Presence Of Technological Spillovers Research Articles

Privatization and innovation in a vertical structure

We investigate how upstream privatization affects downstream R&D investments and social welfare in a vertically-related industry with an upstream monopolistic firm and two downstream firms. One of the downstream firms can undertake R&D investments to reduce input coefficient. We examine two cases: private upstream monopoly versus public upstream monopoly, and show that the presence of a public upstream firm might reduce the downstream firm's motivation to invest in R&D. Compared to upstream nationalization, upstream privatization could lead to higher consumer surplus and social welfare, especially when the R&D process is significantly efficient. We further extend our analysis in three directions to show the implications of technology spillovers, upstream competition and downstream R&D competition. We show that our main results hold with the presence of technology spillovers, and under a successive Cournot oligopoly involving two upstream firms. When there is downstream R&D competition, upstream privatization always hurts consumers and social welfare. Our study yields valuable insights for privatization policies.

Technology spillovers, strategic environmental policy, and foreign direct investment

Empirical studies have so far failed to find conclusive evidence that a tightening of environmental regulation will shift foreign direct investment (FDI) to less regulated countries. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for the mixed results in the empirical literature and highlight the role of technological spillovers in explaining why FDI is not always attracted to low-regulation countries. In a Cournot duopoly with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, we show that the presence of technological spillovers may induce the foreign firm to relocate to the domestic country with stricter environmental regulation. This result holds for a wide range of values of technological spillovers. We also find that the domestic (foreign) country’s welfare is always higher (lower) with FDI.

Strategies of Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Technological Spillovers

In this paper we present a differential game model of two firms with different technologies producing the same good and selling in the same world market. The firm equipped with advanced technology is deciding whether to outsource parts of its production to the home country of its competitor, where wages and the level of technology are lower. Outsourcing reduces production costs but is associated with spillovers to the foreign competitor. The degree to which the foreign competitor can absorb these spillovers depends on its absorptive effort. Using numerical methods the properties of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this game are characterized and the implications of the variation of different key parameters are examined.

A Carbon Tax Credit Policy in the Presence of Technological Spillovers

We model an environmental policy problem with two representative firms in two countries (one for each country). Firms are subject to environmental taxation, aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, and a unilateral technological spillover takes place: one of the two countries (innovating country) is responsible for generating the technological spillover while the other country is the one benefiting from the spillover effect. Two different scenarios are analysed: one where countries do not cooperate and one where a single supranational authority is in charge of setting environmental policy. At first, both countries feature emissions taxation aimed at reducing CO2 emissions. In such a case, we show that the standard international externality applies, i.e. a suboptimal emission tax rate is set, leading to larger than efficient pollution. However, the tax rate is larger than marginal national damages in the innovating country due to the need to provide incentives towards technical change. Then we present a setting where the two countries are both subject to a national tax on emissions but the innovating country introduces a tax credit which is directly proportional to the innovative effort. In such a setting, we obtain counterintuitive results: interestingly, for a sufficiently large spillover, the tax rate in the non cooperative setting might exceed the one arising under cooperation.

Optimal foreign investment dynamics in the presence of technological spillovers

In this paper we present a dynamic model of a firm which is deciding whether to outsource parts of its production to a less developed economy where wages and the level of technology are lower. Outsourcing reduces production costs but is associated with spillovers to foreign potential competitors. Spillovers over time increase productivity of firms in the foreign country and make them stronger competitors on the common market. The paper analyzes the inter-temporally optimal behavior of the firm and shows that two outcomes are possible in the long-run. One outcome is that there is one steady state where the firm invests a positive amount in the foreign country and the other outcome is a continuum of steady states with no investment. The paper then derives conditions such that it is optimal for the firm to invest in the foreign country and characterizes different types of optimal dynamic investment patterns. In addition, using numerical dynamic optimization methods, the effect of the speed of technology adoption and of the wage differential on total labor income in the home country is studied taking into account the transition dynamics.

Corporate Control, Foreign Ownership Regulations and Technology Transfer*

Multinationals are often required to form joint ventures (JVs) with local firms when entering the host country market. Explicitly taking corporate control into account, we explore the relationship between technology transfer and foreign ownership regulation in the presence of technology spillovers from JVs to local firms. It is shown that foreign ownership regulations may facilitate both technology transfer and spillovers when the multinational has corporate control. Under corporate control by the local partner firm, however, such regulations may hamper technology transfer.

