Presidential Activism Research Articles

Presidential Activism on Social Media: Multidimensional Analysis and Empirical Examination of Presidential Twitter Use in Europe

Since the advent of mass media, ‘going public’ has been a key tool in the strategic inventory of presidents seeking to promote their policies to politicians and the public. Over the last decade, social media has offered presidents and their office with a new platform to address the nation directly without relying on traditional media gatekeepers. Nevertheless, both ‘going public’ strategies and presidents’ use of social media have almost exclusively been researched in the context of the presidential systems. The aim of this article is to extend research and offer the first systematic study of presidential Twitter use in European semi-presidential systems. We conceptualise presidential Twitter use as a form of presidential activism that is complementary to the use of formal powers or informal attempts to influence policy. Whereas the latter are driven by institutional or partisan conflict, going public strategies and presidential Twitter use primarily address societal concerns and, hence, are motivated by contextual factors outside the core realm of party politics. Instead, we should expect social conflict and societal grievances to determine demand and supply of presidential Twitter use. We test our propositions using a new dataset of tweets by presidents in European semi-presidential systems 2010–2020.

Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism: Czech presidents compared

Abstract This article analyses the use of powers by Czech presidents Václav Havel (1993–2003), Václav Klaus (2003–2013) and Miloš Zeman (2013–2023). The text is based on the concept of presidential activism, empirically examining mainly their interactions with governments and legislative vetoes. The results show that important incentives for presidential activism are non-cohesive coalition governments, minority governments, slim government majorities in parliament, the collapse of governments and a chaotic parliament. On the other hand, the internal cohesion of a government acts as a constraint on presidential activism. Popularly elected Zeman interpreted his powers much more widely in appointing and removing governments and ministers than Havel or Klaus, who were elected by parliament. By contrast, Zeman used his legislative powers less than his two predecessors, which was apparently influenced by their low success (with some exceptions) in this area. The president’s political proximity to the government was found to only sometimes limit his agility. Czech presidents have rarely been passive. A specific factor that affected activism, albeit only to a limited extent, was the poor health of Havel and Zeman at certain moments. To reduce systemic risks in the future, it would be useful to define more precisely the rules for appointing and dismissing a government and individual ministers.

Presidential Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Explaining Variation Among Semi-Presidential Countries

This article seeks to explain variations in presidential activism in semi-presidential countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa is one of the continents where semi-presidentialism is most prevalent, but the dynamics of intra-executive relations are severely understudied. The four case studies discussed here—the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Cabo Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe—belong to the premier-presidential subtype. In this exploratory study, we aim to examine how institutional dimensions of premier-presidentialism interact with contextual factors to explain variations in presidential activism among Sub-Saharan African countries. In addition to fundamental contextual differences among the two pairs of countries, francophone and lusophone, there are specific institutional factors associated with the design and operation of premier-presidentialism that contribute to greater presidential activism in the two francophone cases. Taken together, these contextual and institutional factors skew effective executive power heavily toward the president in our francophone countries. We also find that the degree of political institutionalization matters for the impact of presidential activism on intra-executive conflict and government policymaking capacity. The article increases our understanding of the operation of semi-presidentialism in this understudied region, underscoring the importance of both contextual and constitutional factors for explaining variations in presidential activism in Africa.

Routine Presidential Activism by Going Public under Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes

Presidential research commonly focuses on the most prominent cases of going public by presidents in semi-presidential regimes: such as expressing a lack of trust in the cabinet members. However, it is also important to understand the day-to-day functioning of semi-presidential republics and routine efforts by the presidents to insert themselves into government decisions. Moreover, presidents in parliamentary republics may also try to influence the government through the power of the public word. In this article, we conceptualize going public as an instance when a president weighs in on the performance of the cabinet and/or individual minister in the media. We analyze the focus and intensity of these instances in semi-presidential (Lithuania) and parliamentary (Latvia) regimes. Our main finding is that on average, presidents are more routinely active in public under semi-presidentialism. We also find that the intensity and focus of presidential attention on the cabinet are highly correlated to the media attention. Furthermore, presidents go public more often during the first year of their terms and pay more attention to foreign and defense policy than to other areas. Our results tend to support the presidency-centered arguments that emphasize the institutional prerogatives and political culture in the explanation of presidential activism.

