Presidential Success In Congress Research Articles

The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Polarization and Presidential Success in Congress

For better or for worse, presidents receive much of the credit and much of the blame for their legislative success in Congress. Indeed, much has been written about the correlates of presidential success in Congress. In this article, we test the proposition that presidential success in Congress is mainly a function of context and the context of presidential interactions with Congress has changed over the past 50 years. Specifically, it is both the best of times and worst of times for presidential relations with the legislative branch. It is increasingly the case that because of partisan polarization in Washington, presidents can be quite successful, if they command a majority. However, if they face a divided government gridlock is the result and overcoming that gridlock has gotten to be more difficult over time.

Presidential Electoral Influence in Congressional Districts, Public Approval, and Presidential Success in Congress

Other SectionsAbstractPUBLIC APPROVAL AND PRESIDENTIAL LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCEDATA AND METHODFINDINGSCONCLUSIONFigureTableReference

Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force

We examine two competing arguments relating to the role of Congress in explaining presidential decisions to use force from 1953 to 2000. We offer a policy availability rationale that suggests Congress matters in the decision to use force because presidents are motivated by their ability to influence legislative policy making. The models demonstrate that presidential success in Congress is the significant factor determining military action, not party control. Presidents employ force when their ability to influence policy is weak and avoid military actions when Congress supports the president's agenda. The results speak to the intersection of two important literatures, namely, presidential unilateralism and conventional theories on domestic politics and the use of force.

The President’s Role in the Partisan Congressional Arena

Models of presidential success have sometimes focused on the importance of political capital and sometimes looked at the partisan environment of Congress. We develop time-series models of success that refine and integrate these perspectives while reframing the matter in terms of research on congressional parties. Measures of the ideological and partisan makeup of Congress are used to explain presidential success from 1953 to 2006 but the approval of the president’s base is important as well. We also show the electoral consequences to congressional parties of presidential success—congressional parties gain and lose seats based on the battles won and lost by the president. This gives legislators (not) of his party an incentive to see his agenda implemented (defeated). Studying both the causes and consequences of presidential success in Congress is meant to integrate theories of the two institutions along with extant theories of party behavior.

The Importance of Policy Scope to Presidential Success in Congress

The topic of presidential-congressional relations is well studied, with scholars identifying party control as a strong predictor of presidential success in Congress. Although the research recognizes the importance of policy variation to explaining political processes, few have examined its impact on presidential success in Congress. This article holds that policy scope is important to explaining presidential success in Congress in that different policies engender different levels of conflict and participation in the legislative process. Using data on individual policy proposals from 1949 to 2006, I demonstrate that the policy scope of the president's legislative agenda not only affects the likelihood of presidential success, it also conditions the impact of expected effects on presidential success.

Strategic Position Taking and Presidential Influence in Congress

The rise and fall of presidential success in Congress remains a central puzzle in the literature. We model success as two interrelated processes: presidential position taking and Congress's decision to support or oppose the president. The analysis emphasizes the importance of strategic position taking in determining presidential success. We show that presidential approval significantly influences success, not only because it affects congressional behavior, but also because it shapes presidential decisions to take positions. Moreover, we explain that legislative success during the honeymoon period is driven by presidential position taking. Our findings highlight the role of a president's strategic decisions for theories explaining congressional‐executive relations.

Presidential Success on the Substance of Legislation

The topic of presidential success in Congress is central to the study of American politics. Yet existing research does not sufficiently assess the president's success at shaping the substance of legislation. To help remedy this deficiency, the authors measure the degree of presidential success on 191 important statutes from 1965 to 2000 and find that presidents typically accept significant concessions to ensure passage of legislation. Using factor and regression analyses, the authors demonstrate that several factors—including the presence of unified government, the president's approval ratings, and the point in a president's tenure—affect the extent to which the president receives what he wants concerning legislative content.

The Marginal and Time-Varying Effect of Public Approval on Presidential Success in Congress

We analyze the relationship between public approval and presidential success in Congress using time-varying parameter regression methods. Cues from constituency, ideology, and party dominate congressional vote choice, so the effect of public approval of the president is typically marginal. Because the strength of these primary cues varies through time, the effect of public approval on presidential success should also be time varying. Analysis of conflictual roll-call votes from 1953 through 2000 using the time-varying Kalman filter reveals that the effect of public approval on presidential success is marginal and changing through time. These models assume that the time variation is a stochastic process, and finding time-varying relationships may indicate model misspecification. Our theory, however, suggests that this time variation depends on a systematic factor—partisanship. A better specified model that allows systematic parameter variation confirms that the level of partisanship conditions the relationship between public approval and presidential success in Congress.

