Pragmatist Themes Research Articles

Recovering the Story of Pragmatism in India: Bhimrao Ambedkar, John Dewey, and the Origins of Navayana Pragmatism

Recovering the Story of Pragmatism in India: Bhimrao Ambedkar, John Dewey, and the Origins of Navayana Pragmatism

The Evolution of Autonomy in Pragmatist Aesthetics

Writers in pragmatist aesthetics tend, as naturalists, to avoid the originally Kantian-Idealist term “autonomy” when discussing art and aesthetic experience. Even so, a more general autonomy concept, emphasizing that art and the aesthetic comprise a normatively special aspect of experience, is already implicit in much of the pragmatist aesthetics literature, including in John Dewey’s seminal Art as Experience. As the cultural disciplines move beyond earlier modernist- and postmodernist-era debates about art’s total autonomy from or total “heteronomous” absorption within the processes of life, I argue that a more naturalistically down-to-earth version of the above general autonomy idea remains indispensable in a century of social, environmental, and existential crises whose solutions demand creative agency of a kind that artistically charged experiences can inspire. Drawing upon key pragmatist themes, I further develop the general autonomy idea by arguing that aesthetic experiences within and without the fine arts are horizontally transcendent; that art and the aesthetic answer a persistent human need for experiences that are intrinsically rewarding while also serving the instrumental function of being redemptive; that to this end, our global culture needs collectively accessible autonomous spaces within language and experience that can help people explore and interrogate the meanings of what we individually and collectively do; and that the value of our theoretical beliefs about the arts lies not in their power to represent a world supposedly independent of human thought and action but in what they lead us to do in the world. In conclusion, I illustrate this pragmatic interpretation of the general autonomy idea with a reading of Richard Powers’ novel The Overstory.

Georg Simmel and Pragmatism

This paper offers some brief reflections on pragmatist themes in Georg Simmel’s philosophy. §1 presents a number of assessments – by Simmel’s contemporaries, by later interpreters, and by Simmel himself – concerning his proximity to pragmatism. §2 offers a reconstruction of Simmel’s 1885-paper “The Relationship between the Theory of Selection and Epistemology,” focusing in particular on what the argument owed to von Helmholtz. It was this paper first and foremost that suggested to many that Simmel was close to pragmatism. §§3-5 follow the development of the core idea of the 1885-paper in Simmel’s subsequent writings. §§6-8 compare and contrasts Simmel’s views on evolution and truth with the positions of Peirce, James, and Dewey. §9 returns to the overall question whether Simmel was a pragmatist and offers an irenic answer.

Judgment and Practice in Reid and Wittgenstein

This paper considers the views of two figures whose work falls on either side of the heyday of American pragmatism, Thomas Reid (1710-96) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). The broad similarities between Reid’s and (the later) Wittgenstein’s views, and in particular their epistemological views, has been well documented. Here, I argue that such similarities extend to the relation in their work between common sense and the presence of elements in their thought that can be considered pragmatist in some important respect. Beginning with Reid, I argue that some specific theses commonly associated with pragmatism – e.g., that meaning, truth, or the justifiedness of a belief in a matter of practical effects or efficacy – clearly run counter to his stated views, and stand in tension with the well-known common sense character of his work. At the same time, however, and as others have noted, other pragmatist themes and ideas – e.g., about the close relations between belief (and doubt) and action, theory and practice, and facts and values – do have a clear precedent in Reid (§2). Most fundamentally, however, Reid’s epistemological views in particular display an adherence to the idea that practice is somehow primary – an idea that’s central to pragmatism ‘broadly conceived’, as Brandom calls it and, according to some others (e.g., Putnam, Cavell), to pragmatism per se. What’s more, once we are clear on the respect(s) in which Reid’s views do incorporate an important pragmatist element, it becomes clear that far from being at odds with, or needing supplementation by, the latter, common sense is in fact inseparable from it (§3). Finally, I turn (§4) to Wittgenstein, and suggest that the same close connection between pragmatist elements and common sense as we find in Reid is present here as well: like Reid, Wittgenstein rejects several ‘narrow’ pragmatist theses; but he too ascribes practice a crucial role. And while he seldom explicitly refers to common sense, the notions of good judgment, and of the reasonable person – hallmarks of common sense, as Reid conceives of it – are at the heart of Wittgenstein’s later epistemological views as well.