Presidential Activism and Success in Foreign and Defence Policy: A Study of Portugal’s Premier-Presidential Regime

This article investigates presidents’ foreign and defence policy activism under Portugal’s premier-presidential system from 1982 to 2021. First, the article discusses the extant literature on intra-executive conflicts in semi-presidential systems. Then, it provides an overview of Portugal’s experience with semi-presidentialism since 1976 and the powers of the Portuguese president. The third section describes all significant foreign and defence policy presidential interventions from 1982 to 2021 that resulted in disputes with the prime minister. This section estimates presidents’ and prime ministers’ ex-ante preferences over the issues at stake. We verify which preference is closest to the ex-post content of the policy implemented – if it is the president’s, it counts as a presidential win. We identify the formal and informal means by which presidents acted. Informal means are essentially going public tactics. In addition, we inductively pin down the necessary and sufficient conditions under which presidents intervene and succeed. The article’s main findings are two: first, the president’s second term, absence of a strictly unified executive and a majority cabinet are separately necessary but jointly sufficient for presidential interventions to occur; second, formal powers are a necessary but insufficient condition for presidential victory. Finally, we speculate on the policy, institutional, and electoral consequences of presidential activism.

Prime ministers, presidents and ministerial selection in Lithuania

ABSTRACT In the semi-presidential system of Lithuania, a tradition to elect non-partisan presidents coexists with re-occurring conflicts between prime ministers and presidents over cabinet composition. We investigate what factors increase the probability of presidential activism in this field, i.e. when the president attempts to affect ministerial selection. We explain the outcomes of such activism by the electoral cycles and the political weakness of prime ministers and their party governments. More specifically, we argue that prime ministers are most vulnerable to presidential activism right after presidential elections and when they do not enjoy strong support in parliament. We test these hypotheses with a data set chronicling all instances of competition between the prime ministers and presidents over ministerial selection. The quantitative analysis is supplemented with qualitative insights from interviews with former cabinet members and high-level officials.

Why dictators veto: legislation, legitimation and control in Kazakhstan and Russia

ABSTRACT Why do authoritarian presidents still use their legislative power? Although recent studies have argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than “rubberstamps” and can serve as arenas for elite bargaining over policy, there is no evidence that legislators would pass bills that go against presidential preferences. This article investigates this apparent paradox and proposes a theoretical framework to explain presidential activism in authoritarian regimes. It argues that any bills that contravene constraints on policy-making set by the president should generally be stopped or amended by other actors loyal to the regime. Thus, presidents will rather use their veto (1) to protect the regime’s output legitimacy and stability, and/or (2) to reinforce their power vis-à-vis other actors. The argument is tested using two case studies of veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia over the last 10 years. The analysis supports the propositions of the theoretical framework and furthermore highlights the potential use of vetoes as a means of distraction, particularly in relation to international audiences. The article extends research on presidential veto power to authoritarian regimes and its findings contribute to the growing literature on the activities of authoritarian legislatures.

Presidential activism and government termination in dual-executive Ukraine

ABSTRACTThe limits on presidential authority in premier-presidential regimes permit legislatures to wield preeminent influence over government formation and termination. This article shows that even without formal powers to dismiss the prime minister, the president may play a decisive role in government replacement. The article compares three successful and one failed attempt by the president to unseat the prime minister in Ukraine under a premier-presidential system. Based on a review of the significance of 10 variables accounting for presidential activism, it finds that the president’s informal control over institutional veto players as well as the unity of his party faction and cooperation of opposition groups were necessary for the success of attempted cabinet turnover.

Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidential regimes, we still know very little about the actual coordination between the president and the prime minister. Through an in-depth analysis of Lithuanian semi-presidentialism, this article underscores the importance of institutional design on intra-executive balance of power. Drawing primarily on interviews with top-level civil servants and office-holders, it argues that in the absence of written rules or other strong norms guiding intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of operation. Coordination depends on the initiative of the president, with ad hoc practices further weakening the position of the prime minister. While Lithuanian semi-presidentialism has functioned smoothly, the personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European countries create favourable conditions for presidential activism.

Presidents, Assembly Dissolution, and the Electoral Performance of Prime Ministers

Many European presidents have extensive constitutional powers to affect the timing of early parliamentary elections, which enables them to influence when incumbent governments must face the electorate. This article examines whether presidents use their assembly dissolution powers for partisan benefit. To date, presidential activism in the electoral arena of parliamentary and semipresidential democracies remains poorly understood. We hypothesize that presidents use their powers to influence election calling for the advantage of their political allies in government. To test this argument, we use data on 190 elections in 18 European democracies. Our results suggest that presidents with significant dissolution powers are able to shape the electoral success of incumbents. Prime ministers whose governments are allied to such presidents realize a vote and seat share bonus of around 5%. These findings have implications for our understanding of presidential activism, strategic parliamentary dissolution, and electoral accountability.

