Presidential Agency Research Articles

Urgency of Online Petition to guarantee the Freedom of Speech and Participate Rights in Government

The freedom to express ideas and participate in the government is often manifested through democratic voting or involvement in general elections, but the processes taking place in elections cannot fully ensure that the members of the public can get their rights to the freedom of speech and participation in the government. With doctrinal legal method, this research has found that there seems to be an urgency to initiate an online petition platform in Indonesia as an alternative channel accessible to all the members of the public in order to optimize the exercise of the freedom of speech and equal participation in the government. Online petition systems have been around in Indonesia for quite some time, initiated and managed by change.org as a private organization along with other non-governmental organizations, but the legal loophole regarding online petitions that represent public participation in forming policies has not been capable of guaranteeing the attention or responses from the government over particular issues. In order to gain more perspectives, this article compare the online petition systems in the US and South Korea that were initiated by presidential agencies, and also the online petition in Germany that is under the direct management of the Petition Committee bellow the parliament (Bundestag). Therefore, it is concluded that Indonesian president has the power to rule the government in order to respond the urgency to give protection and fulfill Human Rights, especially freedom of speech and the rights to participate in the government by setting the legal basis.

Burocracias humanitarias en Colombia: conocimiento técnico y disputas políticas en la implementación de la Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras

Through an ethnographic study of the policy of reparation to victims in Colombia, this article examines the processes of the production of expert knowledge along different scales and disputes of humanitarian bureaucracies in Colombia. These emerge from the institutional deployment of development and peacebuilding paradigms, at least since 1982, with the creation of the National Rehabilitation Plan (PNR), the Social Solidarity Network (RSS) in 1994, the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation in 2002, and the Department of Social Prosperity (DPS) in 2011. With the subjugation of some paramilitary groups in 2006 (Justice and Peace Law), the Victims and Land Restitution Law in 2011, and the peace agreements with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army (FARC-EP) guerrillas in 2016, transitional institutions associated with truth, justice, and reparation proliferated, and with them, specific bureaucracies and expertise. Thus, the article specifically examines the technical and political tensions between different professional and ideological configurations associated with the implementation of reparations policy and how these disputes are essential to understanding the moral and ideological dimensions of humanitarianism and development in Colombia. It also studies the role of cooperation agencies in inter-institutional strengthening as a specific dimension of the formation of the Colombian State. These articulations configure a moral economy of humanitarianism characterized by institutional experimentalism and the formulation of social projects, expectations, plans, and ideas that never reach the status of having been realized. This strips such policies of any transformative or emancipatory potential. Thus, from an ethnographic perspective, the article provides an account of the techno-political tensions of humanitarian bureaucracies at the middle scales of regional, national, and global institutional structures.

The Institutional Presidency in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis

This article focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency in six Latin American presidential democracies since the last wave of redemocratization. Institutional presidency refers to the bulk of agencies that operate under direct presidential authority and are in charge of supporting the presidential leadership. We document all structural changes occurring under the umbrella of the president for the period of analysis. We find that the expansion in the number of presidential agencies is a deliberate response to situations of conflict or weakness. It is more likely under coalitional presidentialism—when presidents must share cabinet positions and manage relationships with coalition partners—as well as when presidents implement structural reform policies to face critical economic circumstances.

The Institutional Presidency from a Comparative Perspective: Argentina and Brazil since the 1980s

This paper focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency – meaning the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief of the executive – in Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s. It investigates what explains the changes that have come about regarding the size of the institutional presidency and the types of agency that form it. Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system – that is, to the political challenges that the various presidents of the two countries have faced. Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the political environment. In particular, we argue that the type of government (coalition or single-party) has had consequences for the structure of the presidency or, in other words, that different cabinet structures pose different challenges to presidents. This factor has not played a significant role in presidency-related studies until now, which have hitherto mostly been based on the case of the United States. Our empirical references, the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, typical cases of coalitional as well as single-party presidentialism respectively allow us to show the impact of the type of government on the number and type of presidential agencies.

Key Considerations for the Future of American Environmental Policy

Lee writes that the OGR was the false dawn of the communications age in American politics and government. It foretold the coming of the information-drenched twenty-first century ... As a presidential agency dedicated to communications, OGR was a forerunner of the institutionalization of such efforts within the modern White House as well as government-by-publicity (6). McClellan shows us the dangers of misusing that twenty-first-century communication capacity.

Development of Organizational Memory in Presidential Agencies

This article models how organizational memory develops and applies that model to three presidential agencies. Such memory is information generated within an organization, providing a sense of identity and an ability to learn. It enables staff agencies to ground information and advice to the president in sound historical knowledge. Presidential demands and extrapresidential responsibilities influence six organizational features, which in turn affect how memory develops. Usually, presidential requirements disrupt memory, and extrapresidential demands facilitate it. Data from staff interviews allow application of the model to staff components of the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council on Environmental Quality. As expected, OMB receives the most extrapresidential pressures and the fewest presidential demands, and its organizational features help memory to develop. NSC depends on the president alone, and its features deter memory development. CEQ receives few external demands from any source, and its features mildly support some types of memories. Hence OMB has the most extensive memory, strongest learning capability, and clearest identity; NSC has the least memory, learning capacity, and sense of identity; and the CEQ's memory results in strong identity but weak learning.