Divided Government and Democratic Presidents: Truman and Clinton Compared

Little consensus exists about the consequences of divided partisan control of American national institutions. Many scholars argue that with opposite parties controlling the presidency and Congress, the incentive for executive-legislative cooperation on policy issues is reduced (Cox and Kernell 1991, 4-8). Proponents of a responsible party system, like James Sundquist (1989), posit that unified control of the presidency and Congress is vital for presidential policy leadership. They are quick to point out, as Davidson (1988) reminds us, that eras of true legislative harmony, while few and far between in this country, have always occurred when a single party controlled both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue (p. 18). Yet, empirical studies of the impact of divided government have produced decidedly mixed results because of scholars' different research foci. McCubbins (1991) finds evidence that divided government contributed to the budget deficits of the 1980s that have only recently come under control. On the question of presidential success in Congress, roll call victory ratios are conditioned by the size and unity of party factions in Congress, with minority presidents' positions more likely to fail when the opposition majority party is cohesive (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Oppenheimer 1996). Adding to the controversy is David Mayhew's (1991) extensive treatment of legislative productivity. Gauging the amount of innovative legislation adopted in the postwar period, Mayhew finds that the number of laws adopted remains relatively constant despite the partisan configuration of institutions. But reversing the question to analyze legislation that did not pass, Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) find that divided government leads to more legislative failures. This research adds to the debate about the effect of divided government by examining executive-legislative relations under Truman and Clinton after midterm elections reversed party control of Congress. Truman and Clinton share the dubious distinction of being the only two Democratic presidents to face Republican majorities in Congress since World War II. Both had activist agendas, began their terms with a majority of Democrats in Congress, and suffered dramatic reversals of fortune. Political pundits were quick to draw analogies between Truman and Clinton, not only following the 1994 midterm elections but also during the 1996 campaign as Clinton mounted a comeback. But in the legislative realm, there is much more than meets the eye. Whereas Truman attempted and failed to obstruct the Grand Old Party (GOP) agenda, Clinton was much more effective in his ability to force compromise from Republican leaders and halt the Contract with America. This comparative case study of Truman and Clinton focuses on two main hypotheses about presidential-congressional relations from 1947-48 and 1995-96. The first is that in both periods, the new Republican majorities in Congress inverted the expected norm of presidential control of the legislative agenda. The 80th and 104th Congresses were characterized by congressionally led policy innovation that ran counter to the FDR model of a strong president leading Congress. By deconstructing David Mayhew's significant laws in the 80th and 104th Congress, this research shows that few of the innovative laws in either period originated with presidential proposals--a clear-cut impact of divided government that has been overlooked. The second hypothesis is that the structure of voting coalitions in Congress placed Clinton in a much stronger position to influence legislative outcomes than Truman. Prior quantitative studies of postwar executive-legislative relations have excluded Truman because of problems associated with identifying his legislative stands (Edwards 1980, 1989; Peterson 1990; Bond and Fleisher 1990). I construct a proximate measure of Truman's roll call success rate and congressional support for his legislative positions in the 80th Congress, which I compare with Clinton's in the 104th Congress. …

An Integrative Approach to Modeling Presidential Success in Congress

We propose and test an integrative multivariate model predicting aggregate annual presidential success on House and Senate roll calls from 1953 to 1994. We incorporate presidency-centered, Congress-centered, agenda, and timing variables in our analysis. Our results show that there are important similarities and dissimilarities across legislative chambers. For both chambers, the percentage of co-partisans of the president and when they came into office are important. A presidential honeymoon with Congress, however, is evident in the House of Representatives, but not in the Senate. Also, the House equation does a substantially better job of explaining the variation in presidential success than does the Senate equation. We argue that an integrative approach offers a more satisfactory statistical and substantive explanation of presidential success than an approach based on asingleperspective. The presidency-centered view of presidential-congressional relations emphasizes the importance of presidential skills, popularity, and personality in determining presidents' legislative success (Barber 1993; Hager and Sullivan 1994; Kellerman 1984; Neustadt 1960; Sullivan 1991). Sullivan (1991), for example, finds that presidents have the ability to increase their initial levels of support in Congress. Moreover, he finds that presidential popularity influences the presidents' ability to sway members from their initial positions. A view competes with this perspective, which highlights the partisan and ideological composition of Congress as the primary determinant of legislative victory or defeat (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards 1989; Oppenheimer 1993). The acceptance of the Congress-centered view is based on the dominance of party affiliation in individual-level regression models predicting presidential support, and of chamber party composition in aggregate-level models of presidential agreement or success in getting legislation passed; in contrast, presidency centered variables (such as the president's Gallup approval ratings or perceived levels of legislative skill) have weak and inconsistent effects in such models. Obviously, neither perspective should be overemphasized, and some scholars have called for a more balanced, tandem perspective (Jones 1994; Peterson 1990). According to this point of view, it is rare for either Congress or the president to win or lose a legislative battle unambiguously, and each player has a significant role in determining the outcome. These studies tend to combine the quantitative approach emphasized by the congress-centered literature with the qualitative approach stressed by the presidency-centered scholars. In recent years, political scientists have introduced yet another way to view presidential congressional relations. They suggest looking beyond the participants in the legislative process and examining the nature of the process itself. This perspective-which we might call the structural perspectiveincludes a variety of factors. There are temporal factors, such as the trends and cycles in presidential influence and the election calendar. Presidents, for example, might be advantaged by an influx of new members who are elected along with the president. These new members might be especially loyal to the wishes of the president. After an intervening election has passed, however, the impetus of new members of the president's party to be especially supportive might dissipate. Institutional factors, such as the differences in rules across legislative chambers, might contribute to an explanation of presidential success. Last, agenda factors, such as whether the issue under consideration is foreign or domestic policy or if the issue is one favored or initiated by the president as opposed to wholly independent congressional proposals might play a role. While some of these variables have been examined in earlier work on the presidency, the research that specifically employs this perspective is of reasonably recent vintage (for example, Brace and Hinckley 1992; Covington, Wrighton, and Kinney 1995; Jones 1994; Light 1989; Skorownek 1993; Sullivan 1991). …

