Preferences For Income Redistribution Research Articles

Can conflict affect individuals’ preferences for income redistribution?

Can conflict affect individuals’ preferences for income redistribution?

Trust in political parties and ideological proximity voting in Europe: the role of trust in political parties as a heuristic mechanism

ABSTRACT Previous studies have investigated to what extent voters can achieve proximity between their preferences and the positions of the party they vote for. Combining data from the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we investigate whether trust in political parties increases ideological proximity voting. We argue that voters use their level of trust in parties as a heuristic mechanism. First, trust can increase proximity voting because citizens need to trust that political parties will take voters’ policy preferences into account when in government. Second, we examine whether low-trusting voters tend to cast a protest vote, and do not engage in ideological proximity voting. We test this assumption regarding three determinants of the vote choice: general left-right ideology views, preferences for income redistribution, and anti-immigrant sentiments. We find that ideological proximity voting is indeed moderated by trust: those who trust political parties are more likely to cast a vote based on their policy preferences, while those who distrust tend to vote for protest parties. Nevertheless, also among protest voters, trust is conducive for higher levels of proximity voting.

Preferences for Income Redistribution in Unequal Contexts: Changes in Latin America Between 2008 and 2018.

In a developing and highly unequal region like Latin America, it is crucial to understand the determinants that affect people's support for redistribution of resources from the state. A series of theories focused on self-interest have continuously established a negative link between people's income and their support for the reduction of inequalities through redistribution. Despite this, the evidence is scarce and sometimes contradictory while its study in Latin America is almost non-existent. Using data from the LAPOP Survey between 2008 and 2018, a longitudinal dimension is considered for the first time in the measurement of Latin American redistributive preferences, using hybrid multilevel regression models. In contrast to the evidence from studies conducted in other regions, the results reveal that in Latin America it is not possible to detect a clear association between income and redistributive preferences at specific times, but it is possible when changes occur in countries' levels of inequality and economic development. Likewise, other elements that consistently affect preferences are evident, such as educational level, political ideology, and confidence in the political system. In light of this evidence, comparisons are made with previous research findings in industrialized countries, challenging rationalist theories of justice and solidarity.

The interplay of economic vote dimensions: inequality, redistribution preferences and support for incumbents

Economic voting is multidimensional (covering valence, patrimony and positional dimensions), and a growing number of research contributions have explored the existence and strength of the effect of these dimensions on voting. However, we know comparatively little about the interplay between these dimensions. This article fills that void by focusing on how the interplay between the rise of income inequality (the valence dimension) and redistribution preferences (the positional dimension) influences support for incumbents. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Modules 4 and 5, I find that preferences for income redistribution reduce the likelihood of voters supporting incumbent parties. Modest evidence demonstrates that this relationship is stronger in countries where inequality increased to a greater degree between elections. Voters who want more redistribution tend to re-elect left-wing governments and want to throw out right-wing incumbents. However, rise of inequality hurts both left-wing and right-wing incumbents.

Preferences for income redistribution: a new survey item and experimental evidence

Preferences for income redistribution: a new survey item and experimental evidence

How Elastic are Preferences for Redistribution? New Results on Partisan Polarization

I show that a stylized fact on the decades-long stability in preferences for income redistribution – which has surprised public economists, given the spike in inequality – masks a divergence across parties. I then demonstrate that the widening divide owes to preferences sorting rather than strengthening. Next, I return to survey experiments on the elasticity of preferences to information treatments and, in contrast to previous literature, I find a simple treatment that induces substantial support for taxation and redistribution among conservatives. This treatment closes upwards of half the gap in preferences between liberals and conservatives, a key finding amidst worsening polarization.

Where Does the Money Come From? Humanizing High Socioeconomic Status Groups Undermines Attitudes Toward Redistribution.