The Budget Bureau That Was: Thoughts on the Rise, Decline, and Future of a Presidential Agency

On July i, I970, during its fiftieth year, the United States Bureau of the Budget nominally ceased to exist. Its function, personnel, and traditions were transferred to the Office of Management and Budget, a new unit within the Executive Office of the President with a potentially broader mission than its predecessor carried.' From the point of view of bureaucratic continuity, the line of authority established in the Budget and Accounting Act of 192I has been perpetuated. But on the premise that organizations ordinarily are restructured only after they have declined, not at the peak of their capabilities, this article discusses the inadequacies which led to the decease of the Bureau, once the premier institution in the President's Office. And on the presumption that reorganizations rarely work out exactly as intended, we will examine the prospects for the Office of Management and Budget. It is difficult to make a case that the Bureau was inadequate for its various roles, for it always was graced with a favorable public image. Periodically, the Bureau was featured in the media as a valiant guardian of the purse, its directors as embattled enemies of spend-lust bureaucrats, its examiners as men working without honor or acclaim to combat the predatory wiles of federal agencies. The Bureau's image was enhanced by the absence of serious scandal or impropriety; even when there were visible shortcomings in the budget process (such as the gross underestimation of the costs of the Vietnam War and the miscalculation of the I97I budget deficit), the Bureau managed to escape severe opprobrium. This sheltered existence was due in good part to the Bureau's presidential mission and cloistered mode of operation. Only a portion of the Bureau's reality was open to public view, and in a town that often seems to thrive on a fishbowl existence, the Bureau was spared close scrutiny. Few leaks emanated from the Bureau and not many newsmen or scholars penetrated its curtain of secrecy and bureaucratic routines. Most journal articles relate to the directorship of Harold Smith (I939-I945), a period during which the Bureau became the central management arm of the federal government.2 There is almost nothing in the public record concerning the opera-

Approaches to Staffing the Presidency: Notes on FDR and JFK

It has been a quarter century since the President's Committee on Administration Management, chaired by Louis Brownlow, blessed by Franklin Roosevelt, heralded a major innovation in our constitutional arrangements: substantial staffing for the Presidency distinct from other parts of the executive establishment —in Edward Corwin's phrase an “Institutionalized Presidency.” The Executive Office, which throughout our prior history had been essentially a “private office” in the English sense, was to become a “President's Department.” So it did. Presidential agencies have filled the building which in 1937 housed the State Department (and in 1913 had housed War and Navy, too). Presidential aides outrank in all but protocol the heads of most executive departments.We date this development from Brownlow's Report. In the sphere of presidential staffing, its proposals for the most part were put into practice with promptness and fidelity. And practice, for the most part, has been kind to the proposals, has sustained—indeed has vindicated—key ideas behind them. What a rare experience for an advisory report! It gives the work of the Committee special standing which we properly acknowledge as we meet professionally in 1963, the Silver Anniversary of their devoted service to the country and to our profession.

Presidential Leadership: The Inner Circle and Institutionalization

O-NE OF THE SIGNIFICANT trends of the past two decades is the kJ development of the President's staff as an institution. From a purely staff service it is fast developing into an agency that also formulates and coordinates policies at the highest level.2 The White House staff now employs 389 people. Since 1939 this immediate headquarters of the President's activities has been ringed by the Executive Office of the President. In the latter are now included the Bureau of the Budget, the National Security Resources Board, the Economic Adviser, the National Security Council, and the Office of Defense Mobilization.3 Each of these aforementioned agencies in the Executive Office of the President has been created by law and now constitutes an institutionalized part of the President's apparatus.4 One of the principal functions of Presidential agencies is the formulation of plans and policies for executive action. In the first two terms of Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration the most pressing problems dealt with economic recovery and reform policies. When Roosevelt assumed office in 1933, there existed no staff agencies to supply advice to the President. As we shall more fully elaborate, Roosevelt relied upon his closest informal advisors to fill this need. Thirteen years later, in 1946, Congress enacted the Full Employment Act which expressed a new and historic commitment on the part of the

Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion

Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion

Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Herman Miles Somers

<i>Presidential Agency: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion</i>. Herman Miles Somers

Presidential Agency, OWMR: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, by Herman Miles Somers

Presidential Agency, OWMR: The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, <i>by Herman Miles Somers</i>

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEWS Get access Wartime Economic Co-operation: A Study of Relations between Canada and the United States. By R. Warren James. Toronto: Ryerson Press. $5.00. OWMR: Presidential Agency. By H. M. Somers. Harvard University Press (London: Cumberlege). 30s. Planning in Practice. By Ely Devons. Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d. PAUL N. YLVISAKER PAUL N. YLVISAKER Paul Ylvisaker is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Parliamentary Affairs, Volume IV, Issue 3, 1950, Pages 391–394, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pa.a052814 Published: 01 January 1950