Pragmatist themes in Van Fraassen’s stances and Hegel’s forms of consciousness

Pragmatist themes in Van Fraassen’s stances and Hegel’s forms of consciousness

Contributions from Pragmatist Perspectives towards an Understanding of Knowledge and Learning in Organisations

The purpose of this article is to present an understanding of knowledge and learning in organisations from pragmatist perspectives. Relying on the work of early pragmatists as well as contemporary pragmatists, we introduce a conceptualisation of knowledge as the outcome of inquiry. Knowledge, in this article, is presented as provisional, multi-perspective, both particular and general. Our point of departure here is that the chief value of knowledge is its usefulness in solving problems. Pragmatist views of knowledge are further explicated in our discussion of four pragmatist themes, which we have identified as particularly viable on the basis of Jane Addams’ pragmatist view and the practice of democracy in organised life: 1) Knowledge as transactional in organisations, 2) Reciprocity and learning in organisations, 3) Experience-based knowledge and meaning-making in organisations, and 4) Sustainability as an ongoing, democratic process in organisations. In the pragmatist school of thought we draw upon, a predominant issue is always also the very purpose of knowledge, or what we refer to as ‘usefulness’. Under discussion, we argue that a pragmatist understanding of knowledge and learning in organisations allows us to move beyond the polarisation of cognitive-possession — social-process and instead work from an alternative framework, with a focus on processes of learning and knowledge in organisations that aim at integrative, democratic problem solving.

Michael Bacon, Pragmatism: An Introduction. Oxford: Polity Press, 2012. 224pp. Paper ISBN: 978-0-745-64665-7.

Michael Bacon, Pragmatism: An Introduction. Oxford: Polity Press, 2012. 224pp. Paper ISBN: 978-0-745-64665-7.The questions of level, scope and approach confront any to a complex tradition of thought. With such a broad target in view, difficult decisions about what to focus on, how to organize it and what depth is required immediately arise. Further, academic marketability now demands a multipurpose introduction. There is a persistent trend within introductory guides to broad literatures to posit themselves as useful and intended for both ushering undergraduates into the area and contributing to current debates on the state of the discipline.Such concerns only multiply for a tradition like pragmatism, a persistent minority in the philosophical world both in the country of its origin and (to an extreme degree) in the wider philosophical world. Pragmatism, for many years, has been in the contradictory situation of being divided between self-enclosed dialogues and wider campaigns of self-justification. Pragmatism tends towards ghettoization (internally and externally imposed), and it also lives under the very real and constant obligation to justify itself in those wider philosophical circles. As such, introductory texts, for it, bear a unique significance (and responsibility). They can be among the few that students and researchers outside of the tradition ever actually encounter. Seldom do they actually live up to this obligation. However, Michael Bacon's recent Pragmatism: An Introduction successfully balances these responsibilities. It manages to serve as both an accessible introduction to a complex tradition while also offering a unique perspective thereon that explores new trends and developments. Further, perhaps most importantly, it attempts to illustrate the relevance of for philosophy in general. This, of course, does not mean that there are no concerns around how Bacon does this and what choices he makes, but we will return to these after a brief overview of the book.The central structuring claim in this book is that, pragmatism is best viewed not as a set of doctrines but rather as a tradition of thought (2). For Bacon, is, specifically, a living tradition with a complex development and contemporary conversation and his account is an attempt to illustrate that progression with a clear emphasis on its contemporary relevance. This is important because of what he situates himself against. Bacon opposes his account of to the dominant eclipse narrative. Identified by Robert Talisse, this account holds that after the establishment and rise of through the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, fell out of discussion during the mid-twentieth century hegemony of Analytic philosophy. On this understanding, it is only with Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) that re-entered the philosophical world. For Talisse, some version of this narrative makes it into most works on (Talisse 2007, chap. 7). To counter this, Bacon's strategy, is to focus on the development of through its central themes (what these are and the strength of his choices is addressed below). Importantly, he explores those themes through a series of figures, some of whom were not self-declared pragmatists, in order to argue that pragmatist themes have been central to twentieth century philosophy despite often not being associated with avowed pragmatists (viii). Many of the figures Bacon chooses to focus on are, in fact, either only partially associated with (e.g. Jurgen Habermas and Richard J. Bernstein) or denied association with it altogether (e.g. Donald Davidson). This unveiling of pragmatist themes and ideas outside the canon is an important, and in Bacon, well-argued contribution to that project of self-justification previously mentioned.Consequently, Bacon's account is chronological without being historical. …