An Integrative Approach to Modeling Presidential Success in Congress

An Integrative Approach to Modeling Presidential Success in Congress

The "Two Presidencies" in Future Research: Moving Beyond Roll-Call Analysis

The two presidencies literature ostensibly seeks to determine whether presidents exercise more power over foreign policy than over domestic policy. In a laudable effort to be rigorous, scholars have sought to answer the question by examining roll-call voting in Congress. Doing so, however, changes the question from the power of the president versus Congress to the success of the president in Congress. Because presidents act without the approval of Congress far more often on foreign policy than they do on domestic policy, the two questions are not identical. Even with the narrower question of presidential success in Congress, several methodological problems cast doubt on the validity of previous studies. Future research needs to confront the problems plaguing roll-call analysis, and it needs to revisit the original question of how presidential influence varies across policy domains.

Measuring Presidential Success in Congress: Alternative Approaches

There are numerous obstacles to studying presidential-congressional relations. One of the most difficult to overcome is measuring presidential success. This article addresses the theoretical significance of the choice of measures, and develops and analyzes four alternative indices of presidential support in Congress. It concludes that usually it is best to employ individual-level measures of presidential support and that, although different measures produce similar results, it is useful to rely on both broad and exclusive measures in one's research.

Presidential Popularity and Congressional Voting: a Reexamination of Public Opinion as a Source of Influence in Congress

IN ORDER to achieve his policy goals, the President must persuade Congress to support his preferences. Richard Neustadt (1960) suggests that the President's task is eased considerably if he is popular with the public. More recent quantitative studies tend to supports Neustadt's conclusions (Edwards 1976, 1977, 1980; Bond and Fleisher 1980). Although the findings of these studies have gained wide acceptance, major conceptual and methodological flaws in the analyses raise doubts about the importance of public opinion as a source of presidential influence in Congress. The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the link between the President's popularity with the public and the success of his policy preferences in Congress using a research design that corrects some of the major problems in previous studies. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section reviews and critiques past research on the relationship between public opinion and presidential success in Congress. The second section describes the data and measures used in our analysis. The third section presents results indicating that the effect of public opinion on presidential success in Congress is more limited than previous work would suggest, while the final section offers conclusions and possible explanations of the limited influence of public opinion on presidential-congressional relations.

Response to Critics

Previous articleNext article No AccessCommunicationsResponse to CriticsLee SigelmanLee Sigelman Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 43, Number 2May, 1981 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2130387 Views: 2Total views on this site Citations: 5Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1981 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Todd Shields, Chi Huang Executive Vetoes, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 431–457.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500402James M. Lindsay, Wayne P. Steger The "Two Presidencies" in Future Research: Moving Beyond Roll-Call Analysis, Congress & the Presidency 20, no.22 (Mar 2010): 103–118.https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469309507874Bradford S. Jones The "Two Presidencies" Thesis and the Reagan Administration, Congress & the Presidency 18, no.11 (Mar 1991): 17–35.https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469109507905RICHARD J. STOLL THE SOUND OF THE GUNS, American Politics Quarterly 15, no.22 (Nov 2016): 223–237.https://doi.org/10.1177/004478087015002002 George C. Edwards III Measuring Presidential Success in Congress: Alternative Approaches, The Journal of Politics 47, no.22 (Oct 2015): 667–685.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130902