Theodore Roosevelt and the Image of Presidential Activism

Today, opponents of every president complain that the object of their criticism has prevailed in the public mind through his devious manipulation of the news media-his use (or abuse) of public relations and hype, press management and rhetoric. Hackneyed as this allegation is today, in Theodore Roosevelt's day it was relatively novel. For not until TR entered the White House did American presidents fully exploit the media; not until his presidency did they fully conceive of their work as promoting an agenda on behalf of the democratic masses. To be sure, all democratic leaders are ultimately answerable to the people; and it is also true that presidents since Washington have carefully superintended their images. But by and large 19th-century presidents didn't actively try to steer the nation along their preferred policy course. That daunting task-which Roosevelt not only embraced but made a condition of presidential success-required using modern tools and techniques of public persuasion that were newly available to TR: generating stories for the mass-circulation newspapers; touring the country to speak on behalf of a policy agenda; hiring dedicated officials to help shape the public discourse on key issues. In these ways Roosevelt turned the presidency into a public platform-and with it, an activist office-as no one had before.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court (review)

Reviewed by: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court Amos Kiewe Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Transformation of the Supreme Court. Edited by Stephen K. Shaw, William D. Pederson, and Frank J. Williams. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004; pp 271. $22.95 paper. This edited volume investigates Franklin Roosevelt's "Court-packing" scheme of 1937 and the ensuing crisis thereof. The study seeks to prove that despite the immediate setback and criticism, Roosevelt did bring significant changes to [End Page 709] the makeup of the Supreme Court and the judiciary. More importantly, Roosevelt's social agenda changed the course of presidential activism. What on the surface appeared to be Roosevelt's miscalculation had both reason and context. This study puts Roosevelt's action in context to show that the president had to find a way to confront a Supreme Court that invalidated many of the New Deal's legislative programs. Roosevelt also found himself in the awkward and rare position of having completed a full term without being able to appoint a single justice to the Court (yet by the fourth term, he would appoint seven of the nine justices). Roosevelt was thus compelled to act to ensure that the many changes he had implemented in overcoming the Great Depression and the collapse of the U.S. economy would not be overturned. The volume is divided into three parts with several chapters covering the theme of a given part. Part 1 tracks the events leading to Roosevelt's attempts to change the direction of the Supreme Court, covering important judicial developments that led to the crisis of 1937. Part 2 tracks the careers of key individuals in the 1937 crisis such as justices Charles Evans Hughes, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and William Douglas. This section delves into judicial and political background and their impact on the "Court-packing" case. Part 3 examines the impact of the "Court-packing" attempt on future legislation in areas such as civil rights, religion, First Amendment, and the legacy of Roosevelt's attempts to change the direction of the Supreme Court. The various chapters are well written and well researched. The volume seeks and succeeds in taking a balanced view of Roosevelt's action and impact. The strength of the book is in giving readers an appropriate context from which to assess Roosevelt's action in seeking to change the direction of the Supreme Court. The discussion is limited when the various writers contemplate rhetorical, symbolic, and relational aspects of this presidential and judicial clash. For example, the discussion on Roosevelt and the Supreme Court alludes to "the symbolic presidency" but this discussion is not fully developed to realize Roosevelt's actions as rhetorical rather than political or that the New Deal and the famous first 100 days were highly rhetorical. In other words, Roosevelt often sought political changes through symbolic and rhetorical means. The volume excels when assessing the public image of the Supreme Court up to 1937 and the significant changes thereafter. This discussion details specific Supreme Court cases that led to Roosevelt's growing frustration with the Court (such as Home Building and Loan v. Blaisdell and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States). By 1935, Roosevelt was alarmed to see major portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) being struck down as unconstitutional. Despite the strong criticism Roosevelt suffered after his attempt to add justices to the Court, two of his key "opponents" changed their votes in subsequent cases, thus bringing the change Roosevelt sought. Indeed, a significant [End Page 710] shift in the Supreme Court's ruling had taken place already by 1937, proving Roosevelt's contentions all along. The shift is not only in the direction of specific cases but in the Court's overall increased activity and involvement. Roosevelt's task, well documented in the volume, was difficult and risky. He was severely criticized by many newspaper editorials but in the end, Roosevelt prevailed, not by resorting to coercion but by persuasion. Yet, on balance, Roosevelt's interpretation of executive power was beyond constitutional precedents. His New Deal legislation was grounded on the political need of the president to take all necessary measures during...