The concentration of wealth in the hands of a few at the expense of general impoverishment is a major problem in some modern societies. However, there is a general opposition to redistribution policies or to the application of a progressive taxation system. The goal of this research was to explore one factor that might drive the attitudes toward income redistribution: The (de)humanization of high socioeconomic status groups. Previous studies have shown that high socioeconomic status groups tend to be considered as unemotional machines without any concern for others. However, the consequences of mechanizing (vs. humanizing) high socioeconomic status on the interpretation of socioeconomic differences has not been explored yet. We considered that humanizing high socioeconomic status groups might have an unexpected negative effect on attitudes about income inequality and wealth concentration. Specifically, this research aims to determine how humanizing high socioeconomic status groups influences people’s perceptions of the group’s wealth and preferences for income redistribution. We conducted two studies in which we manipulated the humanity (mechanized vs. humanized in terms of their Human Nature traits) of a high socioeconomic status group. Results of these two studies showed that humanizing (vs. mechanizing) high socioeconomic status groups led to lower support for income redistribution/taxation of wealthy groups, through considering that the group’s wealth comes from internal sources (e.g., ambition) rather than external ones (e.g., corruption). These results were independent of the group’s likeability and perceived competence/warmth. The present research provides valuable insight about the possible dark side of humanizing high socioeconomic status groups as a process that could contribute to the maintenance of the status quo and the legitimation of income inequality in our societies.

A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements

Many politicians, in an election, join political parties and create political advertisements. Political advertisements take many forms including TV commercial, Web sites, and posters, which are often criticized for wasting money. This study sheds lights on their positive aspect: they function as signals to voters under asymmetric information. In the election, candidates’ policy preferences (e.g., preferences for income redistribution) are uncertain for voters. Candidates use political parties and advertisements to signal their hidden preference to the voters. Investigating a multi-period version of Snyder and Ting (2002) with the possibility of reelection, I show that political parties are not sufficient signals to reveal politicians’ types. Political advertisements work as a complementary signal to political parties. With political parties and advertisements, voters can elect their favorable candidates adequately. Even if the advertisements are a waste of money, they contribute to voting for favored candidates.

Information, Beliefs and the Responsiveness of Preferences for Income Redistribution

Information, Beliefs and the Responsiveness of Preferences for Income Redistribution

Responsibility, Race and the Information-Sensitivity of Preferences for Income Redistribution

Responsibility, Race and the Information-Sensitivity of Preferences for Income Redistribution

Public Goods Provision, Redistribution and Capital Mobility

Two results follow from the standard workhorse model of tax competition. One is that tax competition between countries leads to underprovision of public consumption goods (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986). The other that tax competition lowers capital taxes and may lead to less redistribution due to higher e¢ ciency costs of capital taxation. This paper embeds both public goods provision and redistribution in a single model framework, and shows that preferences for income redistribution may alter the standard result of under-provision of public goods under tax competition.

Is the Welfare State Sustainable? Experimental Evidence on Citizens' Preferences for Redistribution

The sustainability of the welfare state ultimately depends on citizens’ preferences for income redistribution. They are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment performed in 2008 in Switzerland. Attributes are redistribution as GDP share, its uses (the unemployed, old-age pensioners, people with ill health etc.), and nationality of beneficiary. Estimated marginal willingness to pay (WTP) is positive among those who deem benefits too low, and negative otherwise. However, even those who state that government should reduce income inequality exhibit a negative WTP on average. The major finding is that estimated average WTP is maximum at 21% of GDP, clearly below the current value of 25%. Thus, the present Swiss welfare state does not appear sustainable.

Economic Well-Being, Social Mobility and Preferences for Income Redistribution: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment

In this paper, preferences for income redistribution are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) performed in 2008. In addition to the amount of redistribution as a share of GDP, attributes also included its uses (working poor, unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, ill health) and nationality of beneficiary (Swiss, Western European, other foreigners). Willingness to pay for redistribution increases with income and education, contradicting the conventional Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. The Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis [Hirschman and Rothschild (1973); Benabou and Ok (2001)] receives partial empirical support.

Entitlements and fairness:: an experimental study of distributive preferences

Under three different rules for allocation of initial income we elicit experimental subjects’ preferences for income redistribution using an incentive compatible elicitation mechanism. The three income allocation rules are designed to capture preferences for distributive justice among subjects. The concern is motivated by claims in some of the experimental economics literature that non-self-interested motives often underlie individual behavior. We cannot reject self-interest in favor of any redistribution motives based on our observations. Almost all individuals chose the income distribution which maximized their own income — high income individuals chose no redistribution and low income individuals chose perfect equality in income distribution.