GROWTH, R&D AND WELFARE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY

ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes the normative side of an R&D growth model in which market structure and growth are jointly determined in the equilibrium of a one‐sector economy under monopolistic competition. We find that a distortion in the allocation of R&D, namely the presence of technological spillovers between firms, generates two market failures: insufficient growth and excessive entry of firms. We show that this result is driven by the interplay between market structure and growth. A simple tax/subsidy scheme to support the efficient solution is proposed.

Hub-and-Spokes Free Trade Agreements in the Presence of Technology Spillovers: An Application to the Western Hemisphere

Using a comparative-static general equilibrium model in the context of the Western Hemisphere, this paper compares the economic effects of a “hub-and-spokes” type of bilateral trade configuration (with Chile being the hub) with those of a more comprehensive regional FTA (namely, the FTAA). The model is augmented to account for the possibility of technology spillovers and its effective assimilation among participating economies. In particular, absorptive capacity, governance factor, proximity and socio-institutional congruence conjointly determine an economy’s capacity to capture the technology that is transmitted from the developed spoke United States to other regions.

Second-Best Climate Agreements and Technology Policy

Abstract We study second-best climate agreements in the presence of technology spillovers within and across countries, where the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of two types of international climate agreements when the inter-country externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. With an international agreement on emission quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower than the socially optimal subsidy. The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement instead dictates that a common carbon tax should be imposed in all countries. Under a quota agreement, total quotas should be set low enough for the price of carbon to exceed the Pigovian level, whereas the opposite may be true under a tax agreement. We also show that social costs are higher under a second-best tax agreement than under a second-best quota agreement.

Implications of Intellectual Property Rights for Dynamic Gains from Trade

A simple intellectual property rights (IPRs) framework is introduced into a dynamic quality ladder model of technological diffusion between innovating firms in one country and imitating firms in another country. The presence of technological spillovers and feedback effects between firms in the two countries demonstrates that, even when steady state growth increases, transition costs sometimes dominate steady state welfare gains. Most existing models of international IPRs find that high intellectual property enforcement in the imitating country leads to welfare gains in the innovating country at the expense of the imitating country. In contrast, we find IPR regimes that, even after accounting for transition costs, positively affect welfare in both countries. Preferred IPR regimes maintain competition from imitative activity but enforce some remuneration to innovators for the spillovers they generate. Well-designed IPR regimes imposed at the time of trade liberalization will be welfare enhancing for both regions relative to trade liberalization without IPR enforcement.

Implications of Intellectual Property Rights for Dynamic Gains from Trade

A simple intellectual property rights (IPRs) framework is introduced into a dynamic quality ladder model of technological diffusion between innovating firms in one country and imitating firms in another country. The presence of technological spillovers and feedback effects between firms in the two countries demonstrates that preferred IPR regimes are ones that positively affect world growth and hence welfare in both countries. Most existing models of international IPRs, however, generally find that high intellectual property enforcement in the imitating country leads to welfare gains in the innovating country at the expense of the imitating country. An well-designed IPR regime imposed at the time of trade liberalization will be welfare enhancing for both regions relative to trade liberalization without IPR enforcement. Moreover, the preferred IPR regime will be one that maintains competition from imitative activity but enforces some remuneration to innovators for the spillovers they generate.

Hub-and-Spokes Free-Trade-Agreements in the Presence of Technology Spillovers: An Application to the Western Hemisphere

Using a comparative-static general equilibrium model in the context of the Western Hemisphere, this paper compares the economic effects of a “hub-and-spokes” type of bilateral trade configuration (with Chile being the hub) with those of a more comprehensive regional FTA (namely, the FTAA). The model is augmented to account for the possibility of technology spillovers and its effective assimilation among participating economies. In particular, absorptive capacity, governance factor, proximity and socio-institutional congruence conjointly determine an economy’s capacity to capture the technology that is transmitted from the developed spoke United States to other regions.

A dynamic model of R&D competition

This study considers a dynamic model of R&D competition in a situation of no uncertainty with identical firms in a perfect foresight. We are going to find out about the effects of firms' absorptive capacity on R&D strategies in the presence of technological spillovers. The conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a feedback–Nash equilibrium on firms' R&D expense will be also discussed. Numerical simulations will show as the introduction of the absorptive capacity reduces the impact of spillovers degree on firms' R&D strategies.