From Semi‐presidentialism to Parliamentary Government: Political and Constitutional Developments in Finland

Within the framework of a ‘mixed constitution’, the Finnish political system wavered during a period of 80 years between genuine parliamentarism and effective semi‐presidential rule. The new constitution, adopted in the parliament almost unanimously and carried into effect on 1 March 2000, aimed to reduce the powers of the president and to bind the exercise of the president’s remaining powers more tightly to the cooperation of the parliamentary government. The constitution will act as a buffer, preventing any recurrence of the presidential activism of the 1960s and 1970s, and the political climate is in fact amenable to the further development of parliamentary modes of operation. It is clearly to be expected that the strengthening of the parliament–government axis and the reduction of the president’s powers will distance the head of state from the everyday policy making and emphasize his or her role as a support of the government of the time, a moderator in conflicts and a mirror of popular opinion. In the future, the functioning of the political system will not be directed so much by reference to the political capital and personal activities of the president, but rather by reference to the parliamentary constellation, party interrelations and the ebb and flow of governing coalitions.

The Presidency, Social Movements, and Contentious Change: Lessons from the Woman's Suffrage and Labor Movements

No less than other specialized research fields in political science and history, presidency scholarship can exemplify many conceits regarding the causal power and transformative effects that its primary subject, the executive office, bestows on American politics. Studies old and new the of the presidency as perhaps the most crucial engine of contentious change in U.S. political development. presidential government, Americans have established one of the most powerful political institutions in the free world, James MacGregor Burns asserted in 1965. They have fashioned, sometimes unwittingly, a weapon that has served them well in the long struggle for freedom and equality at home.(1) In one of the most important recent works on the presidency, Politics Presidents Make, Stephen Skowronek similarly depicts the executive office as a blunt disruptive force whose deep-seated impulse to reorder things jolts order and routine elsewhere. Although Skowronek does not embrace Burns's vision of a heroic presidency, he does find that the routinely disrupts established power arrangements and continually opens new avenues of political activity for others.(2) These studies place the presidency at the vanguard of change in American politics, a governing whose occupants are compelled to persistently challenge and remake the existing political order. A growing literature on the executive office and racial politics contests this portrait of a transformative presidency. Far from being agents of contentious change, presidents are depicted in this scholarly work as staunch guardians of prevailing economic, social, and political arrangements. In a sweeping study of the presidency and race, Kenneth O'Reilly argues that the imperatives of elections and majoritarian politics in the United States made incumbents reactionary opponents of civil rights reform. At root, it nothing more than a belief that presidential elections can be won only by following the doctrines and rituals of white over black, he notes. The pecking order has stayed that way through the death of slavery and Jim Crow, and notwithstanding Lincoln and Johnson, our presidents have in nearly every other case made it their job to keep that order.(3) According to scholars such as Russell Riley and Thomas Langston, executive caution and resistance on questions of racial justice also reflect the presidency's role as a nation-maintaining institution whose occupants portray themselves ... as the embodiment of the whole nation.(4) For most of our presidents, they argue, social movement challenges to prevailing racial structures do not fit comfortably with executive imperatives to secure domestic tranquility and national unity. In contrast to the transformative model of the American presidency, Riley concludes that the presidency is fundamentally a change-resistant institution.(5) These contrasting portraits of the American presidency raise enormously important theoretical questions. Most obvious, does executive power and leadership propel or frustrate major change in American politics? In particular, what the relationship between the American presidency and efforts to secure greater freedom and equality of democratic citizens in the United States? Finally, if the presidency in fact a cautious resistant to contentious change, then how do we account for episodic bursts of presidential activism on behalf of controversial reforms that enhance the freedom and equality of citizens? This article begins to answer these daunting questions by investigating two illuminating cases of presidential activism that helped produce major social and political breakthroughs, episodes that capture profound tensions between the presidency and social movements for greater democratic equality. first case examines the uneven relationship between the Woodrow Wilson administration and the woman's suffrage movement, and the second case focuses on the labor movement and its engagement with the Franklin D. …

The Disingenuous Presidency: Reagan’s Veto and the “Make-My-Day” President

AbstractIn many respects, the presidential veto is an under-appreciated litmus test of presidential activism and power with respect to the legislative realm. This article offers insights on the interplay of symbols and actions in the Reagan presidency by examining the administration’s use of veto powers and veto issues, including Reagan’s veto rhetoric versus reality, veto strategies, and veto threats. These examples support the conclusion that Reagan sought to narrow the gap between presidential expectations and presidential reality that dogs the modern presidency by pursuing a unique strategy: rather than lowering expectation-inflating rhetoric, or more aggressively pursuing conventional political solutions, the administration sought to transform rhetoric into reality, cultivating a “disingenuous presidency.”

