, 1820-1913

ABSTRACTThis paper examines sovereign lending to Latin America and the Caribbean from 1820 to 1913. We examine four waves of capital flows where defaults were followed by a return to market access. In spite of extended default, countries kept promising high returns that attracted international investors again and again: financial autarky thus gave way to eras of high integration to global markets as measured by sovereign risk pricing. We discuss imperfections of the sovereign debt institutional context in the region and discuss a menu of options that some countries used to seek funds in the global financial markets after defaults. The parallel with the modern Latin American and Caribbean sovereign bond market experience is striking.

Long Memory and Correlation Dynamics of Eurozone Sovereign CDSs

We study the variation of sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs) of eurozone countries, their persistence and co-movements, with particular attention given to the impact of the financial crisis. Specifically, using a dual fractional integration model, we test the evidence of long memory for CDSs of ten eurozone countries. Our analysis reveals that price discovery processes satisfy the minimum requirements for a weak form of efficiency for sovereign CDS markets, even during the crisis. In contrast, we document the spreading out of persistent CDS uncertainty among the peripheral economies with its outbreak. We provide evidence that CDS uncertainty has implications for the pricing of sovereign risk including that of core countries in the crisis period. Finally, we present the potential spillover effects utilizing a dynamic conditional correlation model and show that, with the collapse of Lehman, the probability of a contagion increased across all countries and became more explicit for peripheral economies as the sovereign crisis took on a new dimension.

The Pricing of Sovereign Risk and Contagion During the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

The Pricing of Sovereign Risk and Contagion During the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

Fiscal space and sovereign risk pricing in a currency union

We examine how membership in a currency union affects public debt sustainability and market assessments of default risk in eurozone countries. We argue that there exist offsetting effects: expectations of bailouts tend to make a given level of debt more sustainable, lowering bond yields and CDS rates, but constraints on the use of monetary policy would tend to have the opposite effect, pushing rates up especially as room for fiscal maneuver gets exhausted. We develop a formal concept of fiscal space (which takes account of the notion of fiscal fatigue under which there are limits to the government's ability to raise the primary surplus in response to higher debt), and apply it to the eurozone countries, investigating in particular how currency union membership affects CDS and bond rates during both quiet and turbulent times for a given amount of fiscal space. We find that in quiet times, CDS and bond rates for eurozone members were below what would be expected given their fiscal space (a bonus from currency union membership). But when the crisis erupted, CDS and bond yields rose more sharply for eurozone members than would be predicted based on their available fiscal space. Our interpretation is that sovereign bailouts did not occur with the hoped-for alacrity in euro-crisis countries, generating sharper penalties for sovereigns that belong to a currency union.