Pre-flight Briefing Research Articles

A case study into the safety management systems for the effects of potential space weather risks, for operators of very high altitude ‘near space’ flights from Mojave Air & Space Port, California, and the associated regulatory challenges

Mojave Air & Space Port is located in Mojave, California, United States. It is at an elevation of 2,801 feet (854 m), is nearly 3000 acres in size and has three runways. It is licensed by the FAA for horizontal launches of reusable spacecraft and is already a major hub for aerospace research and space enterprises, which includes potential space flights and very high altitude subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic flights.During potential very high-altitude ‘near space’ space flights, the effects of cosmic radiation exposure, especially during sudden changes in space weather, such as ground level enhancement (GLE) or solar particle events (SPEs), could have significant health implications for crew and passengers. This case study examines the intricate landscape of radiation risks, regulatory challenges, licensing complexities, and approaches to risk management for very high-altitude ‘near space’ space flights from Mojave Air and Space Port carrying one or more paying "space flight participant" (being an individual, who is not crew, carried aboard a launch vehicle or re-entry vehicle).The study explores the specific challenges of risk assessment of very high-altitude flights, looking in detail at the risk posed by the space weather radiation environment in flight planning and execution, for both Space Port and flight operator. The study covers the ‘end to end’ licensing process and the regulatory considerations of space weather required for both Space Port and flight operator. Further, we look at the integration of Safety Management Systems (SMS), namely, we explore how SMS frameworks proactively identify, assess, and mitigate risks throughout the ‘near space’ space flight process. Further, the study presents a template for addressing the regulatory framework for flights, risk assessment, pre-flight briefings, and the flight licensing procedure.This case study offers valuable insights for Space Port and flight operators, regulators, and policymakers, contributing to the development of comprehensive safety strategies, which are crucial for safe very high-altitude ‘near space’ space exploration.Plain Language Summary: A case study of how the potential space weather risks can be successfully managed for very high altitude ‘near space’ subsonic, supersonic, and hypersonic flights from Mojave Air and Space Port, California, USA carrying one or more space flight participant(s).

Leadership style in transition? Decision-making processes in cabin crew's pre-flight briefings

In this article we study how top-down propagated processes of hierarchical flattening affect the leadership style of participants in an atypical Community of Practice (CofP), namely the cabin crew of an airline. We focus on pre-flight briefing meetings and tease out how cabin crew members (CCMs) negotiate the division of in-flight positions. This decision tends to be based on a general principle, namely the seniority of the CCMs. By means of a micro-oriented discourse analytical approach, we tease out how decisions that follow as well as divert from this principle are discursively negotiated. We conclude the article by discussing what the implications of this discursive work are for the leadership style that is enacted in these meetings and we call for more research on atypical CofPs, such as these highly ephemeral working groups that do not have many chances to develop their own CofP-norms.

Survival from Canadian Seaplane Water Accidents: 1995 to 2019.

INTRODUCTION: Each year in Canada, there are a number of pilots and passengers who die in seaplane water accidents. A study examining the human factors and fatality rates associated with these accidents was conducted. METHODS: Seaplane water accident investigations by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) between 1995 and 2019 were reviewed. RESULTS: There were 487 accidents involving 1144 occupants (487 pilots, 657 passengers). There were less than 15 s warning in 86% of cases. There were 60 pilots and 88 passengers who dieda survival rate of 87%. Drowning, trapped within the cabin was the principal cause of death (54%). Loss of control on landing, wheels down landings, and other landing problems (49%) were the principal causes of the accidents and 77% of the fatalities occurred in this group. These arose because the pilot(s) misjudged wind, waves, and glassy water. Over 50% of seaplanes inverted and 10% floated briefly then sank, resulting in the highest percentage of fatalities. Wearing the seat harness incorrectly, injury, in-rushing water, and inability to locate and operate exit mechanisms (including rescuers inability to open the exits external to the fuselage) all contributed to the fatalities. Life jackets would have been of benefit in several cases. Of the accidents, 57% were private flights. CONCLUSIONS: Passengers require a thorough preflight briefing, life jackets should be worn by all pilots and passengers, and private and commercial pilots should receive Underwater Egress Training. MacDonald C, Brooks C, McGowan R. Survival from Canadian seaplane water accidents: 1995 to 2019. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2021; 92(10):798805.

No Rank in the OR: A Guide to Improving Communication

Residents' Review| September 2021 No Rank in the OR: A Guide to Improving Communication Thomas R. Gedulig, DO Thomas R. Gedulig, DO Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar ASA Monitor September 2021, Vol. 85, 42. https://doi.org/10.1097/01.ASM.0000791656.77781.43 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Cite Icon Cite Get Permissions Search Site Citation Thomas R. Gedulig; No Rank in the OR: A Guide to Improving Communication. ASA Monitor 2021; 85:42 doi: https://doi.org/10.1097/01.ASM.0000791656.77781.43 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu nav search search input Search input auto suggest search filter All ContentAll PublicationsASA Monitor Search Advanced Search Topics: safety, work teams, internship and residency, medical residencies, aviation, crew resource management, healthcare, surgical procedures, operative A routine training mission of a three-ship formation of F-16s to drop live ammunition came to an abrupt end. An inexperienced wingman pilot missed key radio calls during our first dive to the drop zone and a “knock it off” call was made by the flight lead, so we returned to base ending the mission prematurely. This call halts any in-flight maneuvers and the jets ascend or descend to briefed deconflicting altitudes when flight safety is compromised. An emphasis is made during pre-flight briefings that there is no rank in the cockpit, meaning that any aircrew of any rank or position can call “knock it off” if flight safety is compromised. Task saturation is defined as having too much work without enough time, tools, or resources to accomplish the task, causing a degradation in performance. Often the first clue that someone is task saturated is when they miss radio transmissions... You do not currently have access to this content.