Pragmatism and Ethnomethodology

Three features of pragmatist thought remain empirically underdeveloped or insufficiently explored: its call for a return to experience or recovery of concrete practices; its idea that obstacles in experience give rise to efforts at creative problem-solving; and its understanding of language in use, including conversational interaction, as an order of empirical practices in and through which problem-solving efforts are undertaken and social order ongoingly and collaboratively accomplished. Our aim in this article is to show that there exists a long-standing, theoretically informed, and empirically rich research tradition in which these pragmatist themes are further developed, albeit in ways the originators might have foreseen only in dimly programmatic form. This research tradition is ethnomethodology. We present in bold strokes the classical pragmatist ideas of Peirce, James, Mead, Dewey, plus Addams, focusing on the three themes mentioned above. We show how Garfinkel’s work surpasses even that of the pragmatists in developing the larger implications and promise of those themes. We demonstrate how ethnomethodological studies of work and science and conversation analysis, respectively, continue as well to develop the original pragmatist impulse in unsuspected ways. Finally, we step back from this account to ponder the broader significance of the connections we have explored between pragmatism and ethnomethodology.

Pragmatist Aesthetics and Confucianism

I am grateful to Scott Stroud for organizing this symposium and inviting me to discuss pragmatist aesthetics and Confucianism. Neither field formed part of my university education, so my interest in them is essentially a product of fascination, devoid of professorial or professional pressure, though it was surely shaped by other contingencies and needs. Trained as an analytic philosopher in Jerusalem and Oxford, I first came to appreciate the power of pragmatism only in the mid-1980s when I moved to America. My awakening to the philosophical richness of Confucianism is much more recent. It began with my desire to get acquainted enough with classical Chinese philosophy in order to write prefaces for the Chinese translations (published in 2002) of Pragmatist Aesthetics and Practicing Philosophy. I very quickly became deeply impressed with the significant resonances between Chinese philosophy and the pragmatist themes that most appealed to me, so I continued my study of Chinese thought. There remains so much to learn.1 Chinese philosophy is vast and diverse, but the pragmatist tradition, while far more limited, is also far from monolithic and resists essentialist, homogenous definition. Its roots include elements of older British and German philosophies that were creatively brewed in the crucible of the New World, where they could be more fruitfully mixed with greater freedom because they could function free from the constraints imposed by their old national cultural fields. The multiple roots of pragmatism also extend to Asian thought. Emerson, widely recognized as a prophet of pragmatism before the movement's official beginning with C. S. Peirce, was deeply inspired by the

Agrarian Philosophy and Ecological Ethics

Mainstream environmental ethics grew out of an approach to value that was rooted in a particular conception of rationality and rational choice. As weaknesses in this approach have become more evident, environmental philosophers have experimented with both virtue ethics and with pragmatism as alternative starting points for developing a more truly ecological orientation to environmental philosophy. However, it is possible to see both virtue ethics and pragmatism as emerging from older philosophical traditions that are here characterized as "agrarian." Agrarian philosophy stresses the role of nature, soil and climate in the formation of moral character as well as social and political institutions. As such, reaching back to the agrarian tradition may provide a way to move forward with both virtue oriented themes as well as pragmatist themes in developing ecological ethics.