The Impact of the Modern Presidency on Presidential Success in the U. S. Congress

This study investigates the impact of the modem presidency on presidential programmatic success with Congress. Specifically, this study tests for the effects that war, presidential activism, presidential electoral margins, and the strength and cohesion of the president's party have had on the president's ability to have his legislative program enacted by Congress. Much change consistent with theory about the modern presidency is found, though continuity of party effects across both premoder and modern presidencies is also found.

Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesPresidential Vetoes from Washington to NixonJong R. LeeJong R. Lee Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 37, Number 2May, 1975 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381600041268 Views: 24Total views on this site Citations: 27Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1975 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Philipp K?ker Introduction, (May 2017): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_1Philipp Köker Determinants of Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 23–54.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_2Philipp Köker The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Central and Eastern Europe, (May 2017): 55–90.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_3Philipp Köker Patterns and Specifics: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Findings on Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 211–243.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_7Tobias T. Gibson, Lake Moore Institutional Presidency, (Jul 2016): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052595Dave Bridge Return to Spender: The Electoral Connection’s Effect on Veto Challenges and Overrides, The Forum 13, no.22 (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2015-0017Dean Keith Simonton The Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders: Quantitative Multiple-Case Assessments, (Jan 2014): 53–69.https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472038_4B. DAN WOOD Pontificating About Moe's Pontifications, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no.44 (Dec 2009): 805–818.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2009.03708.xChristopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. Marshall Assessing Presidential Power, American Politics Research 37, no.33 (Oct 2008): 508–533.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08324426Nolan McCarty Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?, The Journal of Politics 71, no.22 (Jul 2015): 369–384.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090331Carl E. Klarner, Andrew Karch Why Do Governors Issue Vetoes? The Impact of Individual and Institutional Influences, Political Research Quarterly 61, no.44 (Dec 2008): 574–584.https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314200Eric Magar Executive Vetoes as Electoral Stunts: A Model with Testable Predictions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486804Eric Magar The Incidence of Executive Vetoes in Comparative Perspective: The Case of American State Governments, 1979-1999, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491112David R. Mayhew Suggested Guidelines for Periodization, Polity 37, no.44 (Nov 2016): 531–535.https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300025 John B. Gilmour Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto, The Journal of Politics 64, no.11 (Oct 2015): 198–218.https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00124Richard S. Conley Presidential Influence and Minority Party Liaison on Veto Overrides, American Politics Research 30, no.11 (Jul 2016): 34–65.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030001002Richard S. Conley, Amie Kreppel Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides, Political Research Quarterly 54, no.44 (Dec 2001): 831–852.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400408Todd Shields, Chi Huang Executive Vetoes, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 431–457.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500402George A. Krause, David B. Cohen Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 458–481.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500403Todd G. Shields, Chi Huang Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model, Political Research Quarterly 48, no.33 (Sep 1995): 559–572.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299504800305Samuel B. Hoff The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality, Journal of Policy History 6, no.22 (Oct 2011): 188–208.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030600003717Samuel B. Hoff Saying No, American Politics Quarterly 19, no.33 (Nov 2016): 310–323.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9101900303Donald A. Gross GOVERNORS AND POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL CONCERNS AND ANALYTIC APPROACHES, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 764–787.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00818.xEric B. Herzik, Charles W. Wiggins GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES1, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 841–862.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00822.xDean Keith Simonton Presidential Inflexibility and Veto Behavior: Two Individual-Situational Interactions, Journal of Personality 55, no.11 (Mar 1987): 1–18.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1987.tb00425.xDean Keith Simonton The vice-presidential succession effect: Individual or situational basis?, Political Behavior 7, no.11 (Jan 1985): 79–99.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987263 Gary W. Copeland When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation, The Journal of Politics 45, no.33 (Oct 2015): 696–710.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130711

Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon

Previous articleNext article No AccessArticlesPresidential Vetoes from Washington to NixonJong R. LeeJong R. Lee Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 37, Number 2May, 1975 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381600041268 Views: 28Total views on this site Citations: 27Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1975 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Philipp K?ker Introduction, (May 2017): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_1Philipp Köker Determinants of Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 23–54.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_2Philipp Köker The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Central and Eastern Europe, (May 2017): 55–90.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_3Philipp Köker Patterns and Specifics: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Findings on Presidential Activism, (May 2017): 211–243.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51914-2_7Tobias T. Gibson, Lake Moore Institutional Presidency, (Jul 2016): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052595Dave Bridge Return to Spender: The Electoral Connection’s Effect on Veto Challenges and Overrides, The Forum 13, no.22 (Jan 2015).https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2015-0017Dean Keith Simonton The Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders: Quantitative Multiple-Case Assessments, (Jan 2014): 53–69.https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137472038_4B. DAN WOOD Pontificating About Moe's Pontifications, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39, no.44 (Dec 2009): 805–818.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2009.03708.xChristopher S. Kelley, Bryan W. Marshall Assessing Presidential Power, American Politics Research 37, no.33 (Oct 2008): 508–533.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08324426Nolan McCarty Presidential Vetoes in the Early Republic: Changing Constitutional Norms or Electoral Reform?, The Journal of Politics 71, no.22 (Jul 2015): 369–384.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381609090331Carl E. Klarner, Andrew Karch Why Do Governors Issue Vetoes? The Impact of Individual and Institutional Influences, Political Research Quarterly 61, no.44 (Dec 2008): 574–584.https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908314200Eric Magar Executive Vetoes as Electoral Stunts: A Model with Testable Predictions, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1486804Eric Magar The Incidence of Executive Vetoes in Comparative Perspective: The Case of American State Governments, 1979-1999, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2007).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1491112David R. Mayhew Suggested Guidelines for Periodization, Polity 37, no.44 (Nov 2016): 531–535.https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300025 John B. Gilmour Institutional and Individual Influences on the President's Veto, The Journal of Politics 64, no.11 (Oct 2015): 198–218.https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00124Richard S. Conley Presidential Influence and Minority Party Liaison on Veto Overrides, American Politics Research 30, no.11 (Jul 2016): 34–65.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X02030001002Richard S. Conley, Amie Kreppel Toward a New Typology of Vetoes and Overrides, Political Research Quarterly 54, no.44 (Dec 2001): 831–852.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400408Todd Shields, Chi Huang Executive Vetoes, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 431–457.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500402George A. Krause, David B. Cohen Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994, American Politics Quarterly 25, no.44 (Nov 2016): 458–481.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9702500403Todd G. Shields, Chi Huang Presidential Vetoes: An Event Count Model, Political Research Quarterly 48, no.33 (Sep 1995): 559–572.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299504800305Samuel B. Hoff The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality, Journal of Policy History 6, no.22 (Oct 2011): 188–208.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0898030600003717Samuel B. Hoff Saying No, American Politics Quarterly 19, no.33 (Nov 2016): 310–323.https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X9101900303Donald A. Gross GOVERNORS AND POLICYMAKING: THEORETICAL CONCERNS AND ANALYTIC APPROACHES, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 764–787.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00818.xEric B. Herzik, Charles W. Wiggins GOVERNORS VS. LEGISLATURES: VETOES, OVERRIDES, AND POLICY MAKING IN THE AMERICAN STATES1, Policy Studies Journal 17, no.44 (Jun 1989): 841–862.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1989.tb00822.xDean Keith Simonton Presidential Inflexibility and Veto Behavior: Two Individual-Situational Interactions, Journal of Personality 55, no.11 (Mar 1987): 1–18.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1987.tb00425.xDean Keith Simonton The vice-presidential succession effect: Individual or situational basis?, Political Behavior 7, no.11 (Jan 1985): 79–99.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987263 Gary W. Copeland When Congress and the President Collide: Why Presidents Veto Legislation, The Journal of Politics 45, no.33 (Oct 2015): 696–710.https://doi.org/10.2307/2130711

Linear Algebra and Legislative Voting Behavior: Rice's Indices

Previous articleNext article No AccessLinear Algebra and Legislative Voting Behavior: Rice's IndicesThomas W. CasstevensThomas W. Casstevens Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 32, Number 4Nov., 1970 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2128382 Views: 4Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1970 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Serhiy Kudelia Presidential activism and government termination in dual-executive Ukraine, Post-Soviet Affairs 34, no.44 (May 2018): 246–261.https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1465251Vilho Harle Actional Distances between the Socialist Countries in the 1960's, Cooperation and Conflict 6, no.3-43-4 (Nov 1971): 201–222.https://doi.org/10.1177/001083677100600305