Response to: Protocols: help for improvement but beware of regression to the mean and mediocrity

Dear Editor, I read with interest the recent Intensive Care Medicine editorial entitled ‘‘Protocols: help for improvement but beware of regression to the mean and mediocrity’’ [1]. I wish to support the authors’ comments highlighting how the use of protocols can lead to improvements in care and outcome, but I have serious concerns with the suggestion that these can not be successfully applied to advanced and experienced organisations and providers. There are echoes of the hubris of medicine as described by Atul Gawande [2]. Girbes et al. reference the benefits of a well-designed checklist for central venous catheter (CVC) insertion [3], yet then continue to illustrate how a badly designed checklist may not be effective, overlooking that this is the result of poor design rather than the use of a checklist. Checklists are designed to support and complement professional decision-making [4] and as such are critical to improving our outcomes. They are an effective method of creating institutional knowledge. I have serious concerns that this editorial may result in misconception of the importance of human factors integration into healthcare systems. This is illustrated by the misrepresentation of the Hudson aircraft landing. This landing was not achieved by ‘‘knowledge of aeronautics, his skill as a pilot, and his intuition’’ as stated in the editorial. It was achieved by a pre-flight briefing by two pilots who had never previously flown together, clear communication, the co-pilot running through a series of checklists including that for ditching in water as they were losing altitude, use of the aircraft fly-by-wire system, a highperforming crew and their skills as pilots [5]. It is essential that we as a profession are prepared to ditch our hubris, accept that reducing variation requires a compromise of professional autonomy, stop hiding behind an apparition of human complexity and save our expertise for the relatively rare scenarios in which it is required and then use it in conjunction with well-designed decision support. This is how we will start to really improve our performance. Sullenberger’s own words following the Hudson incident are worth consideration: ‘‘Everything we know in aviation, every rule in the rule book, every procedure we have, we know because someone somewhere died...We have purchased at great cost, lessons literally bought with blood that we have to preserve as institutional knowledge and pass on to succeeding generations. We cannot have the moral failure of forgetting these lessons and have to relearn them.’’

Barriers to Intra-Aircraft Communication and Safety: The Perspective of the Flight Attendants

Failures of communication and teamwork between cabin crew and flight deck crew have been implicated in a number of fatal accidents involving commercial aircraft. This study was designed to identify perceived barriers to effective teamwork and communication between pilots and flight attendants in airline operations. The nominal group technique (NGT) was used to gather data from 18 flight attendant focus groups involving 100 flight attendants operating on both narrow-bodied and wide-bodied jet aircraft from a major air carrier. The NGT focus group methodology generated both barriers and solutions to communication from the flight attendant perspective in the following key areas: the locked flight deck door and interphone protocols; “sterile cockpit” standard operating procedures (SOPs); preflight briefings; knowledge of basic aircraft terminology; debriefings after incidents; and contractual differences in hotels, meals, and allowances. An emphasis on joint crew resource management (CRM) training between pilots and flight attendants provides the most appropriate way to address these perceived barriers. The solutions generated should be written into CRM and emergency procedures (EP) course content. Training opportunities should be provided to allow both flight deck and cabin crew a better understanding of the other's role and workload patterns.

Effects of Video Weather Training Products, Web-Based Weather Briefing, and Local versus Non-Local Pilots on GA Pilot Weather Knowledge and Flight Behavior

This study explores 1) whether video weather training products significantly affect general aviation (GA) pilot weather knowledge and weather-related flight behavior, 2) use of modern Web-based weather preflight briefing products, and 3) whether local Oklahoma GA pilots differ appreciably from non-local pilots in weather knowledge or weather-related flight behavior. No highly significant, meaningful, simple effects were found for two 90-minute video weather training products on weather knowledge or subsequent flight safety on a simulated flight involving deteriorating weather. A data-collecting emulation of www.aviationweather.gov suggests that mere time spent on preflight briefing, pages viewed, and page view duration alone are not adequate predictors of either quality of preflight briefing nor subsequent flight safety. Finally, no important differences between local and non-local pilots were seen, implying that FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute flightdeck studies are generalizable to the national population of U.S. GA pilots.

An Analysis of Preflight Weather Briefings

Weather plays a factor in general aviation (GA) accidents and mishaps. This study documented the types of weather information that GA pilots requested and received from automated flight service stations (AFSS), and how this information might influence flight planning and weather–based decisions. An analysis was performed on 306 GA pilot telephone conversations with AFSS preflight specialists. Approximately 78% of the pilots requested a preflight briefing and specialists relayed these items: Weather synopsis, sky conditions, visibility, weather at the departure, en route, and destination point. In 15.4% of the calls, pilots declined reflight weather briefings but AFSS still relayed weather synopsis and sky conditions in addition to weather conditions that might be significant during flight. Whether by requesting additional information or receiving weather information, 31 pilots decided to change their flight plans. Surprisingly, 27% of the pilots when told “VFR Flight Not Recommended” filed a VFR flight plan anyway.

Aviation Weather Forecasts in Tomorrow's Flight Service System

A comparison is made between the current and future Flight Service Station systems and the planned differences in methods for providing weather information to pilots. Currently the information is interpreted for the pilot by a Flight Service Station specialist while in the future the pilot may use a self-service computer terminal for direct access to a weather data base for the preflight briefing. Changes to aviation weather forecasts to facilitate understanding of the information by the pilot and some of the necessary characteristics of the future aviation weather forecasts are discussed.