Nature and Spirit in Hegel’s Anthropology

Some recent readings of Hegel have stressed the social dimension of Hegel’s philosophy in order to ward off common exaggerations and misconceptions about his idealism. Robert Brandom, for example, has pointed to “pragmatist themes in Hegel’s idealism.” But a general question arises as to whether this deflationary strategy really does justice to Hegel’s thought : what becomes of the logical preconditions for knowledge and agency, on which Hegel places much emphasis, and how exactly do these preconditions mesh with the natural and social dimensions of experience ? On the basis of passages in the Encyclopedia and other texts, this paper argues for a modest transcendentalism in Hegel, in order to avoid the over-correction that consists in reducing Hegel’s concept of the concept to a network of social practices.

Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel's Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms

This paper could equally well have been titled ‘Some Idealist Themes in Hegel’s Pragmatism’. Both idealism and pragmatism are capacious concepts, encompassing many distinguishable theses. I will focus on one pragmatist thesis and one idealist thesis (though we will come within sight of some others). The pragmatist thesis (what I will call ‘the semantic pragmatist thesis’) is that the use of concepts determines their content, that is, that concepts can have no content apart from that conferred on them by their use. The idealist thesis is that the structure and unity of the concept is the same as the structure and unity of the self. The semantic pragmatist thesis is a commonplace of our Wittgensteinean philosophical world. The idealist thesis is, to say the least, not. I don’t believe there is any serious contemporary semantic thinker who is pursuing the thought that concepts might best be understood by modelling them on selves. Indeed, from the point of view of contemporary semantics it is hard to know even what one could mean by such a thought: what relatively unproblematic features of selves are supposed to illuminate what relatively problematic features of concepts? Why should we think that understanding something about, say, personal identity would help us understand issues concerning the identity and individuation of concepts? From a contemporary point of view, the idealist semantic thesis is bound to appear initially as something between unpromising and crazy. My interpretive claim here will be that the idealist thesis is Hegel’s way of making the pragmatist thesis workable, in the context of several other commitments and insights. My philosophical claim here will be that we actually have a lot to learn from this strategy about contemporary semantic issues that we by no means see our way to the bottom of otherwise. In the space of this essay, I cannot properly justify the first claim textually, nor the second argumentatively. I will confine myself of necessity to sketching the outlines and motivations for the complex, sophisticated, and interesting view on the topic I find Hegel putting forward.

Comment on Robert Brandom's ‘Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism’

Comment on Robert Brandom's ‘Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism’

Classical American Philosophy's Invisible Women

In 1910 an American author wrote: Humanity, thus considered, is not a thing made at once and unchange- able, but a stage of development; and is still... 'in the making.' Our humanness is seen to lie not so much in what we are individually as in our relations to one another; and even that individuality is but the result of our relations to one another. It is in what we do and how we do it, rather than in what we are. Some, philosophically inclined, exalt 'being' over 'doing.' To them this question may be put: 'Can you mention any forms of life that merely "is," without doing anything?' (Gilman [1910] 1914, 16-17)1 This passage captures such characteristic pragmatist themes as process, evolutionary development, the self defined in relation to others, and praxis as determinative of being.2 It could have been written by any of the classical American pragmatists. What follows it, however, could not have been: during the comparatively short period of written history, "we have had almost universally what is here called an Androcentric Culture. The history, such as it was, was made and written by men. The mental, the mechanical, the social development, was almost wholly theirs. We have, so far, lived and suffered and died in a man-made world" (Gilman [1910] 1914, 17).